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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Around Europe in search of a court 
1.1.1 A Grand Tour of Europe’s courts 
In October 2007, in an exclusive part of London, bodyguards were scrumming on 
the doorstep of a Hermes store.1 The matter at stake was not a rugby competition, 
however, but US$6.5 billion.2 Inside the store, Boris Berezovsky was serving 
Roman Abramovich with a court writ. The two men had been associates in the 
privatisation of important assets of the aluminium and oil industries in the Russian 
Federation. They were part of a small group of Russian nationals − who came to 
be known as oligarchs − that had accumulated an enormous amount of wealth in 
a short period. The oligarchs had formed a small compact group, and exercised 
considerable political power over Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian 
Federation between 1991 and 1999. When President Vladimir Putin came into 
power in 2000, the seemingly compact group began to crack, and conflicts arose 
between members.3 
While they were associates, Berezovsky and Abramovich had exchanged money 
and shares without documenting these activities. Based on this business 
relationship, Berezovsky claimed that Abramovich owned him a large sum of 
money related to the change of property in certain companies. Oral agreements, 
claimed Berezovsky, provided for specific payments that Abramovich was 
required to make to him. Berezovsky, however, could not − or was unwilling to − 
litigate in a Russian court for fear of persecution and an unfair trial. Because of 
problems with the Russian government, Berezovsky went into self-imposed exile 
in London, and was granted asylum in England prior to the start of the court 
proceedings. Abramovich was frequently in London because he was − and still 
is − owner of the Chelsea Football Club. These reasons seemed to justify 
Berezovsky’s decision to initiate proceedings in England. 
                                                        
1 Duncan Gardham, ‘Berezovsky v Abramovich trial: Timeline’ The Telegraph (31 August 
2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/chelsea/9509960 /Berezovsky-v-
Abramovich-trial-Timeline.html> accessed 22 December 2017. 
2 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2012] EWHC 2463 (Comm). 
3 Duncan Gardham, ‘Berezovsky v Abramovich trial: How Boris Berezovsky lost a fortune’ 
The Telegraph (31 August 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ uknews/law-and-
order/9509951/Berezovsky-v-Abramovich-trial-How-Boris-Berezovsky-lost-a-
fortune.html> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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The case, thus presented to the court, involved two Russian nationals disputing 
contractual relations connected only to Russia. Berezovsky claimed that his 
problems with the Russian authorities would make it difficult for him to organise 
a fair trial in that country. Whether this was true, however, was not taken into 
account by the court, given that Abramovich did not challenge its jurisdiction, 
which the court thus assumed. Given that no documents existed to support the 
claims of either party, the case was reduced to a point at which the court had to 
decide based only on the testimony of both men. The court considered that 
Berezovsky and his claim were not credible; hence, the final decision, rendered 
on 31 August 2012, was in favour of Abramovich. 
The Berezovsky v Abramovich case established the record for the highest value in 
the history of courts in England. It became the most famous of the oligarch cases, 
but also the tip of an iceberg of oligarch cases being disputed in English courts.4 
In 2012, Berezovsky settled out of court a case that was being heard by a court in 
London.5 This time, Berezovsky was litigating against the estate of his late 
associate Badri Patarkatsishvili. In 2012, Mikhail Cherney and Oleg Deripaska 
settled out of court a case worth £1 billion.6 In 2015, two other cases involving 
billions were presented in London courts. The first was between Victor Pinchuk, 
Ihor Kolomoyskyi, and Gennadiy Bogolyubov7 settled outside of court a case 
worth £2 billion. The second case, BTA Bank v Mukhtar Ablyazov, worth US$4.4 
billion was decided by an English court.8 This case in fact broke the English 
record for the number of lawyers involved: fifty in total.9  
Cases like these are characterised by having limited or no connections with 
England, and they usually involve wealthy businessmen from the ex-Soviet 
Union. These businessmen have amassed their fortunes in ways that are unclear, 
                                                        
4 Adil Mohamedbhai, ‘Why do Russian oligarchs love the English courts?’ (The Lawyer, 19 
October 2016) <https://l2b.thelawyer.com/why-do-russian-oligarchs-love-the-english-
courts/> accessed 22 December 2017.  
5 Jane Croft, ‘Berezovsky settles Patarkatsishvili lawsuit’ Financial Times (London, 13 
September 2012) <https://www.ft.com/content/c3a60aee-c126-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf? 
mhq5j=e3> accessed 15 July 2017.  
6 Luke Harding, ‘Deripaska and Cherney make surprise deal out of court’ The Guardian (27 
September 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012 /sep/27/deripaska-cherney-
surprise-deal> accessed 22 December 2017. 
7 Owen Bowcott and Shaun Walker, ‘Ukrainian oligarchs settle mine dispute worth billions out 
of court’ The Guardian (22 January 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2016/jan/22/ukrainian-oligarchs-settle-mine-dispute-worth-billions-out-of-court> accessed 
22 December 2017. 
8 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2015] UKSC 64. 
9 Khristina Narizhnaya, ‘Russian oligarchs take over London courts’ Public Radio International 
(17 February 2012) <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-02-17/russian-oligarchs-take-over-
london-courts> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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which has led to friction among themselves and between their governments. 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of connection, English courts have been consistent 
in assuming jurisdiction and resolving these disputes. In fact, 60% of the cases 
before the London Commercial Court involves Eastern European individuals with 
no connection to England.10 The examples above show that the financial interests 
involved in these cases are considerable. These litigations provide considerable 
revenue for English law firms, and have a substantial effect on the British 
economy.11 It is no surprise that the Russian government is trying to counter this 
migration of cases.12 
Cases of foreign litigants going to European courts to resolve their disputes have 
often been reported in the media. One of them involved BEG SpA and Enelpower 
SpA. In 2000, BEG SpA was contracted by the Albanian government to build a 
hydropower plant in Kalivaç. BEG SpA contracted Enelpower SpA to provide 
essential electromechanical equipment for the project. Before delivery of the 
equipment, however, Enelpower SpA asked for an additional €50 million over 
and above the already agreed price.13 BEG SpA refused, and initiated proceedings 
before an arbitral tribunal in Rome. The tribunal decided to dismiss the BEG SpA 
claim, a decision that was also upheld by the Italian Court of Cassation. However, 
BEG SpA started proceedings in Albania against Enelpower SpA via its Albanian 
subsidiary Albaniabeg Ambient shpk (ABA shpk). ABA shpk claimed non-
commercial damages caused by Enelpower SpA in the Albanian courts. These 
                                                        
10 David Christie, ‘Magnates for law: oligarchs in London’ The Law Society Gazette (12 
September 2012) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/magnates-for-law-oligarchs-in-
london/67280.article> accessed 22 December 2017. 
11 Mike Giglio, ‘Oligarch v. oligarch: London's courts attract litigious tycoons’ The Daily Beast 
(23 July 2012) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/oligarch-v-oligarch-londons-courts-attract-
litigious-tycoons> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Rupert Neate, ‘Top London law firms profit from feuding Russian oligarchs’ The Guardian (4 
September 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/sep/ 04/london-abramovich-v-
berezovsky-court-case> accessed 22 December 2017. 
12 David Christie, ‘Magnates for law: oligarchs in London’ The Law Society Gazette (12 
September 2012) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/magnates-for-law-oligarchs-in-
london/67280.article> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Khristina Narizhnaya, ‘Russian oligarchs take over London courts’ Public Radio International 
(17 February 2012) <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-02-17/russian-oligarchs-take-over-
london-courts> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Russian Move for Keeping Judicial Business at Home’ (Conflict of Laws, 6 
December 2012) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/russian-move-for-keeping-judicial-
business-at-home/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
13 ‘Enel: la Beg di Cerroni-Becchetti chiede 430mln dopo sentenza in Albania’ Corriere della 
Sera (23 April 2012) <http://www.corriere.it/notizie-ultima-ora/Economia/Enel-Beg-
Cerroni-Becchetti-chiede-430mln-sentenza-Albania/23-05-2012/1-A_001599062.shtml> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
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claims were accepted by the first14 and second instance15 court in Albania, and a 
recourse by Enelpower SpA to the Supreme Court was not accepted. With a court 
decision worth over €400 million, ABA shpk initiated proceedings for the 
recognition and enforcement of the Albanian decision in France, Luxembourg, 
Ireland, the US, and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the final decision on this 
case was taken by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on 23 June 2017, 
supporting BEG’s claim.16 
The BEG vs. Enelpower example shows that not only oligarchs tour Europe in 
search of litigation venues − other companies also do so, and probably wealthy 
individuals as well. Similar to the Grand Tours of the 17th century, modern 
litigants travel Europe in search of a place to litigate. Considering the sums 
involved, touring litigants should generate considerable business for lawyers and 
related services. Thus, it is no surprise that certain jurisdictions in Europe would 
be happy to have more cross-border litigants in their courts. 
1.1.2 A research idea 
Even before these cases, the Lawyer17 reported that the court of Düsseldorf in 
Germany held its first case in English. In fact, in January 2010 the Courts of 
Aachen, Bonn, and Cologne and the Cologne Appellate Court initiated a project 
to use English as a language for the submission of documents and to conduct 
hearings in international commercial cases. This was an attempt by German courts 
to be more attractive to international litigants, and it did not stop there. In 
November 2012, the Committee on Legal Affair of the German Parliament 
discussed the draft bill to allow courts in Germany to use English during their 
proceedings.18 In fact, Germany’s attempt to attract foreign litigants dates back to 
                                                        
14 Claimant ‘ALBANIA BEG AMBIENT’ shpk, and Respondent ‘ENEL’ spa and 
‘ENELPOWER’ spa, Decision No. 2251, dated 24.03.2009 of the Tirana District Court. 
15 Claimant ‘ALBANIA BEG AMBIENT’ shpk, and Respondent ‘ENEL’ spa and 
‘ENELPOWER’ spa, Decision No. 789, dated 28.04.2010 of the Tirana Court of Appeals. 
16 Albaniabeg Ambient SH.P.K. v ENEL S.P.A. and Enelpower S.P.A. [2017] Hoge Raad der 
Nederland ECLI:NL:HR:2017:1141 [23 June 2017]. 
17 Tom Philips, ‘Open for business: the German Commercial Court, in English’ (The Lawyer, 
21 June 2010) <http://www.thelawyer.com/open-for-business-the-german-commercial-
court-in-english/1004799.article> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Miriam Lichstein and Oliver Seyd, ‘English as an official language in German courts: lost in 
translation?’ (International Law Office, 6 April 2010) <http://www.international 
lawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=f8867ec1-f103-49b9-a2b6-aa6916974518> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
18 Christoph A. Kern, ‘English as a court language in continental courts’ (2012) Erasmus Law 
Review 187, 199. 
Currently, German courts are allowed to hear cases in English (or any other Language) if parties 
have agreed on this. A draft law proposing to create at regional level Chambers for 
International Commerce able to hear cases in English has been proposed for the second time 
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2008, when the brochure ‘Law Made in Germany’ was published.19 The brochure 
was part of an attempt by German legal associations and professionals to promote 
the use of German law in international commerce.20 The brochure promoted the 
use of German courts as efficient, affordable, and professional. However, it 
appears to be a response to a similar English brochure titled ‘England and Wales: 
the jurisdictions of choice’ published by the Law Society with the support of the 
British government.21 The Law Society aimed at attracting foreign litigants to 
London or other courts in Britain. Moved by the same goals, France inaugurated 
a new international division in the Paris Commercial Court, which would be able 
to assess evidence in English, German, and Spanish. However, remaining 
procedural steps would be held in French. This division aimed at becoming more 
attractive to international litigants, and, also, at responding – though not openly – 
to the competitive pressure from other jurisdictions.22 
It came to the attention of journalists that during the oligarch cases some EU 
jurisdictions were competing to attract litigants.23 These attempts to attract 
litigants seem to have increased with the progress of the Brexit negotiations. 
Clearly, some Member States are trying to capitalise from the potential migration 
of litigants from London to other EU jurisdictions. The Netherlands, for example, 
has an advanced project to create a specialised court, which will deal with 
international commercial cases. Belgium is following similar steps, which aim at 
                                                        
to the Bundestag by the Bundesrat. The draft is still with the Bundestag. Barbara Mayer, 
‘English courts abroad—Germany waits to move forward’ (LexisNexis Dispute Resolution, 
13 January 2017) <http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/dr/english-courts-abroad-germany-waits-to-
move-forward/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
19 The brochure has reached its third edition and can be downloaded from the website 
<http://www.lawmadeingermany.de> accessed 22 December 2017. 
20 Gralf-Peter Calliess and Hermann B. Hoffmann, ‘Judicial Services for Global Commerce – 
Made in Germany?’ (2009) German Law Journal 115, 117. 
21 The brochure can be downloaded from the website of Eversheds, one of the law firms 
supporting its development <http://www.eversheds-sutherland.com/ documents/LawSociety 
EnglandAndWalesJurisdictionOfChoice.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
22 Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Paris, the Jurisdiction of Choice?’ (Conflict of Laws, 2 February 2011) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2011/paris-commercial-court-creates-international-division/> 
accessed 27 September 2017. 
23 David Christie, ‘Magnates for law: oligarchs in London’ The Law Society Gazette (12 
September 2012) <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/magnates-for-law-oligarchs-in-
london/67280.article> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Mike Giglio, ‘Oligarch v. oligarch: London's courts attract litigious tycoons’ The Daily Beast 
(23 July 2012) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/oligarch-v-oligarch-londons-courts-attract-
litigious-tycoons> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Russian Move for Keeping Judicial Business at Home’ (Conflict of Laws, 
6 December 2012) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/russian-move-for-keeping-judicial-
business-at-home/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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creating an International Business Court in Brussels.24 In Germany, as well, the 
voices that shout out the lucrative possibilities of Brexit in the competition for 
litigations are increasing. The Frankfurt Initiative (supported by the Federal State 
of Hessen) calls for a promotion of Frankfurt as a litigation hub, where litigants 
can go when migrating from London.25 
It is clear that competition involves not only litigants that choose a court but also 
lawyers, and not only governments but also courts, and, in addition to this, also 
the EU. It is therefore reasonable to assume that competitive activities have the 
potential to affect not only laws and institutions of the countries involved but also 
regulations and institutions of the EU. Furthermore, changing the laws and 
institutions has repercussions on society and on the economy. The relation 
between governments, courts, cross-border litigants, laws, and economy appears 
to be intertwined. And this intertwinement of factors − combined with its 
relevance for governments, lawyers, and litigants, as well as the effects it has on 
law and procedures − is the primary inspiration for the present research. This 
introduction continues with an analysis of the meaning of jurisdictional 
competition and the competition of civil justice systems. The other sections in this 
chapter define the research question, the scope and focus of this research, and the 
steps taken in conducting it. 
1.2 Defining the competition of civil justice systems 
1.2.1 Competition of jurisdictions 
As mentioned above, it is common to find governments competing in different 
fields of law. Some examples include competition in tax, labour, company, and 
environmental law. These forms of competition are commonly called competition 
of jurisdictions or regulatory competition. While there is no agreed definition of 
these ‘competitions of jurisdictions’, some characteristics are common to all of 
them, and are expected to be present in other forms of competition as well. A first 
characteristic is the existence of a law or group of laws offered to mobile users of 
legislation. A specific law or a group of laws is the focal point of the competition 
of jurisdictions. It is the law that a jurisdiction offers and that is chosen and applied 
by legislation users. In this regard, the law also includes the institutions that are 
created and organised based on a specific law. Specific institutions, like courts, 
                                                        
24 Ministry of Justice of Belgium, ‘Création Brussels International Business Court’ (Press 
release, 27 October 2017) <https://www.koengeens.be/news/2017/ 10/27/creation-brussels-
international-business-court> accessed 22 December 2017. 
25 Matthias Weller, ‘The Justice Initiative Frankfurt am Main’ (Conflict of Laws, 31 March 
2017) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/the-justice-initiative-frankfurt-am-main-2017-law-
made-in-frankfurt/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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are sometimes the reason that legislation consumers choose a particular 
jurisdiction. Competition, therefore, can also be expected to unfold as modalities 
of organising the institutions of a jurisdiction, improving their performance and 
outlook. A second characteristic is the existence of two or more jurisdictions that 
prepare, maintain, and promote the laws requested by the consumer. Competition 
implies the existence of more than one jurisdiction that tries to attract consumers. 
However, as will be argued in Chapter 2, competition can still exist even if only 
one jurisdiction is actively offering its law to cross-border users. Nonetheless, the 
number of jurisdictions that offer their law to foreign users is important in 
determining the intensity and the development of competition itself. A third 
characteristic is the existence of mobile consumers that choose the laws of one of 
the competing jurisdictions in order to further their business. Given that many 
laws limit their territorial scope within the borders of one jurisdiction, mobility is 
an expected characteristic of these consumers. It is therefore important for many 
of them to relocate to the territory of a jurisdiction in order to benefit from its law. 
Apart from being mobile, legislation consumers should be able to choose from 
among the laws of different jurisdictions. It is this choice that highlights 
consumers’ preferences. 
Considering the characteristics distilled above, the competition of jurisdictions 
can be defined as a process where two or more jurisdictions offer and promote the 
use of their laws to mobile legislation consumers who choose these laws to further 
their business. The competition of civil justice systems is a type of competition of 
jurisdictions, whose court systems are offered to cross-border litigants. 
1.2.2 Different terms used for the civil justice system competition 
The legal literature uses different terms when it comes to the competition between 
jurisdictions to attract litigants. Three of the most common terms are ‘court 
competition’, ‘dispute resolution competition’, and ‘civil justice system 
competition’.26 It appears that scholars do not distinguish between the terms, but, 
even though they are each technically correct, only ‘civil justice system 
competition’ seems to better describe the competitive activities of jurisdictions. 
Civil justice system competition implies the existence of two or more jurisdictions 
that offer their judicial system to cross-border litigants. At the same time, cross-
border litigants choose the court of one of these jurisdictions. However, courts are 
part of an ecosystem, which is the civil justice system, in turn composed of all the 
institutions, laws, and procedures that facilitate the resolution of a dispute by 
courts. For example, the litigation culture, the reputation of the court, the quality 
                                                        
26 Although ‘competition of judicial markets’ and ‘competition between national procedural 
systems’ are also used. 
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of the lawyers, the litigation procedure, and the enforcement possibilities are all 
part of a jurisdiction’s civil justice system. Therefore, when litigants make a 
choice of court they choose not only the jurisdiction’s court but the whole 
ecosystem that supports and facilitates the court’s functioning. Considering these 
factors, the competition of civil justice systems as described in this dissertation 
denotes all the activities aimed at attracting litigants to the courts of a jurisdiction, 
and all the activities of litigants in choosing a court in which to litigate. The other 
terms are not necessarily wrong, but they fail to include all the elements entailed 
by the civil justice system competition. 
Court competition suggests, sensu stricto, a competition between courts, where 
some jurisdictions or some courts are offered to litigants. The term, however, 
omits the existence of a cross-border element, as it can also refer to a competition 
between the courts of a jurisdiction. Sensu lato ‘court competition’ would imply 
the competition of the whole judicial system of a jurisdiction, and also the 
existence of a cross-border element. ‘Dispute resolution competition’ hints at a 
competition not only between courts but also between other mechanisms that 
resolve disputes, like arbitration and mediation. While competition between these 
mechanisms exists, ‘dispute resolution competition’ is often used to describe the 
civil justice system competition. Furthermore, dispute resolution competition 
does not show the cross-border element of the process. Regardless of the term, 
however, it is important to emphasise that the civil justice system competition 
should include cross-border choice makers as well as the whole justice system 
dedicated to the resolution of disputes. 
1.2.3 Assumptions on the competition of jurisdictions 
Scholars studying the competition of jurisdictions make assumptions that will 
help in their research, and that are often accepted as true without further 
discussion. However, critics point out that some of these assumptions are 
questionable. Hence, the vulnerability of the studies are also dependent on the 
vulnerability of the assumptions. Given that the present study makes implicit and 
explicit use of some of these assumptions, it is a good idea not only to present 
some of the ones used but also to critically assess their validity as well as their use 
and implications. The set of assessments identified here is based on the work of 
Alpa (2004)27 and Swire (1996).28 This list is neither exhaustive nor compiled in 
any particular order of importance. Clearly, some assumptions are used more than 
others, while others are specific to particular aspects of the research. 
                                                        
27 Alpa (2004) 43. 
28 Swire (1996) 67. 
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Jurisdictions seen as people. This assumption considers jurisdictions to be similar 
to people, having a body and a spirit that is controlled by a single central unit. As 
a consequence, competing jurisdictions rush to prevail over other jurisdictions in 
the same way competing athletes do. This race is undertaken in a fully conscious 
manner and by using all the physical and mental resources of that jurisdiction. 
However, the assumption oversimplifies the similarities between people and 
complex organisations like states. In fact, states have complicated decision-
making mechanisms, with a division of power and decentralisation that results in 
them having multiple decision-making centres.29 Furthermore, in the competition 
of legal systems, not all of a country’s resources are dedicated to that competition 
− not even a percentage compared to those applied by an athlete in a competitive 
race. 
Legal orders seen as geometric constructions fixed in time. This assumption 
considers jurisdictions to have a clear scheme of regulations, possibly arranged in 
the shape of a pyramid. This structure is monolithic and fixed in time, and 
therefore provides a systematic vision of a country’s whole legislative body. 
However, this static approach does not take into account that regulations change 
over time, and often with considerable frequency. Furthermore, the pyramid shape 
or any other geometrical figure cannot be used to represent the exact form of the 
legal organisation. Hence, simplifying a jurisdiction’s legislative structure poses 
the risk of making regulatory competition easier than it is.  
Regulations and legal orders seen as items on supermarket shelves. This 
assumption gives a simplistic view of the regulations and legal orders in general. 
On the one hand, they are considered as attempts to be more appealing and more 
fashionable so that potential clients will select them. On the other hand, clients 
can choose freely from among a seemingly endless number of regulations or 
jurisdictions. In reality, the ‘appeal’ or ‘fashion’ is not the prime concern of law 
makers or governments, and at the same time, clients are not completely free to 
choose between regulations in the way that they are free to choose items in a 
supermarket. Choice of law or choice of court is not as simple as taking apples 
from a supermarket shelf. 
Legal orders seen as pure and untouched by foreign interference. This assumption 
considers legal orders to be isolated, and therefore having their own individual 
evolution. In other words, jurisdictions are sterile; hence, in the case of the 
German jurisdiction, its legal solutions are endemic, and cannot be found in other 
jurisdictions. In contrast, this assumption does not take into account that 
jurisdictions study each other for inspiration and solutions to common problems. 
                                                        
29 This is discussed further in Section 4.4. 
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This means that their regulations influence and borrow from each other, resulting 
in a relationship involving constant exchange and offering cases of remarkable 
similarity. The harmonisation process in the EU and the role of EU legislation 
have further integrated the legislation of Member States. Although differences 
exist between Member States, they do not define the whole system. 
Legal orders seen as denoting the identity of a nation. The legal order and the 
regulations of a nation are part of its cultural identity, but they are not the only 
cultural identification element. In the study of the competition of jurisdictions, 
this assumption reduces the national identity to the legal culture. This eliminates 
the possibility of seeing a broader picture in which a nation’s cultural elements 
add to the legal culture and, indirectly, to the competitive capability of a 
jurisdiction. 
Competition of jurisdictions merged with the competition of nations or firms or 
products. This assumption considers that the winner of the race would be the 
jurisdiction with the strongest political power, or the one that displays the best 
qualities or manifests the most evolved or refined culture. According to Alpa, 
these measurements are established arbitrarily by the observer.30 In reality, 
however, history has many examples of judicial systems living not in competition 
but in harmony. Each of these systems bears appreciable or depreciable values 
based on the observer’s point of view. It is this perspective and the standards 
applied by the observer that make a jurisdiction a winner or a loser. Accepting 
these aspects of the problems related to the choice of standards in evaluating the 
winner of a race, Alpa does not touch upon the competition of nations in general. 
In this regard, it should be said that the competition between jurisdictions cannot 
exist independently of the general attempts of a nation to increase its 
competitiveness. Furthermore, having a competitive legislation would increase 
the image of the country as competitive31 in general. In this view, competitions 
are organically related to each other. 
Competition is seen as a positive process and the others as negative. In general, 
competition is considered a positive process.32 Other processes like 
harmonisation, approximation, convergence, common core, uniformity, or 
homologation are considered to be negative. Without arguing how true this is, it 
                                                        
30 Alpa (2004) 47. 
31 Alpa has a good point in considering that the standards used to evaluate a successful 
competitive race are relative. In this perspective, a country might choose to improve its 
human rights legislation and be competitive in this respect. Another country might choose to 
change its tax legislation and be competitive in this regard. Each would think the other odd 
and non-competitive, simply because of the different standards they apply. 
32 Benefits derived from regulatory competition are discussed further in Sections 2.1. 
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can be said that competition and the other processes do not exclude each other. 
They are not on opposite sides of the same coin. In some cases, harmonisation can 
facilitate competition and vice versa. Therefore, competition cannot have an 
absolute positive value while the others are stigmatised as being negative. 
Competition is seen as positive because it respects diversity. The fact that 
competition can work only because of the plurality of regulations and legal orders 
does not mean that competition respects them. In fact, it is because of competition 
that many legal norms do not survive, and fall into disuse. Therefore, competition 
disrupts, and has a tendency to shrink diversity. 
Governments are assumed to know the consequences of their competitive 
behaviour. It is considered that governments have a clear knowledge of the 
consequences of their actions. They know how the economy will respond, and 
how their society will be affected. However, it is clear that governments have 
limited abilities to predict the impact of competitive behaviour on society. 
States are assumed to represent the will of their population. Representative 
democracies are considered to represent the will of a large segment of the 
population. This remains true when governments decide to enter into competition 
with another jurisdiction. While the assumption is true and in line with the general 
conception of representative democracy, it can pose problems with regard to 
studying competition. Where environmental law, tax law, or employment law are 
concerned, the competition of jurisdictions might have severe consequences for 
the population. It should come as no surprise if the government were to take a 
decision that is supported by the minority rather than the majority of voters. 
1.3 Research question 
1.3.1 Central research question 
Many elements and actors are involved in the competition of civil justice systems. 
The above-mentioned examples illustrate that attempts to compete for foreign 
litigants involves governments, law makers, laws and regulations, courts, judges, 
lawyers and their associations, and businesses. The abundance of these elements 
and actors in the EU seems to create the ideal conditions for the competition to 
develop. Nevertheless, while the examples seem to affirm this, competition in the 
EU needs further study. The aim of this research is to systematically study the 
elements and actors, using theoretical and empirical analysis as well as insights 
from other disciplines. On a practical level, the aim of the research is to bring the 
benefits of competition to the attention of governments, and to bring to lawyers a 
better view of this process. To realise these goals, the research aims to answer this 
question: How do civil justice systems compete in the European Union? 
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1.3.2 Perspectives and supporting research questions 
This research considers two perspectives, the first of which requires the 
identification and the analysis of elements and actors. A preliminary assessment 
identifies three group of actors: one that creates the demand for cross-border 
litigation, one that supplies the civil justice system, and one that consists of 
interested parties. The group creating the demand for cross-border litigation is 
composed of mobile businesses or individuals, lawyers, and related associations 
like chambers of advocates or chambers of commerce. The supply side is 
composed of governments, courts, judges, and other institutions that provide 
support in supplying the civil justice system. Interested parties are those that are 
not directly involved in the demand for or in the supply of cross-border litigation, 
but are affected by the competition that develops. These parties include the EU, 
individuals, and the public in general. Some elements identified by a preliminary 
assessment include EU law, local law, justice quality, harmonisation, and rights 
of parties involved in or affected by competition. To support the central research 
question and to better examine the elements and actors, the following sub-
questions must be answered: What is the role of the EU in the civil justice system 
competition? (Chapters 3 and 5); Who composes the demand side? What roles do 
litigants and lawyers have? How do they relate to each other? (Chapter 4); What 
roles do governments and courts have? (Chapters 4 and 5); How are individuals 
affected by competition? How is the general public affected by competition? 
(Chapters 2 and 4). 
The first perspective is more introspective, seeking to understand the internal 
elements and actors in the competition. The second perspective considers the 
relation and the influences of competition on processes like harmonisation, reform 
of the judiciary, and so on. Some questions considered from this perspective are: 
What happens to the quality of law during competition? (Chapter 2); How do 
competition and harmonisation relate to each other? What effect does EU law 
have on competition? (Chapter 3); How does competition affect the protection of 
weaker parties in the EU? (Chapters 3 and 4); How does competition affect access 
to courts? How does competition affect national procedural law? (Chapter 4). 
These combined perspectives provide an answer to the central research question. 
It should be pointed out that these perspectives are often combined because the 
elements and actors are intertwined with the process in which they are involved. 
The questions listed for each perspective do not exhaust the pool of questions that 
can arise from the study of the civil justice system competition. However, they 
are limited by the scope and the focus of this research. 
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1.4 Scope and relevance 
1.4.1 Scope 
This research limits the study of the competitive activities from Member States or 
cross-border litigants to the period between 2007 and 2017. Legislation, case law, 
and the literature before 2007 is considered without prejudice. The year 2007 is 
significant because it marked the launch of the brochure ‘England and Wales: the 
jurisdictions of choice’ by the Law Society of England and Wales, which initiated 
a ‘brochure war’ between England, Germany, and France, and that continued for 
several years.33 The brochure war was followed by competitive steps to attract 
cross-border litigants, and they continue to this day with no sign of slowing down. 
As is clear from the central research question, this study is focused on the civil 
justice system competition in the European Union, although examples and studies 
from the US are referred to below. Studying the EU is interesting in several 
respects. First, it already shows signs of competition from between several 
jurisdictions, and as mentioned there is no indication that competition will slow 
down. Second, competition in the EU is based not only on a series of EU 
regulations that facilitate the cross-border movements of litigants, but also on the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions. These regulations allow a great deal of 
party autonomy, and therefore create the best conditions for the development of 
regulatory competition. Third, the EU has twenty-eight diverse legal systems, 
which provides a plurality of choice to mobile cross-border litigants with a 
plurality of choice, and as a consequence helps competition to thrive. Fourth, 
Brexit will change the competition landscape considerably in EU. England as the 
most attractive jurisdiction will lose the benefits of being in the EU, and which 
will lead to some litigants considering other alternative jurisdictions to litigate. 
Because of this, civil justice system competition in the EU has a considerable 
potential to intensify, with Member States competing to replace England as the 
leading competitor. Fifth, competition is economically significant. Competing 
Member States extract direct and indirect benefits from cross-border litigants. 
Direct benefits consists of revenues from court fees, while indirect benefits are 
those derived from the taxation of litigants or their lawyers. Lawyers are, also, 
beneficiaries benefit from competition. An attractive jurisdiction provides a 
heftier workload to lawyers, and potentially increases their revenues. Sixth, the 
harmonisation of civil procedural rules is an ongoing process in the EU, and 
although competition benefits from legal diversity, harmonisation does not favour 
                                                        
33 Vogenauer (2013) 227, 231. 
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it. The interaction between harmonisation and competition is an interesting aspect 
of the EU. 
The most important regulations for the civil justice system competition are the 
Brussels I (recast) Regulation and the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. Their 
scope involves civil and commercial cases, which also determine the substantive 
extent of this research. Cross-border civil and commercial cases involving 
international companies engaged in high-value disputes are also lucrative, and are 
expected to attract the attention of governments as well as lawyers. Furthermore, 
cross-border commercial disputes are also important for the EU, which is 
interested in facilitating a healthy judicial environment that would benefit 
investments. Among others, this means clear rules on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, and the protection of party autonomy. 
Competing Member States face competition not only from each other but also 
from other dispute resolution mechanisms. These include arbitration and 
mediation, which offer reliable and familiar instruments for solving disputes. A 
competition between courts, arbitration tribunals, and mediation institutions is 
therefore very important for businesses and Member States. However, the 
competition between different dispute resolution mechanisms is beyond the scope 
of this research, which is focused only on the competition of civil justice systems, 
with courts being the central point. This choice was made because competing 
Member States address the competition between each other more frequently than 
the competition with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In addition, their 
competitive activity is directed more towards attracting court litigants, rather than 
parties that would go for an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Arbitration 
and mediation, as the brochure war showed, are often mentioned as good practices 
and inspiration to offer innovative court services, and only incidentally are 
mentioned as competitors in government policy documents. Moreover, the 
competition of courts within the same jurisdiction is also excluded. Without 
prejudice to the role of arbitration and mediation, courts are important in the 
protection of the rights of weaker parties and in the guarantee of social peace. 
Furthermore, the research is limited to the competition for civil and commercial 
cases. This limitation is set by the same regulations that allow litigant mobility, 
but − as the research demonstrates − civil and commercial cases are also the most 
lucrative for competing jurisdictions and other interested parties. 
1.4.2 Relevance of the research 
The freezing of academic discourse on the civil justice system competition seems 
to have coincided with the end of the brochure war. While competition for 
litigants is often mentioned, dedicated research is rare. At the same time, to attract 
litigants nowadays, competing Member States bypass the brochure war and 
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compete by changing laws and procedures or the institutional framework. This 
research contends that the time is right to discuss the civil justice system 
competition more fully, and to instigate further academic debate by engaging in a 
theoretical and empirical study. 
From a practical perspective, this study is important to the EU, to competing 
governments, and to cross-border litigants and their lawyers. The EU is as proud 
of its diversity as it is willing to harmonise the legislation of its Member States. 
However, because harmonisation and competition are not highly compatible, and 
are an ongoing source of debate, this research contributes in the form of an 
analysis of the discussion. Furthermore, the analysis provides insights into the role 
of the EU in regulating the judicial system across Europe. The EU’s position as a 
regulator as well as a policy maker should take into account the role of the civil 
justice system competition for Member States and the internal market.34 Hence, 
theoretical research combined with empirical data is a valuable contribution. 
This study is relevant to the governments involved in competition, as it provides 
an analysis of the benefits and of the impact on laws and institutions, and an 
empirical analysis of choice of court in Europe. Recent developments show that 
governments’ interest in attracting international litigants is increasing. With 
Brexit approaching, more opportunities have sprung up on the horizon of 
countries in continental Europe. Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Brussels seem to be 
preparing for a migration of litigants from London. The Netherlands, in this 
respect, has been preparing for a relatively long time.35 The project for the 
Netherlands Commercial Court is well advanced, and in 2018 the Court is 
expected to open its doors.36 Germany is not as advanced as the Netherlands, but 
the Frankfurt Initiative shows the existence of numerous interests groups that 
                                                        
34 Hess (2016) 12-14; Burkhard Hess, Harmonized Rules and Minimum Standards in the 
European Law of Civil Procedure (In-depth analysis for the European Parliament's 
Committee on Legal Affairs, PE 556.971, 2016) 12 <http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/556971/IPOL_IDA(2016)556971_EN.pdf> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
35 Marta Requejo Isidro, ‘Brexit – Immediate Consequences on the London Judicial Market’ 
(Conflict of Laws, 24 June 2016) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2016/brexit-immediate-
consequences-on-the-london-judicial-market/> accessed 22 December 2017. Dutch lawyers 
also seem optimistic, see Sarah Beeston, ‘Brexit: a further boost to the popularity of the 
Dutch courts for cartel damages claims?’ (Van Doorne, 6 March 2017) 
<https://www.vandoorne.com/globalassets/publicaties/2017/brexit_dakota_sarah.pdf> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
36 It is expected that the court will open its doors in the second half of 2018. Updated 
information is published at: <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
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lobby for the creation of an attractive court for international commercial cases.37 
A newcomer in the competition scene is Belgium, which declared its intention to 
create the Brussels International Business Court as an alternative litigation venue 
after Brexit.38 The Belgian proposal seems to offer a court with arbitration 
elements, which aims at answering the needs of business litigation. These 
examples show the importance of the current study, not only on an academic level, 
but also on a practical level. Competing governments can use these results to 
adjust their competitive activities as well as to improve their understanding of the 
competition. For governments that do not already compete, this study can be an 
inspiration to begin, and to consider the best strategy. 
Companies and individuals that engage in cross-border business are among the 
stakeholders that could make good use of this study. Through it they could better 
assess which Member State has policies that welcome foreign litigants, which 
Member State has the best judicial system, and how do parties choose a court. 
However, it is the lawyers as a professional and as a lobbying group that would 
benefit most. As professionals, lawyers would see the general trend regarding 
choice of court in the EU, as well as how their choice of court strategy compares 
to that of other lawyers, and how they might improve it. As a lobby group, lawyers 
could use the study’s results to advocate with their governments regarding more 
involvement in the competition and better strategies to benefit from that 
involvement. 
1.5 Approach to the research 
1.5.1 Literature review of the most important studies 
Before the start of this research project, it was clear that the literature on the 
competition of civil justice systems in the EU was limited. Vogenauer (2013a)39 
and Wagner (2014)40 were among the first to conduct studies of this kind in EU, 
and they were included in a book edited by Eidenmüller (2013),41 which also 
                                                        
37 Matthias Weller, ‘The Justice Initiative Frankfurt am Main 2017’ (Conflict of Laws, 31 
March 2017) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/the-justice-initiative-frankfurt-am-main-2017-
law-made-in-frankfurt/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
38 Ministry of Justice of Belgium, ‘Création Brussels International Business Court’ (Press 
release, 27 October 2017) <https://www.koengeens.be/news/2017/10/27/creation-brussels-
international-business-court> accessed 22 December 2017; Maxime Colle and Carlo Persyn, 
‘An International Business Court in Brussels: a Modern Step Forward’ (Lexology, 2 
November 2017) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f101059a-3678-4797-
8ee0-54c7a0487fc2> accessed 22 December 2017. 
39 Vogenauer (2013a). 
40 Wagner (2014). 
41 Eidenmüller (2013). 
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contained other contributions related to the topic of this research. In his paper, 
Vogenauer analysed several empirical studies (including one he conducted 
himself in 2009), and concluded that no competition of jurisdictions existed 
between civil justice systems in Europe. Wagner’s paper offered a theoretical 
analysis of the competition for adjudication. He analysed the demand for court 
adjudication, proposing the idea of Chapter and bilateral competition. Without 
aiming at a complete review of the literature, it is worth mentioning a paper by 
Landes and Posner (1979),42 in which the authors describe the nature of court 
decisions as goods. This study shows that court decisions comprise a bundled 
good, and each good in the bundle has different characteristics. Another group of 
studies has made a major contribution to this research from the empirical 
perspective. As previously mentioned, a survey conducted by Vogenauer in 2009 
indicated that England and Switzerland were the most preferred court jurisdictions 
in Europe. Another survey on businesses was conducted by the Haute Ecole 
Commerciale Paris,43 and concluded that psychological factors play an important 
role during the choice of law and procedural law. Keeping in mind this basic body 
of knowledge, the present research was organised from a theoretical and an 
empirical perspective, which is explained in the steps below. 
1.5.2 Methodology 
It was clear from the literature review at the beginning of this research that 
regulatory competition is dynamic and changing rapidly. It was also clear that 
theoretical and empirical studies on the civil justice system competition in the EU 
are limited, although regulatory competition studies are more frequent in the US. 
However, using these studies in the EU context seems difficult because of 
differences in the legal systems and in the development of competition in other 
fields of law. Based on these premises, the present study considers a combination 
of doctrinal research, desk research and empirical methods to be the best 
methodology to tackle its core question. 
Doctrinal research sets about studying primary as well as secondary sources, 
which include legislation, reports and policy documents, and case law. The most 
important regulations for the civil justice system competition are the Brussels I 
(recast) Regulation and the Rome I and Rome II Regulations. The analysis of 
these regulations aims at defining the legal framework within which competition 
develops, and in particular the instruments that allow parties a choice of court. 
Establishing a legal framework also facilitates the study of behaviour on the part 
of competitors and the EU as a third party. The EU, which creates and maintains 
the legal framework, is interested in consolidating the internal market and 
                                                        
42 Landes and Posner (1979). 
43 Durand-Barthez (2012). 
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improving judicial systems throughout its Member States. EU policies and 
responses can be better considered through a critical analysis of reports and policy 
documents related to the civil justice system competition. The EU’s official 
websites are used to search for such documents, and the snowballing approach 
starting with the EU Judicial Scoreboard is examined, as well as documents 
mentioned in the scholarly literature. The analysis of these documents is divided 
between Chapters 3 and 5. Secondary sources consist of legal studies as well as 
those from other disciplines. Sections on the psychology of choice rely on studies 
conducted by psychologists and sociologists, while other sections rely on the work 
of economists. This interdisciplinary contribution provides depth to an analysis 
that takes into account how the civil justice system competition is connected with 
other disciplines. 
The empirical research is divided into three parts, the first of which is a study of 
the data reported in the EU Civil Justice Scoreboard. Section 5.1 provides a 
detailed methodology regarding this part of the research. The second part consists 
of research into the economic significance of the legal business in four competing 
Member States (England, Germany, France, and the Netherlands), in addition to 
two potentially very competitive Member States (Denmark and Luxembourg). 
This part uses the Member States’ national statistics to collect data in order to 
compare the relevance of the legal industry for the local economy. The third part 
is a survey regarding lawyers’ choice of court preferences in the EU. For this, a 
questionnaire was distributed among lawyers working at the top law firms in the 
EU. In addition to collecting data on lawyers’ preferences, the questionnaire’s 
purpose was to provide data regarding predictions made in the theoretical 
analysis. Section 5.3 provides a detailed analysis of the methodology used for the 
survey. 
1.5.3 Sixteen steps taken to conclude the research 
Step 1 was to assess the benefits of competition in general and the regulatory 
competition in particular. Research from the US was extensive on this topic, and 
applicable to the EU situation with only minor adjustments. Assessing the benefits 
and importance of competition also exposed the importance of certain theories 
related to the competition of jurisdictions. Among the most important are the 
Tiebout theory and the heterodox and orthodox conceptions of competition, all of 
which help to explain the importance of the civil justice system competition. Step 
2 was to analyse research on the competition of jurisdictions in company, tax, 
labour, contract, and environmental law. These fields of law were chosen because 
of the relative abundance of related research. Some of the conclusions are 
applicable to the civil justice system competition because the modality in which 
competition unfolds in all the cases is similar, and the parties are mostly the same. 
Nevertheless, these conclusions are re-examined in the other steps. Step 3 was to 
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evaluate the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. Race-to-the-bottom is considered to 
affect the law of competing jurisdictions, and is one of the negative outcomes of 
competition. This step discusses findings from other studies, and examines them 
within the framework of the civil justice system competition. Step 4 was to make 
a link between psychological studies on choice and the choice process in law. The 
ability to choose is crucial for the competition of jurisdictions, but few studies 
have paid attention to the psychological implications of choice making. This step 
was based mainly on the work of Schwartz (2000, 2002, 2004) and Salecl (2009, 
2010, 2012), who are renowned psychologists. The former has a well-established 
reputation in the psychology of choice, and the latter is a well-known researcher 
in cognitive sciences. Step 5 was a proposal to create a formula for assessing the 
intensity of the competition. This step is a response to the debate between scholars 
that either deny or accept the existence of competition (regardless of the field). It 
is suggested that this debate can be settled if parties calculate the intensity of 
competition by using predefined requirements. This method can also be used to 
better describe the civil justice system competition in the EU. 
Step 6 is an analysis of the legal framework that facilitates the competition, and it 
covers mostly the Brussels I (recast) Regulation and the Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations. Step 7 examines the relation between harmonisation and the civil 
justice system competition: first, it compares the modalities that harmonisation is 
actuated, and how these modalities interact with competition; and second, it 
proposes possible future scenarios for both harmonisation and competition. 
Civil justice system competition unfolds in a market, and is composed of a good, 
a supply side, and a demand side. Step 8 was an analysis of the market; it builds 
on current studies on judicial markets, and analyses the structure and 
characteristics of the civil justice system market. Steps 9, 10, and 11 analyse the 
good in the market, the supply side, and the demand side. These steps relied on 
existing literature on the concept of good, on the lawyers market, and on analyses 
carried out in the previous steps. Step 9 is important for showing that the good in 
the civil justice system market is compound. This conclusion is used in 
constructing the reasoning on the development of the civil justice system 
competition. Step 11 is significant in demonstrating the dominant position that 
lawyers have in the lawyer-client relationship. This role is important in terms of 
lawyers being the most important target population for the survey in step fourteen. 
Step 11 examines the outcomes in a unilateral and bilateral form of choice of 
court. 
Step 12 is important in analysing on an empirical basis the supply side of the civil 
justice system competition in the EU, using the results of the 2016 EU Justice 
Scoreboard. Section 5.1 provides more details on the methodology. Step 13 
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assesses the competitive activities of Germany, France, England and Wales, and 
the Netherlands as competing Member States, plus Denmark and Luxembourg as 
the best-scoring jurisdictions from step twelve. Step 13 uses data from the 
statistical institutes of each country to assess the importance of the legal market 
for its economy. Step 14 is an empirical study consisting of a survey distributed 
among lawyers in the EU. The survey’s methodology and organisation is 
explained further in Section 5.3. 
Step 15 culminates in the conclusions contained in Chapter 6, which collects 
material from the above-mentioned steps, and answers the central research 
question as well as sub-questions. 
1.6 Outline 
The work is aimed at answering the central research question, and is divided as 
follows in accordance with the steps described above. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview on the competition of jurisdictions. The aim of 
this chapter is to analyse certain issues common to the different types of regulatory 
competition. This analysis will be used further in the other chapters to explain 
aspects of the civil justice system competition. The importance and the benefits 
of regulatory competitions are analysed in Section 2.1. The analysis in this section 
relies mostly on economic viewpoints on competition, some of which consider 
that competition increases knowledge and creates order. Examples from 
competition in other fields of law are analysed in Section 2.3 with regard to the 
implications of competition for civil justice systems. One of these implications is 
the impact that regulatory competition has on the quality of law. Section 2.4 
considers whether the quality of law deteriorates during competition, and, if it 
does, how it can be stopped. However − although competition is possible thanks 
to people’s ability to choose − owing to psychological and social hurdles, it is not 
easy to make a choice (Section 2.5). There is considerable academic debate on 
competition regarding the existence − or not − of competition of jurisdictions in a 
particular field of law. Section 2.6 contributes to this debate in the form of a 
method to measure the intensity of the competition. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the legal framework that facilitates the civil 
justice system competition in the EU. Section 3.1 is dedicated to the Brussels I 
(recast) Regulation and Section 3.2 to the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, with 
the purpose of demonstrating the tremendous potential that EU legislation offers 
to the development of competition. Competition, however, can be disrupted by 
the harmonisation process that is currently underway. Section 3.3 analyses the 
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relation between competition and harmonisation, and whether a coexistence of the 
two is possible. 
Chapter 4 contains a theoretical analysis of the civil justice system competition in 
the EU, and its aim is to dissect and theoretically analyse all of its components. In 
this context, Section 4.1 analyses the market for civil justice systems, in particular 
its organisation and characteristics, as well as its incentives for litigating parties. 
The good in the market, the demand side, and the supply side of the market are 
analysed in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Competition of jurisdictions can unfold in 
two ways, depending on who makes the choice from the demand side. These 
situations have different consequences for both the demand and the supply side 
(Section 4.5). If the choice of court is made by only one party (usually the 
claimant), competition is considered unilateral; if the choice is made by two 
parties, competition is considered bilateral. 
Chapter 5 contains an empirical analysis of the civil justice system competition in 
the EU, with Section 5.1 examining the results of the 2016 EU Judicial 
Scoreboard. The aim of this section is to assess which jurisdiction in the EU is the 
best according to the Scoreboard, how competing Member States perform, and 
whether the best-scoring Member States are the ones most frequently chosen by 
lawyers. Lawyers’ choice preferences and the results from the survey conducted 
for this research are analysed in Section 5.3. Section 5.2 examines the competitive 
activities of England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and 
Denmark. The aim of Section 5.2 is to clarify what competitive activity each 
Member State conducts, and its benefits − or potential benefits. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions, which follow the structure of the research: 
namely, summarising the main findings of the various sections, and providing an 
overview of how the competition between civil justice systems unfolds in the EU. 
This also fulfils the study’s overall goal. 
The manuscript was submitted to printing on 29 December 2017. 
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Chapter 2 Competition, regulatory competition, 
and choice-making 
Jurisdictions compete with each other in various ways. Among others, they 
employ changes in legislation in order to attract investors in general or a particular 
business niche. Examples of competition between jurisdictions are found, for 
instance, in company, tax, and labour law. In addition, the further globalisation of 
the economy has facilitated cross-border exchange as well as civil commercial 
conflicts, which involve considerable economic interests. Some countries seem to 
compete to attract these interests, which gives rise to the civil justice system 
competition, in which jurisdictions seek to entice litigants to resolve conflicts in 
their courts. 
However, the competition of jurisdictions has broad implications. This chapter 
introduces, discusses, and analyses some of the most important topics in this 
regard. As mentioned in Section 1.2.3 of the Introduction, competition is assumed 
to be a positive process. While this assumption is maintained throughout the 
research − with some explicit exceptions − this chapter goes beyond it, and 
explores certain derivative benefits. Although benefits of and incentives for the 
civil justice system competition are analysed in Chapter 4, the present chapter 
adopts a broader approach. Furthermore, it discusses research findings from 
regulatory competition in other fields of law with the intention of providing an 
outline of the development, problems, and benefits of the competition in these 
fields, and of exploring the possibility of transposing some of these findings to 
the civil justice system competition. Another aim of this chapter is to create a 
bridge between the study of the civil justice system competition and the studies 
on the psychology of choice. This interdisciplinary approach becomes necessary, 
given that competition depends on choice, and choice is a process affected by 
psychological factors. 
This chapter begins with a critical evaluation of some theories on regulatory 
competition, which along with competition in company, tax, and labour law, and 
in some other fields is discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides an analysis 
of the consequences of regulatory competition on the quality of law. Regulatory 
competition is possible if individuals and companies are able choose between 
different jurisdictions. However, choosing is a complicated process, with part of 
the difficulty in the form of certain psychological hurdles often recognised in legal 
research. For this reason, Section 2.5 provides an overview of a selection of 
psychological studies on choice making. In concluding, this chapter proposes a 
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method of measuring the intensity of regulatory competition, and is geared 
towards a better understanding of how competition unfolds and what the 
consequences might be for both the demand and the supply side. 
2.1 Competition 
2.1.1 Historical overview 
This section gives a brief overview of how the term ‘competition’ has been shaped 
over time. It describes how the notion of competition developed and when 
competition as a term acquired its present meaning and usage. The next section 
demonstrates the importance and the benefits of competition. The aim of the 
present section is to help us better understand how competition reached its current 
prominence.  
Most of the developed nations have dynamic economies, which requires them to 
be competitive and attractive in order to maximise the possibilities of capital 
pouring into and minimising the possibilities of capital leaking out their 
jurisdictions. It would be easy to think of competition as a quiet contest or a race 
involving intelligent and astute ideas, but historical facts testify otherwise. 
Historically, countries have always competed violently, either to assert their 
competitive advantage or to gain it. This violence has sometimes even 
degenerated into full-scale warfare. 
History is rich in accounts of the competitive nature of humans. The story of the 
Apple of Discord from Hellenistic Greece, the tragedy of Abel and Cain in the 
Old Testament, the Roman legend of Romulus and Remus, and many others 
remind us that since the dawn of civilisation, competition has been a fascinating 
theme of legends. Indeed, this reasoning can go back to primitive humanoids or 
even to animals, because their lives were dictated by the competition for survival 
and reproduction in an environment with scarce or limited resources. 
Competition, therefore, is at the heart of many natural and social developments. 
The role and nature of competition should not be overstated, however; some 
caveats are important. First, competition is only one of the driving forces in 
nature; in conjunction with other factors and elements, it contributes to the 
ensemble of social processes. In many cases, chaos and chance are more 
determinant than competitive advantages or strategies. Second, coordination and 
collaboration offer – under certain circumstances – better solutions compared to 
competition. Third, in developed societies, the need to compete is simply one of 
their main characteristics; humanism, altruism, and comradeship are in many 
cases considered more valuable. 
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Competition was neither discovered nor invented at any given time.44 Instead, it 
was clarified and refined over time until it acquired its current meaning. 
Competition was first studied as a phenomenon, or as a situation that could be 
observed, and later as a notion, or as an understanding of its elements and 
contributions to society. To better clarify this, it is necessary to take a brief 
journey though the evolution of competition as a phenomenon and competition as 
a notion. 
As a phenomenon, competition has been described by authors since antiquity. 
Aristotle was aware of it when discussing market exchange and prices. Hesiod 
gave an example of two potters’ efforts to surpass each other in crafting the best 
pot, which created a ‘good conflict’.45 Other authors have used similar examples 
to exemplify the same phenomenon, and early economic writers described it by 
using words like rivalry or emulation.46 These facts indicate that authors were 
aware of the phenomenon of competition, but the notion as it is known today was 
still in gestation. 
However, only in the 16th century did compete/competition begin to be used in its 
current forms. Its usage can be traced back to the 16th century in England and 
earlier in Italy, Spain, and France. At that time, the Scholastic School led by 
Spanish authors used the verb compete simply to denote the fact of two merchants 
working together. Its use was equated with the verb concur, which has the same 
root. With the decline of the Scholastic School and the rise of Mercantilism, 
however, a shift from collaboration to strife occurred. 
Scholars of the Mercantilist School were grappling with the idea of how to 
increase commerce and to profit from it, as well as of how to gain an edge on their 
commercial rivals. It is not surprising that analyses of this kind were undertaken 
by scholars from merchant cities or states. Dennis (1975) gives some examples. 
First, Botero, an Italian author, who in 1588 described a competition and 
emulation between city-states to construct attractive fairs for merchants, and in 
1589 a competition and emulation of soldiers for military excellence.47 Second, 
Wheeler (1601), an English author, who described the struggles of towns in the 
Low Countries to be preferred above their rivals and competitors in an effort to 
win the trade in North-East Europe. Subsequently, authors like Montchretien in 
                                                        
44 Stigler (1957) 1. 
45 Dennis (1975) 3. 
46 In Greek writings, the verbs used to denote competition were agon (contest, struggle, battle), 
from which the words antagonism, protagonist derive; amilla (conflict or contest of 
superiority) came, from which the word emulation derives; zelos (jealousy or zeal); eris 
(strife, quarrel). See Dennis (1975) 3. 
47 Dennis (1975) 24. 
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1615 speak about competition as a source of progress and efficiency. These 
examples mark the first descriptions of competition between jurisdictions not 
merely as a fact but as a desirable process that governments should be aware of. 
It should be noted, however, that these authors were very vague, and did not 
elaborate on competition in the way that authors in the 18th and 19th century would 
do. 
This period of mercantile thought was systematised further by authors of the 
Liberal Mercantilism School and, among others, by Forbonnais, Quesnay, and 
Baudeau.48 Their main idea was that competition was an exchange of equivalents 
between individuals, and was therefore a limited but beneficial force in the 
economy. Adam Smith polished these authors’ ideas, and attributed to 
competition between states a more positive role by showing how competition 
facilitates market exchange and creates conditions for a better use of resources. In 
Smith’s view, within a free market framework, competing self-interested 
individuals would − as if guided by an invisible hand − converge to create more 
prosperity for society. Smith’s invisible hand called for a ‘healthy competition’, 
in which self-interested individuals would compete but not at the expense of 
others: in other words, competition should be fair, as only in this way would it 
serve the greater good of increasing a nation’s wealth.49 
With the emergence of socialist theories in the second half of the 19th century, 
classical liberalism and mercantilism entered into a crisis. In this period, the need 
to distinguish between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ income distribution and 
between ‘individual’ and ‘class’ created the conditions for a better understanding 
of competition. However, change from the classical to the neoclassical theory was 
slow, and needed the shift from mainly verbal reasoning to the mainly 
mathematical reasoning of the late 19th century. During this period, the concept 
of perfect competition50 was created,51 but although it was supported by its 
                                                        
48 Dennis (1975) 2. 
49 Skousen (2001) 23, 215. 
50 The Dictionary of Economics defines perfect competition as ‘An idealized market situation 
in which all information is known to all market participants, and both buyers and sellers are 
so numerous that each is a price-taker, able to buy or sell any desired quantity without 
affecting the market price. It was once thought that these were the assumptions necessary to 
describe a competitive economy. This is not the case. Provided all market participants have 
symmetric information (but not necessarily complete information) and act as if they were 
price-takers, the competitive equilibrium will emerge’. See John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, 
and Gareth Myles, ‘perfect competition’, A Dictionary of Economics (5 ed., 2017) 
<http://www. oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198759430.001.0001/acref-
9780198759430-e-2315> accessed 22 December 2017. 
51 Stigler (1957). 
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mathematical construction, it did not have solid evidence to support it in reality.52 
Judging from the amount of legislation and the number of institutions dedicated 
to competition, it can be argued that competition is one of the most highly 
regarded values in modern societies. 
Despite the rise and fall of different economic schools of thought, competition 
remains one of the ingredients needed to increase social development and 
economic wealth. It is hoped that the competition of jurisdictions in a field of law 
will bring the same or similar benefits that it is considered to bring to economies 
and societies in general. Competition among civil justice systems might also 
harvest the same benefits. The question at this point involves what precisely are 
the benefits that competition offers. The answer is in the following subsection. 
2.1.2 Importance and benefits of competition 
The social benefits of competition have long been observed, and since the 19th 
century, its economic benefits have been studied using increasingly more robust 
methodologies. It is hoped that the same benefits will apply in the competition of 
jurisdictions, and, more importantly, in the civil justice system competition. This 
section provides an overview of their importance. 
Since the time of Adam Smith, competition has been considered the best form of 
market as opposed to monopoly, oligopoly, oligopsony, and so forth. On the one 
hand, competition is a situation in which the supply side is composed of many 
providers that fight each other to gain as much of the market as possible. In 
competition, suppliers are price takers, and they do not set the price. On the other 
hand, monopoly is a situation in which one or only a few firms form the supply 
side of the market. Being the only supplier results in many benefits for these firms, 
among others the ability to set the price, extract maximal profit – also known as 
monopoly rent – and thereby distort the market. The belief that competitive 
markets were superior to any other kind of market had significant consequences 
for academic thought and applied economics.53 
Authors of the Mercantilist and Liberal schools concluded that competition was 
necessary for an appropriate allocation of resources. Without it, countries and 
companies would not enjoy optimal economic and social outcome, as a combined 
result of resources misallocation, inefficiencies, and monopoly rents. Therefore, 
one of the reasons countries should protect competition was to make sure that 
resources were distributed efficiently. It can be argued that the competition 
between governments creates the same effects. It pressures governments to do a 
                                                        
52 Skousen (2001) 217, 353. 
53 Nickell (1996) 725. 
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better job allocating their resources and improving their efficiency. In this respect, 
state competitiveness is considered a key indicator of economic health. The World 
Economic Forum regularly publishes a Global Competitiveness Report that 
highlights the progress or regress of 140 economies in becoming more 
competitive and improving their productivity and prosperity.54 Increasing 
competitiveness is considered a focal point of EU policies, and attempts by EU 
institutions to develop the single market further rely most of the time on the 
competitiveness of single Member States. As the 2016 Competitiveness Report 
affirms, competition is needed not only for economic growth but also for 
resilience in the event of economic downturns.55 
The above notion, streaming from the Mercantilist and Liberal schools, that 
competition is beneficial and necessary is not always shared by the market’s 
active participants. Some of these players, mostly commercial companies, are not 
interested in the efficiency of resource allocation and productivity growth. 
Although studies focus on these, they do not take into account the companies’ 
profitability. In some cases, profitability has an inverse relation to competition, 
because in highly competitive markets the profitability is lower compared to in 
less competitive markets. Therefore, to increase their profits, companies might be 
interested in a less competitive market. 
Competition and monopoly are not insulated from each other. In a competitive 
market, a company may acquire large parts of the market and be in a dominant 
position. The risk of a competitive market shifting to become a monopoly market 
is always present. In these cases, it is important to have a supervisory body that 
can prevent such situations. For the most part, the government tries to ensure a 
certain amount of competitiveness, but the operative word is tries, because authors 
debate the role of the state in the market. There is an ongoing heated discussion 
on the theories ranging from laissez faire to the more interventionist notions. 
Nevertheless, scholars generally accept that unless competition is regulated and 
supervised, it risks becoming a monopoly or another less competitive type of 
market. With regard to the civil justice system competition, it is debatable which 
authority would be capable of supervising, but it is also important to consider the 
dangers that an increased intensity in the competition might pose to weaker 
parties. Although this discussion has more to do with competition between 
                                                        
54 The latest edition of the Global Competitiveness Report is the 2015-2016 Report, which is 
available at <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
55 Report on Single Market Integration and Competitiveness in the EU and its Member States, 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/competitiveness/reports/single-market-
integration-competitiveness_en> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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companies, Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the consequences of an intense 
competition involving court adjudication as a good. 
It can be argued that competition also affects managers and workers. Through 
their mechanisms, competitive markets require managers to be more efficient and 
to step up their efforts to manage their company effectively. The same reasoning 
applies to workers. In a competitive economy, workers are required to be more 
efficient and to apply their labour skills in an optimal manner. If the civil justice 
system competition can be compared with the competition between companies, 
there would be reason for concern. Competing states that require courts to be 
efficient might do so to the detriment of certain procedures − in particular, those 
in support of weaker parties − or that uphold important principles of justice. 
Apart from the behaviour of workers and managers, competition affects research 
and development. In competitive markets, companies try to reduce costs by 
researching and developing more efficient production methods as well as better 
products to attract buyers and to increase their revenue. It would be logical to 
think that companies in a monopoly situation have few incentives to improve their 
products or to change them. However, this is not true. In fact, such companies 
have stable streams of revenue and a dominant position in the market, allowing 
them to invest and to maintain consistent progress in research and development.56 
Competing firms might be too afraid to change the already fragile market 
situation, and thus play a passive role in this area. Can this be expected of the civil 
justice system competition? Research and development with regard to courts and 
legal procedures can be expected if litigants choose legal and infrastructure 
development as criteria for their choice, thus incentivising competing states to 
invest in such measures. 
However, competition does not work by forcing parties to be more effective or 
more productive, or to undertake more research. It works by creating and offering 
many alternatives. In the end, the most appreciated product or a set of the most 
appreciated products will survive.57 This means that the best or the cheapest 
product will not always win; it is often simply a matter of luck that one product 
becomes more appealing than the other. This conclusion is similar to that 
regarding evolutionary biology; namely, competition in nature favours neither the 
best nor the strongest, but the one that happens to be more capable of adaptation. 
                                                        
56 Nickell (1996) 728. This idea was proposed by Joseph Schumpeter, who considered that once 
a company reaches a monopolistic status, it would continue to defend its position by 
investing more in research and development. This in turn would create a gap between the 
monopolist and potential competitors. 
57 Nickell (1996) 741. 
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As previously mentioned, not only companies compete. Counties and smaller 
jurisdictional units within one state may compete with each other. Moreover, it 
has been argued that competition between nations is a key element in their 
progress and advancement in technology and social welfare. The example of 
Europe and China serves to show the extent to which competition can change 
history. In the Middle Ages, China was highly advanced and more prosperous 
than Europe. Furthermore, it was unified as compared to a dis-unified Europe.58 
A unified China had little interest in changing its already established progress and 
stability, while change and progress in Europe was prompted by the competitive 
attitude of the many small states. However, because of its hard work and 
competitive nature, Europe by the beginning of the 20th century was more 
progressive and advanced in comparison to China. 
Competition between nations also indirectly promotes economic growth and 
innovation with regard to non-competing states. While the process of competition 
between nations might not be of interest to some states, the developments and 
innovations produced by competing states also indirectly carry those that do not 
compete. A good example of this relates to the last rulers of Japan in the Shogun 
period; they refused to accept guns, fearing that these weapons would put an end 
to their power, but in effect they led their country to a period of submission to 
European powers. In a certain way, choosing not to compete is not an option; 
therefore the majority of the countries also develop as an indirect result of 
competition.59 The same can be argued for the civil justice system competition. 
The innovations and developments produced by competing states also foster the 
development of countries that do not compete. 
As shown, competition is a wide-ranging process with indirect and direct 
consequences for companies, individuals, and countries. It is a process through 
which actors and regulators adapt to and reshape their environment, resulting in a 
higher and more stable long-term growth. Competition induces actors to use their 
resources more effectively and to increase productivity. Considering these 
benefits, many countries agree to enter into competition, fearing that other 
competitive countries might surpass them. Some of this section’s findings can be 
transposed to the civil justice system competition. However, although the benefits 
derived from competition are certainly desirable, attention should also be paid to 
undesired side-effects, some of which will be assessed in the following 
subsections. 
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59 Chaudhry and Garner (2006) 667. 
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2.1.3 Importance and benefits of competition: knowledge and social 
order 
As discussed above, competition has attracted the attention of many scholars 
throughout the course of history. Among others, Adam Smith is considered one 
of the most influential authors who promoted competition as a perfect ingredient 
of the market.60 He was part of the Scottish Enlightenment Movement, which had 
a similar perspective. In accordance with Smith’s ideas, Friedrich Hayek (1948) 
developed a Theory of Spontaneous Social Order, and promoted competition to a 
leading mechanism in the development of society.61 This section briefly discusses 
the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment Movement, and then Friedrich Hayek's 
Theory of Spontaneous Social Order. The focus of the discussion will be on the 
role of competition in these theories and on their relevance for the current study. 
Adam Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson were part of a generation of 
Scottish thinkers who established the Scottish Enlightenment Movement of the 
18th century. Their common idea was that social phenomena could be explained 
in terms of individual actions.62 According to them, institutions and social 
behaviour could be considered a combination of the individual actions. In other 
words, individuals in every society strive to achieve their personal goals, and in 
doing so they experiment with new behaviour, new solutions, or new variations, 
and as a result they establish patterns. If one of these patterns is adopted by a large 
number of people, it can create a new social institution, a new social norm, or a 
new social code of conduct. Upon these ideas are based Smith’s concept of the 
‘invisible hand’ in the market, and Ferguson’s concept of social institutions 
deriving from human actions and not from human designs.63 For Smith, a free 
market could be self-regulated, because by pursuing their individual goals, 
individuals would end up creating rules that in turn would regulate their actions 
in the market. 
Individual behaviour varies widely, however, and individuals do not have the 
same solution for the same problem. Social norms emerge from the behaviour of 
individuals by way of the competition process. As mentioned above, individuals 
try to reach their goals by experimenting with new behaviour, new solutions, or 
                                                        
60 Skousen (2001) 20. On competition considered by Smith as one of the three crucial 
ingredients, see Skousen (2001) 22. See also McNulty’s discussion on how Adam Smith 
used the notion of competition, McNulty (1967). For more insights, see also Dennis (1975) 
88. 
61 Vanberg (1986); Powell and Stringham (2009) 21; Hayek (1948) 10, 50. 
62 Vanberg (2014b) 100; Vanberg (1986) 80; Boettke (1990) 63; Hayek (1948). 
63 Vanberg (1986) 80. 
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new variations.64 These behaviours confront each other and involuntarily or 
voluntarily enter into competition. The most successful behaviour wins, and 
becomes a rule or a norm in society, and, at the same time, it becomes the target 
of new experiments that can become the future dominating norms.65 
The idea of individuals competing and producing social norms that affect the 
whole group has a homologue in Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. Writing 
after the Scottish Enlightenment, Darwin demonstrated that evolution, through a 
process of variation, selection, and retention, produced individuals that were more 
successful to overcome the challenges presented in their living environment. 
Inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Evolution, Donald 
Campbell, Karl Popper, and Friedrich Hayek became proponents of the 
evolutionary epistemology way of thinking. This theory proposes that knowledge 
is accumulated through trial and error, a process in which new ideas are tried and 
inspected for their veracity;66 hence, although an oversimplification of 
evolutionary epistemology, all ideas are good unless otherwise proven. 
Hayek went beyond evolutionary epistemology, however, and created his Theory 
of Spontaneous Order and Cultural Evolution,67 which was an advancement of the 
thoughts of the Scottish Enlightenment authors, and especially of Adam Smith's 
concept of a self-regulated market.68 According to Hayek, individuals that 
pursued their own interests created the basis for the accumulation of knowledge, 
which was the aggregate knowledge of every individual in the market. While 
competing with each other, individuals explored new ways of winning, and 
therefore accumulated more knowledge. They did this without knowing the 
outcome of their actions, but proceeded through trial and error experimentation.69 
Competition in this sense is considered a process of discovery and understanding, 
where the accumulated knowledge allows for the creation of rules and norms of 
behaviour in the market. Norms created in this process regulate the market itself, 
and are considered to be optimal norms because they are fruits of an aggregate 
                                                        
64 To keep the discussion simple, behaviour will be used and will include ‘solutions’ and 
‘variations’. 
65 To describe this, just think how quickly fashion changes. Individuals begin to experiment 
with new behaviour and new clothing that at some point become the norm for most people. 
This theory explains not only social norms but legal ones as well. 
66 Vanberg (2014b) 101; Vanberg (2014a) 3; Vanberg (1994b) 96. 
67 There is some debate on the relation between evolutionary epistemology and the Theory of 
Spontaneous Order. The discussion is centred on the chicken-or-the-egg idea of which 
derived from which. Given that the two concepts were conceived and developed at the same 
time, they might have been in a symbiotic relationship, enhancing each other. 
68 Vanberg (1994b) 63-64, 81-85; Skousen (2001) 214; Stringham and Zywicki (2011). 
69 Vanberg (2014a) discusses more on the concept of ‘blindness’ in Hayek's work. See as well 
Boettke (1990) 70, 74. 
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knowledge.70 Starting from this point, Hayek suggested that the same ideas could 
be applied to other social institutions.71 According to him, social coordination, 
social norms, and social institutions emerge from the self-interested behaviour of 
individuals, without any given institutional framework,72 and the self-regulation 
of the market is simply a manifestation of this process. 
For Hayek, spontaneous order can emerge from the interaction of a multiplicity 
of elements that are governed by certain rules. Their character will determine the 
general features of the system, while the specifics will be dependent on 
circumstances. Rules are of two kinds: innate (genetically inherited) and learned 
(culturally transmitted). Innate rules are presumed to be uniform in time and 
space, because they are fruit of the long process of human evolution.73 These rules 
create the first framework in which individuals act. While individuals pursue their 
goals, they create behavioural regularities that prevail over the others because the 
group benefits from them.74 Some of these regularities are given formal 
recognition by a governmental power, while others remain in use as social norms. 
Norms created in this way are the product of a double-layered competition 
process. At first there is a competition between individuals, where the diverse 
behaviours of different individuals are confronted, and a single one or a very small 
number are adopted by the group. Next, the behaviour acquired by the group is 
confronted by the behaviour of other groups. In this competitive process, the 
optimal norm is preferred. Nothing in this process guarantees that the best norm 
will emerge, but it ensures that that norm will always face competition so that it 
is able to change if the conditions for its emergence disappear.75 
In conclusion, it can be said that Hayek's theory of Spontaneous Social Order and 
the role of competition in its creation is relevant to the current research in three 
ways. First, it shows that competition encourages a process of discovery and the 
accumulation of knowledge. On the one hand, optimal norms emerge through the 
competition process, while on the other hand, the competition process maintains 
the norm, updated in accordance with the actual needs of the group. Based on this, 
it can be argued that the civil justice system competition would create a process 
of discovery, and promote legal innovation more optimally than a situation in 
                                                        
70 Boettke (1990). 
71 Hayek (1948) 77-92. 
72 Boettke (1990) 70-73 summarises the criticisms of this idea. 
73 Vanberg (1986) 77. 
74 Hayek is criticised on this point, as during his career he first believed that behaviour 
regularities prevailed because they benefitted the individual, and later he changed it to the 
group. It must be said that critics do not give enough importance to the competition between 
groups. For more, see Vanberg (1986) 83. 
75 Hayek's theory has received some criticism (see footnote 72), but critics have not touched on 
the role of competition as a factor in the spontaneous development of social order. 
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which competition was absent. Second, it shows that the competition of norms 
and groups (jurisdictions, states, or other) can produce optimal results in terms of 
norms and institutions. Given that the government cannot reach the level of 
aggregate knowledge that individuals have, it would be better to submit legal 
norms and institutions to a competition process. This means that the civil justice 
system competition could lead to new rules that would better serve the needs of 
court users, and provide better rules compared to what law makers can offer. 
Third, Hayek's theory can be a useful contribution to the general discussion on the 
harmonisation of civil procedures in the EU.76 If indeed competition produces 
optimal rules, the EU should welcome the competition between jurisdictions, and, 
for the sake of harmonisation, select the rule(s) that emerges as the most 
preferred.77 Problems exist of course, but if harmonisation is desired, competition 
might be the way to go. In this regard, the civil justice system competition can 
display and highlight whichever legal rules are more optimal, and are appreciated 
by users and governments alike. Any one of these rules could be the model for 
future harmonisation steps. 
2.1.4 Importance and benefits of competition: Tiebout’s theory 
In the mid-1950s, the work of Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson on public 
finances was based on the approach that there was no ‘market type’ solution to 
determine the level of expenditures on public goods.78 When Tiebout tried to 
explain his solution in one of Musgrave’s seminars, he was not taken seriously.79 
Nevertheless, he did not despair, and in 1956, while an assistant professor at 
Northwestern University, he published his now famous paper ‘A pure theory of 
local expenditures’. The paper remained obscure, however, and for some time 
attracted little attention. Tiebout wrote three other articles related to his 1956 
article, but none fared any better. After 1962, Tiebout stopped writing on public 
finance topics. He died in 1968. 
Before Tiebout’s paper, Musgrave and Samuelson were busy identifying a 
mechanism that would register the preferences of the public for public goods. 
While private good preferences are registered by market mechanisms like price 
and demand-supply interaction, public goods are different from private goods, and 
market mechanisms do not apply entirely.80 In his paper, Tiebout explained a 
                                                        
76 On the relation between harmonisation of civil procedure and the competition of civil justice 
systems, see Chapter 3. 
77 It can be argued that at this moment competition would cease; however, the spontaneous 
competition of rules should be allowed as soon as need demands it. 
78 Tiebout (1956) 416. 
79 Fischel (2006) 2-3; on the negative reaction of the Musgrave school, see Vaubel (2008) 44. 
80 Tiebout (1956) 417. Section 4.2 provides a critical overview of the different kinds of goods 
and their definition. It is also important to note that dispute resolution and the civil justice 
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mechanism that would help governments register the public’s preferences more 
efficiently, and consequently do a better job of allocating resources at the local 
level. The usual mechanism is one whereby consumers can express their opinion 
by voting for the various policies proposed by politicians.81 The problem with this 
mechanism is that many consumers do not vote at all, or they understate their 
preferences in order to avoid taxes. Therefore, in addition to the problem of 
allocating resources efficiently, the free-rider problem emerges. A solution to this 
would be to force consumers to express their opinion, so that the government 
would be able to satisfy and tax them accordingly. However, this is not possible. 
Hence, Tiebout proposed a mechanism whereby consumer-voters could select the 
community that best matched their preference pattern for public goods. This 
mechanism is based on the following seven assumptions: consumers are fully 
mobile, and will move to the community that best satisfies their needs; consumers 
have full knowledge of revenue and expenditures in different locations, and they 
respond accordingly; a large number of feasible communities exist; employment 
restrictions are not considered; there are no external economies or diseconomies 
between communities; communities below the optimal size try to attract residents, 
while communities above the optimal size do the opposite; and communities with 
the optimal number of residents try to keep this number unchanged: in other 
words, communities try to reach their optimal size. The idea proposed by Tiebout 
is that communities, jurisdictions, or any similar organisations offer a different 
pattern of public goods. For the model to work properly, it is assumed that 
consumers will try to find the community that best fulfils their needs by keeping 
its products constant. The basic movement will be from communities larger than 
their optimal size to communities that are smaller. Communities larger than their 
ideal size will not perform optimally, so they will not completely satisfy 
consumers’ needs and wants.82 Dissatisfied consumers will move to a different 
community that is to a certain extent similar to the old one; at the same time, 
communities that have reached their optimal size will begin to restrict migration 
to their jurisdiction. In this way, consumer-voters will be constantly on the move, 
and will vote with their feet for the community that best serves their needs. 
Moving or failing to move replaces the usual market willingness to buy or not buy 
a good, and reveals consumers’ desire for public goods. Once it is understood 
                                                        
systems are special kinds of goods, which means that market mechanisms affect them 
differently in comparison to other goods. 
81 This is the classical political scenario: voters vote for different alternatives regarding 
expenditure on public goods that are either presented by different candidates or by the same 
person or institution. 
82 It is accepted that two or more communities with the same patterns might exist. 
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exactly what consumers want, communities can tax them accordingly and allocate 
resources efficiently. 
Musgrave and Samuelson took note of Tiebout’s paper, but held it to be 
unrealistic. In general, the paper remained obscure for historical reasons.83 First, 
it was published during a period when the Cold War was attracting considerable 
attention, and communist centralisation was believed to be the wave of the 
future.84 No one was prepared to see decentralisation and competition among 
jurisdictions as a serious possibility. Second, local governments at that time were 
labouring beneath a cloud of negative associations. Therefore, any policies or 
theories that would grant them more power were not warmly received. To these 
historical reasons, it should be added that after 1962 Tiebout apparently lost 
interest in the topic. 
Tiebout’s model of course does not answer every question.85 It can be argued that 
the model relies on the notion of a rational person who makes choices based only 
on economic terms, and without taking into account the emotional and other non-
economic factors. Furthermore, the model is based on seven assumptions that are 
highly unlikely to occur simultaneously; in fact, it is rare for any one of them to 
occur even singly. Moreover, Tiebout neglected property taxation and land use 
regulation,86 conceding that his proposed solution was a conceptual one.87 Its aim 
was to show that in a multitude of communities, consumers would choose the one 
that best fulfilled their wants and thus create a type of market for public goods 
where governments could understand the preferences of consumers and adjust 
their expenditures and taxation accordingly. In the end, Tiebout’s paper proposed 
a hypothesis, and only time and empirical evidence would determine whether it 
was true. Despite the title, however, it does not evolve into a full theory; hence, 
many authors refer to it as ‘hypothesis’, ‘suggestion’, ‘idea’, and so on. 
The competition of jurisdictions as described by Tiebout can be applied to 
describe a theoretical scenario involving the civil justice system competition in 
the EU. This scenario would work under the following assumptions, which are an 
adaptation of Tiebout’s original assumptions. First, litigants are fully mobile. 
There are no or limited barriers to litigating in the courts of another jurisdiction, 
and litigants choose the court that best satisfies their preferences.88 Second, 
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86 Fischel (2006) 9. 
87 Tiebout (1956) 424. 
88 In the European Union, mobility is guaranteed by the Brussels I (recast) Regulation: 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
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litigants have full knowledge of all the jurisdictions, including legislation, 
expenses, and revenue. As was explained in Sections 2.1 and 2.1.3, knowledge is 
important for the development of competition. The more widespread the 
knowledge, the more beneficial for competition. Third, all Member States − or 
most of them − compete. A relatively large number of competing jurisdictions is 
needed to provide potential litigants with a plurality of choices as well as of 
arrangements for the dispute resolution system. Fourth, there are no restrictions 
or limited obstacles to the use of lawyers from outside the jurisdiction. Apart from 
legal requirements, there are two major obstacles to the mobility of lawyers: the 
language used in a jurisdiction and the lack of knowledge regarding that 
jurisdiction’s legislation. If these obstacles are overcome, the mobility of lawyers 
would greatly facilitate the mobility of their clients.89 Fifth, there is an optimal 
caseload for every jurisdiction, meaning that when a jurisdiction reaches a certain 
number of cases, it uses it resources in an optimal way. A lower or a higher 
number of cases means that resources are being either wasted or overexploited. 
Sixth, governments try to reach this optimal level. 
In this system, litigants would try to find the court and jurisdiction that best 
fulfilled their needs. It is reasonable to think that litigants have different sets of 
preferences and needs, and it can therefore be assumed that each of them would 
have different choice preferences. Having no problem with mobility, for instance, 
litigants from Portugal would go to Finland to litigate or vice versa. Member 
States on their own would try to reach their optimal caseload level either by 
increasing or decreasing the number of cases they could handle. If they had too 
many cases, they would restrict access to their courts by creating legal barriers; if 
they had not reached the optimal caseload level, they would relax their legal 
barriers or undertake other activities to invite litigants to their courts.90 Under 
                                                        
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters. OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32. 
The recast Regulation sets the rules on jurisdiction and for the choice of court in the EU. It 
allows commercial parties to choose the court that best serves their needs. The ample 
mobility allowed and guaranteed by the recast Regulation would serve as the basis of the 
first assumption. Chapter 3 provides a short analysis of the importance of the Brussels I 
Regulation for the civil justice system competition. 
89 Section 4.3 argues that in the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer has a dominant position. 
This allows lawyers to make legal choices on behalf of their clients, including choice of 
court. In view of this, more mobility for lawyers would translate into more mobility for 
litigants. 
90 It should be said that governments generally have a constitutional duty to provide access to 
justice to their citizens. Therefore, legal barriers will be targeting the access to justice of 
foreign citizens. Many procedural requirements tend to restrict access to courts only to those 
cases considered by the governments to be important. In this regard, see also the discussion 
in Section 4.2. 
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these conditions, litigants would have more choice options to satisfy their needs, 
while governments would be better able to assess what litigants want and thus to 
allocate their resources more efficiently. Some governments would find it 
unappealing to continue with the competition, and would retire from it, while 
others would feel encouraged to take part. A possible consequence of 
governments offering different litigation solutions could also be the emergence of 
new dispute resolution mechanisms or specialised courts in different states. In this 
scenario – created on the basis of Tiebout’s theory and assumptions – there seems 
to be more than one beneficiary. The first beneficiaries were those governments 
that were better able to understand litigants’ preferences and to allocate their 
resources accordingly. The second beneficiaries in this scenario, which were the 
litigants, had more diversity in their choice of court. 
However, this model remains a fantasy.91 Wagner claims that the Tiebout model 
is not realistic, because its assumptions are highly improbable, and they do not 
take into account mobility problems related to different languages and cultures 
among countries in the EU. While this problem can easily be overcome by 
claiming that English is already the language set to be used in cross-border 
litigation, some of the assumptions made by Tiebout and mentioned above are 
still highly improbable. Nevertheless, the model is valuable in that it offers an 
idea of what competition can offer to governments and litigants. Furthermore, 
some of the assumptions and the mechanisms described here are not entirely 
speculative. Stripped of all its merits, the model can still be used by governments 
to study their own behaviour in the competition of civil justice systems. 
2.2 Orthodox and heterodox competition 
Economists often use the term competition, but they do not share the same view 
of or approach to it. This section provides a brief overview of the debate on the 
use of the term in economic scholarship, and concludes with a comment on the 
importance of this debate for the present research. It is important for this research 
because when the term is used in the competition of jurisdictions, its orthodox 
meaning is implied. At the same time, this study considers the heterodox approach 
better equipped to represent the findings of this and other related studies. 
Economic scholarship has an abundance of ideas and theories that generate 
movements and schools of thought. One major division in scholarship is that 
between orthodox and heterodox economics. The labelling is problematic in that 
it lacks a clear definition of either term. The general rule would be that orthodox 
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economics is used to describe mainstream economics, while heterodox is used to 
describe all others that are not mainstream.92 As regards competition, orthodox 
economics is centred on neo-classical economics,93 while heterodox economics 
refers to all others that are not affiliated with the neo-classical view. Among the 
heterodox scholars are Karl Marx,94 Joseph Schumpeter, and Piero Sraffa;95 
among the heterodox schools96 are part of the Austrian School of Economics, The 
Oxford Economists’ Research Group (OERG), classical economics,97 post-
Keynesian economists, and Evolutionary Economics.98 
For neo-classical economics, competition is a crucial concept, and as a term it was 
inherited by the classical school and the Scottish Enlightenment Movement. This 
term is so important that scholars view it as if it were their religion.99 Neo-classical 
economics considers competition in terms of perfect and imperfect. Perfect 
competition is the positive side, and occurs in a situation in which there is ‘a large 
number of relatively small buyers and sellers, each acting on the belief that he or 
she cannot affect the market price’.100 The negative side, imperfect competition, 
is mostly connected with a monopoly situation, in which the seller sets the price 
for all the buyers. Other situations also exist in which perfect competition is 
disturbed and should be considered imperfect. In these situations, productivity 
falls and the resources are not properly allocated. The aim of the neo-classical 
school is to reach the equilibrium of perfect competition, which would create 
perfect competitive markets.101 Therefore, the more competition, the better. 
                                                        
92 The problem remains in defining the term mainstream. What precisely is mainstream, and 
how does one know that something is mainstream? It can be said that the term is used in an 
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93 Black, John, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Myles, ‘neoclassical economics’ A Dictionary 
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Heterodox economists contend that orthodox economists do not have a system in 
place to determine whether more competition is better,102 and their analysis is 
based on falsity.103 Falsity is related to the use of the terms ‘perfect competition’ 
and ‘monopoly’, which for heterodox economists do not exist.104 In fact, the world 
is characterised by pervasive monopolies,105 and competition is neither perfect 
nor imperfect – it is simply real.106 In their view, on the one hand, sellers 
continually set the price, and on the other hand, they are constrained by the 
number and the size of other sellers participating in the market. This means that 
competition is not a point of equilibrium but a dynamic process that influences 
the economy. 
For heterodox economists, competition is a historical process, differing from 
period to period and from place to place. In their view, competition is a form of 
rivalry for gain − an attempt to outdo other rivals for a larger share of the 
market.107 To describe this form of competition, heterodox scholars accept 
Schumpeter’s theory of innovation, enterprise, and competition, and his other 
theory of creative destruction. The first theory can be described as a three-stage 
process. The first is innovation, where a new business tries to enter a market by 
innovating the ways of production, the labour conditions, the use of resources, 
and any other activity that would cause the price of its product to fall below the 
price of its rivals’ good.108 The second is competition, where different products 
that are the result of innovations are confronted with each other in the market. The 
third stage is acceptance, which determines which firm has won the competition. 
To win in the last stage, a product or an innovation needs to grow faster than that 
of its rivals, thus allowing it to capture more of the market share and therefore 
become more successful. This three-stage competition creates a dynamic 
framework composed of a qualitative (innovation and competition stage) and a 
quantitative element (acceptance stage). 
In this view, competition promotes innovation as an essential stage geared to beat 
the rivalry.109 This leads to change in the structure of firms, in the methods of 
production, and in the order of business.110 Order of business is based on the 
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principle of the invisible hand, where managers and directors change the structure 
and form a business to match the requirements of their production plans. Market 
order emerges from the interaction of different individuals pursuing their goals 
following established rules of conduct.111 
This section has provided a short description of two different approaches to 
competition in economics. The intention was to distinguish which is better suited 
to the study of regulatory competition. The present research considers that both 
the orthodox and the heterodox approach are scientifically robust, but that the 
heterodox approach is better suited to describe the civil justice system 
competition. The civil justice system competition is a process in which suppliers 
behave like monopolists and set the price of the good they offer, with little regard 
for the supply-demand interaction. In the orthodox view, this means that resources 
are not allocated properly, and that productivity (i.e. conflict resolution) is low. In 
the heterodox (at least Schumpeter’s) approach, the situation is indeed a 
monopoly, considering that the government is the only supplier of the court 
dispute resolution mechanism. However, the government is in constant 
competition with alternative mechanisms as well as with other governments. 
From the heterodox perspective, this monopoly is porous. From the orthodox 
angle, a monopolistic producer would have little to no incentive to innovate. But 
in a porous monopoly, innovation comes with a need to respond to competitors 
that penetrate the seemingly monopolistic market. Ultimately, the civil justice 
system competition creates the conditions for innovation and development. Even 
if the civil justice system competition were dominated by a single supplier, 
innovation and development would still make their way into the market. 
2.3 Regulatory competition in different fields of law 
The previous sections introduced the topic of competition, with particular 
attention given to regulatory competition and the competition of civil justice 
systems. The current section provides a brief overview of the competition between 
jurisdictions in different fields of law. These cases serve as examples and models 
geared to enhance our understanding of the competition of civil justice systems 
by demonstrating the effects on participating jurisdictions. To that end, this 
section will discuss four fields of law in which scholars have been particularity 
active: namely, company, tax, labour, and environmental. 
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2.3.1 Competition in company law 
Competition in company law or − as it is often referred to − ‘competition for 
incorporation’ can be described as a process whereby two or more jurisdictions 
compete with each other to persuade companies to incorporate or to move their 
seat to one of these jurisdictions. As legal entities, companies choose a place of 
incorporation,112 and as a consequence of this choice the company submits itself 
to the laws, regulations, and legal framework of the jurisdiction in which it is 
registered. This legal framework regulates, among others, the rights and duties of 
managers, shareholders, minority shareholders, takeover actions, and many other 
details related to the functioning of a company. Furthermore, choosing the seat of 
a company also includes the tax jurisdiction. The taxation level is another factor 
taken into account during incorporation, but is omitted in this section in order to 
simplify the analysis. Thus, the law of the jurisdiction where a company is seated 
is significant with respect to the relation between managers, shareholders, and 
third parties. As regards large companies, powerful interests are at stake, making 
the choice of seat and the reasons behind the choice a sensitive topic.113 
In the US, scholarship involving competition in company law is particularly 
abundant. As Kahan and Kamar (2002)114 observed, discussions on the 
                                                        
112 This is possible in jurisdictions that apply the incorporation theory. In these jurisdictions, 
companies can register without needing to produce or undertake activities there. 
113 There are two theories for the incorporation of a company. One is the real-seat theory, which 
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Court Reports 2003 I-10155. 
Without forgetting to mention Cartesio and Vale as landmark decisions of the Court, it can 
be argued that the court favours the incorporation theory over the real seat theory. 
114 Kahan and Kamar (2002) 727. 
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competition of jurisdictions have been going on since at least the 1900s, during 
which time several US states were competing with New Jersey to attract the 
registration of companies in their jurisdiction. It has been reported that in addition 
to New Jersey, states actively promoting themselves as incorporation centres were 
West Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, and Maine. This competition started when 
technological advancements made it possible for companies to transfer their 
production units away from their decision-making centres.115 At that point, 
competition between states began to intensify, and New Jersey emerged as the 
dominant jurisdiction. Other states considered New Jersey's legislation a reference 
point, and continued to improve their company law legislation. At that time, New 
Jersey was a centre of legal innovation aimed at being as attractive as possible for 
new companies. This position might well have been maintained until the present, 
but in 1912 – for political reasons − New Jersey renounced that position.116 After 
New Jersey’s withdrawal, Delaware became the dominant venue for incorporation 
in the US, and to this day it accounts for half of the incorporation registrations in 
the US; in comparison, other states have only a minor percentage.117 
On the basis of several studies, scholars118 debate whether competition for 
incorporation is a profitable activity for states, although certain profit sources are 
mentioned as being of interest for competing states or jurisdictions. The first and 
most obvious source of profit is taxes. In this respect, it can be said that a 
jurisdiction gains direct and indirect taxes from incorporating firms. Direct gains 
include incorporation fees and annual taxes on incorporation, while indirect gains 
include taxes paid by local law firms that have benefitted by providing legal 
services to newly incorporating firms. A second and less obvious gain and 
incentive is the creation of an attractive and hospitable business environment for 
investors. In other words, it is debatable whether the profit from direct and indirect 
sources is higher than the expenses incurred during competition. Some studies 
show that states in the US do not enjoy any significant economic gain. These 
studies also demonstrate that legislative changes in the last few years have been 
promoting not competition but other political or social goals.119 Competition was 
apparently not high on the political agenda of state governments. Furthermore, 
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different sources consider Delaware to be the winner of the competition in the US, 
and they also confirm that no other state is interested in the competition for 
incorporation.120 In a certain way, competition for incorporation in the US was 
killed by Delaware’s success. 
Nevertheless, the academic debate on the effects of competition is still lively. A 
first topic of contention has to do with whether a competition of jurisdictions 
produces a race-to-the-top or a race-to-the-bottom as regards the quality of law.121 
Defenders of the race-to-the-bottom consider that owing to the competition for 
incorporation, corporate law favours managers more than shareholders, and, in 
general, stronger parties more than weaker ones.122 Delaware is considered by 
some to be an example of the race-to-the-bottom,123 while others consider it an 
example of the race-to-the-top.124 A race-to-the-top means that the quality of law 
is improving, and weaker parties in general are offered more protection. Managers 
and stronger parties are usually better equipped to lobby for their rights. Given 
that shareholders are scattered and not always residents of the incorporating 
jurisdictions, they have little say in the drafting and approval of jurisdictions. 
Managers have more power and more information compared to shareholders, and 
are better equipped to pursue lobbying activities.125 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that company law in the US favours managers as opposed to shareholders. 
A second topic of debate concerns whether competition encourages predictability 
and innovation. When discussing the relationship between innovation and 
competition, it is best to refer to Sections 2.1 and 2.1.3, where it was demonstrated 
that competition indeed promotes innovation and the accumulation of knowledge. 
In fact, as regards innovation, Delaware − as a competing state − is more receptive 
compared to non-competing jurisdictions. Delaware keeps its legislation up to 
date and tries to refresh it in accordance with new trends and innovations, while 
non-competing jurisdictions, since they do not compete, have few incentives to 
innovate. Innovation would be present, regardless of the intensity of the 
competition. The intensity would influence the speed of innovation, where the 
more intense the competition, the faster the legislative innovation, and the less 
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intense the competition (Delaware case), the slower the innovation. The present 
research considers that competition influences innovation in a different way in 
comparison to predictability. In general, non-competing jurisdictions either do not 
innovate their legislation or they do so very slowly. As a consequence, these states 
have time to clarify and metabolise the legislation they use. Of course, many lack 
the infrastructure established by Delaware,126 but this study considers countries in 
legal stagnation to be negentropic in legal reasoning, and therefore to be 
increasing the predictability of their legislation. In situations of low competitive 
intensity, some authors suggest that Delaware would be more interested in 
offering indeterminate and litigation-intensive laws, which would be more 
beneficial to that state’s community of lawyers.127 Hence, in the current situation, 
where Delaware has monopolised the supply side of the market, the other states 
have neither the knowledge nor the potential to make more predictable law, while 
Delaware lacks the incentives to make its legislation more predictable. In 
competition-intensive situations, states would be under pressure from each other 
to satisfy the needs of the demand side, which requires predictability to facilitate 
cross-border mobility and business.128 Competing states would strive to offer 
predictable law, which would also be facilitated by emulating each other and 
learning from the legal cases they face. However, competition and legal 
development do not run smoothly hand-in-hand; political interference and interest 
comprise a force that must be taken into account in this discussion.129 
The situation in the EU is different.130 Politically, Europe is more divided, and 
culturally and linguistically the differences are even greater than in the US. 
However, this does not mean that European companies do not consider the 
benefits of registering in one jurisdiction instead of another. For example, already 
in the 1840s French companies migrated first to England and later to Belgium to 
benefit from their better legal conditions.131 Since the 1840s, of course, the 
political landscape in Europe has changed. Countries have joined the European 
Union, which now plays the role of a supranational regulator. The EU aims at 
creating a single market, which should in principle be facilitated by legal 
certainty, mobility, and predictability. The creation of a single market has also 
                                                        
126 Delaware has a well-established legal infrastructure specialised in company law, such as 
specialised courts, experienced lawyers, and an extensive body of case law. On the legal 
infrastructure supporting Delaware's position as a dominant venue for incorporation, see 
Charny (1991) 432; Kahan and Kamar (2002) 738. 
127 Charny (1991) 432. 
128 See also the results of the empirical research in Chapter 5. 
129 The last point is defended by scholars who consider competition for incorporation in the US 
a very weak process. Kahan and Kamar (2002) 748. 
130 Ringe (2013) 234-236; Braun (2013) 403-404. 
131 Charny (1991) 428. 
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triggered a process of harmonisation in company law, with one implication being 
that any form of competition in the EU would disappear or would be further 
limited.132 However, waning competition and the emergence of harmonisation 
pose certain risks for the diversity of company law.133 The defenders of 
harmonisation argue that a unified legal framework would encourage cross-border 
trade, and therefore further the creation of a single market. The opposers claim 
that harmonisation would destroy the diversity of legal solutions in the EU, and 
therefore suffocate the sources of innovation. 
To conclude, the study of the competition of jurisdictions in company law is 
relatively developed in the US, and academic and practical debates derived from 
these studies can be useful in the study of the civil justice system competition. A 
first issue discussed was whether competition is over if one of the jurisdictions is 
dominating the market to the point of resembling a monopoly. The case of 
Delaware serves as an example. On this issue, the present study did not find a 
satisfying conclusion. It can simply be said that competition continues despite the 
fact that one of the jurisdictions seems to be a monopolist. The same might be 
expected for the civil justice system competition. A second issue discussed was 
the source(s) of direct and indirect benefits for competing jurisdictions. Alleged 
benefits from the competition of jurisdictions are direct profit from taxation and 
indirect profit from the incorporation-related taxation of businesses. It remains 
debatable whether these benefits are enough to justify entering into a competition 
with other states. Companies would benefit from competition in that they would 
have a better choice of rules addressing their needs. In many cases, managers have 
the final word in choosing a company’s place of incorporation; therefore, 
legislation in the US tends to favour managers. While in the civil justice system 
competition there is no manager for litigants, lawyers are a force to be reckoned 
with. Section 4.3 takes on the task of analysing the relation between litigants and 
lawyers. A third issue discussed was the alleged race-to-the-bottom. However, 
this issue is analysed further in Section 2.4. A fourth issue discussed was the 
effects of competition on innovation and the predictability of law, and it was 
argued that competition promotes innovation. However, predictability is more 
relative to the interest of the parties able to influence the competing states. If these 
parties were interested in predictable law, competition would produce predictable 
law. A fifth and final issue discussed was the relation of regulatory competition 
and harmonisation. In the EU, the competition of jurisdictions for incorporation 
(also the civil justice system competition) coexists with the harmonisation 
process, although harmonised legislation could put an end to competition. The 
                                                        
132 The interaction between harmonisation and competition is elaborated further in Section 3.3. 
This section presents some issues related mainly to harmonisation in company law. 
133 Zumbansen (2006) 543; Enriques and Gelter (2006) 419-422; Deakin (2000). 
47 
 
outcome of this coexistence is important both for competition and harmonisation. 
Section 3.3 provides a further analysis of the relation between competition and 
harmonisation, with special attention to the civil justice system competition. 
2.3.2 Competition in tax law 
Tax legislation is another field of law in which countries are considered to 
compete. The advantages and disadvantages derived from taxation are directly 
palpable for governments and private parties, thus making taxation a sensitive 
topic.134 Governments perceive taxes as revenue, while taxpayers perceive them 
as an economic loss. To maintain an optimal level of taxation that can bring 
sufficient revenue to further political goals, and that can be considered an 
acceptable burden by tax payers, governments develop elaborated tax policies.135 
In doing so, governments take into account not only internal social, economic, 
and political factors but also international economic and political factors, thereby 
entering into a competition process that they cannot avoid.136 
Tax competition in modern scholarship is described as a basic model in which 
two countries of the same size share the same mobile tax base and have tax 
policies that are interdependent.137 Tax revenues of one country depend on the tax 
level of another. For example, country A lowers taxes, and by doing so it attracts 
a large share of the mobile tax base to its jurisdiction; country B sees a large share 
of its mobile tax base migrate to country A, and consequently loses tax revenue.138 
This model leads to a race-to-the-bottom, where countries lower their taxes on 
foreign capital, thereby lowering the tax revenue of the other country. The other 
country will eventually respond by lowering its taxes until both countries reach a 
                                                        
134 Dietsch (2014). 
135 Tiebout’s theory is an attempt to better calculate the taxation level for public goods. See 
Section 2.1.4. See also Baskaran (2014) 5-7. 
136 It should be made clear that governments can decide to stay out of the regulatory competition 
in many fields of law, but in tax law they are largely unable to do so. If a government decides 
not to participate in the tax law competition, it has three possibilities: close up its economy 
in a (semi) total isolation (e.g. North Korea); delegate power to supranational organisations 
to enact tax policies; or not tax at all. Each of these options is possible, but few consider 
them feasible in practice. The majority of governments consider isolation economically 
unsustainable. The second option of giving up taxing authority to another supranational 
organisation is not politically possible (the case of the EU is a good example), while not 
taxing at all is more a utopian notion than a possibility. See Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 
353. 
137 Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 353. For another definition, see Höijer (2008) 130. See also 
the definition of ‘harmful tax competition’; Pinto (2002) 12. 
138 Before the 20th century, tax levels were relatively low, and cross-national tax levels were not 
high enough to entice mobile taxpayers. Interestingly enough, cross-border movement of 
capital was at that time easier. With the advent of the 20th century and the rise of the welfare 
state, the burden of tax was increased. At the same time, states began to restrict movement 
of labour and capital. For this, see Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 341; Kiss (2011) 642. 
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point of equilibrium, in which the tax level is lower than it would be in the absence 
of competition. This model is simplistic, but it has been expanded and developed 
with other variations. The first variation regards country size. In the basic model, 
countries are the same size, and therefore their tax incentives or disincentives are 
similar. If countries are of different sizes, their interests differ as well. Tax 
competition involving same-size countries is called symmetric competition; 
competition between countries of a dissimilar size is called asymmetric 
competition. Another variation in the basic model is the addition of domestic 
constraints. In the basic model, international tax competition dominates a 
country’s internal tax policies; however, the addition of domestic constraints 
suggests that governments are subject to internal control and pressure from 
diverse interest groups. It can be argued that the last variation is also the most 
common. 
The term ‘tax competition’ and similar terms are used to describe the above 
model. While the term tax competition bears strong economic connotations, it is 
also a legal term strongly connected to laws and legislation that create taxes, 
establish enforcement mechanisms, and regulate taxpayers’ behaviour. Therefore, 
tax competition refers not only to an economic competition based on economic 
instruments but also to a legal competition. Scholars have identified four legal 
mechanisms used by governments to enforce and tax competitive policies: 
namely, reducing the statutory tax rate; narrowing the tax base; relaxing tax 
enforcement; and improving legislation governing national secrecy. 
Reducing the statutory tax rate is held to be a better option than narrowing the tax 
base.139 The first option is more visible and politically more retributive. 
Furthermore, it sends a concrete message to mobile capital that the level of taxes 
is being lowered.140 Relaxing tax enforcement has been used by governments to 
ease the tax burden during certain periods. This policy is difficult to detect, but it 
might become a problem if tax law is harmonised in the EU, in the event of which 
some Member States would relax their tax enforcement in order to be more 
competitive. Another competitive policy that governments may further is the 
approval of additional legislation that defends secrecy. Generally, these laws 
favour tax evaders, and allow them to avoid the enforcement mechanisms in other 
states. The four policy options described here can be implemented by targeting 
specific types of taxes or specific groups of taxpayers.141 
                                                        
139 Pinto (2002) 32, 41. 
140 Using tax reduction to attract investments; see Cookson (2004) 359. 
141 Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 351-353. 
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Competition in tax law has its negative side. Certainly, governments do not like 
tax competition, as it drives tax rates down and therefore decreases revenue for 
the state budget. The race-to-the-bottom that ensues after competition is 
undesirable and unwelcome,142 and it is reflected as well in the race to secrecy. In 
certain circumstance, countries try to approve legislation that defends the secrecy 
of bank accounts, shareholders, or profit from shares.143 However, while these 
moves might be welcome to shareholders, they are unwelcome to states that try 
to enforce their fiscal legislation, and that are interested in having information on 
the revenue of their subjects. 
Secrecy relating to identity and information is so important that small countries 
have created a whole system aimed at attracting companies and individuals that 
want to keep their identities secret and to avoid taxation in their own 
jurisdiction.144 These countries are known as tax havens, and, especially after the 
global financial crisis of 2008, are under heavy fire from the world’s leading 
economies demanding that they reform their legislation. Already in 1998, the 
OECD had defined tax havens as countries that fulfil the following conditions: a) 
no or only nominal taxes; b) lack of effective exchange of information; c) lack of 
transparency; d) no substantial activities.145 It is clear that the problem is not the 
low level of taxes in these countries – it is the combination of low taxes, lack of 
transparency, and collaboration between states.146 Tax havens undercut the tax 
base of many countries, and therefore increase the tax burden of immobile factors 
as well as of mobile factors that do not or cannot migrate. As a response to this, 
states increase expenditures on the supervision and enforcement of their fiscal 
legislation.147 
Its negative image aside, scholars believe that tax competition helps to attract 
investments.148 In fact, the tax rate is one of the factors that companies take into 
account when determining where to establish their seat or production site. 
Countries with a low level of taxation rates are able collect revenue resulting from 
                                                        
142 Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 343; Avi-Yonah (2004) 385, describes a-race-to-the bottom 
started by the US; Kiss (2012) 648; Littlewood (2004) 449. 
143 Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 345. 
144 Avi-Yonah (2004) 375-378; Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 349. 
145 OECD - Harmful Tax Competition Report: <http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ 
44430243.pdf> accessed on 22 December 2017. 
146 Slemrod and Wilson offer another point of view, showing how tax havens play a positive 
role in the economy. Despite their claim, however, it can be said that the lack of transparency 
and the provision of facilities for tax evasion is enough for tax havens to be considered 
negative elements. See Slemrod and Wilson (2009) 1262. 
147 Slemrod and Wilson (2009) 1269; Avi-Yonah (2004) 375. 
148 Avi-Yonah (2004) 377, 381. 
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an increase in economic circulation in their jurisdiction.149 Another positive 
aspect is that tax competition helps prevent taxes being increased in an ‘abusive’ 
way, because a government knows that its mobile tax base will migrate to another 
jurisdiction. 
Tax competition can also develop within the borders of a country. In this regard, 
two arrangements can emerge: vertical and horizontal. The first happens when a 
hierarchy of taxing authorities exists. The second happens when there are two or 
more co-equal taxing authorities.150 In their law and economics analysis, Klick 
and Parisi (2005) concluded that tax authorities in the horizontal competition 
scenario would be better off if they colluded. This means that from the tax 
authorities’ perspective, competition should be avoided. A further implication is 
that harmonising solutions with respect to taxes and to tax rates would be more 
advantageous for the competing authorities than for the competition.151 
The question of harmonisation152 of taxes has been popular in the EU since the 
Ruding Committee (Report of the committee of independent experts on company 
taxation 1992),153 which proposed a minimum of 30% for corporate tax. Although 
the proposal was not accepted, the idea of harmonising tax law was planted.154 
The problem with harmonisation is that by giving up their tax authority, Member 
States would consider that they had lost a piece of their sovereignty,155 which 
would result in political problems and reactions.156 
                                                        
149 Avi-Yonah proposes restricting tax competition among or from developing countries. In his 
opinion, this kind of competition is detrimental to their economies, and they would be better 
off without it. The reason is that large companies exploit the possibility of working in a tax-
free − or few taxes − jurisdiction, but their profit goes outside the jurisdiction. Another 
reason is that because of few taxes, there are few resources to develop the country and to 
provide a well-educated workforce or to improve infrastructure. In contrast, Littlewood 
considers tax competition among developing countries to be a positive step to further their 
development. See Avi-Yonah (2004) and Littlewood (2004). 
150 Klick and Parisi (2005) 387. 
151 Klick and Parisi (2005) 394. 
152 In this regard, harmonisation means that taxes are set to a common intermediate level 
between the initial levels of taxes in two or more countries. Kotakorpi (2009)141. 
153 Link to the report from the Archive of European Integration of the University of Pittsburgh: 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/8702/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
154 Kiss (2012) 641. 
155 Although this is a political problem, different scholars have considered economic problems 
as well as benefits resulting from tax harmonisation. As shown above, Klick and Parisi found 
that tax harmonisation makes horizontal competitors better off under certain assumptions. 
Kotakorpi (2009) considers that harmonising tax would have a negative impact on 
competition. 
156 Ring (2009) 559; Genschel, and Schwarz (2011) 355. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that governments are somehow obliged to engage in 
tax competition, the aim of which is to keep or to attract a large mobile tax base, 
with another goal being to attract investments or to prevent them leaving. 
Competition has resulted in a low level of taxes on a global scale. On the one 
hand, governments do not feel comfortable participating in a race-to-the-bottom, 
but on the other hand, they have to face this problem by competing with tax 
havens. While tax havens are a consequence of tax competition, they are 
considered unfair, and are criticised by other states. Harmonisation of taxes has 
been proposed to mitigate tax competition; however, while it would be beneficial 
to countries, it also faces political and sometimes economic censure. 
Certain lessons related to the competition of civil justice systems can be drawn 
from the tax competition. Despite the general view that competition is beneficial, 
some competitions − like tax law − are not entirely advantageous. While taxpayers 
profit from low taxes, governments and public expenditures suffer from low 
revenue. Part of the civil justice system competition involves fees and taxes 
applied to suits and to other legal acts or procedures before a national court. 
However, whether countries compete by lowering these fees needs to be 
evaluated. Like competition in tax law, the civil justice system competition can 
produce rivalry between conflict resolution providers within the same 
jurisdiction: for example, the competition of some German courts for intellectual 
property litigation.157 In the end, it can be expected that the civil justice system 
competition would be intertwined with many aspects of a country’s political and 
economic activity. It is a matter of finding the right balance between the positive 
and the negative sides. Likewise for tax competition, it is hard to imagine any 
sound advice that would apply to all jurisdictions. 
2.3.3 Competition of jurisdictions in labour law 
Labour law is another area where competition between jurisdictions has been 
observed. Because labour is one of the main cost and production factors in a 
country’s economic life, competition to have low labour costs is important for 
many economies. Competition in this regard is achieved not only by innovation 
or economic mechanisms but also by changing the legal bases upon which 
employment functions. This section provides a brief description of the 
competition of jurisdictions in labour by focusing mostly on the EU. Lessons 
derived from labour law can contribute to the study of the competition of civil 
justice systems, and will be described at the end of this section. Meanwhile, this 
section offers a historical introduction to competition in labour law, a theoretical 
overview, and a summary of the situation in the EU. 
                                                        
157 Wagner (2013) 366; Stürner (2016) 146; Cremers and others (2016) 5-7. 
52 
 
Competition in labour law can be considered part of a greater process: namely, 
competition in labour. Since antiquity, countries have competed (i.e. waged wars) 
in having slaves or low-cost labourers to sustain their economic needs. And apart 
from the use of slavery in more recent times, things have not changed.158 
Economic agents try to find cheap labour, and they exploit it to save production 
costs. In this respect, competition in labour can be dissected into two parts: 
between companies and between jurisdictions. 
Early examples of competition between companies show how aggressive it was 
in times of economic expansion.159 In the 1920s, the US was experiencing a boom 
in car sales, and Detroit was the production powerhouse. Companies badly needed 
workers to fulfil customers’ orders. One ploy was for company representatives to 
stand outside their competitor’s factory and − using a megaphone − shout out 
promises of better working conditions. Workers would immediately throw down 
their tools and hurry over to the factory that was making the promises. Other 
companies repeatedly did the same thing. This was considered dangerous, 
however, and did not last long.160 Nowadays, companies compete using other 
methods: for example, they try to combine lower labour costs with better-trained 
employees and advanced production technologies. Economic scholarship takes 
considerable care in discussing the way firms compete for labour and the 
implications it has for the economy. As regards this discussion, several point of 
interest can be isolated. 
First, the labour market is not perfect, which means that at some point there are 
monopolies or oligopolies that apply market power to distort prices;161 second, 
employers have some influence in setting the wages of their employees;162 third, 
the labour market is characterised by product differentiation and imperfect 
                                                        
158 Scholarship and the literature are of course concerned with the question of modern slavery 
as a way to exploit vulnerable groups of immigrants or citizens of underdeveloped countries. 
However, this is not part of the current topic, and will not be discussed further. For ‘wage 
slavery’ as a form of ‘modern slavery’, see Jenkins (2011) 190. 
159 Chalmers-Hunt (1903a, b) gives a detailed explanation of legal aspects related to the labour 
competition in the UK at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. This study is 
outdated, but gives an idea of the amount of thought that the academic world at the time 
gave to discussing labour competition. 
160 Welton (1923) I14. This does not mean that the early 20th century was a ‘happy time’ for 
workers; a good illustration of the precarious working conditions can be seen in Charlie 
Chaplin’s acclaimed film Modern Times. 
161 Sørensen (1994). Perfect competition is in line with the theories of classical economics; in 
contrast, heterodox economics does not use these terms. For more on this, see Section 2.2. 
162 This is in line with the first point. In an imperfect market, one of the actors might have 
considerable power to influence prices. See Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002), Manning 
(2003) 1. This is, however, in line with the heterodox concept of the market, where parties, 
despite being in competition or a monopoly, have some power to influence the price. 
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information; fourth, labour demand is heterogeneous;163 and fifth, labour supply 
is not perfectly elastic.164 
The boundary within which firms can compete is set by law. Jurisdictions have in 
many cases an elaborate labour legislation enhanced by international conventions 
and court precedents that regulate labour conditions. Legal regulations set 
standards for working conditions that play an important role in attracting 
investment companies. Therefore, the competition of jurisdictions in labour law 
is focused on the level of standards offered to investors. From the point of view 
of employees, work standards are considered a benefit in addition to the wages. 
For example, paid holidays, a 40-hour working week, or travel reimbursements 
are considered additional revenue. From the standpoint of the employers, work 
standards are considered a tax on labour that is used to confer a public good. For 
example, paying employees who do not work for a long period or for only a short 
one increases the costs of production, but it produces a public good that in the 
long run might be beneficial to the company.165 
Charny distinguishes between four types of labour standards that are important in 
the competition of jurisdictions in labour law.166 His categories are used to 
describe where and how countries might compete with each other. First, static 
labour standards confer a direct benefit on the employee in the firm in question, 
rather than creating a generic public good. With the introduction of these 
standards, workers might agree to work for a lower wage because they receive 
other benefits. A competition of jurisdictions within this set of standards is not 
feasible, as altering it would not offer any advantage. Second, dynamic labour 
standards are similar to the first ones but are − as the name says − dynamic. While 
static standards are acquired and can barely change, dynamic standards like 
minimum wage frequently can, and thus are able to offer a competitive advantage 
to jurisdictions. Third, labour standards as social insurance spreads risk among 
the workers as a group. These standards help workers to insure their group against 
future economic uncertainties. Employers pay a part of the wages to certain 
schemes, making them a burden that governments try to ease in their attempts to 
attract investors. Fourth, labour standards designed to empower groups of 
                                                        
163 Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) 155. 
164 This means that an increase in wages in one firm does not prompt all possible workers to go 
to that firm. Furthermore, a wage cut does not prompt all of that firm’s workers to leave. 
This implies that the workforce is dependent not only on the wages but also on other 
elements such as distance from the workplace, hours of work, job specification, and social 
environment. See Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2002) 160, Manning (2003) 1. 
165 Charny (2000) 283. For theories against standards as a tax on labour, see Charny (2000) 
287. 
166 Charny (2000). 
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workers aim at redistributing bargaining power between employers and 
employees. In general, it is considered that employees have little bargaining 
power compared to employers, and therefore governments encourage and defend 
the creation of trade unions, and increase the negotiating power of employees. 
Trade unions have a social function, and are often a sign of a country’s healthy 
economy. From this perspective, they are considered by governments to be an 
important competitive factor. 
In Europe, labour policies are considered important factors with regard to a 
country’s competitiveness.167 The promotion of employment and the 
improvement of living and working conditions are some objectives of the 
European Union and its Member States.168 These objectives are achieved through 
legislative and court decisions, which aim at making the EU a common market 
with free movement of workers. The goal of all this legislation is to set minimum 
standards for working conditions that Member States will not be able to breach.169 
Apart from having a human face, these norms block the race-to-the-bottom of 
labour legislation. In fact, competition in labour law is believed to be immune to 
the race-to-the-bottom problem.170 Nevertheless, labour law in the EU is not 
immune to other types of difficulties, one of which is social dumping. 
Social dumping is a process whereby a developed country raises the living or 
working standards in such a way as to attract skilled workers and professionals 
from other jurisdictions. This means that unless that country’s unskilled workers 
move away from this jurisdiction, they will remain unemployed. By the same 
token, jurisdictions unable to keep up with such an increase in standards will have 
a higher concentration of unskilled workers and a less qualified workforce.171 
Bellavista (2006) explains that the EU should try to mitigate social dumping either 
through harmonisation or approximation of legislation.172 The tension in this 
                                                        
167 For Bellavista, the asset of labour law in one jurisdiction does not influence in a decisive 
manner the decision of a firm to invest or not in that jurisdiction. This decision is influenced 
by many other factors. See Bellavista (2006) 5. Because this might be true, competitive 
factors should always be considered important, as their role might become decisive in 
several settings. The same can be said of labour law. 
168 Art. 151-153, The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326, 
26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390. 
169 Bellavista (2006) 18. 
170 Charny (2002) 282. 
171 Social dumping can sometimes be mistaken for the inability of a jurisdiction to adjust its 
economy in accordance with the requirements of the market. See Charny (2002) 287-288. 
172 Bellavista (2006) 10-11. 
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regard is considerable, and the debate on harmonisation or approximation is 
heated.173 
To draw some parallel lines with the competition of civil justice systems, it can 
be said that EU Member States have created minimum standards in labour law 
that are an obstacle to the race-to-the-bottom. The question, however, is whether 
they can create a set of minimum standards in civil procedure to mitigate the risk 
of a race-to-the-bottom in the competition of civil justice systems. It can be argued 
that in the EU a minimum set of civil procedure standards exists, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention on Human Rights, and as elaborated by the European 
Court of Human Rights. In line with this, European legislation on private 
international law pays particular attention to the protection of weaker parties.174 
However, the competition in labour law bears the risk of social dumping. This 
does not seem to be the case for the competition of civil justice systems, however, 
as courts and cases do not migrate in the same way that workers do. Theoretically, 
competition in labour law can develop in four directions, and each has different 
characteristics and a different sensitivity. Such a distinction can be made as well 
in analysing the competition of civil justice systems and the way jurisdictions 
might consider responding to them. Competition can develop either by 
improvements in the court infrastructure, in the litigation procedures, or by a 
combination of both. Competition in labour law shows that single units exert little 
influence, which means that the possibility of influencing competition is 
concentrated in the hands of certain organisations. In the case of the civil justice 
system competition, lobby groups can be expected to have considerable sway. 
2.3.4 Competition in contract law and environmental law 
The above examples of company, tax, and labour law aptly demonstrate how 
competition between jurisdictions develops, as well as what some of its 
consequences are. However, examples of competition of jurisdictions can be 
found in other fields of law, and offer different perspectives on the dynamics of 
regulatory competition. This section scrutinises the competition of jurisdictions 
in environmental law and contract law, and submits some conclusions relating to 
these fields of research and the civil justice system competition. 
To some extent, competition in contract law is difficult to tackle, largely because 
of the goal itself. An analysis of how countries try to compete in accordance with 
the laws applicable to a contract is a difficult undertaking, because those laws can 
                                                        
173 Section 3.3 discusses the harmonisation and approximation dichotomy in the context of the 
civil justice system competition. 
174 Section 3.1 provides an analysis of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, focusing on its role in 
the civil justice system competition. 
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be as diverse as the reasons for concluding a contract. In other words, because of 
the plurality of contracts, the applicable laws are diverse, and therefore the fields 
of law where they can compete are numerous. For example, a contract for the 
purchase of an immovable property and a contract for the purchase of a movable 
property have different applicable laws, and they are even more different if 
compared to a contract for the transportation of goods. Furthermore, business-to-
business and business-to-customer contracts have different legal bases compared 
to each other or compared to the contracts concluded between individuals. This 
adds more complexity to the study of the competition in contract law. Moreover, 
an additional difficulty is the fact that different laws apply to different parts of a 
contract. Business-to-business contracts, for example, can reach extraordinary 
levels of complexity with different applicable laws for different parts of the 
contract. It can be argued that competition in contract law can focus only on the 
core part of the contractual transaction. This would mean discriminating between 
important parts of the contract, not to mention the difficulties in distinguishing 
between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ parts. Given the aforementioned difficulties, any 
discussion about competition in contract law should be undertaken with 
caution.175 
Scholarship in this regard has been trying to construct a framework within which 
to analyse competition in contract law.176 For example, Rühl (2010) analyses the 
legal framework that allows the choice of law in contracts in the EU, and 
concludes that it has several limitations. Nevertheless, it remains an important 
element for litigating parties.177 Another study found that even though the choice 
of law and of court in a contract is important, lawyers do not act rationally and 
are often biased because of psychological preconditions.178 Vogenauer (2013) 
goes into more detail in the analysis of choice of law and of court, and concludes 
that no competition exists in contract law.179 On the demand side of the market, 
there are the contracting parties, who in many cases have asymmetric interests 
and different court preferences. Contracting parties possess varied levels of 
information and experience, which is limited but more abundant on the side of the 
most professional party. In view of the limited experience and information, parties 
in a contract choose the law most familiar to them, or that is neutral or 
linguistically accessible. If these criteria are not enough, the perceived 
                                                        
175 Durand-Barthez (2012) accepts these difficulties in setting up a questionnaire that would 
investigate the governing law clause. This survey is discussed in Chapter 4. 
176 This part focuses on the situation in the EU. For empirical studies on the choice of contract 
law in the US, see Eisenberg and Miller (2009) 1475; Sanga (2013). 
177 Rühl (2010) 34. 
178 Durand-Barthez (2012) 510. For more on the process of choice and on some psychological 
implications, see Section 2.6. 
179 Vogenauer (2013). 
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sophistication, the fairness, and the accuracy of a law are taken into account.180 
Based on this description, the demand side does not seem to help competition or 
to behave in such a way as to force the supply side to compete. From this 
perspective, the supply side, which is composed mainly of states, does not have a 
strong incentive to enter into competition. In fact, the supply side does not 
compete at all.181 
In conclusion, it can be said that competition in contract law faces certain 
methodological difficulties related to the delimitation of the research and the 
specification of the aim. Undertaking a study of the contract law competition bears 
the risk of it being submerged in a sea of legal scholarship. In view of this, such a 
study should be limited to a particular contract and within a specific region. 
Regardless of the methodological difficulties, scholarship has approached the 
issue of competition on contract law with interest. The major findings show that 
competition in contract law is a faint reality if it exists at all. The behaviour of 
both the supply and the demand side is not in keeping with that of a competitive 
market.182 
In contrast to the competition in contract law, the competition in environmental 
law is well studied. American scholars were the first to address it and to establish 
a framework based on law and economics. In this regard, environmental law is 
treated as a tax on companies or individuals who engage in exploiting the 
environment. In many instances, environmental law deals with externalities that 
do not have a proper market price, therefore it is difficult to measure the costs and 
benefits of its application.183 In other words, it is difficult to determine what 
damage is done to the environment, and to what extent environmental law 
mitigates it. Nevertheless, subjects of the jurisdiction that enforces environmental 
legislation consider that it protects and enhances welfare. Hence, lowering 
environmental protection would be perceived as lowering the welfare of the 
population in general. Given that environmental protection can be seen as a tax 
                                                        
180 Vogenauer (2013) 23. In this part, perceived is in italics to show that the parties rely on 
perceived knowledge, and have no strong evidence or research to support their choice. This 
is in line with what Durand-Barthez (2012) suggests − that psychological factors play a role 
in the choice of law. 
181 Vogenauer (2012) 29. Despite this, some EU Member States consider that competition is 
beneficial and should receive political support. See Vogenauer (2012) 35. 
182 Cuniberti (2014) offers a different view on the competition for contract law. Based on an 
empirical study conducted on data from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
Cuniberti concludes that there is a tendency to choose the law of England or of Switzerland 
as the law governing international contracts. He calls this competition between jurisdictions, 
with the English and the Swiss being the winners, and the others struggling behind. 
183 Swire (1996) 76. 
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involving companies, tax law competition can be used to draw parallels and 
conclusions with respect to environmental law. 
One of the most widely discussed topics on the competition of jurisdictions in 
environmental law is the race-to-the-bottom.184 In the EU, terms like ‘lowest 
common denominator’ or ‘regulatory meltdown’ have been used as well.185 The 
term race-to-the-bottom has been criticised by some authors as being 
inappropriate and based on false assumptions.186 In short, it can be said that the 
term offers only a mono-dimensional view of the process of jurisdictional 
competition, and does not represent the multi-faceted image of reality. Swire 
(1996) has suggested a more dynamic approach and terminology.187 
In conclusion, it can be said that regulatory competition is a process that has been 
studied in many fields of law. It was submitted above that contract law comprises 
provisions for several specific contracts. Therefore, the competition of 
jurisdictions in contract law would involve as many nuances as the number of 
types of contracts. This caveat can be applied as well to the competition of civil 
justice systems. In fact, many procedures and court competences are dependent 
on the type of case. If a jurisdiction is well known for its diligence in transport 
cases, parties signing a transport contract might choose to submit their claims to 
that court. The same parties might choose another court if the case in dispute 
involves intellectual property rights. Furthermore, some studies have shown that 
the choice of law is not based on rational criteria, and that psychological factors 
play a role. The significance of different factors in the choice of court is analysed 
in Section 5.3. 
Mirroring the discourse on the competition of jurisdictions in environmental law, 
the consequences that affect the quality of law during the civil justice system 
competition can be better described by adopting a multi-dimensional perspective, 
in contrast to the bi-dimensional race-to-the-top vs. race-to-the-bottom view. 
More on this topic is discussed in Section 2.4. 
2.3.5 Concluding remarks 
This section provided an overview of the competition of jurisdictions in different 
fields of law. One of its aims was to draw lessons that can be applied to the 
competition of civil justice systems. Any analogy in this sense should be applied 
                                                        
184 In this regards Holzinger and Sommerer, based on empirical data, conclude that regulatory 
competition in environmental law has produced a race-to-the-top in the EU. See Holzinger 
(2011). 
185 Charny (1991) 423. 
186 Swire and Revesz have both addressed the same issue in numerous articles, starting with 
Swire (1996) and Revesz (1992).  
187 Detailed in Section 2.4. 
59 
 
cautiously, as competition behaves differently in diverse fields of law, and thus 
produces varied consequences.188 The fields chosen are those on which scholars 
have concentrated and produced more studies. This section offers a resumé of the 
findings stated above, which relate mostly to the competition of civil justice 
systems. 
It should be noted that the competition of jurisdictions falls in the grey area that 
divides economics from law, making it a popular theme for law and economics 
scholars. As a consequence, many studies have been reduced to a cold calculation 
that tries to demonstrate the benefits, the side-effects, or the harm of competition, 
with legislation often treated as a burden that imposes costs on companies or 
individuals. Therefore, when countries relax their legislation, they ease the tax 
burden on users of law, and, consequently they lower the costs sustained by 
companies and individuals. While this might be acceptable for tax law, 
environmental law, or labour law, it cannot be true for the competition of civil 
justice systems. The fees paid by parties to courts are in many cases lower than 
the cost of the proceedings, and court fees are lower than other costs, especially 
lawyers’ fees. 
During the overview of the competition of jurisdictions for company law, part of 
the debate centred on the problem of evidence and its meaning. In other words, 
does the empirical evidence demonstrate a competition of jurisdictions for 
incorporations? This issue was raised by Vogenauer (2013)189 with regard to 
regulatory competition in contract law. In the competition for tax law, it might be 
easy to spot competition by monitoring the level of taxes, but if applied to the 
competition of civil justice systems, the monitoring of court fees would show no 
result. Thus far, it can be said that empirical evidence is just one of the indications 
that might prove the existence of the competition of civil justice systems.190 
When addressing the competition of jurisdictions in the EU, scholars consider the 
consequences and problems encountered during a harmonisation process. In broad 
terms, harmonising means making laws similar to each other. While this would 
increase legal certainty in cross-border cases, it might smother competition. 
Furthermore, while harmonisation would increase the unity of the EU and its 
cross-border transactions, it would hinder the innovation process sparked by 
competition. 
                                                        
188 Adams (2011) 229. 
189 Vogenauer (2013). 
190 The problem of assessing the existence of the competition of civil justice systems is 
addressed in Section 2.6. 
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For many scholars, the competition of jurisdictions raises a number of concerns 
regarding the race-to-the-bottom. While some dismiss the issue, others 
consider it a danger. A conceptual problem is that it offers a two-dimensional 
view of the situation. In other words, laws (legislation, legal situation) either 
improve or deteriorate. This view does not take into account other dimensions 
of law and legislation such as desirability or inducing efficiency. For these 
reasons, a perspective that takes into account other aspects is preferred.191 
2.4 Competition of jurisdictions: consequences for the 
quality of law  
One of the consequences of regulatory competition is its influence on the quality 
of law. It can be expected that competing jurisdictions change their legislation in 
the hope of making it more attractive to businesses or other consumers. These 
legislative changes affect the perceived quality of law in different ways. This 
section offers an overview of the discussion in this regard, and draws some 
conclusions in connection with the study of the competition of civil justice 
systems. 
2.4.1 ‘Race-to-the-top’ vs. ‘race-to the-bottom,’ or race to 
somewhere else? 
When discussing consequences for the quality of law during competition, the term 
most often used is race-to-the-bottom or its antonym race-to-the-top. Their 
meaning does not have a wide consensus, however, and many scholars apply their 
own working definition. In general, definitions vary from those that make the 
production of public goods the focus of their attention to those that use legal 
standards to measure the quality of law. In tax law competition, for example, a 
race-to-the-bottom occurs when one country lowers the provision of public goods, 
and taxes are too low relative to the optimal level, while race-to-the-top means 
that the provision of public goods is high and the taxes are set too high.192 Other 
definitions that take into account the quality of law rather than the provision of 
goods are more frequent. According to them, in a race-to-the-bottom, the quality 
of law changes because of competition, and that change is for the worse compared 
to the period before the competition started.193 Two elements are important in this 
definition. The first is that the quality of law changes because of the competition 
activities or as a consequence of the competing process. This means that if the 
                                                        
191 The topic of race-to-the-bottom is addressed in Section 2.4. 
192 Dhillon, Wooders, and Zissimos (2007) 391. 
193 The opposite happens during a race-to-the-top: i.e. the quality of law improves. For the 
definition, see Revesz (1992) 1210; Roe (2003) 595. 
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quality of law in a country decreases, but the country is neither participating in 
any competition nor is affected by it, this is not an indication of a race-to-the-
bottom. The second element is that the quality of law decreases in relation to a 
specific point in time, which is the beginning of the competition process. This 
creates the problem of identifying the exact point in time when the competition 
started. Given that this is a difficult task, scholars in many cases select a time 
before the changes to the legislation under study had been implemented. 
One important characteristic to be aware of during the race-to-the-bottom analysis 
is the fact that its meaning is subjective. When scholars describe the race-to-the-
bottom, it is from the perspective of shareholders in company law, employees in 
labour law, the common population in environmental law, and the state in tax 
law.194 The problem, however, is that if the law deteriorates for one of these 
groups, it improves for their counterparts, which in most cases are companies.195 
The question remains: Are companies what jurisdictions are trying to attract? If 
yes, then why is legislation that helps companies described as being in a race-to-
the-bottom? The answer is that analyses adopt the perspective of the most 
vulnerable side, because in many cases this side has no bargaining power, bears 
the costs of the legal change, and does not profit from the change.196 Companies, 
however, have more bargaining power, sometimes have strong lobbying 
possibilities, and in many cases the proportion of the profits is larger than the 
proportion of the costs. 
What scholars emphasise is that a race-to-the-bottom or a race-to-the-top should 
not be taken a priori, meaning that competition and a race-to-the-bottom need not 
always be associated.197 In fact, the race process needs analysis, but in many cases 
the evidence produced is inconclusive. Many scholars do not agree on whether a 
race-to-the-bottom or a race-to-the-top even exists in their fields of study.198 The 
disagreement about the existence of a race-to-the-bottom are manifested in the 
confused debate regarding the consequences of such a race.199 In tax law, this race 
implies that governments are lowering their taxes to suboptimal levels and losing 
                                                        
194 On tax law, see Razin and Sadka (2012); Hoffmann and Runkel (2012); Kiss (2011); 
Genschel and Schwarz (2011); Ring (2009); Littlewood (2005); Avi-Yonah (2005). On 
company law, see Kamar (2006); Deakin (2006); Roe (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
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197 Dhillon, Wooders, and Zissimos (2007) 392. 
198 For tax law, see Kiss (2011) 641; Genschel and Schwarz (2011) 341; Ring (2009) 28; 
Dhillon, Wooders and Zissimos (2007) 395. For company law, see Kamar (2006) 1727; 
Deakin (2006) 451; Enriques and Gelter (2006) 453; Roe (2003) 591. 
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revenue, and are therefore unable to produce public goods.200 Other scholars posit 
that a race-to-the-bottom can be avoided if a Tiebout mechanism is functioning. 
In this case, the interaction between jurisdictions and populations would offer 
optimal results.201 As well as affecting the quality of law, a race-to-the-bottom 
can produce negative social problems like social dumping and spillover(s).202 
Some scholars consider that a race-to-the-bottom, notwithstanding the negative 
consequences, would be beneficial because it could create a network effect 
between countries;203 others − apart from not believing in the race-to-the-
bottom204 − consider that the bottom would never be touched, so either the term 
should be changed205 or it is not applicable in the first place. Other scholars have 
proposed changing the terminology from the two-dimensional race-to-the-bottom 
vs. race-to-the-top to something better and having more dimensions.206  
The new terminology proposed by Swire (1996) erases the terms race-to-the-
bottom and race-to-the-top in favour of ‘race to strictness-race to laxity’ and ‘race 
to desirability-race to undesirability’. The first category is descriptive, meaning 
that it describes whether laws become more permissive than before, while the 
second category has a normative character, describing whether the competition 
produces the desired effects. In some cases, legislation during competition can 
become stricter,207 but at the same time these effects would be undesirable. 
Important to note here is that this proposal does not change the elements implied 
in the race-to-the-bottom rationale. In other words, the quality of law changes 
because of competition, and a specific timepoint should be used to assess the 
consequences. Furthermore, all these ‘races’ should be judged from a specific 
perspective, which should always be that of the weaker party. Despite offering 
more dimensions and a different point of view regarding the race-to-the-bottom 
scenario, this proposal gained little favour and has seldom been used. This is 
undeserved, however, for two reasons: first, race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-
top are terms that − despite their popularity − generate more debate than results; 
second, Swire’s approach involves two dimensions that can better describe the 
consequences for the quality of law during competition. 
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2.4.2 How to brake in a race-to-the-bottom: observations 
Leaving aside the new terminology suggested by Swire, a question arises: What 
can jurisdictions do in the event of a race-to-the-bottom? The answer is not 
simple. First of all, some jurisdictions do not realise that they are in a race-to-the-
bottom,208 and they keep on going, with negative consequences. To a certain 
extent, this attitude prompts other jurisdictions to enter the race, thus providing 
more impetus. Second, jurisdictions find themselves in a Prisoner’s Dilemma,209 
and they would be better off collaborating with each other rather than 
competing.210 When jurisdictions compete, their behaviour escalates and their 
legal framework deteriorates. If they were to collaborate, jurisdictions would 
determine a common strategy that would hinder the downward spiral. Critics of 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma point out that jurisdictions could reach an agreement to 
avoid suboptimal levels of legislation. Such an agreement would take the form of 
a treaty and a cross-border agreement between countries to maintain a certain 
quality of law in all the jurisdictions. Third, it is hard to measure the quality of 
legislation and the benefits derived from it, which makes it difficult to develop 
and implement policies. 
A proposed solution to the race-to-the-bottom problem involves the intervention 
of a supra-jurisdictional legislator. A classic example of this is the US 
environmental legislation,211 which the federal government took into its hands to 
foil the attempts by some states to use low environmental legislation to attract 
investors. In the EU, a possible way to stop a potential race-to-the-bottom is to 
harmonise a particular field of law, or to establish a minimum level of legal 
standards.212 Minimum standards have been applied in human rights law since the 
creation of the European Convention of Human Rights, which in itself embodies 
the minimum standards that contracting parties cannot breach. The EU in this way 
should play the role of arbiter for competing countries, and protect standards that 
                                                        
208 Littlewood (2005) 453. 
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sceptical approach to the possibility of a Prisoner’s Dilemma in the competition of 
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must not be violated.213 The problem with harmonisation is that it terminates not 
only a race-to-the-bottom but it does away with competition as well.214 This is 
why scholars more often use terms like ‘minimum level of social standards’, 
‘parameters that allow Member States to refer to’, and ‘protection of 
standards’.215 Therefore, if competition is desired, even harmonisation should be 
undertaken with caution. 
In terms of a possible race-to-the-bottom in the competition of civil justice 
systems, it is wise to tread carefully in order to better understand the process.216 
First, it should be established whether a particular jurisdiction is in fact 
competing. Second, it should be established whether the quality of law is 
decreasing in comparison to its level at a particular previous point in time. This 
can be the time at which the jurisdiction decided to take part in the competition, 
or when the last major legislative changes were made. Third, it should be 
established which is the weaker party whose standpoint should be taken to 
evaluate the race-to-the-bottom. In the competition of civil justice systems, 
however, it is difficult to determine which is the weaker side. In general, 
individuals and small enterprises are weaker, but in other cases, it can be argued 
that the defender is the weaker party; nevertheless, this is still relative. As in 
company or environmental law, the debate in this regard is inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the competition of civil justice systems in 
the EU is immune to a race-to-the-bottom. In fact, the EU as a supranational 
legislator should assume the role of arbiter, and take measures to stop a race-to-
the-bottom before it begins. It is understandable that harmonisation and the 
creation of minimal standards in procedural law are difficult, and resistance is 
fierce, but taking slow preparatory steps is better than waiting passively for the 
storm to arrive. 
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2.5 The choice making process  
Competition involving jurisdictions occurs not only because the government 
desires it but also because individuals and companies are able to express their will 
by making choices. This process is of vital importance, and policy makers should 
pay closer attention to it. Studies having a legal or an economic background tend 
to have a rational approach to the process of choice making. They consider the 
decision maker to be as rational as homo economicus, a being that is capable of 
always making the best decision, thereby reducing choice making to a formula of 
static factors. This conceptualisation is also reflected in empirical studies of 
jurisdictional competition, where researchers try to find factors that influence a 
rational choice maker. Commenting on the results of empirical research that he 
co-conducted, Durand-Barthez (2015) concluded that in many cases the choice of 
jurisdiction is influenced by psychological factors rather than being the result of 
rational thinking.217 Given that these factors play a significant role in the choice 
making process, this section offers a brief description of related findings. 
2.5.1 Choice preferences and choice categories 
As regards choice, almost the first thought is to consider it a rational process, 
meaning that an individual using his free arbiter can decide upon a given issue. 
Choice rationality means that individuals see the issue clearly, they have complete 
information about the cost and benefits of each option, and they compare the 
options in a single scale,218 after which they make a choice in order to maximise 
their preferences. The origin of the preferences is considered exogenous.219 Thus, 
an important element in the choice making process is preference, which can be 
conscious or unconscious. Conscious preferences reflect the needs and objectives 
of the choice maker, while unconscious preferences reflect his prejudices and 
biases. For example, a litigant seeking a court has certain needs and objectives to 
which certain preferences correspond. If the litigant wants to delay the process, 
he will prefer a slow court. If the litigant wants to lower the costs, he will prefer 
a low-fee court and other similar characteristics. Unconscious biases are, for 
example, a preference for a certain country, for a certain type of person, or for a 
certain kind of culture; they are not recognised, but play a role in the decision 
making process. It is suggested that individuals categorise preferences based on 
                                                        
217 Durand-Barthez (2012) 505, 510. 
218 Meaning that the value of every issue, problem, or question can be translated into a single 
denominator or measuring unit, and thereby become comparable. 
219 As Schwartz explains it, “…preferences are frequently described as exogenous to the model 
of rational choice, meaning both that the model has nothing to say about them and that 
whatever the story on the origins of preferences may turn out to be, the power and validity 
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their needs and possibilities,220 meaning that they create categories in their mind, 
and while determining their preferences, they tend to calculate how much they 
will gain in each of these categories. For example, let us say that a litigant wants 
to save costs, but at the same time wants to delay litigation. This person’s 
preferences will land on the elements that satisfy both categories. The problem 
with categories is that they are not equal; in fact one category can have a weight 
that far outweighs the others. In the above example, one of the categories is more 
important for the litigant, which means that the preferences for this category will 
take precedence over the others. At this point, it is important to understand how 
categories come into being. Some are created as a result of habit, cultural norms, 
and tradition.221 It can be expected that when litigants and lawyers make a choice, 
they take into account certain categories of needs and their corresponding 
preferences. Some individuals have clear knowledge of the above-mentioned 
categories, and try to avoid these by being influenced only by other factors such 
as market trend or fashion. The literature that criticises rational choice theory is 
abundant,222 with critics claiming that it is extremely difficult to fulfil all the 
requirements of the ‘rational’ definition. However, it should be remembered that 
in the present research, the term rational choice is also used to point out the 
importance of preferences and categories. 
Despite varied criticism of the rational choice theory, preference and categories 
hold as essential elements during the choice making process. Even irrational 
choice makers use preferences and create categories. As shown in this section, 
individuals who choose the court should be investigated beyond the jurisdiction 
they select. Their preferences and choice categories should be explored in depth 
for a clearer understanding of how the demand side of the civil justice system 
competition behaves. 
2.5.2 Choice seen as provoking anxiety and blocking decision 
making 
In some modern societies, individuals are vested with the idea that they have 
immense freedom, and are entitled to a lifetime of pleasure and happiness. 
Constant marketing and media displays bombard people with the notion that they 
are masters of their own life, with endless choices at their disposal. A person 
might almost see his life as being a piece of art that can be shaped and moulded 
according to his will.223 Paradoxically, this notion increases insecurity and anxiety 
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during choice making.224 In fact, in modern times, individuals are supposed by 
society to possess all the information necessary to make an appropriate decision. 
When the time comes, however, this supposition creates an anxiety that translates 
into a feeling of inadequacy and uncertainty. The individual may feel lacking in 
knowledge, and so turns to authorities225 in search of relevant information, but 
then constantly doubts the authority. The anxiety is also increased in terms of the 
image that the individual wants to project. Choice making is not an individual 
process,226 but one in which the person takes into account how his actions will be 
perceived by others. The opinion of others is another anxiety factor during the 
choice making process.227 
In addition to this behaviour during the choice making process, the perceived 
freedom to choose is sometimes masked by what is referred to as forced choice, 
which can best be illustrated by the famous gag question ‘your money or your 
life’. Here the robber appears to be offering the victim a choice, but in fact he is 
offering only a single possibility, and sometimes not even that. In some cases, 
people that have to make a forced choice can experience severe instances of 
neurosis.228 
The reason that making a choice induces anxiety is because choosing one things 
mean losing another.229 When a person makes a choice, he loses the possibility or 
chance of following the other option. People in modern societies respond to this 
anxiety by trying not to make any choice at all, which may even – at a basic level 
− partly explain why some restaurants offer limited menus. If customers are 
confronted with an extensive menu, they become anxious, and often regret the 
choice they eventually make. Many books and advice columns are published daily 
with the sole purpose of helping individuals develop strategies to limit their 
choices.230 This is a strange but obvious response to the anxiety induced by the 
need to make a choice. Regardless of how much anxiety a choice entails, however, 
it is an important element in furthering progress and in societal and scientific 
research. 
Decision makers face great difficulties when confronted with multiple options, 
and this can result in a choice overload. In other words, too great a choice can be 
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challenging. Experiments have shown that when people in a supermarket have a 
choice of only six varieties of jam, they are more prone to choose and buy one of 
them, compared to if there are thirty varieties.231 Apart from resulting in people 
buying less jam, choice overload can lead to production paralysis, poor decision 
making, and dissatisfaction with good decisions. In other words, even though 
choice is related to freedom, too much choice may restrict that freedom. 
2.5.3 Maximisers or satisficers? 
As explained earlier, the possibility of choosing does not mean that a person will 
be happier. Anxiety looms over choice makers. Furthermore, choice is not fully 
rational, but is influenced by other elements. It is also true that not everyone 
behaves in the same way during the choice making process. In fact, individuals 
can be divided into Maximisers and Satisficers.232 Maximisers233 always want the 
best, and are not happy with a second-best alternative. Satisficers, however, can 
also accept good-enough options. As regards choice, this has several implications. 
In comparison to Satisficers, Maximisers tend to spend more time and effort in 
making their choice. This means that the choice made by the Maximiser is more 
costly than that made by a Satisficer. Furthermore, after the choice has been made, 
there is a high probability that Maximisers will find an option that is better than 
the one they had just chosen, which will cause them to regret their choice. 
Maximisers are more prone to be quickly dissatisfied with the choice they make. 
In fact, during the choice making process, while they are investigating and 
evaluating several options, they start building expectations. The risk is that these 
expectations can exceed the perceived satisfaction, and therefore make the choice 
appear less satisfactory if satisfactory at all. The consequences are even worse 
when a Maximiser cannot determine the best option, as Maximisers tend to be less 
adaptive to options and to become frustrated. In the end, being plagued by so 
many problems related to choice increases the possibility of Maximisers falling 
into depression. 
Lawyers are constantly expected to perform well or to over-perform. Requests 
from their clients and their superiors exert considerable pressure on them to make 
impeccable decisions. An environment that behaves like a maximising choice 
maker emerges, which pushes lawyers towards the same previously mentioned 
constraints. In this environment, lawyers will refrain from making risky decisions, 
and will adapt less to the changing environment, which has a negative impact on 
the civil justice system competition. Lawyers would be reluctant to choose a 
                                                        
231 Schwartz (2000) 86. 
232 This part is based on Schwartz (2004). 
233 Schwartz has created a scale to categorise Maximisers. Maximisers are those that score 4 or 
higher on the scale, which is a set of 14 questions. For more, see Schwartz (2004) 72. 
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jurisdiction that has not been tested, fearing that they were not making the best 
choice as Maximisers. The Maximiser and Satisficer dichotomy has considerable 
potential to influence lawyers in determining their choice of court. It is suggested 
that dedicated studies be conducted to examine more thoroughly how this 
condition affects lawyers. 
2.5.4 Making a choice and choosing a court 
Making a choice is an internal human process that manifests in the outside world 
as a decision. No matter how formal the decision, the internal process is loaded 
with some of the aforementioned psychological characteristics. As a result, even 
the choosing of a court should be considered in the light of psychological 
processes that influence human behaviour. One of these factors is the creation of 
categories of needs to which a different set of preferences correspond. However, 
because decision makers create many categories and have many preferences, they 
also face more decision options. Research has shown that a plurality of choice 
options induces anxiety that in turn prevents decision makers from making an 
appropriate choice. This is even more pronounced for Maximisers, who often 
regret or are dissatisfied with their choice. Lawyers and their working 
environment tend to be Maximisers, and the combination of these factors creates 
a choice overload.234 This means that choice makers either face psychological 
difficulties in making a choice or they are not able to make a decision at all. To 
overcome this, choice makers resort to reducing choice alternatives. 
In the choice of court process, lawyers often have the possibility of choosing 
between more than two options. In addition to the information barriers, choice 
overload and other psychological factors can prevent lawyers from considering 
certain jurisdictions. This of course is to the detriment of the regulatory 
competition in general and to the civil justice system competition in particular. 
Thus far, empirical studies have not rigorously tackled the problem of 
psychological influences. Durand-Barthez (2012) is one of the few researchers to 
acknowledge that psychological factors play a role during the choice of law 
process. Therefore, it is important that theoretical studies examine choice making 
as a psychological process. Empirical research is also needed to provide data on 
theoretical advances, as well as to determine possible missing elements. 
                                                        
234 Low (2013); Posner (2013). 
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2.6 Assessment steps for the competition of civil justice 
systems 
The regulatory competition can be studied and described from many different 
viewpoints. Arguably, diverse mechanisms and perspectives can be used to 
measure competition. Often a point of contention is not so much the existence of 
competition but its intensity, and intensity is important with regard to the expected 
results of the competition. Because the behaviour of parties involved in 
competition is affected not only by the existence of competition but also by its 
intensity, this section proposes a mechanism to assess that intensity. First, the 
mechanism is described, and then observations and examples are presented. 
Studies on the competition of jurisdictions are in some cases inconclusive, with 
the ongoing debate on company, tax, environmental, and labour law being a good 
example. In company law, for instance, scholars still argue whether competition 
is an ongoing process or a phenomenon of the past.235 The same discussion also 
recurs in other fields of law, including the competition of civil justice systems. 
These examples demonstrate that providing a clear-cut answer is difficult, and 
sometimes not truly in line with reality. A better approach would be to give grades 
to the process of competition, in the same way that hotels or restaurants receive 
stars or grades for their quality. In other words, it would be beneficial for the study 
of regulatory competition to introduce a benchmark, a grade system, or an 
assessment mechanism to determine its intensity. 
In this section, a three-step mechanism that measures the intensity of a 
competition of jurisdictions is proposed. Two of these steps are qualifying 
conditions, meaning that without them a process cannot be qualified as 
competition, while the remaining step is complementary or qualitative, meaning 
a condition that can assess the intensity of competition. If a supposed competition 
process does not fulfil the qualifying conditions, it means there can be no talk of 
a competition process. If the process reaches the score of zero, it means there is 
no competition. If the maximum score is reached, the process under study is a 
‘pure competition’ as assessed by the mechanism. Pure competition means that 
the process measured has reached the maximum score for this scale. 
2.6.1 Assessing the intensity of the competition of jurisdictions 
To begin with, let us assume that the degree of the competition between 
jurisdictions in a given legal field is 𝐹(𝑐). 
                                                        
235 Described in Section 2.3.1. 
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I. The first step is a qualifying one. From among a predefined number 
of potential jurisdictions, it measures the ratio of countries that are 
active in the competition. 
Studies on the competition consider a pool of jurisdictions to be potentially equal 
to compete. For example, when the competition of jurisdictions in the US is 
studied, all the states are considered to be equally interested in it; the same can be 
true when the competition of jurisdictions in the EU is examined. These countries 
are considered potential competitors but without any proof of their interest in 
competing. A priori, they are presumed to be potentially interested in competition 
for the sake of the study and not on the basis of their merits. At this point, let us 
assume the potential jurisdictions to be 𝑛𝑝. It is clear that the value of 𝑛𝑝 cannot 
be zero, otherwise it makes no sense to study competition if there is no group of 
jurisdictions to be studied. From this set, only some of the jurisdictions will show 
signs of interest in competition and be willing to take part in it; the others will 
remain uninterested and nonreactive. Let the jurisdictions that demonstrate some 
form of interest or activity be 𝑛𝑎. The problem might be how to detect this interest. 
In general, it could stream from the government and be expressed in any possible 
form. In its purest form, this interest is expressed through political and/or 
legislative actions. For this step, every form of expressed interest in the 
competition of jurisdictions should be counted as valid, and the jurisdiction that 
expresses is counted as 𝑛𝑎. The value of 𝑛𝑎 can be zero or one, which means that 
there is no country that shows interest in competing, and therefore there is no 
competition. Measuring the ratio between 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑛𝑎 would give a value to the 
interest of the jurisdictions in the competition process. The nearer the ratio is to 
one, the more jurisdictions are interested in competition, and the more intense the 
competition is expected to be. The nearer the ratio is to zero, the weaker the 
competition. Based on this, the value of 𝐹(𝑐) in relation to 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑛𝑎 would be 
𝐹(𝑐) = 𝑓(
𝑛𝑎
𝑛𝑝
). As previously mentioned, it is obvious that 𝑛𝑝 cannot be zero, 
otherwise the function is not valid, while in real life it means that it makes no 
sense to speak of competition, because there is no potential for it. While if 𝑛𝑎 is 
zero, the value of 𝐹(𝑐) would be zero, meaning that there is no competition. In an 
extreme case when 𝑛𝑝 and 𝑛𝑎 are equal, 𝐹(𝑐) would be one, meaning a very 
intense competition. 
II. The second step is a quantitative one. It measures the actions taken 
by jurisdictions in the process of competition. The actions can be 
political and/or legislative. 
As mentioned in Step I, jurisdictions can take political or/and legislative actions 
as competition activities. Political activity should be considered any form of 
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official debate to promote the benefits as well as the positive aspects of a 
jurisdiction, in addition to policy drafting and implementation actions that 
promote competition. Furthermore, actions carried out or supported by the 
government or one of its agencies should be considered political activities. Let 
these activities be 𝜋, which measures all the actions taken by all the jurisdictions 
together, and not only the actions taken by a single jurisdiction. For example, 𝜋 
can be expressed as 𝜋𝐹𝑟 + 𝜋𝑈𝑆 + 𝜋𝐺𝑒𝑟 + 𝜋𝐼𝑡 = 𝜋, where 𝜋𝐹𝑟 ,  𝜋𝑈𝑆, 𝜋𝐺𝑒𝑟 , 𝜋𝐼𝑡 are 
political activities in France, United States, Germany, and Italy. 
As well as political activities, competing jurisdictions can engage in legislative 
activities, which would change a jurisdiction’s legislative package and offer new 
competitive products to businesses and individuals. ‘Consumers’ of the law need 
not only political rhetoric but legislative actions as well. Legislative activity 
would be considered any change, amendment, or approval of law in the legislative 
field where the jurisdiction is competing in order to give the country a 
comparative advantage. Moreover, changes in by-laws, regulations, procedures, 
directives, and other legislation should also be counted as legislative activity. In 
contrast, legislative proposals should be considered political rather than 
legislative actions. Let the political activities be 𝜑. 
The sum of political and legislative actions would be 𝜋 + 𝜑, were 𝜋, 𝜑 ∈  𝑁. 
There are two difficulties in calculating this step, of which the first is how to count 
activities. Would many activities related to each other count as one? Would a 
single activity be dissected into small components? If a liberal counting approach 
is taken, the value of 𝜋 and 𝜑 might be higher than the actual situation. The 
counting from two different persons can give different results. Furthermore, it 
might be difficult to distinguish between a political and a legislative activity. 
Legislative activities are sometimes preceded by political activities, which for one 
person might be considered a single activity, while for another it might be more 
than one. Therefore, it is useful to introduce an arbitrary cap of ten to the value 
that 𝜋 and 𝜑 can reach.236 This has two benefits. First, it makes a distinction 
between a process that has one legislative or political activity and a process that 
has two or three or more. Beyond ten activities, two processes should be 
considered equally competitive, at least as regards this step. Second, by 
introducing a cap of ten, the importance of this step remains limited and does not 
overshadow the others. With reference to the previously mentioned difficulties, 
the second one is in establishing a timeframe from which to begin counting the 
activities. This can be resolved by measuring when countries began to show 
interest in the competition process. An obstacle to this can be the fact that 
                                                        
236 The limit of ten is arbitrary, but allows ( 𝜋 + 𝜑) to take nearly twenty values and therefore 
have considerable influence on the value of the intensity. 
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jurisdictions are not synchronised in their competitive interest. Therefore, two 
jurisdictions might have a difference of ten or more years as regards expressing 
their interest. This problem can be resolved by establishing a timeframe and 
counting activities only within this period. In conclusion, the degree of the 
competition in relation to the first two steps is 𝐹(𝑐) =
𝑛𝑎
𝑛𝑝
( 𝜋 + 𝜑), where 𝜋 ≤
10  and  𝜑 ≤ 10. 
III. The third step is a qualitative one. The competition of jurisdictions 
is composed not only of some jurisdictions that offer their legislation 
or legal environment but also of consumers that take up their offers. 
These consumers comprise the demand part. This step serves to 
establish the presence and the magnitude of the demand side in a 
competition process. 
If two or more parties compete, they need to know which one has an advantage 
and the nature of its most appreciated element. In other words, they need feedback 
on their competitive behaviour. In the competition of jurisdictions, the feedback 
is provided by legal consumers that use the legislation on offer. Calculating this 
step is similar to the process in the first step. First, the set of target legal consumers 
(𝑙𝑡) should be established. It can be argued that the whole population of 𝑛𝑝 and 
even more can be considered as 𝑙𝑡. But when 𝑛𝑝 think of entering into 
competition, their target legal consumers are not all the companies and individuals 
in their areas.237 Their target is only a limited number of consumers, which most 
often are associated with big companies. Therefore, 𝑙𝑡 should be studied carefully 
and established, and not be presumed to be 𝑙𝑝 = 𝑙𝑡. The number of the target legal 
consumers is not enough to give a meaning to the formula; as with the first step, 
it should be related to the number of actual legal consumers 𝑙𝑎. Legal consumers 
do not only express their interest in the competition of jurisdictions − they also 
choose one of the jurisdictions based on certain rational criteria. There are two 
important elements in this step: the choice process and the rationale behind the 
choice. The first requires the legal consumer to pick one or two of the offers and 
to use them. If he does not make a choice and the choice is forced upon him, or if 
he fails to do it, this means that the choice does not take into account any of the 
offers, and therefore does not contribute to the competition.238 The second element 
is rational choice. If the legal consumer chooses not because there is a rational 
reasoning but because of tradition or routine or some other ingrained behaviour, 
he fails to deliver a message to the competing parties. This kind of legal consumer 
                                                        
237 The total number of potential legal customers can be represented by 𝑙𝑝, where 𝑙𝑝 > 𝑙𝑡. 
238 Imposed or forced choices should not be considered choices at all. Therefore, the number of 
legal consumers that make forced choices should be discounted. 
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does not take into account any of the advantages or disadvantages of the parties. 
Therefore, these two elements need to be present in order for a legal consumer to 
qualify as 𝑙𝑎. 
The magnitude of the demand side can be expressed as the ratio between 𝑙𝑎 and 
𝑙𝑡. It is obvious that 𝑙𝑡 cannot be zero, because there is no competition without a 
target group of customers, as the function is not valid. However, 𝑙𝑎 can be zero, 
which means that there is no competition, because there is no demand side and 
the value of the function is zero. Combining the three steps, the formula for the 
intensity of competition can be expressed as 𝐹(𝑐) =
𝑛𝑎
𝑛𝑝
( 𝜋 + 𝜑)
𝑙𝑎
𝑙𝑡
, where 𝜋 ≤
10  and  𝜑 ≤ 10. 
2.6.2 Hypothetical case studies 
Let us consider some hypothetical cases of competition and examine the outcome 
of the assessment mechanism. 
Case 1: In a particular field of law, twenty-eight jurisdictions can potentially 
compete to attract legal-consumers (𝑛𝑝 = 28). Only six of twenty-eight 
jurisdictions are competing (𝑛𝑎 = 6). These jurisdictions have engaged in some 
political and legal activities to compete (𝜋 + 𝜑 = 12). From a survey of two 
hundred lawyers (𝑙𝑡 = 200), forty of them responded that they choose rationally 
between one of the competing jurisdictions because of a competitive advantage it 
offers (𝑙𝑎 = 40). From these data, it can be calculated that the intensity of 
competition in this case is 𝐹(𝑐) = 0,5142. This score is very low if compared to 
the maximum of twenty that the assessment can reach. The reason for this is the 
relatively small proportion of jurisdictions that take part in the competition, along 
with the small proportion of legal consumers that are interested in it. 
Case 2: In a particular field of law, four jurisdictions can potentially compete to 
attract legal consumers (𝑛𝑝 = 4). Only three of four jurisdictions are competing 
(𝑛𝑎 = 3). These jurisdictions have engaged in some political and legal activities 
to compete (𝜋 + 𝜑 = 6). From a survey of forty lawyers (𝑙𝑡 = 40), thirty-nine 
responded that they choose rationally between one of the competing jurisdictions 
because of a competitive advantage it offers (𝑙𝑎 = 39). From these data, it can be 
calculated that the intensity of competition in this case is 𝐹(𝑐) = 4,3875. This 
score remains low because of the limited amount of political and legislative 
activity on the part of the competing jurisdictions. As mentioned earlier, 
legislative and political activities are important in demonstrating the interest of 
the jurisdictions, and in showing that they are trying to change and to offer 
different and new attractive solutions to legal consumers. 
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Case 3: In a particular field of law, fifty jurisdictions can potentially compete to 
attract legal consumers (𝑛𝑝 = 50). Only two of fifty jurisdictions are competing 
(𝑛𝑎 = 2). These jurisdictions have engaged in some political and legal activities 
to compete (𝜋 + 𝜑 = 20). From a survey of six hundred lawyers (𝑙𝑡 = 600), five 
hundred and fifty responded that they choose rationally between one of the 
competing jurisdictions because of a competitive advantage it offers (𝑙𝑎 = 550). 
From these data, it can be calculated that the intensity of competition in this case 
is 𝐹(𝑐) = 0,7333. The score is very low because of the limited number of 
jurisdictions that take part in this competition despite the large number of legal 
consumers that are interested and the large number of political and legislative 
activities observed. 
On the basis of these hypothetical cases, it should be said that a high-intensity 
competition is one that achieves a high score in all the components. It can also be 
said that competition is not a process that can be carried out from only one side 
(offer-demand) − it needs both − and furthermore, it needs real engagement from 
jurisdictions to create a political and legislative stimulus in order to be attractive 
and to compete with other jurisdictions. 
2.6.3 Comments on the assessment mechanism 
The assessment mechanism is intended to be used along the lines of empirical 
research because it can give a value to the intensity of regulatory competition. In 
many cases, empirical studies produce figures without taking a good 
comprehensive look at their magnitude and gravity. Using data derived from 
empirical research, applying the assessment mechanism would at least give an 
idea of the competition’s intensity. Measuring the intensity, however, is not the 
same as measuring the quality, which is a topic that requires a different approach, 
including a careful inspection of the policies employed. Furthermore, the 
mechanism is unable say anything about a possible race-to-the-bottom or a race-
to-the-top, or about laxity, strictness, or anything else. Another limitation is 
related to the quality of the sources it is using. If these are not trustworthy, or they 
do not provide figures to express the variables of the formula, the results of the 
assessment mechanism will be weak or not useful at all. 
Parties interested in competing can apply the results of the mechanism to evaluate 
their possibilities. A low assessment score means that the intensity is low, and 
therefore − in comparison to a high score − there is more space for competitors. 
The lowest score that the assessment can yield is zero, which means there is no 
competition to speak of. The highest possible score is twenty, which means full-
intensity competition. The higher the score, the higher the intensity of 
competition, and therefore the more difficult to compete or to enter the 
competition. 
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It must be said that the assessment mechanism does not measure the extent of the 
competition, as this measurement can be derived only from surveys or empirical 
studies. In this sense, the extent would be described by the size of firms in a 
market. The larger the size, the smaller the competition.239 
2.7 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of certain topics that recur in 
the studies on regulatory competition, and are important for the research on civil 
justice systems. 
On competition 
Section 2.1 showed that a competition of jurisdictions has long been observed. 
However, competition earned its prominence in economics thanks to the work of 
Adam Smith (1776), who argued that, if left alone, competing self-interested 
individuals would produce more wealth and benefits for society compared to a 
society constrained by restrictions. Since Smith, competition has undergone 
various types of scrutiny, although it is generally agreed that it confers benefits 
on individuals and society alike. Among the benefits is its ability to promote an 
efficient allocation of resources. Efficiency also affects the use of human 
resources and innovation in production and products. Competition, however, is 
vulnerable to market distortions such as monopoly, oligopoly, and oligopsony. 
Governments or market regulators should be careful to investigate market 
distortions and to help competition remain ‘healthy’. 
Competition is also credited with the accumulation of knowledge and social 
norms. Hayek (1948) was one of the promoters of this idea, according to which 
competing units tend to create a social order with efficient rules that change 
according to changing needs, while interacting and competing parties create a 
process of discovery whereby they try to overtake other competitors. The 
discovery process creates a process of knowledge accumulation that is important 
for social development. 
                                                        
239 This is measured by the Herfindahl Index (often referred to as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index), which measures the concentration of firms in an industry. As mentioned, the higher 
the Herfindahl Index the lower the competitiveness of the market in a given industry. 
Measuring the Herfindahl Index requires considerable data and which are difficult to collect. 
For the civil justice systems, in particular, it requires court data from all the Member States 
about the number of cross-border commercial cases in order to establish the market share of 
each Member State so that the concentration in this particular industry can be assessed, and 
therefore the competitiveness of this market. If data are available, it would be interesting to 
see in the future researchers that use the Herfindahl Index in the study of regulatory 
competition. Besanko (2013) 171-172, Baker (2010) 238. 
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Several theories have been developed, with competition as their main theme. 
Among them, Tiebout’s theory stands out as an important contribution to the 
competition of jurisdictions. The aim of his theory was to clarify how a 
government could assess the needs of its population and allocate its resources 
more efficiently. According to Tiebout, individuals that were free to move would 
go to the jurisdiction that better satisfied their needs. Consequently, governments 
would know for sure that those individuals wanted the services that they were 
being offered. Tiebout’s theory showed that competing jurisdictions, when 
working optimally, could efficiently allocate their resources. 
On regulatory competition 
The regulatory competition of civil justice systems is developed to a lesser extent 
compared to the regulatory competition in company, tax, and labour law. It is 
worth examining the findings and the conclusions regarding these competitions, 
as they may be useful in light of the following chapters dedicated to the civil 
justice system competition. The competition of jurisdictions in company law has 
been particularly active in the US, where states compete with each other to attract 
companies to incorporate in their jurisdictions. The hope is that these companies 
will increase the revenue and the benefits of the hosting state. Revenue derives 
from the incorporation fees or other taxes that companies pay to the tax authorities 
in the hosting jurisdiction. Along with this direct revenue, there is also certain 
indirect revenue as well as benefits that states hope to gain. Among other benefits, 
competition in company law increases the revenue of the local lawyer community 
and the local professional community involved in the business of company law. 
These groups pay taxes and provide employment, which increases the welfare of 
the competing state. It can be expected that a civil justice system competition will 
provide similar incentives for competing states. However, because of Delaware’s 
dominant role and the relatively passive role of the other states, it is still debatable 
whether competition in company law in the US is over. It has been argued that it 
is not over, but continues at a low level of intensity. Competitive pressure to 
change and to improve still exists, and remains important for the development of 
legislation. 
In labour law, jurisdictions compete to attract the best segment of the workforce, 
by offering good working conditions, work security, and other benefits. Better 
working conditions improve the performance and the productivity of the 
workforce, which is beneficial for the government. However, competitive 
jurisdictions attract the best elements of non-competitive jurisdictions, and thus 
deplete the latter’s human resources. This consequence is called social dumping, 
which − combined with other factors – makes it extremely difficult for certain 
societies to be able to overcome their own period of under-development. This 
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under-development also has a legal aspect, which is worrying when it applies to 
the civil justice system competition. 
Competition in tax law suggests that some jurisdictions use their legislation to 
attract businesses. This comes as no surprise, considering companies’ sensitivity 
with regard to taxation. Symmetric tax competition is the competition of similar-
sized jurisdictions, while asymmetric tax competition is the competition of 
jurisdictions of different sizes. Size is important in tax competition because it 
denotes the sensitivity of a jurisdiction to revenue derived from taxation. Small 
jurisdictions are less sensitive, which means they can lower their taxes and be 
more attractive. Large jurisdictions are more sensitive, which means they cannot 
lower the level of taxation too much. This is owing to the presence of a static tax 
base, which is that segment of the business population that is not able to move 
from one jurisdiction to another. In general, this is the largest part of the 
population that the government tries to satisfy. Developing jurisdictions are more 
prone to lower the standards of their tax legislation in order to be attractive to 
companies. Lowering standards because of competition has been described as a 
race-to-the-bottom. 
The idea that competition promotes a race-to-the-bottom implies that the quality 
of law deteriorates. When discussing deterioration, it is assumed that the 
discussion is from the perspective of the weaker party, because they are vulnerable 
to the abuses of more sophisticated parties, and therefore deserve the protection 
of legislators. A race-to-the-bottom apparently occurs to the detriment of these 
weaker parties, although some scholars point out that this is not entirely true. 
Competing jurisdictions improve their legislation in order to be attractive to legal 
customers, and these attempts to compete promote a race-to-the-top. In order to 
prevent a deterioration in the quality of their law, competing jurisdictions can 
agree on a set of minimum legal standards that cannot be breached. These 
standards guarantee the basic rights of weaker parties, and can promote a race-to-
the-top on the basis that lowering the standards is not possible. The top-bottom 
dichotomy can be criticised, however, for not being able to depict all the shades 
of competition. A suggestion is to use laxity-strictness and desirability-
undesirability as measurements; indeed, it can be argued that more measurements 
can better describe the effects of competition on law. 
On choice 
The choosing of a court is a psychological process that begins internally and 
manifests in the outside world in the form of a selection. The choice process is 
influenced by preferences and the categorisation of needs that exist − consciously 
and unconsciously − in everyone. Conscious preferences are influenced by past 
experiences, taste, intellect, and other factors, while unconscious preferences are 
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based on the biases and prejudices that choice makers may not even be aware that 
they have. These preferences are used to fulfil certain categories of needs. And 
although categories can be equally significant, they also differ in importance. 
Choice makers would tend to satisfy the most important categories, first in 
accordance with their conscious and unconscious preferences. However, making 
a choice is not so easy. In modern societies where sources of information are 
widespread, everyone is assumed to be capable of making a good – or appropriate 
− choice. For this reason, some individuals find themselves under pressure. 
Anxiety also increases when choice makers face a growing number of choices. As 
a consequence, some people fail to make a choice at all, or surrender their choice 
privilege to someone else. Lawyers are important actors in the civil justice system 
competition, and are not insulated from these choice-related problems. It can be 
argued that lawyers face the same difficulties, are affected by biases, and perceive 
anxiety the same way as anyone else faced with having to make a choice. It was 
suggested in Section 2.5 that lawyers might be choice Maximisers, which means 
they tend to aim for the best, and therefore during their choice making process 
they face difficulties in determining the most favourable option. They are often 
dissatisfied with their choice. These psychological constraints play an important 
role for choice makers, and consequently for the civil justice system competition. 
Further studies on this issue would provide more robust results and conclusions. 
This chapter introduced certain important topics and notions relating in general to 
the civil justice system competition. However, the major focus of this study is the 
competition in the European Union. The following chapter provides an analysis 
of the legal framework with regard to choice of court and choice of law, and is in 
the form of a discussion on the interaction between harmonisation and the civil 
justice system competition. 
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Chapter 3 Freedom of choice, harmonisation, 
and the competition of jurisdictions 
in the EU 
3.1 Choice of court in the Brussels I (recast) Regulation and 
the civil justice system competition 
The legal possibility of choosing a court is one of the most important, if not the 
most important, elements that fosters the development of the civil justice system 
competition. In the EU, choice of court is regulated by the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation. In addition to choice of court, this Regulation sets the rules on 
jurisdiction, and on the recognition and enforcement of court decisions. The 
Regulation is based on a number of principles that support party autonomy and 
the freedom to choose. Therefore, it is important for this research to discuss the 
most significant principles and articles related to the civil justice system 
competition. While attention is focused on the part of the Regulation that allows 
choice of court, the first section provides an outline of the Regulation’s other 
articles. 
3.1.1 From the Brussels Convention to the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation 
This section provides a brief overview of the historical steps that marked the 
creation of the Brussels Regime, describing the path from the Brussels 
Convention to the Brussels I (recast) Regulation. 
The original six Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
had a common interest in facilitating trade and economic exchange. In keeping 
with the EEC Treaty provided in Article 220, Member States were entitled to enter 
into negotiations with each other to secure the simplification of formalities and 
procedures for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments. On 27 
September 1968, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands signed the treaty known as the Brussels Convention. The drafting 
Committee was daring enough to propose rules not only on the recognition and 
enforcement of court decisions but also on assigning the jurisdiction of courts in 
international cases.240 This proposal avoided concepts related to nation states like 
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reciprocity or nationality as a connecting factor.241 Abandoning nation-related 
concepts meant that the EEC regarded Member States as parts of a single unit, 
which would be the basis upon which the Brussels Regulations would stand. To 
guarantee the uniform interpretation and application of the Convention, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) was given jurisdiction to interpret it.242 Indeed, 
the distribution of jurisdictions among Member States is important, but a uniform 
interpretation is also of considerable significance. 
The problem with having a convention and making frequent modifications, 
however, is that not all the contracting countries ratify and adopt changes at the 
same time, and this created discrepancies between Member States and legal 
uncertainty for end users. Furthermore, Member States had to create legislation 
that implemented the Convention, which was costly.243 The problem related to the 
uniform application of the Convention’s revisions was resolved by the 
Amsterdam Treaty on the EC.244 Articles 61 and 65 made cooperation in matters 
of police and justice a community competence (Art. 85 of the TFEU). Based on 
this, on 22 December 2000, the Commission adopted Regulation No. 44/2001,245 
better known as the Brussels I Regulation, which entered into force on 1 March 
2002. This Regulation was based on the Brussels Convention, and, apart from 
certain changes, they were very similar.246 
Ten years after the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation, the Council and 
the European Parliament approved a recast version. The most important changes 
in light of the civil justice system competition were the abolishment of exequatur 
procedures, the extension of some of jurisdictional rules to third-country 
defendants, and the enhancement of the effectiveness of the choice of court 
clauses.247 This regulation was adopted on 17 December 2012 as Regulation No. 
1215/2012,248 and it repealed Regulation No. 44/2001, becoming applicable on 
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242 This competence was based on the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court 
of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. This Protocol entered into force on 1 September 
1975. 
With regard to the Regulations Brussels I and Brussels I (recast) this competence derives 
from Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 
234 EC Treaty). 
243 Fawcett, Carruthers, North (2008) 205. 
244 Van Calster (2016) 13-20. 
245 Official Journal L 012, 16.1.2001 p. 1–23. 
246 Denmark has signed a separate treaty with the EU on the application of the Brussels I 
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247 Magnus (2016) 23. See also Kramer (2010). 
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10 January 2015.249 Even before then, however, it was amended by Regulation 
No. 542/2014.250 These amendments entered into force on the same day as the 
Regulation, and aimed at making the Unified Patent Court and the Benelux Court 
of Justice jurisdiction over the Regulation common courts, which are courts that 
exercise jurisdiction over matters falling within the scope of the Regulation. 
3.1.2 Scope of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation 
In accordance with Article 1, the Regulation applies only to civil and commercial 
matters, regardless of the court or tribunal seised. The term ‘civil and commercial’ 
is broad, however, and is not defined in the Regulation, resulting in different 
Member States interpreting the term in diverse ways.251 To avoid confusion and 
uncertainty, ‘civil and commercial’ should be given an autonomous interpretation. 
The CJEU’s autonomous interpretation has been developed gradually through 
some landmark cases that include, among others, Eurocontrol,252 Rüffer,253 
Gemeente Steenbergen,254 and Sonntag.255 In an effort to exemplify the types of 
cases to be excluded from the scope of the Regulation, the second sentence in 
Article 1 refers to matters of revenue, customs, or administration, or to the liability 
of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority. For example, 
if a person enters into a conflict with a state authority exercising its public 
                                                        
249 Article 81 of the Regulation distinguishes between entry into force and becoming effective. 
The Brussels I (recast) Regulation entered into force twenty days after being published in 
the Official Journal of the EU, and became applicable from 10 January 2015. This is in 
contrast to the Brussels I Regulation (Article 76), where these steps where not detailed in 
the Regulation, which provided only the date of its entry into force. 
250 OJ L 163, 29.5.2014, p. 1–4. 
251 Bogdan (2012) 35. 
252 In the Eurocontrol case, the Court decided that the terms civil and commercial should be 
interpreted autonomously. Furthermore, the Court found that the services of the defendant 
Eurocontrol being ‘obligatory and exclusive’ qualify it as being a body exercising state 
power (iura imperii). Case 29-76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v 
Eurocontrol 1976 European Court Reports 1976-01541 14 October 1979 (Court of Justice). 
253 In Rüffer, the court clarified that a public authority acting based on national law and 
performing an international obligation should be considered a public authority. Case 814/79 
Netherlands State v Reinhold Rüffer 1980 European Court Reports 1980-03807 16 
December 1980 (Court of Justice). See also Rogerson (2016) 65. 
254 In Gemeente Steenbergen, it was decided that, on the one hand, there are actions that are 
based on ordinary law and are matters of private law, while, on the other hand, there are 
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v Luc Baten 2002 European Court Reports 2002 I-10489 14 November 2002 (Court of 
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255 In Sonntag, the court considered that a teacher, although employed in a publicly funded 
school and performing a public duty, can be held liable for compensation under civil law. 
Case 172/91 Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann, Elisabeth Waidmann and Stefan Waidmann 
1993 European Court Reports 1993 I-01963 21 April 1993 (Court of Justice). 
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obligations, this conflict is excluded from the scope of the Regulation, but if a 
state authority is acting as a private entity, the Regulation is applicable. It does 
not matter whether the proceeding is brought on behalf of or against a state 
authority.256 Article 1(2) specifies some exclusions from the scope of the 
Regulation. In addition to arbitration and bankruptcy, these situations are 
considered to have no connection to international business, and therefore are to 
be covered by other instruments.257 Arbitration is excluded from the Regulation’s 
scope because the 1958 New York Convention regulates matters of arbitration 
satisfactorily for Member States. The same is also true for situations of 
bankruptcy, which are to be handled in accordance with the Insolvency 
Regulation.258 
A sine qua non requirement for the application of the recast Regulation is the 
existence of a cross-border element,259 which should be checked by the court 
before it begins to apply the Regulation. This requirement, which is a cornerstone 
of private international law, is mentioned in the recitals of the Brussels I 
Regulation. In general, the Regulation refers only to cases where the existence of 
a cross-border element is evident (domicile in another Member State, cause of 
conflict located in another Member State, immovable property located in another 
Member State). In particular, Recital 3 mentions the existence of a cross-border 
implication for the creation and development of this Regulation. Despite the lack 
of definition in the Regulation, CJEU case law has clarified the meaning of cross-
border element. Two cases should be mentioned here: Owusu and Lindner.260 
According to the court, a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, 
the conditions under which the rules of jurisdictions must apply, and, on the other 
hand, the criteria by which international jurisdiction is determined. These criteria 
should be uniform among Member States, and guarantee legal certainty and 
uniform application in the European Union.261 This means that the Regulation 
would apply to disputes not only within the EU but also to those with a cross-
border element not related to the EU. However, it is important to stress that the 
Regulation should not be viewed as a mechanism that allows purely national cases 
to be exported outside their jurisdiction.  
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As mentioned above, the Regulation is directed to civil and commercial cases, 
and was emphasised by the Court in several instances, by excluding cases of a 
non-commercial nature as often as possible. The Regulation remains an 
instrument that facilitates the free movement of judgments and cases, and helps 
trade and commerce by reducing legal barriers and procedures. This not only 
benefits commerce but creates an environment with potential for the development 
of competition between courts. While the CJEU considered mutual trust a 
cornerstone of the Regulation, it has made courts of different Member States trust 
each other not only in the quality of their decisions but also in the procedures they 
offer. Given that courts of different Member States are considered to be of the 
same quality, parties can choose to bring cases to the court that best satisfies their 
needs, without fearing obstacles to their recognition or enforcement. 
Jurisdictional rules, mutual trust, and an autonomous interpretation of the 
Regulation create the premises for the civil justice system competition. The 
following section provides an overview of the Regulation’s jurisdictional rules. 
3.1.3 Choice of court and principles 
This section provides an analysis of the rules regarding choice of court as 
formulated in the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, and the principles on which these 
rules, and more in general the Regulation, are based. 
3.1.3.1 Principles 
From the perspective of the civil justice system competition, the most important 
principles employed in the application and interpretation of the Regulation are 
mutual trust, party autonomy, autonomous interpretation, and lis pendens. Forum 
non conveniens is another principle that – although it does not apply in the 
Regulation − is also important in increasing the certainty of cross-border 
litigation. 
Autonomous interpretation 
A common problem for international legal instruments concerns the differences 
in interpretation adopted by different contracting states; coupled with an uneven 
application, these can have negative effects on legal certainty. Since the 
adaptation of the Brussels Convention, CJEU case law has clarified that the 
Convention (and as a consequence the Regulation) should be interpreted 
autonomously. In this regard, two cases should be mentioned: Tessili v Dunlop 
and LTU v Eurocontrol. In Tessili v Dunlop,262 among others, the Court decided 
that the decision on how to interpret principles or concepts should be made 
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separately for each provision.263 In LTU v Eurocontrol,264 the Court concluded 
that Article 1 of the Convention should have an autonomous interpretation,265 
which became the principle to be used in the interpretation of the Regulation. An 
autonomous interpretation guarantees that the Regulation’s terminology will not 
be affected by the legal order of Member States, and that the Regulation is self-
sufficient in terms of its own interpretation, thus offering parties an increased 
certainty that the Regulation will be applied uniformly across the EU.266 The 
development of the principles of autonomous interpretation helped the 
establishment of other principles such as mutual trust between Member States, 
certainty in the allocation of jurisdiction, and party autonomy.267  
Mutual trust 
One of the most important pillars of the Brussels I Regulation is that of mutual 
trust between Member States.268 Although a form of mutual trust existed before 
the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, court decisions required procedural steps by 
foreign courts in order to be recognised or enforced. The recast Regulation’s 
innovation was to abolish special procedures needed for enforcement of 
judgments required in many Member States (Art. 36-44).269 However, it did not 
establish complete mutual trust.270 Rules on the refusal of recognition and of 
enforcement are listed in Articles 45 and 46, which can be invoked in the event of 
public policy concerns and problems with judgments given in default of 
appearance. These articles remain in the Regulation as reminders that mutual trust 
still has some way to go in the European Regulations.271 
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Legal certainty 
The CJEU has linked mutual trust and autonomous interpretation to the concept 
of legal certainty. Legal certainty derived from mutual trust and autonomous 
interpretation benefits cross-border trade and litigation, which are crucial 
ingredients for the development of a common European civil justice market. In 
integrated markets, it is easier to see the development of competition between 
states to attract cross-border litigants, but it also becomes easier for litigants to 
choose where to litigate and to adjust their choice to their needs. It can be said 
that the civil justice system competition is one of the beneficiaries of an 
independent interpretation of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation and of an 
increased mutual trust between Member States. 
Party autonomy 
Another important principle of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation is party 
autonomy.272 In Europe, party autonomy is the core principle of private 
international law, and is fundamental to the Rome I and Rome II Regulations.273 
Party autonomy is vital for the development of the civil justice system 
competition,274 as it allows parties to choose the court that best satisfies their 
needs. In the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, party autonomy is framed by Article 
25, while Articles 15, 19, 23, and 26 allow some form of party autonomy restricted 
by special requirements.275 In principle, party autonomy implies the freedom of 
contracting parties to choose the law as well as the court that will govern or 
resolve their dispute.276 This liberty is based on the conviction that parties can 
best assess their own needs, and determine the law or the courts for their legal 
relationship. Conveniently, parties can allocate their resources more effectively, 
and increase their productivity. Apart from this economic connotation, party 
autonomy also has a political significance. It allows parties to escape the tutelage 
of the state and to decide for themselves the best legal solution. 
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However, the freedom that comes with party autonomy is restricted under special 
circumstances. Regulations set certain limits that aim at protecting weaker parties 
or public interests. Weaker parties are protected because of their limited 
bargaining power compared to commercial parties, or because of the information 
asymmetries that plague individuals and consumers in comparison to 
professionals and commercial parties. While weaker parties are able to express 
their choice of court, this choice can be suppressed by a party with superior 
bargaining power, or misjudged in the event of information asymmetry. These 
situations do not seem to represent the will of both parties, which means that they 
go against the idea that party autonomy serves to allocate resources more 
efficiently. In view of this, party autonomy in the Brussels I (recast) Regulation 
is restricted to the benefit of weaker parties. Examples of this are the rules on 
jurisdictions in matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts, and individual 
contracts of employment. Restrictions on party autonomy for protection of the 
public interest are intended to defend against abuses regarding freedom of choice. 
In the recast Regulation, these restrictions are provided by Article 24. Despite the 
restrictions, however, party autonomy is relatively sufficient for commercial 
parties, which benefits the civil justice system competition. 
Forum non conveniens and lis pendens 
Forum non conveniens is a principle according to which a court can decline 
jurisdiction if it considers that another court would be more appropriate to decide 
on the case presented. While the Regulation is not explicit in forbidding forum 
non conveniens, the CJEU has been very clear in that this principle is not part of 
the aim of the Regulation. This does not mean that courts should accept all the 
cases referred to them. Cases should still be within the scope of the Brussels I 
(recast) Regulation. In particular, and in addition to other elements, a case should 
have a cross-border element. While these components are mentioned in Article 1, 
the cross-border element is mentioned in Recital 3 of the Regulation, and has been 
refined by the CJEU in three important cases: Owusu,277 Maletic,278 and Corman-
Collins.279 In these cases, it was reaffirmed that courts cannot deny jurisdiction 
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claiming forum non conveniens; which implies that a choice of court is absolute 
and Member States cannot refuse jurisdiction. 
Another principle of the Regulation is the avoidance of lis pendens. Lis pendens 
are situations in which the same case involving the same parties and the same 
dispute is brought in front of two or more courts. Article 29 provides that – with 
the exception of the court first seised − the other Member State courts should stay 
proceedings. Thus, the court first seised has precedence in two ways: first, it 
makes the other courts stay proceedings, and second, it makes them decline 
jurisdiction once the court first seised assumes jurisdiction.280 Article 30 regulates 
situations in which related actions have been initiated in two or more Member 
States. Related cases are those that are so closely connected that it is expedient to 
hear them together. In these situations, there is a risk of providing inconsistent 
judgments that would result in legal uncertainty and confusion. As with Article 
29, Article 30 gives precedence to the court first seised, and the other courts must 
stay proceedings. 
In general, Articles 20 and 30 provide steps to be followed if more than one court 
is seised with the same or related cases. In both instances, precedence is given to 
the court first seised. Lis pendens together with forum non conveniens are 
important in improving legal certainty. While lis pendens avoids inconsistent 
decisions, forum non conveniens guarantees that Member State courts will not 
decline jurisdiction without sufficient justification. The legal certainty resulting 
from these principles benefits cross-border litigation and the civil justice system 
competition. 
3.1.3.2 Choice of court 
As shown in the previous sections, private international law in the EU is 
characterised by increased levels of mutual trust, which − together with clear rules 
on the assignment of jurisdictions and on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments − facilitates parties’ autonomy to choose a court across borders. 
Choosing a court means that the conflict and the parties will submit to its judicial 
system and procedural law. Choice of court is of tremendous importance for the 
case, as it influences parties’ legal strategies and the final outcome of the 
litigation. Choosing a convenient court on these grounds in fact creates the 
premises for the civil justice system competition.  
Article 25 of the Regulation provides the rules for the choice of court between 
two parties for their present and future conflicts. This article sets the rules for 
parties to express their autonomy and to choose the court that best serves their 
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needs. This section provides an overview of the scope and limitations of Article 
25, and its aim is to demonstrate both the legal potential and the limits with regard 
to choosing a court in view of civil justice system competition in the EU. 
Scope and limitations 
Article 25 regulates the choice of jurisdiction by agreement, and is applicable 
regardless of the domicile or the nationality of the parties. Considering that the 
other articles of the Regulation apply mostly to persons domiciled in a Member 
State, Article 25 can be considered an extension of the Regulation’s personal 
scope. As a result, the demand side of the civil justice system market stretches 
beyond the borders of the EU. While Member State courts can in principle be 
reached by litigants from around the world, this extension is primarily important 
for the attempts to attract litigants in the immediate vicinity of EU borders.281 For 
Article 25, the qualities of the parties are not important, as the article applies both 
to legal and to natural persons. However, it should be taken into account that if 
natural persons comprise one of the categories protected as being a weaker party, 
Article 25 becomes inapplicable in favour of the relevant provision. 
Article 25 is applicable if the parties choose the court of one or more Member 
States to have jurisdiction over their disputes. No connection is required between 
the parties or their dispute and the court chosen.282 The parties’ choice creates the 
necessary connection, and, considering that the domicile of the parties is not 
relevant, it can also be the only factor connecting parties to the EU. This means 
that Article 25 should also apply to purely national cases: for example, if two 
Hungarian companies are involved in a dispute related only to Hungary, they can 
choose to litigate in Austria. Choosing the Austrian court is sufficient to 
internationalise the case and to confer jurisdiction on the Austrian court. While 
the Regulation is intended to govern the prorogation of jurisdictions, doubts exist 
about the applicability of Article 25 in cases of derogation. In these cases, parties 
exclude one or more courts from hearing their disputes, but do not point explicitly 
to the court that will hear their disputes.283 It can be argued that the intention of 
Article 25 is to allow parties freedom to choose the court that best serves their 
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needs and that increases legal certainty. The derogation of courts should be 
accepted if it increases legal certainty and best serves parties’ interest. 
Article 25 requires the Regulation to have entered into force in the jurisdiction 
chosen by the parties at the time the disputes arrived for judgment by the court. It 
does not matter whether parties made their choice before the entry into force of 
the Regulation − it is still valid if all the requirements of Article 25 are met. It 
should also be considered a valid choice agreement for a state that has become a 
member of the Union by the time the dispute reaches its courts, even if the choice 
was made before the state became a member. Parties can make a choice of court 
for future and present disputes, provided that they are linked to a specific legal 
situation.  
The choice of court made in accordance with Article 25, apart from certain 
exceptions, cannot be imposed upon third parties. An example of this exception 
involves contracts for the benefit of third parties.284 In this situation, third parties 
are obliged to follow the choice of court made by the contracting parties. 
Furthermore, parties’ choice of court cannot extend to contracts connected to the 
legal situation for which the choice of court was made. Despite the connections, 
the contracts are considered separate, and each should involve a specific choice 
of court. The legal relationship referred to in Article 25 should be taken into 
account in view of the scope of the Regulation and other relevant articles. 
Obviously, civil and commercial matters define the scope of the Regulation, and 
consequently the scope of Article 25. However, its effect is reduced by the 
provisions of Article 24 (exclusive jurisdiction), Articles 10-16 (matters relating 
to insurance), Articles 17-19 (consumer contract), and Articles 20-23 (individual 
employment contract). Despite limitations, the material scope of Article 25 
remains broad enough for commercial parties to make a choice of court within the 
European Union. Considering that commercial parties are also expected to 
generate the demand side of the civil justice system market, the material extent of 
Article 25 is important for the development of competition between jurisdictions. 
Effect and validity of choice 
Parties’ agreement on choice of court gives exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute 
only to the court chosen. This means that any other court must refuse jurisdiction. 
An exclusive choice of courts excludes not only other jurisdictions but also other 
courts within the same jurisdiction if a specific court has been selected. Parties, 
however, can agree otherwise, and make the choice of court agreement non-
exclusive. Choice of court in this case becomes indicative, in the sense that it gives 
jurisdiction not only to the court mentioned in the choice of court agreement but 
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also to the courts that would have jurisdiction in the absence of the agreement. 
Obviously, court exclusivity does not mean that parties can override the 
provisions of Article 24 (exclusive jurisdiction), Articles 10-16 (matters relating 
to insurance), Articles 17-19 (consumer contract), and Articles 20-23 (individual 
employment contract). Exclusivity is very important for the competition of 
jurisdictions, as it demonstrates parties’ intention to invest one or more courts and 
to exclude others from involvement with the dispute. It is a clear indication that 
parties want a specific court to adjudicate. 
The validity of the choice of court agreement can be reviewed by the court of the 
Member State where the claim is brought. The court should examine the 
agreement’s validity before starting the proceeding, without asking parties for 
permission. The court’s first procedural step would be to review whether there is 
a violation of Article 24 of the Regulation (Art. 27), or of other Articles that 
provide protection to weaker parties (Art. 28). The next step would be to establish 
whether the choice of court agreement is null and void according to the court’s 
jurisdictional rules. However, it does not matter if the parties present before the 
court do not challenge its jurisdiction; weaker parties, nevertheless, should be 
informed about their right to contest jurisdiction (Art. 26). If parties challenge the 
validity of the choice of court agreement, the court will use the law of its own 
jurisdiction, including the conflict of law rules, to determine the substantive 
validity of the agreement. 
Form of the agreement 
An important step for the choice of court agreement is the creation of the 
agreement itself. Obviously, agreeing parties should be free of any physical or 
psychological constraints, and be able to express their free will unhindered. The 
reaching of the agreement should be evidenced in the forms required by Article 
25. The forms are alternatives to each other, and filling in the requirements of any 
one of them is sufficient. One of the required forms and the consensus between 
parties should be present in the agreement. If either is missing, the agreement 
becomes invalid. Article 25 recognises agreements that are in writing or 
evidenced in writing, that are in any form that is in keeping with established 
practices between the parties, and, in international trade and commerce, that are 
in any form that is widely recognised by those trade practices. Durable electronic 
communications should be considered as writing. As regards the written form of 
the agreement, nothing more is required. However, the agreement needs to be 
clear about the identity of the parties, should identify well the chosen court, the 
legal relation between the parties, and the conflict that the parties want to address 
to the court. The term ‘evidenced in writing’ is a softening of the ‘writing’ 
requirement. It allows parties to validate at a later stage a verbal agreement that 
was made earlier. While the English version of the Regulation is not clear in its 
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formulation, the Regulation’s version in other languages clearly refers to prior 
oral agreements that need to be confirmed in a written form.285 The written form 
serves as evidence of the real agreement that was concluded orally. As a 
consequence, the written confirmation should make clear the existence of a prior 
verbal agreement and its terms. For the validity of the written confirmation, one 
of the parties is required to present the written confirmation to the other party, and 
the receiving party does not object to the confirmation. Another valid form of 
agreement is that concluded in accordance with established practices between 
parties. ‘Established practices’ are not defined in the Regulation, but it can be 
expected that such practices should be regular, take place often, and last for a 
relatively long time. It should be clear in these practices that the parties agree on 
a choice of court, and that there is certainty regarding the court chosen. A similar 
reasoning should be followed for cases of international trade or commerce, where 
parties can make a choice of court in accordance with trade practices. This is 
mostly directed at experienced professional traders well acquainted with trade 
practices. Allowing parties engaged in international trade to use these established 
practices is vital, considering that rapidity and simplicity are important in these 
parties’ environment. 
Severability  
Article 25(5) recognises the severability of the choice of court clause from the 
contract to which it is attached. The choice of court agreement should be seen as 
separate, which means that its validity is not related to that of the contract. A 
choice of court agreement can be valid even if the contract it is connected with is 
not. 
3.1.4 The mechanics of the Regulation 
For the civil justice system competition, the Regulation’s most important rule has 
to do with the freedom of parties to choose the court through an agreement. In the 
absence of a choice of court agreement, the general rule of the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation provides that the defendant be sued in the court of the Member State 
where he is domiciled (Art. 4), although in special circumstances a defendant may 
be sued in the courts of another jurisdiction (Art. 5). These circumstances (Art. 7, 
8, and 9) allow claimants to choose between at least two countries, thus giving 
competing Member States an opportunity to attract them. Claimants that make a 
unilateral choice of court create a special type of demand that is analysed in 
Section 4.5.1. The Regulation provides specific protection for weaker parties in 
                                                        
285 Magnus (2016) 641. An official English version of the regulation reads, ‘in writing or 
evidenced in writing’. The official version in some other languages would translate into 
English as ‘in writing or verbally with confirmation in writing’. Among the languages that 
mention an oral agreement are French, German, Spanish, and Portuguese. 
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matters related to insurance contracts, consumer contracts, and individual 
contracts of employment (Art. 10-23). Despite the freedom guaranteed by the 
Regulation, however, some special situations are guaranteed an exclusive 
jurisdiction (Art. 24). This brief outline is followed by a short exploration of the 
above-mentioned rules and the principles that support them. 
3.1.4.1 Default rule: defendant sued in his domicile court 
In the absence of a choice of court, the Regulation’s default rule is that the 
defendant will be sued in the court of his domicile (Art. 4). Referring to domicile, 
Article 4 applies irrespective of the nationality of the defendant, and therefore is 
also applicable to persons that are not nationals of a Member State.286 Domicile 
for natural persons should be defined according to the national law of each 
Member State, while domicile for legal persons should have an autonomous 
definition. There is no clear definition of convenient courts or of the 
characteristics of such courts. It can be said that fast and economical proceedings 
are always appreciated, but these can vary depending on the industry or 
characteristics of the market. For example, Dutch courts might be better at 
deciding on maritime cases, while French courts might be better at deciding 
transportation cases. Nevertheless, if companies or legal persons consider the 
characteristics of a court system an important factor in choosing their domicile, 
this would prompt a competition for civil justice systems between jurisdictions. 
From the outside, we would observe a migration of companies to one or to a 
limited number of jurisdictions. However, it is more realistic to think that 
companies take into account other aspects while choosing their domicile: for 
instance, tax level, market possibilities, workforce, and so forth.287 However, it is 
interesting to consider whether the importance of the court system would prevail 
over the importance of tax level, or of company or labour law. 
3.1.4.2 Exceptions to the default rule: unilateral choice of court 
Articles 7 and 8 offer alternative jurisdictions to Article 4’s default rule, thereby 
creating a possibility of choices for the claimant. The rules contained in Article 7 
point not only to the jurisdiction where the conflict may be submitted but also to 
its specific courts.288 Based on these alternatives, claimants are not obliged to 
follow the defendant in the court of his domicile, but can choose between two or 
more jurisdictions. In other words, the claimant has the possibility of making a 
unilateral choice of court. A unilateral choice creates a special type of demand in 
                                                        
286 If the defendant is not domiciled in any Member State, the jurisdiction of the court is 
determined by the national law of that court. In any case, the rules of Articles 24, 25, and 
18(1) and 21(2) take priority. 
287 Competition in company law was discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
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the civil justice system competition. This demand is different from that created 
when the court is chosen by both parties, in terms of the elements and the 
characteristics of the jurisdiction they choose. Section 4.5 provides a detailed 
analysis of both types of demand. The magnitude of each type is important for the 
general output of the demand and the signals it gives to competing Member States. 
The frequency of this type of choice is not clearly known, though it can be argued 
that companies rather than individuals would be involved mostly in cross-border 
disputes. A considerable number of companies conduct business, or have daughter 
companies, in more than one Member State (see the case BEG v ENEL in Section 
1.1 for example). In light of this, Articles 7 and 8 in conjunction with Articles 4 
and 63 would give claimants the possibility of making a choice of court within 
the EU. 
At a glance, the alternatives mentioned in Article 7 offer the possibility of suing 
a person domiciled in a Member State: for example, in matters relating to a 
contract; in the courts of the place of performance of the obligation in question; 
in matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict; in the courts of the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur in relation to a civil claim for damages 
or restitution that is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings; in the 
court seised for those proceedings, to the extent that this court has jurisdiction 
under its own law to undertake civil proceedings; as regards a civil claim for the 
recovery, based on ownership, of a cultural object as defined in point 1 of Article 
1 of Directive 93/7/EEC,289 and initiated by the person claiming the right to 
recover such an object; in the courts of the place where the cultural object is 
situated at the time the court is seised; as regards a dispute arising out of the 
operations of a branch, agency, or other establishment; in the courts of the place 
where the branch, agency, or other establishment is situated; as regards a dispute 
brought against a settlor, trustee, or beneficiary of a trust created by the operation 
of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally and evidenced in writing, 
in the courts of the Member State in which the trust is domiciled; and as regards 
a dispute concerning the payment of remuneration claimed in respect of the 
salvage of a cargo or freight, in the court under the authority of which the cargo 
or freight in question has been arrested to secure such payment or could have been 
so arrested, but bail or other security has been given, provided that this provision 
                                                        
289 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects removed 
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will apply only if it is claimed that the defendant has an interest in the cargo or 
freight, or had such an interest at the time of salvage. In business practice, in 
particular alternative contract, tort and branch jurisdiction provide opportunities 
to one-sidedly choose a more favourable court than that of the domicile of the 
defendant. 
3.1.4.3 Jurisdiction in specific matters 
Matters related to insurance (Art. 10-16), consumer contracts (Art. 17-19), and 
individual contracts of employment (Art. 20-23) have special provisions in the 
Regulation, which aim at protecting weaker parties in situations where they are 
most vulnerable. 
The main rule in matters related to insurance is that an insurer domiciled in a 
Member State may be sued in the courts of that Member State; or in another 
Member State in the event of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured, or 
a beneficiary, in the courts of the place where the claimant is domiciled; or, if he 
is a co-insurer, in the courts of a Member State in which proceedings are brought 
against the leading insurer. An insurer is also deemed to be domiciled in a Member 
State if he has an agency or a branch, and if the dispute derives from the activities 
of the branch or agency.290 
Articles 17-19 regulate the jurisdiction over contracts between consumers and 
parties conducting commercial activities.291 The main rule of these articles allows 
consumers to bring proceedings against the other party either in the court where 
the consumer is domiciled or in the court where the other party is domiciled. A 
consumer can be sued only in the court of his domicile. 
Articles 20-23 regulate the jurisdiction over individual employment contracts. An 
employee is allowed the possibility of choosing where to sue the employer, and 
can choose between the courts of the Member State where the employer is 
domiciled or the courts of the Member State(s) where he (the employee) carries 
out his work (Art. 21).292 An employer may bring proceedings only in the court 
where the employee is domiciled. 
A common characteristic of the jurisdiction in sections dealing with specific 
matters is that they demonstrate that weaker parties are given the possibility of 
choosing to sue the other party in more than one jurisdiction. This possibility can 
be significant for the civil justice system competition. However, it can be assumed 
that weaker parties would choose a court different from that of their domicile only 
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in exceptional circumstances. The typical weaker party is an individual with little 
knowledge of the law and the courts, and with few means to be mobile. Even 
competing jurisdictions would not be interested in the type of cases brought by 
this kind of demand. 
In addition to the provisions described above, parties can make a choice of court 
if the dispute has already arisen or in other limited circumstances can an earlier 
choice of court have effect. Choice of court in these cases is not expected to 
promote any competition between jurisdictions, because the weaker party, who is 
granted more freedom, is expected to have limited mobility and is therefore unable 
to undertake cross-border litigation. For the reasons listed above, competing 
Member States are not interested in these kinds of cases. Therefore, any civil 
justice system competition arising from them is likely to be weak or non-existent. 
3.1.4.4 Exclusive jurisdictions 
Article 24 of the Regulations provides an exhaustive list of situations in which an 
exclusive jurisdiction is assigned. This means that these provisions cannot be 
overridden by agreements between parties. Party autonomy in this regard is 
limited in order to protect public interest. Any agreement contrary to this 
provision should be considered null and void, and the voluntary presence of a 
defendant in the court chosen by the claimant cannot override the provisions of 
Article 24.293 Given the impossibility of prorogation of the rules set out, this 
article plays only a small role in the civil justice system competition. 
Article 24 provides exclusive jurisdiction in the following cases: those involving 
rights in rem of immovable properties; conflicts over the ‘validity of the 
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or 
associations of natural or legal persons, or the validity of the decisions of their 
organs’; conflicts over the validity of entries in public registers; conflicts over the 
registration or validity of patents, trademarks, designs, or other similar rights 
required to be deposited or registered; and cases involving the enforcement of 
judgments.  
3.1.5 The recast Regulation and the civil justice system competition 
Choice of court agreement is one of the most important elements of the civil 
justice system competition. The Brussels I (recast) Regulation recognises the role 
of party autonomy in improving cross-border trade, because it provides parties 
with more freedom to allocate their resources and plan their legal strategies. This 
freedom cannot be used to the detriment of weaker parties, however, or to infringe 
upon social security. For the competition of jurisdictions, Article 25 is the single 
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most important article in the Regulation, as it opens the doors of Member State 
courts to litigants that otherwise would not be able to use EU courts. This results 
in potential users for the courts, and potential clients for the lawyers. In keeping 
with the Regulation, choice of court agreements are also very flexible, offering 
parties not only the choice between the court of Member States but also the 
possibility of choosing a specific court. This freedom to choose should be taken 
into account by Member States in promoting their jurisdiction. Governments, 
however, might be reluctant to attract litigants and cases if these lack a factor 
connecting them to the chosen jurisdiction, also considering that often the law 
applicable might be that of another jurisdiction. Nevertheless, countries interested 
in the civil justice system competition should pay closer attention to the 
possibilities offered by Article 25. Litigants in the immediate vicinity of the EU 
use Member State courts to avoid corruption problems and if they do not trust 
their own courts. Member State courts have the opportunity to become global 
players and to attract litigants worldwide without the need for a connecting factor. 
The possibilities offered by the Brussels I (recast) Regulation are important in 
terms of how the competition of civil justice systems unfolds. Situations where 
the choice of court is made by only one party create the conditions for competition 
from unilateral choice of court, which is the case when two parties do not make a 
choice of court. Without this choice of court and within the possibilities afforded 
by the Regulation, only the claimant has the possibility of choosing where to start 
proceedings. Situations where the choice of court is made by both parties create 
the conditions for competition from bilateral choice of court. Considering the 
freedom granted by Article 25, parties can choose any of the Member State courts. 
Although similar, factors considered both in unilateral and bilateral choice of 
court have their own variations, and differences in choice possibilities prompt 
diverse reactions both from states and from litigants. Competition from unilateral 
and bilateral choice of court is analysed further in Chapter 4. 
3.2 Choice of law in the EU 
Section 3.1 provided an overview of the rules related to the assignment and choice 
of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. These rules, detailed in the 
Brussels I (recast) Regulation, set the basis for the civil justice competition in the 
EU. Agreements on choice of court and choice of law are often made in tandem, 
and they inevitably influence each other. Thus far, this influence has not been well 
studied, although Section 5.3 tries to fill this gap with data collected from a survey 
conducted for the present research. The current section provides a brief 
description of the rules on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual 
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obligations as provided in the Rome I 294 and Rome II Regulations.295 Rome I 
provides rules on the law applicable and the choice of law for contractual 
obligations, while Rome II provides rules on the law applicable and the choice of 
law in matters related to non-contractual obligations. The first and second part of 
this section provide a brief overview of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, 
respectively. The third part explores the relation between the Regulations and the 
civil justice competition in the EU. 
3.2.1 Rome I Regulation: the law applicable to contractual 
obligations 
This part gives a brief description of the Rome I Regulation. First, a short 
introduction and historical description of the Regulation is provided; second, the 
scope and some rules on the law applicable to contractual obligations are 
described; third, rules on choice of law are analysed in the context of the civil 
justice system competition. 
3.2.1.1 Introduction 
Party autonomy has long been a cornerstone of conflicts of laws in Europe. 
However, its meaning changed over time, until in the 20th century it reached its 
current more comprehensive interpretation.296 Party autonomy refers to the 
freedom parties have to choose the rules applicable to their legal relationship, with 
as little state interference as possible.297 In the context of private international law, 
party autonomy means the freedom parties have to choose the law applicable to 
their relationship, along with the court responsible for their disputes. To enable a 
uniform application of party autonomy, Member States − though of course spurred 
by other reasons as well − approved the Rome I Regulation officially named 
Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations. The Rome I 
Regulation entered into force on 17 December 2009 in all Member States except 
Denmark (Recital 46), replacing the Rome Convention. For this reason, Member 
States in the context of the Rome I Regulation means EU Member States where 
                                                        
294 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
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the Regulation applied, excluding Denmark (Art. 1(4)). For Denmark, the Rome 
Convention is still applicable.298  
3.2.1.2 Rome I Regulation: law applicable to contractual obligations 
Because the Rome I Regulation is a private international law instrument, its 
terminology is similar to that of the Brussels I and Rome II Regulations.299 In 
order to maintain legal certainty and to avoid inconsistencies between these 
regulations, the Recitals to the Rome I Regulation recommend a uniform and 
consistent application and interpretation of these terms (Recitals 7, 17, 24, and 
39). This fact is important considering that choice of court and choice of law are 
often negotiated together. Each of these choices is very important to the outcome 
of any litigation. The chosen law needs to be interpreted by the chosen court, and 
that court needs to apply the chosen law, which means that one choice would 
inevitably influence the other. In the survey conducted for this research, 
respondents were asked to rate which law has the greatest influence on their 
choice: substantive law or procedural law.300 Results showed that most of the 
respondents (33.33%) considered substantive law and procedural law to equally 
influence their choice of court behaviour. However, there was a tendency to 
consider substantial law to be more important than procedural law. Some 
respondents commented that substantive law was one of the factors they 
considered when making a choice of court. However, the survey results seemed 
to indicate that substantive law was also an important factor. This means that 
choice of law is extremely important for the choice of court process. Nevertheless, 
further research is needed to understand their relationship, along with empirical 
data in support of theoretical advances. 
Scope and limitations of application 
The Rome I Regulation set the rules on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters (Art. 1(1)). Civil and commercial 
matters are terms also used in the Brussels I and Rome II Regulations.301 To avoid 
inconsistencies between both Regulations, their definition should be autonomous 
and interdependent,302 meaning that any interpretation in cases relating to one 
Regulation should be accepted and used in the interpretation of the other. 
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Interdependency, legal connections, and interrelations makes even more crucial 
the need to maintain a uniform interpretation between the Regulations. The 
meaning of ‘contractual obligations’ in the Rome I and Brussels I Regulations 
also has an impact on the Rome II Regulation; the term ‘non-contractual 
obligation’ is used here, and should be understood as an inverse of ‘contractual 
obligation’ as used in Rome I and Brussels I.303 The scope of the Rome I 
Regulation excludes from its application revenue, custom, and administration 
matters, which are also found in the Brussels I and Rome II regulations. This list 
is not exhaustive, and it is meant as a set of examples for public functions. 
Likewise, in the Brussels I and Rome II Regulations, public functions should be 
excluded. 
While Article 1 provides the scope of the Regulation, Article 2 provides for a 
universal application, meaning that ‘any law specified by this Regulation shall be 
applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State’. As mentioned, Member 
States would mean all the states where the Regulation applies. Clearly, the 
Regulation does not favour any law, and remains neutral as regards the law of any 
jurisdiction. This non-discriminatory approach fosters a uniform application and 
the development of trade.304 
Applicable law 
In the absence of choice of law, the applicable law is assigned in keeping with 
Article 4 of the Regulation. This is also applicable if parties’ choice of law is 
invalid, difficult to determine, and in other situations where the parties have made 
a choice of law, but it is difficult or impossible to accurately determine the correct 
law.305 In general, Article 4(2) provides for the application of the law of the party 
that undertakes the characteristic performance in the contract.306 However, if the 
contract has an element that is related to the cases listed in Article 4(1), this last 
one applies. And if the circumstances of the case show that the contract is 
manifestly more closely connected to a country other than those mentioned in 
Articles 4(1) and (2), the law of that country will apply. The law of the country 
with the closest connection also applies if the applicable law cannot be determined 
by the above provisions (Art. 4(4)). 
Applicable law in particular cases 
The Rome I Regulation contains separate provisions for contracts involving 
carriage (Art. 5), consumer contracts (Art. 6), insurance contracts (Art. 7), and 
individual employment contracts (Art. 8). As with Article 4, the provisions of 
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these articles should be applied if parties did not make a choice of law in keeping 
with Article 3. To distinguish the type of contract, the focal point of obligations 
needs to be assessed. 
For carriage of goods contracts, Article 5(1) provides that the law applicable is 
the law of the habitual residence of the carrier if this is the same as the place of 
the receipt or the place of delivery or the habitual residence of the consignor.307 
The applicable law for contracts for the carriage of passengers is the law of the 
country where the passenger has his habitual residence, or where the carrier has 
his habitual residence, or where the carrier has his place of central administration, 
or where the place of departure is situated, or where the place of destination is 
situated. If these requirements fail to be met, or the parties do not make a choice 
of law, the law of the passenger’s habitual residence will apply if the place is the 
same as the place of departure or the place of destination. If these requirements 
are not met, the law of the country where the carrier has his habitual residence is 
to apply. 
If parties in an insurance contract did not make a choice of law in keeping with 
Article 3, the provisions of Article 7 will apply. This article applies to all contracts 
covering risks within Member States (Art. 7 (1)), regardless of where the covered 
risk occurs. Article 7(2) provides that the law of the jurisdiction where the insurer 
has his habitual residence will apply. If it is clear that the contract is manifestly 
more closely connected to another jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction applies. 
Contracts not covered by Article 7(2) are covered by Article 7(3), which further 
limits the freedom of choice granted to parties by Article 3. According to Article 
7(3), parties can choose only the law of any Member State where the risk is 
situated at the time of conclusion of the contract; or the law of the habitual 
residence of the policy holder; or, in the case of life insurance, the law of the 
policy holder’s nationality, or for insurance covering risks limited to events 
occurring in one Member State; or the law of that Member State, or if the policy 
holder is a trader or freelancer, and the contract covers two or more risks related 
to activities in different Member States, the law of any Member State concerned 
applies, including the law of the policy holder’s habitual residence. If the parties 
did not make a choice of law in accordance with Article 7(3), the law of the 
Member State where the risk is situated at the time of conclusion of the contract 
is to apply. 
Provisions of Articles 5 and 7 are derogated by Article 6 if one of the parties is an 
individual acting outside his trade or profession and the other party is a 
professional exercising his trade or profession. In other words, Article 6 covers 
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cases involving business-to-consumer contracts. If these conditions are not met, 
Articles 3 and 4 apply. In general, Article 6 aims at protecting consumers from a 
choice of law that would deprive them of the protection offered by their home 
jurisdiction.308 Therefore, the minimum standards with which the consumer is 
familiar are always granted to him. Excluded from the scope of Article 6 are 
supply of services contracts, contracts of carriage, contracts related to rights in 
rem, financial instrument contracts, and contracts concluded in the financial 
market. 
The last type of contract especially governed by the Regulation is the individual 
employment contract (Art. 8). As with consumer contracts, the Regulation rules 
favour employees in terms of them being vulnerable parties.309 In this regard, if 
the parties did not make choice of law, the applicable law will be considered the 
law where the employee habitually carries out his work. The parties may also 
choose the applicable law in accordance with Article 3 of the Regulation, but this 
choice cannot derogate the protection afforded to the employee if the choice of 
law was not made. Similar to other provisions, choice of law can be overridden if 
circumstances show that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with 
another jurisdiction. 
3.2.1.3 Rome I Regulation: freedom of choice 
The first basic rule of the Rome I Regulation is that the law applicable to a contact 
is the law chosen by the parties (Art. 3(1)). This article gives contacting parties 
maximal freedom to choose what is best for their legal relationship. A Dutch and 
a German party, for example, may choose to submit their contract to Spanish law, 
even in the absence of any connection to Spain.310 Freedom of choice derives from 
party autonomy, which is the cornerstone of Article 3 and the Rome I 
Regulation.311 However, while party autonomy provides many benefits to trade 
and to the ability of parties to allocate their resources, it also has undesired 
externalities.312 For these reasons, some restrictions to the freedom of choice exist. 
First, the Regulation protects weaker parties such as passengers, consumers, 
employees, and insurance policy holders. These situations have dedicated 
provisions, which were discussed in the previous section. Second, parties might 
try to avoid a jurisdiction’s mandatory laws by choosing the law of another 
jurisdiction even though no element is connected to that jurisdiction. To prevent 
this, Article 3(3) provides that if all the elements of a situation are located in a 
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country other than the one chosen, the choice of law cannot affect mandatory laws 
that cannot be derogated from by an agreement in the other country. Overriding 
mandatory laws are those that parties cannot derogate from by an agreement, and 
that are important for safeguarding a country’s public interest. This rules is 
important given that private international law and the Rome I Regulation can 
facilitate an ‘escape’ from certain rules.313 Limits to this freedom are set out in 
Articles 9(2) and (3). These paragraphs provide that overriding mandatory 
provisions cannot be restricted by any article in the Regulation, and that those 
provisions of the jurisdiction where the obligation arising from the contract have 
to be performed or have been performed may apply. The same principle is applied 
to European Union law by Article 3 (4), which extends the application of 
mandatory law from national law to EU law. In other words, parties cannot choose 
the law of a jurisdiction outside the EU in order to avoid mandatory EU law. Of 
course, all the elements relevant to the situation should be located in a Member 
State in keeping with the meaning of the Regulation. Third, the Regulation limits 
parties’ choice to national law. Fourth, parties’ choice of law may become 
inapplicable if it is ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the forum’s public policy (Art. 
21). Fifth, this potential limitation is a consequence of the CJEU’s Ingmar case,314 
in which the CJEU decided to apply mandatory EU rules despite the parties’ 
choice of law for a non-member. This limitation by the court was justified by the 
desire to protect the requirements of the internal market. With regard to this case, 
however, there is disagreement among scholars.315 Given that the case was 
decided based on the Rome Convention, and that the Ingmar situation was not 
reflected in the Rome I Regulation, this precedent should not be used. However, 
the court has not expressed its opinion on the matter, which fuels doubts on the 
validity of the Ingmar case. 
Article 3 does not require any particular form for the choice of law agreement, but 
parties should be able to demonstrate the choice made in any form possible. 
Choice of law can also be agreed verbally, although the parties should be able to 
prove it. This said, choice of law should be understood as contractual in nature 
and independent of the main contract; namely, its validity does not depend on that 
of the main contract. Article 5(3) provides that the existence and the validity of 
the choice of law agreement should follow the same rules used to determine the 
validity of the main contract. Parties also have the right to choose the applicable 
law for the whole or part of the contract, thus allowing different aspects of the 
contract to be governed by different laws. Choice of law can be changed at any 
                                                        
313 Schmidt-Kessel (2015) 321. 
314 Case 381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. 2000 European Court 
Reports 2000 I-09305 9 November 2000 (Court of Justice). 
315 Kramer (2015) 282, Ragno (2015) 252, Heiss (2009) 8. 
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time, provided that the contract’s formal validity and the rights of third parties are 
not affected. 
It should be made clear that Article 3 is to be read in conjunction with Article 20, 
so that when parties choose the law of a certain jurisdiction, they choose the 
substantive law without the conflict of law rules. However, the choice should be 
as clear as possible. Referring to the law of a country composed of several 
jurisdictions, and where it is not possible to point out any of the jurisdictions, 
would make the choice of law clause invalid. Parties have the right to amend their 
choice of law fully or partially at any time, which, however, should produce 
effects from the moment of application and not from the beginning of the contract. 
Hence, the freedom of parties to choose the law applicable to their contractual 
matters is relatively broad. The limitations mentioned above should be considered 
protective of particular situations rather than an attempt to restrict the choice of 
law. 
3.2.2 Rome II Regulation: laws applicable to non-contractual 
obligations 
The alter ego of the Rome I Regulation is the Rome II Regulation, which regulates 
situations involving conflict of laws in non-contractual obligations. Cases 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation are non-contractual obligations arising 
from family relationships, from matrimony, wills and succession, from 
promissory notes, from changes in the registry of companies, from trusts, from 
nuclear damage, and from violations of privacy and rights related to personality. 
For the Regulation (Art. 2), non-contractual obligations include damages from 
torts/delicts, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio, or culpa in contrahendo. 
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations is the law of the country where 
the damage occurs (Art. 4). If the claimant and the tortfeasor have their habitual 
residence in the same jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction applies. In cases 
where it is manifestly evident that the situation giving rise to a non-contractual 
obligation is closely connected to another jurisdiction, the law of that jurisdiction 
applies. Rome II Regulation has a universal application, which means that the 
laws specified by its provisions apply regardless of whether they are the laws of 
a Member State (Art. 3). Other situations specified in the Regulation include 
product liability (Art. 5), unfair competition and acts restricting free competition 
(Art. 6), environmental damage (Art. 7), infringement of intellectual property 
rights (Art. 8), industrial action (Art. 9), unjust enrichment (Art. 10), negotiorum 
gestio (Art. 11), and culpa in contrahendo (Art. 12). 
Party autonomy to choose the applicable law in cases related to non-contractual 
obligation is regulated by Article 14 of the Regulation. As with the Rome I 
Regulation, the parties’ choice of law is limited only to the law of a state. 
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Regulations of international organisations or principles of law cannot be 
considered a valid choice of law. Article 14(1) allows parties to choose the law 
only after the event giving rise to the damage has occurred. However, parties 
pursuing a commercial activity can make the choice of law before the event. These 
parties should be considered more experienced than non-commercial parties, and 
therefore more able to make an appropriate choice. There is no form requirement 
for the choice of law agreement, but parties should be able to prove its existence 
with reasonable certainty. 
The parties’ choice of law provided for in the Rome II Regulation is limited to the 
benefitting of parties in a weaker position, to overriding mandatory provisions, 
and to specific cases. Third parties can be considered to be in a weaker position 
when parties make a choice of law. For this reason, the choice of law of two parties 
cannot prejudice the rights of a third party who is unable to influence the choice 
of law, but whose rights can be affected. An additional protection of weaker 
parties is the restriction of non-commercial parties from making a choice of law 
only after the event giving rise to the damage that occurred. Non-commercial 
parties do not have sufficient knowledge to make a good choice of law before the 
event. This inability can be to the detriment of their rights, and more experienced 
parties can take advantage of it. Another limit to the choice of law is set by the 
application of overriding mandatory provisions. Article 16 provides that 
regardless of the choice of law, mandatory provisions of the court are always 
applicable. Thus, choosing the law of a jurisdiction cannot implicitly exclude the 
mandatory provisions of the jurisdiction where the litigation will take place. A 
third group of limitations to the freedom of choice is that related to specific cases. 
The Regulation provides (Art. 6(4)) that the freedom of parties to choose cannot 
derogate the provisions of Article 6, which provides the rules on the law 
applicable in cases of unfair competition and acts restricting free competition. The 
same restriction to the freedom of choice is imposed by Art. 8(3), which sets the 
rules on the law applicable in the event of an infringement of intellectual property 
rights. The freedom of choice provided by the Rome I and Rome II Regulations 
extends beyond the borders of the EU, thus increasing the possibilities of 
commercial parties being better equipped to protect their rights and to allocate 
their resources more effectively. 
3.2.3 The Rome Regulations and the civil justice system competition 
Party autonomy is an important component of choice of law and choice of court, 
and both choices are often negotiated and arranged simultaneously. Data from the 
survey organised for this research hint that choosing the law of a jurisdiction also 
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induces parties to choose the court of that jurisdiction.316 There are several reasons 
a litigant would be more interested in choosing the court and the law of the same 
jurisdiction. Two of these are costs and predictability.317 Some of the costs 
incurred for cross-border litigants include the costs of a foreign lawyer, of travel, 
and of translation. If the law and the court chosen are from different jurisdictions, 
other costs emerge: e.g. complexity costs related to the application of a foreign 
law in a court, and costs for any possible extra lawyer for each jurisdiction 
involved. The predictability and accuracy of the court might also suffer if a judge 
is asked to interpret and apply the law of another jurisdiction. It can be argued that 
parties would be interested in having high predictability and accuracy for their 
litigations. The salient point here is that while the civil justice system competition 
relies on party autonomy for choice of court, this choice might be influenced by 
choice of law. For competing jurisdictions, it is important to know which is more 
important: procedural law or substantive law. As mentioned previously, more 
empirical research is needed to tackle this problem. 
The symbiotic relationship of choice of court and choice of law is reflected in the 
drafting of the Rome I and II Regulations and the Brussels I (recast) Regulation.318 
The three regulations should be read and interpreted interdependently, and always 
taking into account the consequences they have for each other. The Brussels I 
(recast) Regulation provides rules on choice of court, for both contractual and 
non-contractual obligations. Considering that parties are influenced by the 
applicable law when making a choice of court decision, Rome I and Rome II 
become important in view of the civil justice system competition. The freedom of 
choice provided in these Regulations is more restricted in cases involving 
vulnerable parties, as opposed to cases in which two commercial parties are 
involved. For commercial parties, a limit to their choice is posed by overriding 
mandatory provisions, and by provisions that cannot be derogated by agreement. 
To conclude this section, choice of law is considered a factor that influences 
choice of court, and, as a consequence, also the civil justice system competition. 
The Rome Regulations are important for the actors involved in this competition. 
Brussels I, Rome I, Rome II, choice of court, choice of law, and the civil justice 
system competition are strongly connected to each other; hence, any fine-tuning 
of one of them would change the melody of the other.  
                                                        
316 See Section 5.3. 
317 See also Sections 4.3.1.1, 4.5.1, and 4.5.2, which expand on costs and predictability 
regarding choice of court. 
318 Mentioned also in Recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation and Recital 7 of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
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3.3 Harmonisation and competition of civil justice systems 
3.3.1 Introduction 
While the first two parts of this chapter focused on the legal framework that 
enables parties to pick the courts and laws of their choice, the present section is 
dedicated to the harmonisation of civil justice systems in the EU. Harmonisation 
can unfold in different ways, but its main goal319 is to smooth out differences 
between legal systems, and can go as far as to remove any that are visible. 
However, removing or lessening differences contradicts the needs of the civil 
justice system competition, which thrives on diversity. As a consequence, a rising 
tension between harmonisation and competition is inevitable.320 It is the intention 
of this section to explore the interaction between the two processes, and its goal 
is to identify the potential consequences of this interaction. For this purpose, this 
section first provides a summary of the different terms used to describe 
harmonisation; second, it confronts arguments in favour of and against 
harmonisation; third, it provides an overview of the legal foundations for the 
harmonisation of civil procedure in the EU; fourth, it analyses the interaction 
between competition and harmonisation, and its possible consequences. 
3.3.1.1 Terminology: Harmonisation, convergence, approximation, and others 
Harmonisation is not only a legal concept used exclusively by lawyers and 
academics − it is also a political term that seems to be increasingly often in use. 
This extensive use has created confusion with regard to its terminology, as 
different terms have been used and replaced. These terms include harmonisation, 
convergence, unification, approximation, homologation, and legal integration, 
and they are used interchangeably in the context of the European Union.321 In 
addition, they often bear322 different meanings of an etymological and a technical 
nature. In this section, unification of legislation refers to the total replacement of 
national law by a common legislation shared by several jurisdictions. This 
includes not only the process of unification but also the situation that this process 
creates. Such a process can be furthered in several ways. One of these is 
convergence, which means that different legal jurisdictions move towards a single 
unitary legal system. In the EU, convergence through the European Directives and 
                                                        
319 Technically, the goal of the harmonisation of civil procedure is to smooth out differences, 
but tactically it is to improve the internal market and the creation of a common judicial area. 
These aspects are analysed further in Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.4. 
320 Of course, their relationship would depend on the degree of harmonisation and on the 
intensity of the competition. 
321 Smits (2007) 220. 
322 The word ‘often’ should be stressed here, because it is used deliberately to denote different 
stages of the harmonisation process. 
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other legislative instruments would be called harmonisation,323 which in its 
weaker form would be called approximation.324 Outside of this unification-
harmonisation spectrum, there is uniformity, meaning the creation of structural 
characteristics for every market segment in order to induce the coexistence of 
regulations competing with each other and rules that are uniformly applicable.325 
Attention should be paid to the distinction between unification and uniformity, as 
unification refers to the replacement of national legislation by a common 
legislation, while uniformity refers to a uniform application of seemingly diverse 
rules.326 Nevertheless, uniformity still suggests the existence of diverse and 
competing rules, but at the same time hints at a uniform applicable structure that 
in a certain manner would also bring similar results. 
The aforementioned terms do not have broadly accepted definitions. It should be 
said as well that the above definitions may appear inconsistent with other research, 
and therefore care should be taken in any comparison. Many academic researchers 
use their own working definitions, or try not to become too involved with 
definition technicalities. As explained in the previous paragraph, these terms are 
connected to each other, and create a scale that ranges from total unity of 
legislation to simply an approximation of it. In Section 3.3, harmonisation, unless 
specified, will include all the terms mentioned above. Defining these terms, 
however, is just a part of the problem − the processes related to harmonisation are 
even more challenging. The following section serves as an introduction to these 
difficulties.  
3.3.1.2 Difficulties in harmonising civil procedure 
The focus of this section is the relation between harmonisation and the civil justice 
system competition in the EU. The competition depends on the rules of civil 
procedure, and consequently on how their harmonisation affect competition. This 
section provides an overview of some of the troublesome features that every 
harmonisation process needs to face. 
                                                        
323 Smits (2007) 220. Andrews perceives harmonisation on two levels: first, as an adjustment 
of the national system to ensure compliance with the procedural guarantees contained in 
other international regulations; second, as a regulation introduced to ensure the pan-EU 
adaptation of more specific procedural institutions or practices. See Andrews (2012) 20. 
324 Bellavista (2006) 10. 
325 Bellavista (2006) 3; for more details, see Zoppini (2004). Smits has a more orthodox 
approach, and considers uniform law a consequence of the unification process. Smits (2007) 
220. 
326 Thiele gives a similar account of the attempts of drafters of The Hague Convention on 
Choice-of-Court Agreements to create safeguards regarding uniform application of the 
Convention, despite the multitude of applicable laws. Thiele (2007) 72. 
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The first aspect to be taken into account when attempting to harmonise327 civil 
procedure is the large number of rules that comprise it. In fact, civil procedure is 
composed of all the procedural rules that allow substantive law to be applied and 
protected. Just as there is a multitude of rules in civil law, they are overly abundant 
in civil procedure. These rules are greatly detailed, and in many cases are 
customised with regard to the necessities of how substantive law has been drafted 
and will be implemented. This means that procedural law is not simply a body of 
law that can be replaced using a single stroke of the brush. Careful consideration 
must be paid even to the small details that give procedures their characteristics. 
So again, the problem would be how to harmonise all the mechanisms assembled 
by the rules of procedure, the rules of court, and judicial organisation, and still 
guarantee the protection and application of substantive law and the functioning of 
institutions. 
A second aspect of civil procedure that needs to be taken into account is the 
fragmentation of procedural rules.328 This means that rules of civil procedure are 
not located in only one or two legislative acts, but are scattered. A code of civil 
procedure can no longer contain all the related rules, and rules on court and 
judicial organisation are often separate. With the creation of new institutions, new 
substantive and procedural laws are created. Many Member States have 
specialised courts that require new legislation if not special procedural laws. Any 
harmonisation should target each of the various fragments. Given the number of 
Member States and the number of fragments that a harmonisation process affects, 
the effort needed to start and to finish a harmonisation process increases 
enormously. 
A third aspect to consider is that procedural law has a strong national imprint. 
Civil procedure and the system of civil justice have been shaped and imbued with 
a spirit of nationalism from the moment that nationalistic movements began to 
spread across Europe. Codification during the 19th century was marked by a strong 
national pride, rooted in national culture and history.329 Nation states like France 
and Germany were proud of their respective civil codes, which were also 
reflective of the legal and social developments in those countries. England was, 
and still is, proud of its way of approaching civil procedure. Even countries that 
used the German or the French model to draft their civil codes added their own 
national touch, and the codes of civil procedure that followed were marked in the 
same way. Therefore, any group wanting to harmonise civil procedure in the EU 
                                                        
327 In this paragraph, as well as in the rest of this section, the term harmonisation is generic, and 
includes concepts ranging from unification to approximation. 
328 Uzelac (2012) 185, Taruffo (2012) 218. 
329 Smits (2007) 223. 
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would have to deal with the nationalistic feelings, texture, and mindset inherent 
in national civil procedures. The same reasoning can be applied to civil justice 
systems. Courts are an expression of the national approach to conflict resolution; 
over a long period, they have been shaped and imbued with national traits, and 
they bear many national characteristics.330 Therefore, the harmonisation of civil 
justice systems cannot be undertaken without first dealing with Member State 
courts’ diverse array of nationalistic imprints.331 
A fourth aspect to be taken into account is the close relationship between 
substantive and procedural law. Because both laws are related, changing one will 
inevitably affect the other. Procedural law is considered as the instrument that 
allows the protection and enforcement of substantive law.332 This becomes even 
more important if there is no other effective option to exercise and enjoy 
subjective rights. However, the close relationship between substantive and 
procedural law was not always considered important.333 Splitting the organisation 
of civil justice from civil procedure can resolve some of the problems related to 
that close connection as well as to that between court organisation and 
nationalistic imprint. However, even though this is possible, it does not resolve 
the problems of harmonisation. If harmonisation is to avoid trouble with regard to 
substantive law, a better strategy is needed to target procedural law. Changes in 
strategy might help, but still cannot avoid the problems. 
In summary, this part highlighted some aspects of civil procedure that increase 
the difficulty of harmonisation in this field. The difficulty also depends on its type, 
depth, and intensity. The detailed nature of civil procedure along with its 
fragmentation and nationalistic aspect have considerable influence on the 
techniques and strategies selected for the harmonisation process. In the following 
section, the discussion continues with arguments both in favour of and against 
harmonisation. 
3.3.2 Arguments in favour of and against harmonisation 
Harmonisation is an ongoing trend in the EU, and two areas of interest for this 
research are procedural law and private international law, both of which are 
fundamental to the development of a civil justice system competition. This link 
between harmonisation and competition can be problematic, however, because 
while harmonisation and competition are praised for their benefits, their 
                                                        
330 Uzelac (2012) 178-179. 
331 It is also true that some procedures tend to become alike without losing their nationalistic 
imprints. This is the basis of what is called spontaneous convergence. 
332 Storme, Matthias (2012) 145; Procedural rights as protection for ordinary people, Andrews 
(2012) 34; Visscher (2012) 71. 
333 Van Rhee (2012) 54. 
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coexistence is difficult. At some point, a choice must be made. This section 
provides an overview of arguments both in favour of and against harmonisation. 
Assessing these arguments provides more insight into the relationship between 
harmonisation and competition, and serves to determine which of them is more 
desirable. 
3.3.2.1 Arguments in favour 
One reason brought forward by the proponents of harmonisation is the 
improvement regarding the internal market. Differences in law between Member 
States create barriers to cross-border trade, distort the market, and discourage the 
creation of a single-market area.334 Differences in legislation between Member 
States also present legal as well as psychological barriers to active and potential 
traders. The harmonising of legislation would eliminate these differences and 
remove the barriers. The existence of obstacles does not mean that trade is not 
possible in the EU, but it does mean that it faces undesired difficulties.335 Legal 
barriers are manifested in the challenges that parties have in learning and 
understanding foreign law in order to conduct their business activities.336 These 
difficulties also increase uncertainty and costs.337 Experienced parties have 
already acquired some knowledge of these matters, but for newcomers, the 
obstacles are formidable. It can be said that these differences in law can be 
resolved with the help of a foreign lawyer or partner, but for small parties and 
individuals, these resources can be costly or not available. Persistent legal barriers 
can turn into psychological ones, and, as a consequence, can create a 
predisposition to sedentary trade and cross-border immobility. Nevertheless, it 
should be said that other factors create barriers as well. Most importantly, 
differences in language, culture, and distance between parties should be 
considered. However, which of these factors is the most important and influential 
remains to be assessed more efficiently.338 
                                                        
334 Smits (2007) 221; Van Rhee (2012) 50. 
335 McKendrick (2006) 14. McKendrick argues that even though this is a good argument for the 
harmonisation of contract law, it is not a good argument for creating a single European law. 
336 See also p. 4 of the proposal for the Common European Sales Law. Available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011PC0635&from=EN> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
337 Visscher (2012) 75. The Commission considered that harmonised procedures improve 
access to efficient justice. See p. 10 of the Green Paper ‘On a European Order for Payment 
Procedure and on Measures to Simplify and Speed up Small Claims Litigation’, available 
at: <http://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/57e40e93-d701-4a25-
b741-fbf37ab73648/language-en> accessed 22 December 2017. 
338 It should be said that many aspects of civil law have already been harmonised or have 
converged within the EU. What remains as a significant difference between Member States 
is procedural law and especially civil justice. Therefore, these arguments are even more 
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Differences in law between Member States can distort the internal market, and 
this distortion is reflected indirectly. In other words, differences in legislation 
create a variety of conditions for businesses, thus making some businesses more 
competitive than others.339 While the levelling of differences was the foundation 
of the acquis communautaire in civil law, it can also be the basis for the 
harmonisation of civil procedure. Nevertheless, the steps that lead from 
differences in law to market distortion to competition distortion are not evident. 
In this regard, a careful assessment of facts and factors relating to competition 
distortion needs to be made. If legal differences appear to be responsible, 
harmonisation is advisable. 
Another argument in support of harmonisation is the creation of a European 
identity. The EU founding Member States wanted to create a unitary and solidary 
Europe to avoid conflicts like the Second World War. This could be achieved by 
creating common institutions and by setting aside nationalistic rhetoric and 
behaviour. At the same time, Member States and the EU celebrated cultural 
diversity within the community by using ‘united in diversity’ as the official motto 
of the EU.340 While it is debatable whether this is an ambiguity, it is true that law 
and in particular civil procedure are vested with a nationalistic spirit. Proponents 
of harmonisation suggest that the creation of a single European Civil Code or 
Code of Civil Procedure or even a smoothing out of differences between 
jurisdictions would further unite Member States, and would result in a European 
identity, just as the civil codes drafted in the 19th century served nationalistic 
goals.341 This argument tackles legal diversity as an obstacle to European identity, 
and uses harmonisation as a tool to overcome it. It can be said that legal diversity 
is not the only obstacle to the unification of Europe or to the creation of a 
European identity. Economic, political, and social differences form bigger 
challenges. Harmonisation or legal unity will not automatically result in a single 
European identity. 
The national identity inherent in laws often makes them unsuitable for dealing 
with cross-border trade and litigation.342 While the legislation in some 
jurisdictions is ready to handle international elements, other laws or jurisdictions 
are not, mainly because law is often prepared, approved, and applied only on the 
basis of the national environment. These jurisdictions face difficulties when 
                                                        
important in relation to the harmonisation of civil procedure. Van Rhee (2012) 40; Visscher 
(2012) 76. 
339 Smits (2007) 222; Visscher (2012) 76. 
340 The EU motto <http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
341 Smits (2007) 223. 
342 McKendrick (2006) 17. 
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confronted with international cases. Moreover, rules of law in some instances 
have endemic characteristics with which foreign users are unfamiliar, and these 
rules are potential traps for foreign lawyers and traders, increasing uncertainty and 
costs.343 Harmonisation can be a solution to these problems by levelling 
differences or by creating uniform provision, but the difficulty is that it requires 
as a first step the identification of legal norms that are not suitable for cross-border 
transactions. The second difficulty would be to convince local communities as 
well as politicians to sacrifice part of their national legal system in favour of 
harmonised cross-border legislation. A form of harmonisation used so far to 
bypass these problems has been international legalisation, of which the Brussels 
Regime is a good example. In an increasingly integrated EU market, the Brussels 
Regime sidestepped national law and endemic solutions to provide individuals 
and traders with more legal certainty and consequently fewer costs. 
Another argument in favour is an economic one,344 and it submits that the 
harmonisation of legislation would internalise externalities. Law and regulations 
generate costs that in many cases are not borne by the party that produces these 
norms, but are externalised outside the jurisdiction. In this situation, social welfare 
may decrease because the party that produces the laws does not bear the costs and 
does not respond to the decrease. However, this does not mean that the welfare of 
the country that produces the law declines; it is the joint welfare of the country 
that externalises the costs and the country that bears the costs that declines. This 
is an undesirable effect, and needs to be dealt with in terms of the EU situation. 
In this regard, harmonisation of the law would create common legislation 
conditions that would internalise the above-mentioned costs.345 The problem here 
is that while this resolves the problem between EU Member States, neighbouring 
countries would remain outside this ‘solution’. And although social welfare might 
improve within the EU, it could deteriorate in other countries. Nevertheless, the 
problem of externalities might endure unless the world becomes a single 
jurisdiction. 
In the law and economics literature, an ongoing debate is about whether a 
competition of jurisdictions would produce a race-to-the-bottom,346 meaning that 
competing jurisdictions reduce legal standards in order to be more attractive to 
customers. Obviously, reduced legal standards is a negative effect that must be 
avoided. The harmonisation of legislation between competing jurisdictions would 
                                                        
343 For examples in contract law, see McKendrick (2006) 17. 
344 Visscher (2012) 80-84. 
345 Before jumping to this conclusion, it should be determined whether national law can cope 
with this problem without the need for harmonisation.  
346 This topic was discussed in Section 2.4.1. 
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indeed reduce the risk of a race-to-the-bottom, but in levelling differences it would 
at the same time do away with one of the premises of competition. Setting aside 
the discussion as to whether the race-to-the-bottom is a real risk, it can be said 
that even if harmonisation smooths out legal differences between jurisdictions, 
law implementation and enforcement will remain different.347 Harmonisation 
reduces the premises of competition (differences in law), but it does not eliminate 
all of them (differences in enforcement, application, language, economics, and so 
forth). These differences stem from a variety of extra-legal factors such as various 
traditions and social settings as well as cultural and economic dissimilarities. 
Another economic argument in favour of harmonisation is that it reduces certain 
transaction costs.348 It should be noted that cost reduction is relative to the type of 
harmonisation that is pursued, and certain reductions might be more significant 
with specific types of harmonisation. Costs that are reduced as a consequence of 
harmonisation include349 inconsistency costs, which are derived from legal 
inconsistencies between jurisdictions; information costs, which are incurred in the 
process of learning foreign law; litigation costs,350 which are related to choosing 
a law or a court; instability costs, which are related to changes in legislation that 
affect a cross-border transaction; externalities; and drafting costs, which are 
incurred in the drafting of legislation. In the event of harmonisation, these costs 
would be eliminated or reduced, which would increase the parties’ profit. As 
mentioned, cost reduction is relative to the type of harmonisation and its 
effectiveness. The more that harmonisation resembles unification, the more these 
costs are reduced. In addition, the more effective the harmonisation process, the 
lower the costs. 
3.3.2.2 Arguments against 
Some arguments against harmonisation mirror those in favour of it. Divergent law 
was mentioned as an obstacle to trade, which could be overcome by the 
harmonisation of law. Opponents of this argument point to how the UK and the 
US have a functional single market without having a unified legislation.351 
Therefore, although diversity in the EU should not be considered a problem, but 
                                                        
347 As discussed in Section 3.3.1.1, sometimes uniformity is also necessary to fulfil the purpose 
of harmonisation. 
348 Visscher (2012) 82. 
349 This is drawn mainly from Ribstein and Kobayashi (1996) 138-140. 
350 Litigation and information costs can be merged rather than kept separate. What is considered 
a litigation cost is actually an information cost. In fact, litigating in foreign or cross-border 
cases only adds the cost of obtaining information abroad to the costs of litigation. This means 
that cross-border litigation adds mainly information costs to non-cross-border litigation. 
351 Harmonisation involves several processes that range from unification to approximation. In 
the US, even though commercial law is not unified, it has been approximated by the Uniform 
Commercial Code of the American Law Institute. McKendrick (2006) 21. 
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the ‘real’ problem should be found.352 The core of this argument is directed 
against a total unification of legislation, while softer forms of harmonisation − 
such as approximation − might be a better solution; it would smoothen the 
differences between legislations but would not affect legislative diversity. 
Another opposing argument exalts the virtues of diversity. Diversity of 
legislations within the EU allows parties in a cross-border transaction to choose 
the applicable law or the competent court from among several jurisdictions.353 By 
selecting one or the other, these parties instigate competition between 
jurisdictions that, in the long term, tends to improve the service offered as well as 
the quality of the law. In the short term, the diversity of offers enables parties to 
make better choices. By eliminating this diversity, the EU would lose some of its 
legal principles that incubate in the national systems and, when mature enough, 
spread throughout Europe. 
Apart from these theoretical problems, some practical arguments against 
harmonisation can also be mentioned.354 First, on a practical level, Member States 
would be reluctant to give up their legislation in favour of one that is 
harmonised.355 Second, it would be difficult to reach an agreement on the terms 
or institutions that would replace the national ones. Third, even if an agreement is 
reached, the interpretation of the law and its application would vary. 
From a law and economics perspective, harmonisation is criticised for eliminating 
alternatives. As mentioned previously, the more alternatives, the more choices for 
parties,356 and the more choices for parties in cross-border cases, the more they 
are satisfied. Furthermore, the existence of choices creates a learning process357 
that in the long run helps in the development of new legislation, institutions, or 
approaches to legal problems. 
Harmonisation also carries with it an information problem.358 First, local 
legislators know the problems of their community better than anyone. Some types 
of harmonisation would involve a common legislator for the whole EU, and as a 
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353 McKendrick (2006) 27; for the legal framework in the EU, see Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
354 McKendrick (2006) 26. 
355 For example, judicial and enforcement procedures are closely linked to sovereignty. Even 
in the event of harmonisation, Member States have procedural autonomy to adopt 
procedures that offer more protection or guarantees as compared to harmonised procedures. 
See Kramer (2013) 8. 
356 Visscher (2012) 77. These arguments draw from Tiebout’s theories described in Section 
2.1.4. 
357 For the learning process, see Section 2.1.3. 
358 Visscher (2012) 78. 
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result would increase the distance between voters and law makers. While 
maintaining variations, the diversity of legislation maintains a closer contact 
between voters and law makers. Second, law makers tend to serve a general 
interest when approving laws and regulations. In the case of harmonisation, the 
law-making power would tend to be concentrated in a few hands, and thus be 
vulnerable with regard to powerful lobbying groups, which do not always further 
consumers’ interests. In a non-harmonised Europe, these lobbying groups have a 
hard time coordinating their efforts in all the Member States, which is a benefit 
for consumers. Third, as mentioned above, harmonisation confers competitive 
advantages on some companies by allowing them to choose substantive or 
procedural law according to their needs. These companies would be reluctant to 
lose their advantage. Such an argument of course does not hold for all the 
companies and for all the Member States, but in the field of civil procedure it 
might be true for law firms that rely on the differences between jurisdictions in 
order to conduct their business. These law firms would be the first to object to 
harmonisation if they sensed any danger to their already established 
competitiveness. 
3.3.3 On harmonisation processes 
In Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, a general introduction to harmonisation and some 
arguments both in favour of and against it were presented. It was submitted that 
varying intensities require different approaches to achieve harmonisation. In this 
section, some of the means of achieving harmonisation are discussed. 
Harmonisation processes can be divided into two groups based on the presence of 
a designer or a guide. This guide or designer can be a special commission, an 
international organisation, a group of institutions, or even a person powerful 
enough to coordinate and conduct such a process. The first group is composed of 
processes that require a guide or a designer to organise and to apply, or to 
implements and to regulate the harmonisation process. And that guide or designer 
would need to be well aware of the harmonising mission and its accompanying 
responsibilities. This awareness is crucial, because it enables the guide to 
distinguish the process from the incidental harmonisations of the second group. 
The group of guided processes includes harmonisation through international 
conventions, through European regulations or directives, through the creation of 
common legislation, through soft law, and through the production of minimal 
standards. 
The second group is composed of processes that lack a guide or a designer. They 
are spontaneous, they lack schedules and deadlines, and they do not guarantee 
harmonisation. Included in this group are the creation of an ius commune, and 
harmonisation through the drafting of legal principles, by way of cross-
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fertilisation (influences between jurisdictions), and derived from the competition 
of jurisdictions. 
Some of these processes have elements of both groups, which increases the 
difficulty of categorising them. This is mentioned where appropriate during the 
analysis. In the following sections, these processes will be discussed with a focus 
on the harmonisation of civil procedure in the EU. This section introduces how 
competition can create harmonisation, and how harmonisation can suppress 
competition. Section 3.3.5 expands on this topic, with the competition of civil 
justice systems as its focus. 
3.3.3.1 Guided harmonisation processes 
Guided harmonisation processes are planned, directed, and executed by an 
individual, by a group of people, or by an institution, whose purpose is to 
harmonise the law in a specific field. These processes are the most recognisable 
and the most widely used. They are generally planned, and have schedules, 
deadlines, and a final goal. Some of these procedures are discussed in the present 
section. 
International treaties have long been used to legally regulate relations between 
two or more countries. While checking each other’s behaviour, contracting states 
can agree on common legislation to be applied equally in their jurisdictions. An 
example of harmonisation of private international law through treaties and 
conventions is the Hague Conference on Private International Law (the Hague 
Conference). The Hague Conference works for the unification of private 
international law rules, and more than thirty conventions have been drafted under 
its auspices. The problem with these kinds of harmonising instruments is that they 
require a complicated mechanism to enter into force. Member States ratify and 
make them applicable in their own jurisdictions at different times. In many 
instances, a treaty tends to be based on a legal system that many other states are 
unwilling to ratify, or, if not based on a legal system, the treaty is likely to be 
vague and too general to have a unification effect.359 Another weak point is the 
absence of a higher court to guarantee the uniform interpretation of the treaty or 
convention. Despite these drawbacks, however, treaties and conventions are the 
best way of reaching quick and global legal uniformity. 
In the EU, treaties and conventions have been replaced by directives and 
regulations, which are different in approach but similar in results. On the one 
                                                        
359 Smits (2007) 224; the same conclusion was reached regarding the European Code of 
Conduct for Mediators: Nylund (2014) 37. 
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hand, regulations directly unify a certain legal aspect.360 On the other hand, 
directives give the general guidelines and aim of the process, while leaving the 
Member States to change national legislation according to their needs.361 The 
main advantage of directives is that they leave to Member States the possibility 
of adapting local legal terminology, structure, and setting to the needs of the 
directive. This is also a disadvantage of directives, in that the lack of uniformity 
in terminology in the structure of institutions and in legal settings makes it hard 
to distinguish the effects of harmonisation, which through these instruments tends 
to be fragmentary and arbitrary. It is fragmentary because directives harmonise 
not only an entire field of law but specific aspects as well. It is precisely this 
‘fragmentation’ that creates an idea of arbitrariness. One might ask why one thing 
needs a European regulation while another does not. 
Arbitrariness and fragmentation would be better resolved by adopting a common 
legislation that would harmonise and unify laws or procedures at the same time. 
There have been ideas of creating a European Civil Code362 or a European Code 
of Civil Procedure,363 but any attempt to harmonise civil procedure in Europe 
would inevitably affect rules on choice of law. Harmonisation of rules on choice 
of law and civil procedure have moved in different directions. Rules on choice of 
law have been characterised by attempts to coordinate the legal system of Member 
States, aiming at the free movement of judgments and litigants: for example, the 
Brussels I or the Rome I Regulations. At the same time, international civil 
procedure has been characterised by genuine attempts to harmonise the legislation 
of Member States: for example, the European Order for Payment364 Procedure and 
the European Small Claims365 Procedure.366 Some of these instruments are 
characterised both by the coordination and the harmonisation of legislation: for 
example, the European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims.367 
                                                        
360 Article 288 of TFEU. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, p. 47–390. 
361 The legal basis for the harmonisation of civil procedure in the EU is discussed in Section 
3.3.4. 
362 Alpa (1999) 11. 
363 Smits (2007) 226, Nylund (2014) 42. 
364 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 399, 30.12.2006, p. 
1–32. 
365 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 1–22. 
366 Kramer (2012) 123. 
367 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, OJ L 143, 30.4.2004, 
p. 15–39. 
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Instruments that have both characteristics tend to introduce ‘minimum 
standards’.368 
Another harmonisation trend in the EU is the introduction of minimum standards 
for civil procedures. As Kramer (2012) demonstrates, several regulations 
approved in the last ten years have introduced minimum procedural standards for 
all the Member States.369 In the Stockholm Programme, the European Council 
considered minimum standards important in improving the effectiveness of the 
Union’s instruments.370 Minimum procedural standards can serve as a first step 
towards more prominent harmonisation processes, and they offer certain benefits 
related to their harmonisation effects. First, they avoid the danger of a race-to-the-
bottom or the risk of social dumping.371 Second, they do not eliminate the 
diversity of legislation.372 This gives national legislators space to manoeuvre in 
order to change and to experiment as long as legislation is above the minimum 
standards. Experimentation or legal diversity promotes legal progress by 
introducing new solutions to legal problems. Third, maintaining national identity 
and allowing differences above the minimum threshold makes it possible for the 
competition of jurisdictions to develop.  
Nevertheless, there are negative sides to achieving harmonisation through 
minimum standards. First, some of the problems such as differences between legal 
systems and legal fragmentation will persist. This process, while levelling the 
minimal procedural guarantees, does not deliver true harmonisation. Second, it 
might be difficult to agree on what to consider a minimum standard, as Member 
States have differences in civil procedures that can be reflected in their approach. 
Minimal procedural standards that are higher than national minimal standards can 
be a budgetary burden for some Member States, and they will either reject the 
standards or simply not apply them. Setting minimum standards too low would 
make the reform unnoticeable for Member States employing high standards, 
although the positive side-effect would be that these sets of minimum standards 
would create a basic level across the EU, which would increase legal certainty for 
cross-border players.373 Third, creating a set of minimum standards might cause 
                                                        
368 For example, the European Enforcement Order Regulation includes a set of minimal 
standards from Articles 12-19. 
369 Kramer (2012) 128. 
370 The Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 
OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p. 1–38. 
371 Social dumping was discussed in 2.3.3. See Bellavista for the relationship between 
competition and harmonisation and social dumping. Bellavista (2006) 7-13. 
372 Vernadaki (2013) 309. 
373 It should be said that the European Convention on Human Rights offers some procedural 
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the harmonisation process to become lethargic. After agreeing on a minimum 
standard, the drafters and the Member States might feel content with the solution 
and be unwilling to take further steps. In any case, in light of what has already 
been said, there is no real formula for success where harmonisation in concerned; 
thus, attempting it by way of a variety of methods in different directions seems a 
reasonable approach. After all, learning by failing has always been an effective 
teacher. 
3.3.3.2 Spontaneous harmonisation processes 
Processes of guided harmonisation make up one group, while the other is 
composed of spontaneous processes, the characteristics of which are the absence 
of a guide or designer, the lack of a plan or schedule, and random results. One of 
the producers of spontaneous harmonisation is the competition of jurisdictions.374 
This is important, as it directly connects the competition of civil justice systems 
to the harmonisation of civil procedure in the EU. Moreover, it shows that this 
competition has a harmonising function. This section discusses some of the 
spontaneous processes that lead to harmonisation. 
One process is the revival of ius commune, a law or set of laws that were 
recognised and applied in a more or less uniform way across Europe in the 17th 
and 18th centuries. Ius commune was developed by legal scholars on the basis of 
Roman law, and was adapted to the needs of mediaeval and post-mediaeval 
Europe. The idea of the modern ius commune is to create the same process, 
environment, or phenomenon in the present time. This task is in the hands of 
academics who will propagate the law and teach it. It does not have a guide but is 
simply an ideal for all of Europe to follow: an ius commune. It sounds more 
romantic375 than realistic, but some points here are worth considering. It is true 
that to have a harmonised civil procedure, law students need to be trained 
differently: namely, with a spirit of nationalism but also with a European spirit 
that will make them more inclined to accept and to promote a common European 
law, an ius commune. Furthermore, they should be trained on the basis of similar 
curricula and a common programme as well as in the same legislation and 
principles. Achieving this is not simple, however, because universities respond to 
the needs of the market, and if the market requires local lawyers, then the curricula 
must focus on national law rather than on general abstract European law. Another 
problem is the historical and social context. The historical ius commune was 
                                                        
serve either as a set of minimal standards or as a basis for harmonisation. For more, see Van 
Rhee (2012) 50-51; Kramer (2012) 136; Hess (2012) 196-171. 
374 Van den Bergh (1998) 138-139; another term used is ‘spontaneous convergence’; see 
Visscher (2012) 78; Ogus (1999) 415. 
375 Or mythical, as Vogenauer calls it; Vogenauer (2006) 1. 
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developed from Roman law and in situations where alternatives were not 
available. Furthermore, ius commune was a scholarly tradition that was applied 
and perceived in different ways. In the current modern context, ius commune 
would be in competition with national law and perhaps with other international 
legislation. Nevertheless, the progress in academic cooperation, exchange, and 
initiatives would only work in favour of an approximation of European 
legislation. The time and speed of this approximation would be hard to estimate, 
but as Smits376 demonstrates − and as witnessed during the course of this study at 
the Ius Commune Research School – there is no shortage of willingness. 
Another type of spontaneous harmonisation is the drafting of principles of law, a 
process that falls into the grey area between guided and spontaneous (non-guided) 
harmonisation. It can be considered guided because there is always a group of 
people or institutions that draft the principles. It can be considered non-guided 
because for some of the groups their aim is not the harmonisation of legislation. 
Examples like the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the Principles of 
European Trust Law, European Insolvency Law, and European Tort Law have 
shown that, at least for academics, a common legislation for Europe can be agreed 
upon. As well as the name, these principles contain detailed legal provisions that 
can be used as an applicable law for contracts if parties choose to do so. An 
example of drafting principles in civil procedure is the project developed by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) and the International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law (UNIDROIT).377 The project entitled Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure is aimed at creating a common set of civil procedure compatible 
with common and civil law traditions.378 It resulted in the homonymous set of 
principles that include, among others, guarantees regarding fundamental 
procedural rights, guidelines on the process, and so on.379 Even though the drafters 
intended the principles to be used for cross-border cases, they can be applied in a 
purely national context, as well as a best practice or model for drafting 
legislation.380 A similar project is also the European Law Institute (ELI) and 
UNIDROIT collaboration, which aims at developing further the ALI-UNIDROIT 
                                                        
376 Smits (2007) 229-231. 
377 The Report prepared by Marcel Storme on the Approximation of Judiciary Law in the 
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Principles for Europe by establishing European Rules of Civil Procedure.381 From 
the EU point of view, these principles can be used as a basic model law for a 
common civil procedure. The success of these principles depends on many 
factors, the most recognisable of which are political climate, reputation of the 
drafting team, and the needs of the market. 
Another type of spontaneous harmonisation emerges when jurisdictions influence 
each other. This means that a legal norm is developed, applied, and reaches 
maturity in one jurisdiction, and after gaining international recognition, it is 
implemented in other jurisdictions. Usually this does not result in exact copies, 
but in ones that are adapted to local juridical settings.382 This explains why so 
many legal instruments across Europe are similar to each other.383 Spontaneous 
approximation of this type can be very natural, and is usually the outcome of the 
social, economic, and legal needs of the ‘receiving’ jurisdiction. Being driven by 
these needs, this kind of harmonisation is able to change even fundamental parts 
of legislation. This is also important from the economics point of view, since 
legislative changes are made at the right moment and they target the exact needs 
of the system. The problem with this kind of spontaneous harmonisation is that it 
is often described as an automatic mechanism that solves legislative problems at 
the moment they mature. This means that if a jurisdiction needs a mechanism to 
regulate a particular aspect of civil procedure, it will either create it or be fertilised 
by cross-border experiences. It is more likely that this kind of harmonisation also 
has obstacles similar to those relating to guided harmonisation. Given that it is not 
a guided process, spontaneous harmonisation can be chaotic. As a consequence 
of its spontaneity, it does not have any time schedule, and therefore it might take 
some time before harmonisation is achieved anywhere. From a historic point of 
view, it can be argued that until the end the Second World War no serious attempt 
to guide harmonisation was made. Spontaneity had reigned in Europe since 
Roman times, and as can be seen, legislation in Europe is not harmonised but is 
diverse in procedures and provisions. It can be argued that certain institutions and 
legal provisions are the same across Europe thanks to spontaneous harmonisation, 
                                                        
381 More information on the webpage of UNIDROIT at <http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-
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but legal diversity is also a result of this spontaneity. To conclude, it can be said 
that rather than relying entirely on spontaneous harmonisation, it can be used in 
situations where satisfactory results can be achieved and discouraged where they 
seem uncertain.  
3.3.4 Legal bases of the harmonisation of civil procedure in the EU 
This section is dedicated to the legal bases used to harmonise civil procedure 
through Regulations and Directives. 
The harmonisation of civil procedure can be organised on several levels. At the 
international level, the ‘methods’ mostly used are soft law and international 
agreements,384 which can also be applied at the regional level to include only a 
limited number of jurisdictions. Nevertheless, aspiring EU Member States are 
very active in harmonising and approximating their legislation with EU directives 
and regulations, and this spill-over effect slightly increases the legislation’s 
territorial impact in Europe. However, this theme is beyond the scope of the 
present section, and requires further scrutiny and analysis in another study. 
In the EU, harmonised civil procedure rules have been based on Articles 81 and 
114 of the TFEU. Legislation based on Article 81 (ex. Art. 65 EC Treaty) has a 
cross-border character, while legislation approved based on Article 114 (ex. Art. 
95 EC Treaty) is also applicable to purely national cases.385 Article 81 gives the 
European Parliament and the Council the right to approve legislation that ensures 
the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments 
and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; the cross-border service of judicial and 
extrajudicial documents; the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member 
States concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; cooperation in the taking of 
evidence; effective access to justice; the elimination of obstacles to the proper 
functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of 
the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States; the development of 
alternative methods of dispute settlement; and support for the training of the 
judiciary and judicial staff. In this context, Article 81 provides the legal basis upon 
which to harmonise ‘classical’ private international law instruments, as well other 
‘modern’ mechanisms. Classical instruments with a legal basis in Article 81 are 
the Brussels Regime Regulations and the Rome Regime Regulations. Modern 
instruments with a legal basis in Article 81 deal with topics such as cross-border 
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debt recovery,386 mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters,387 
procedures in cases of divorce or separation,388 and jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,389 and 
so forth.390 Since 2000, at least fifteen regulations have been approved on the basis 
of Article 81 (ex. Art. 65 EC Treaty). This rhythm of almost one regulation per 
year shows that the EU considers harmonisation an important instrument in 
developing a stronger Union. Regulations approved in this spirit are applicable 
not only in cross-border cases but also in dealing with particular and specific 
details of civil procedure, and they are designed to overcome procedural problems 
relating to Europe’s increasing political and social unification. 
The problems with using Article 81 as the legal basis for harmonising civil 
procedure in Europe are its limited subject matter and its limited impact.391 Article 
81 provides the possibility of approving common rules only for cross-border civil 
cases. This means that national cases are not resolved using a harmonised civil 
procedure but with national procedures. While limiting the scope of EU 
Regulations, this situation creates a national conservativism that is difficult to 
shed. The image derived is that of a frequently implemented national procedure 
that is replaced in rare cases (cross-border cases) with an EU procedure. The risk 
here is that rarely used regulations based on Article 81 will become outdated and 
be viewed with diffidence. Of course, this is related to the other problem of 
harmonisation based on Article 81: namely, limited impact.392 As mentioned 
above, having a limited impact results in fewer cases, and therefore the law does 
not develop. Limited usage would leave any regulation to gather dust, and parties 
would be less likely to apply it. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the best way 
to harmonisation would be to create procedures equally applicable for domestic 
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and commercial cases, thus resulting in a uniformity of procedures and avoiding 
inconsistencies between cross-border and national cases. 
Another article has been used as a legal basis for the harmonisation of civil 
procedure. Article 114 of the TFEU (ex. Art. 95 of the EC Treaty) empowers the 
EU to harmonise national procedural law in the event that it is not adequate to 
implement substantive EU law. In this regard, the real aim of Article 114 is not to 
harmonise civil procedure but to establish a functioning internal market. The 
harmonisation of civil procedure is a by-product that helps to overcome the limits 
of Article 81. This is counter-intuitive considering that Article 114 is older than 
Article 81, but until recently it was rarely used for procedural aspects. In the 
current situation, Article 114 empowers the EU to regulate and harmonise 
substantive and procedural law for specific sectors, and even for purely national 
cases. This means that the EU can dig deep into the legislation of Member States, 
and harmonise it across Europe.393 
Articles 81 and 114 serve as legal bases for the adopting of harmonised legislation 
applicable to all Member States. In the event of difficulties in reaching an 
agreement, it is possible for Member States to use enhanced cooperation, an 
instrument provided by Articles 327-334 of the TFEU (ex Art. 27a-27e, 40-40b, 
and 43-45 TEU). This instrument allows a group of Member States to adopt 
regulations applicable only to this group, and the procedure was designed to 
prevent individual Member States from blocking legislation proposals. Proposals 
following the enhanced cooperation procedure should in any case comply with 
the Treaties and the Union law. As such, enhanced cooperation serves as the legal 
basis for some partial-territory harmonisation, which means that this kind of 
harmonisation is limited to the Member States that take part in it. The Rome III 
Regulation,394 for example, is a regulation that was approved using the enhanced 
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cooperation procedure. Despite the room for technical advantages that enhanced 
cooperation offers, its use for harmonisation might face further challenges, one of 
which would be to prevent Member States becoming entrenched in a camp 
populated both by cooperating and non-cooperating Member States.395 On a 
positive note, enhanced cooperation is still an affordable instrument for furthering 
harmonisation goals and finding legal solutions to EU-related problems. 
To recapitulate, in principle the harmonisation of civil procedure is based on 
Articles 81 and 114 of the TFEU. Article 81 sets some limits on the powers of the 
EU to harmonise. These powers are limited to cross-border civil cases, which 
means that regulations based on them have limited impact and limited potential 
for development. Some of the limits of Article 81 are lessened by the provisions 
of Article 114, which allow the EU to harmonise procedural rules of Member 
States if they are not suitable for the application of EU substantive law. 
Furthermore, Article 114 gives the EU the possibility of harmonising the 
substantive and procedural law of an entire sector. This might be a more 
substantial contribution to the integration of Member States and to the creation of 
a single legislation. In addition to Articles 81 and 114, Article 329 enables a group 
of Member States to adopt legislation applicable only to them though an enhanced 
cooperation procedure. While harmonisation through an enhanced procedure does 
not cover all the Member States, it provides an opportunity to explore legal 
possibilities and push harmonisation forward. 
3.3.5 Competition of civil justice systems and harmonisation in the 
EU 
Section 3.3.1 introduced certain notions related to harmonisation, as well as 
aspects of civil procedure that have to be taken into account during harmonisation 
in the EU. Section 3.3.2 mainly discussed arguments both in favour of and against 
competition, while Section 3.3.3 discussed methods of approaching 
harmonisation. These methods can be divided into two groups: one with 
harmonisation methods that are guided and the other with methods that are 
spontaneous (not guided). Competition of jurisdictions in general and the 
competition of civil justice systems in particular fall into the second group. This 
section discusses how the competition of jurisdictions can lead to the 
harmonisation of civil procedure in the EU. 
3.3.5.1 Competition and harmonisation 
The competition of jurisdictions is a process whereby two or more jurisdictions 
try to attract as many ‘legal consumers’ as possible. These are legal or natural 
persons that make use of the law for their commercial or non-commercial 
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activities, and are therefore interested in making a choice of law. In many cases, 
the competition of jurisdictions is focused only on one specific field of law like 
civil procedure, company law, or labour law. Even within these fields of law, 
competition can be focused on one particular element, like the fact the competition 
of civil justice systems is part of the competition of civil procedural law. 
Moreover, different elements from diverse fields of law can be combined to create 
a specific field of competition. Libel and libel tourism are a good example of how 
the combination of civil procedures and substantive law creates a competition of 
jurisdictions.396 However, ‘libel tourism’ and libel suits are not what jurisdictions 
are seeking to attract. This example shows that jurisdictions sometimes enter 
unwillingly into competition with each other, or at least are treated by legal 
consumers as competing products. In the competition of civil justice systems, 
choosing a jurisdiction that offers a ‘torpedo’ can be comparable to the above 
example. A ‘torpedo’ refers to a suit filed in a jurisdiction famous for its slow 
handling of files or for delays in the judgment of cases. The infamous ‘Italian 
torpedo’ is well known, even though in specific cases other ‘torpedoes’ can be 
more devastating. Competing countries base their competitiveness on, among 
others, the efficiency of the judiciary, the clarity of their law, the professionalism 
of their judges, low judicial fees, and swift case management. If allowed, legal 
consumers choose from among the available jurisdictions as if they were 
shopping: hence the term ‘forum shopping’ that is used to describe the activity of 
picking and choosing between jurisdictions. In order for competition to exist, legal 
consumers should be mobile, be fully informed about competing jurisdictions, and 
be able to choose.397 Legal consumers are heterogeneous, composed of different 
categories of persons having varied interests. Moreover, their interests are relative 
to their position in the case. Claimants have different interests compared to 
defendants; frequent users of the court have interests different from occasional 
users; and rich and professional parties do not have the same interests as parties 
who are not in this category. The heterogeneity of legal consumers makes it 
difficult for competing countries to establish which part of the legislation is 
important to specific groups. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the competition of jurisdictions in general and of civil 
justice systems in particular has been described as having negative effects on 
competing jurisdictions. First, the competitions initiate and encourage a race-to-
the-bottom, whereby competing jurisdictions relax their legal protection for 
vulnerable parties and decrease the quality of their legislation.398 Second, the 
competitions lead to ‘social dumping’, a process observable mostly in the 
                                                        
396 Klein (2011), Crook (2010), Berlins (2004). 
397 For more, see Section 4.1. 
398 See Section 2.4.1 on this topic. 
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competition of labour law. It occurs when a jurisdiction’s qualified and competent 
workforce moves to a jurisdiction that offers better legal protection, thereby 
impoverishing the quality and competence of that workforce’s home 
jurisdiction.399 Third, ‘quality dumping’ occurs, which is similar to the social 
dumping effect. In these instances, cases and legal disputes move and are 
concentrated in a few jurisdictions that end up gaining far more experience and 
knowledge, while other countries fall behind, and their legislation makes no 
progress. 
Positive aspects of the competition of jurisdictions include the following. First, 
‘knowledge accumulation’, whereby competing jurisdictions create new 
provisions and explore novel solutions in order to win. By creating and 
experimenting in several directions, they generate information leading to 
knowledge that helps in the development of law and legal science.400 Second, 
competition creates incentives for the development of law.401 Competing 
jurisdictions would try to develop their legislation in order to keep up with their 
competitors. Third, competition creates a plurality of options for legal consumers, 
and therefore satisfies a number of their requirements.402 In view of these negative 
and positive aspects, it can be said that competition is either shunned or promoted 
by those that are either suffering from or gaining from it. The competition of civil 
justice systems in the EU also faces the same predicament: some warn against its 
dangers while others praise its benefits.  
The competition between jurisdictions could result in the spontaneous 
harmonisation of legislation, and, if taken to the extreme, it would produce a 
winner. Given that all legal consumers would prefer this winning jurisdiction, a 
unitary law would emerge in practice. Most probably this extreme scenario would 
be interrupted by the activity of other competing jurisdictions that would change 
their legislation and offer laws that were the same as or more attractive than those 
of the winning jurisdiction.403 This would eventually lead to a levelling of the 
legislation if not a unification of the law: namely, a strong form of approximation. 
However, there are difficulties in practice. Legal consumers are not totally mobile, 
as this mobility is limited by legislation, and their ability to choose is legally 
limited to a few types of cases. Moreover, law makers would be reluctant to copy 
the laws of another jurisdiction. As previously mentioned, civil procedure has 
strong nationalistic imprints, and law makers would be reluctant to change this. 
                                                        
399 Social dumping and competition in labour law were discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
400 Visscher (2012) 78. For more, see Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. 
401 Andrews (2012) 25. 
402 This is connected to Tiebout’s theory, as discussed in Section 2.1.4. 
403 Smits (2007) 235. 
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Finally, the information available to legal consumers is not always enough to 
facilitate a correct choice, thus limiting their ability to choose jurisdictions and to 
influence competition. 
If competition between jurisdictions can produce a harmonisation of civil 
procedure, one might wonder why law is not harmonised at that moment. First of 
all, harmonisation based on the competition of jurisdictions is spontaneous, 
meaning that there is no schedule, no timeframe, and no guarantee of success, 
which is exacerbated by the lack of a guide and of a specific objective. Second, 
harmonisation needs ‘healthy’ competition, with few or no legal restrictions, and 
with many facilities for legal consumers to choose among, along with more 
mobile consumers. In Europe, this possibility has long been absent. Third, 
competition needs time to produce harmonisation. While competition in other 
fields of law may be old, competition involving civil justice systems in the EU is 
relatively new, and is related mainly to the development of the Brussels 
Conventions/Regulations. Fourth, in the competition of civil justice systems, 
harmonisation can occur only if the balance of cross-border cases and national 
cases were to lean towards cross-border cases.404 Considering that cross-border 
trade and commerce has intensified only in recent years, national cases are still 
more numerous and economically more significant. Fifth, harmonisation produces 
the right results only when all its necessary conditions are met. If any of the 
required conditions are missing or are not fully developed, competition will not 
flourish to full capacity, and the harmonisation will be distorted. 
3.3.5.2 Harmonisation and competition 
As mentioned earlier, harmonisation has different shades that denote the varied 
intensity of legal unification,405 and they have diverse consequences for the 
competition of civil justice systems in the EU. The first and most intense form of 
harmonisation is unification. A unified civil procedure would remove parties’ 
choice options, and thereby bring an end to competition. Patent law is a good 
example of this. As with many legal rules, patent law and litigation varied among 
                                                        
404 This can be an economic or a numeric balance, or a combination of the two. The economic 
balance leans toward cross-border cases when they provide more economic benefits 
compared to national cases. In this instance, national governments would try to attract these 
cases, enter into competition, and attempt to emulate the foreign legislation that is preferred 
by cross-border legal-consumers. Numeric balance means that governments may be 
interested in the outright difference between national and cross-border cases. If cross-border 
cases are more frequent than national cases, governments would compete and emulate the 
legislation of the jurisdictions that are preferred during competition. A combination of these 
two factors is also possible. It should be kept in mind that the balance is relative for every 
jurisdiction. The same differences between national and cross-border cases can be 
significant for a jurisdiction, while for other jurisdictions it is less so. 
405 Unification, convergence, harmonisation, and approximation. See Section 3.3.1.1. 
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EU Member States, some of which were in competition with each other in terms 
of attracting disputes related to patent law. Germany and the Netherlands had 
highly specialised courts to deal with such cases. With the enforcement of the 
single market and the promotion of the EU as a leader in the development of 
science and technology,406 the protection of patents became an important issue. 
To ensure a uniform protection of European patents, the EU started a process of 
harmonisation of patent law that consists of three elements:407 first, adopting 
regulation 1257/2012408 on a unified European patent; second, adopting 
regulation 1260/2012409 on language problems regarding European patents; and 
third, agreeing on the creation of a unified patent court.410 The last element is the 
most important as regards the competition of civil justice systems, because it 
creates a single procedure and a single court system for patent-related cases 
involving the signatory members.411 While avoiding proceedings in front of 
national courts, parties can have decisions from the unified courts, and these are 
recognised and enforceable in every Member State signatory of the Agreement. 
The establishment of this court will remove any rivalry and competition between 
jurisdictions. At the moment, however, the results of this reform cannot be 
foreseen. Only time will tell whether competition in patent law will have 
disappeared. 
Other and less radical forms of harmonisation are convergence and 
harmonisation. These forms do not produce a sole unitary legal regime, but try to 
create as many unified pieces of legislation as possible. As explained above, 
several attempts have been made to harmonise certain parts of civil procedure in 
the EU. Some, like the Brussels Regulations, have been beneficial to the 
competition of civil justice systems by providing better legal bases for the choice 
of court in cross-border cases. Before the Brussels Regulations, it was difficult to 
manoeuvre amidst the innumerable private international law conventions. 
                                                        
406 See for example the programme Europa 2020: <http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_ 
en.htm> accessed 22 December 2017. 
407 Bently and Radauer (2014) 127. 
408 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection, OJ L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 1–8. 
409 Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the 
applicable translation arrangements, OJ L 361, 31.12.2012, p. 89–92. 
410 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, OJ C 175, 20.6.2013, p. 1–40. 
411 The courts of first instance are located in London, Munich, and Paris, while the court of 
appeals is located in Luxembourg. The courts will begin their function four months after the 
Agreement has been ratified by at least 13 Member States. The status of the ratification 
process can be followed at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/ 
agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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Furthermore, the Regulations facilitated the free movement of judicial decisions 
and their recognition and enforcement. In other words, they fertilised the soil for 
the development of the civil justice system competition. It seems a paradox that 
the same process (harmonisation) can, on the one hand, eliminate the competition 
of jurisdiction, and, on the other hand, can fuel it. In view of this, it can be said 
that if convergence and harmonisation increase in intensity, they might be just a 
step away from stopping competition, but if they are not intense, they might 
favour the competition of jurisdictions. 
A third and less intense shade of harmonisation is approximation, which is 
generally geared towards having the same legal results with different laws and 
legal systems. This approach leaves legal provisions and procedures in Member 
States virtually untouched. Approximation has a dual nature, in that it can be both 
guided and spontaneous. Spontaneous approximation happens when two or more 
jurisdiction have similar institutions and provisions for the same result. For 
example, the provision of Article 27(4) of the Brussels Convention has been 
deleted from the Regulations on the grounds that the area it covers was gradually 
being approximated.412 Another example is the increase in the powers of 
management being conferred on judges, as is observed in many European 
countries.413 Guided approximation needs the presence of an institution or person 
that will navigate the process to the required result. Attempts to promote the 
approximation of civil procedure in Europe were made by a group of researchers 
led by Marcel Storme.414 Although the group’s proposals for a common European 
code of civil procedure never materialised, the approximation idea prevailed. 
Examples of approximating directives adopted by the EU include the directive 
concerning the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
classification, packaging, and labelling of dangerous preparations;415 the directive 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning liability for 
                                                        
412 Article 27 (4) provided grounds for the refusal of recognition of judgments in the event of 
differences in status or in the legal capacity of natural persons. In the Brussels I Regulation 
proposal, the Commission argues that Article 27(4) can be omitted because, among others, 
the legislation of Member States is being approximated. See Commission Proposal COM 
(1999) 348 final; reported also by Francq (2016) 874. 
413 Van Rhee (2012) 44. 
414 Storme (1994). 
415 Directive 1999/45/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 1999 
concerning the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the 
Member States relating to the classification, packaging, and labelling of dangerous 
preparations, OJ L 200, 30.7.1999, p. 1–68. This directive was replaced by Regulation (EC) 
No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on the 
classification, labelling, and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing 
Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, OJ 
L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 1–1355. 
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defective products;416 the directive on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the labelling, presentation, and advertising of foodstuffs 
for sale to the end consumer;417 and the directive for the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States concerning consumer credit.418 In these cases, legislation in 
each Member State still has a nationalistic aspect, and reflects that jurisdiction’s 
social, economic, and legal development. While approximation leaves some 
diversity intact among Member States, it does not appear to be an obstacle to the 
competition of civil justice systems. 
In conclusion, it can be said that harmonisation taken to the extreme would tend 
to weaken and silence the competition of civil justice systems, whereas less 
intense forms of harmonisation could have a stabilising effect on competition and 
support its development. A symbiosis between harmonisation and competition 
might reconcile those praising the benefits of harmonisation and those lauding the 
benefits of competition. Furthermore, competition and harmonisation are not 
necessarily in conflict with each other; just as a competition of jurisdictions can 
produce harmonisation, harmonisation can produce a competition of jurisdictions. 
It is simply a matter of how to design a harmonisation process that respects the 
competition of jurisdictions and takes advantage of its benefits. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Chapter 3 aimed at providing an overview on choice of court and choice of law 
possibilities in the European Union, as well as on the interaction between the civil 
justice system competition and harmonisation. Choice of court (Section 3.1) and 
choice of law (Section 3.2) provided the legal framework for the competition of 
civil justice systems in the EU. Section 3.3 focused on the analysis of the 
connection between harmonisation and the civil justice system competition. 
In the EU, choice of court, as well as the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, is regulated by the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation. The recast Regulation is the continuation of the Brussels Convention 
and the Brussels I Regulation, which bequeathed it a rich body of clarifying case 
                                                        
416 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products, OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29–33. 
417 Council Directive 79/112/EEC of 18 December 1978 on the approximation of the laws of 
Member States relating to the labelling, presentation, and advertising of foodstuffs for sale 
to the end consumer, OJ L 33, 8.2.1979, p. 1–14. 
418 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, 
regulations, and administrative provisions of Member States concerning consumer credit, 
OJ L 42, 12.2.1987, p. 48–53. 
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law and principles. Section 3.1.3.1 analysed some of the most important principles 
enshrined in the recast Regulation. These principles are party autonomy, mutual 
trust, autonomous interpretation, forum non conveniens, and lis pendens. Mutual 
trust requires not only a free movement of people, services, and goods but also 
court decisions. The recast Regulation abolished the exequatur provisions for 
court decisions given in any Member State. The abolition means that within the 
EU no special procedure is required for the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions, and it is a step that benefits the civil justice system market. The 
principle of autonomous interpretation is shared in common between the Rome I, 
the Rome II, and the Brussels I Regulations. An autonomous interpretation means 
that the Regulations should have their own interpretation, independent of national 
law. While being independent of national law, however, they are interdependent, 
in the sense that terms interpreted for one Regulation should be interpreted in a 
similar manner for the others. 
However, while party autonomy, mutual trust, and autonomous interpretation are 
principles applicable to the recast Regulation, the principles of forum non 
conveniens and lis pendens are excluded, as they are not accepted as being of 
benefit to the civil justice market. The CJEU has maintained a clear stance against 
forum non conveniens, while lis pendens has been explicitly regulated by Article 
29 et seq. of the Regulation. Both forum non conveniens and lis pendens increase 
legal uncertainty and threaten the civil justice system market and party autonomy. 
Party autonomy is the core principle of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, and it 
allows individuals and companies to choose the court most appropriate for their 
situation. Freedom of choice gives parties the possibility of allocating their 
resources more effectively and of better protecting their rights. Party autonomy 
and freedom of choice are essential for the competition of civil justice systems, 
which is based on the ability of parties to choose from among different 
jurisdictions in the EU. Despite its central position in the Regulation, however, 
party autonomy is limited in some instances. First, although the Regulation 
protects weaker parties in employment, insurance, and consumer contracts, choice 
of court possibilities are limited, and are mostly designed to provide minimal 
protection. Second, party autonomy is restricted in certain cases relating to the 
exercise of state sovereignty. Here the state is given a privileged position. If the 
case is not restricted by these provisions, the parties may choose the court 
considered the most appropriate (Art. 25). Choice of court is not limited to the 
nationality or the domicile of the parties, and no connecting factor is required. 
This means that parties from all over the world can litigate in the courts of a 
Member State cases that have no connection to the EU. The market for civil justice 
systems is potentially the biggest beneficiary of party autonomy as regulated by 
the recast Regulation. Member State courts become available to any party that 
wishes to litigate in them. 
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Party autonomy as regulated by Article 25 is one of the jurisdictional rules 
provided by the Regulation. The other rules were analysed in Section 3.1.4. The 
jurisdictional rules are organised into general rules and alternatives, into exclusive 
rules, and into rules on specific matters. The general rule of the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation provides that a defendant must be sued in the court of his domicile. 
For specific cases, the Regulation provides jurisdictions that are alternatives to 
the domicile of the defendant. The possibility of choosing between a defendant’s 
domicile and an alternative opens the door to a form of competition of civil justice 
systems known as competition from unilateral choice of court, thus named 
because the choice of court is made only by the claimant. Cases where both parties 
make a choice of court create the premises for competition from bilateral choice 
of court, which is facilitated especially by the provisions of Article 25 of the recast 
Regulation. Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis of competition from unilateral 
and bilateral choice of court. 
Exclusive jurisdiction rules and rules on specific matters are an obstacle to the 
development of the civil justice system market. These rules aim at limiting party 
autonomy for the benefit of weaker parties or for the state’s prerogatives. Without 
the possibilities of choice, competition is not possible. 
The analysis shows that the recast Regulation provides an appropriate foundation 
for the development of the civil justice system competition, and the most 
important aspects of this base are party autonomy, mutual trust between Member 
States, the abolition of exequatur, forum non conveniens, and lis pendens. In 
particular, party autonomy allows choice of court with few formalities, and in 
addition allows litigating parties who are neither nationals nor domiciled in the 
EU to choose the courts of any Member State. Therefore, the pool from which the 
demand is drawn extends beyond the borders of the EU and becomes global. 
While the Brussels I (recast) Regulation provides rules on jurisdiction, Rome I 
and Rome II provide, respectively, rules on the law applicable in contractual and 
non-contractual cross-border situations. Section 3.2 presented the most important 
features of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, among which party autonomy is 
the most important. Similar to the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, restrictions to 
party autonomy are designed to benefit weaker parties. The freedom to choose the 
applicable law is important in view of the civil justice system competition. Choice 
of law and choice of court are often decided together, and survey results419 show 
that they influence each other. However, the interaction between choice of law 
and choice of court deserves further research in the form of theoretical and 
                                                        
419 See Chapter 5 for more. 
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empirical studies. Additional insights into this interaction will provide valuable 
information for governments as well as for practitioners. 
Diversity of legislation between Member States is one of the ingredients of the 
competition between jurisdictions. Diversity, however, is burdensome for cross-
border trade and commerce. In the EU, traders and consumers face twenty-eight 
diverse legal situations. Hence, for this and other reasons, the EU has been trying 
to harmonise legislation in many fields of law. Harmonisation of civil procedure 
has important connotations for the civil justice system competition. Up-to-date 
harmonisation has affected only small areas of civil procedure, but has the 
potential to affect even more significant parts of it. 
Section 3.3 provided an overview of harmonisation terminology. Harmonisation 
projects have been labelled with different names denoting varying degrees of 
uniformity in the legislation of Member States. In view of this, harmonisation 
projects range from total unification to mild forms of approximation. Unification 
implies the existence of the same law in different Member States. With the 
unification of law, legal differences would cease to be the main sources of 
competition. Nevertheless, competition would not disappear. Cultural differences 
in interpreting and enforcing the law would still differentiate Member States from 
each other, and these small non-legal differences would still allow for a certain 
competition between Member States. Milder forms of harmonisation would not 
remove legal differences between Member States, which means that competition 
would still be present. In this regard, harmonisation should be considered an 
inhibitor of the civil justice system competition, with its inhibiting power 
dependent on the intensity of the competition and its ability to unify legislation. 
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Chapter 4 Civil justice systems competition in 
the EU 
This chapter takes a theoretical approach to the competition involving civil justice 
systems in the EU. The first step describes the market in the EU. Next, the separate 
components of the market are analysed. The concept of the civil justice system as 
a good, of litigants and lawyers as creators of demand, and of governments and 
courts as creators of supply is discussed in other sections of this chapter. The last 
section provides an analysis of how unilateral and bilateral choice of court 
influences competition. 
4.1 Civil justice systems and competition: creating a market 
This section discusses the organisation and certain elements of the market 
involving civil justice systems. The very existence of this market fosters the 
conditions necessary for civil justice systems to compete in the EU, and it allows 
suppliers and customers to find each other and to achieve their business 
objectives. The attention that is paid by the demand and supply side gravitates 
towards another important element in the market, which is the actual good that is 
traded: namely, the good that is the entire civil justice system itself.420 
4.1.1 The civil justice system market 
The aim of this section is to describe the civil justice system market and the related 
elements that facilitate it. Whenever a party is interested in something that 
involves interaction with another actor, there emerges a market for that 
‘something’, which can be a good or a service, and as a rule it has a price.421 In 
the European Union, cross-border litigation has increased over the past few 
decades, and has been facilitated by an ever-increasing party autonomy. At the 
same time, some countries in the EU, in particular England, Germany, France, 
and the Netherlands, have been trying to promote their court systems to attract 
potential litigators. The price of the court system as a good is the fee – or fees − 
                                                        
420 While a civil justice system can be considered a good, its submission to a market and related 
trading is debated. See for example, Alpa (2004) 45. 
421 Ledyard, John O. ‘market failure’. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second 
Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 22 December 2017 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000056> 
doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1029. 
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that court users are required to pay.422 Court adjudication, cross-border litigants, 
and the countries trying to attract them create the conditions for the existence of 
a civil justice system market. In this market, the civil justice system – centred on 
court adjudication – is the good traded, while litigants and governments are the 
creators of demand and supply. These are discussed in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, 
respectively. Certain characteristics of the market are discussed in this section. 
The market as described above is not a place423 but a system, a process that unfolds 
in time and space,424 and has its own structure and characteristics. Furthermore, 
some markets produce externalities that usually require the attention of central 
governments. Most importantly, markets create premises for the development of 
competition between the parties involved in it. 
4.1.2 Party autonomy and the civil justice system market 
Based on the Brussels I (recast) Regulation,425 the supply side of the civil justice 
system market in the EU is composed of all the EU Member States.426The 
Brussels I (recast) Regulation provides the rules for the choice of court and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in the EU, and thus facilitates the 
competition involving civil justice.427 The demand side is composed of litigants 
involved in cross-border litigation. The Brussels I (recast) Regulation applies 
regardless of the nationality of the parties,428 which extends the pool of the 
demand side beyond the population of the EU. In most conflicts arising outside 
contractual obligations, claimants have the advantage of choosing the court that 
will decide on the dispute. In other instances, especially involving cases that 
derive from contracts, both parties decide to agree on a court for resolving future 
disputes. The choice of court is made possible by the existence of party autonomy, 
                                                        
422 Some jurisdictions do not charge court fees: e.g. France. 
423 In this regard, Zoppini considers that even though states have boundaries, the market exceeds 
these. Zoppini (2004) 10. 
424 Rothenberg, Winifred B. ‘marketplaces. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 22 December 
2017. <http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000064> doi:10. 
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425 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1–32. 
426 It can be argued that the market as such was created by countries like England, Germany, 
and the Netherlands, which first showed signs of willingness to attract litigants. However, 
from the legal perspective, the market also includes other Member States. 
427 See for details Chapter 3. 
428 And in some cases also regardless of the domicile, e.g. Article 25 of the Regulation. 
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which creates the conditions for the existence of a demand for civil justice systems 
and, as a consequence, the existence of the market itself.  
In Europe, the advance of the concept of party autonomy has been the result of 
philosophical and social developments.429 With the development of trade and 
commerce in the 18th and 19th century, and with the turn of the tide in European 
politics,430 the individual was considered to be fully independent and free to 
decide his own future. This autonomy in deciding one’s proper future in terms of 
education, political thought, and social setting also inspired legal emancipation. 
Many countries recognised the right of individuals to choose the law or court that 
would better serve their interests. This does not mean total freedom of choice, 
however, but one limited by safeguards against abuse. Governments imposed and 
still impose certain restrictions on autonomy. 
Broadly speaking, party autonomy was developed in two directions. On the one 
hand, individuals were given more discretion in drafting and choosing contractual 
provisions, while on the other hand parties were granted more autonomy to choose 
the law or court that applies to their legal situation. Contractual freedom allowed 
parties to escape strict contractual forms that were required by law, which 
increased the array of contracts that businesses could implement, with the 
potential of increasing efficiency and reducing costs. Increases in efficiency and 
reductions in cost can be achieved by allowing parties to better allocate their 
resources and costs in time and space. Party autonomy creates a positive 
psychological and social climate for individuals as well as businesses. 
Party autonomy allows parties to escape the tutelage of governments in business 
and non-business situations, and can be exercised either by physically moving to 
the jurisdiction of choice (vesting domicile in that country), by interacting with a 
good for which an exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed, or by making a choice of 
law or court from a distance.431 Choice of law allows parties to choose the law 
applicable to their contractual relationship, while choice of court allows parties to 
submit their present or future disputes to a court of their choice. These choices are 
made separately, and it is not mandatory to match the chosen law with the chosen 
court jurisdiction. Choice of law is exercised by businesses frequently and with 
                                                        
429 Kramer and Themeli (2017) 29-33. 
430 During this period, social and political changes transformed Europe’s political landscape, 
from absolutism to a more liberal outlook. 
431 In the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, the general rule of Article 4 is that persons domiciled 
in a Member State shall be sued in the courts of that Member State. This means that by 
selecting domicile in a Member State, a person also chooses the court where he will be sued 
as a defendant. Furthermore, Article 24 provides for exclusive jurisdictions from which 
parties cannot depart. Other articles allow parties to choose a court. 
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ease, but for non-business parties it is not so. In non-business cases, individuals 
may migrate to find the law of a country that offers better legal solutions. 
Employees try to find the place that best combines a broad array of elements, 
including legal protection of their rights.432 Choice of law in family law is also 
practiced by those who wish to engage in same-sex marriage, or who seek to avoid 
legislation restricting divorce, artificial insemination, and so on. Many people 
choose the law and the legal setting of a jurisdiction to regulate parts of their non-
commercial life. This is the case for instance in same-sex marriage, parentage 
(adoption), health care, and libel cases, which create a situation in which one 
person uses the law best suited to his wishes, by traveling to the country with the 
appropriate regulations. Given that these cases are in conflict with the public 
policy of their home countries, choice of law or court may be restricted or not 
recognised. It can be said that legal tourism exists and is growing. In commercial 
cases, party autonomy is used extensively to take advantage of the legal 
regulations in different jurisdictions. Most notably, choice of law is used in 
company law, tax law, environmental law, and so forth. Companies combine it 
with other elements to create their business strategies, moving their seats and 
assets to jurisdictions that offer a good combination of legal protection and 
economic possibilities. A good choice of seat offers an important competitive 
advantage to many companies, and a good location can save considerable 
resources. Consultancy firms regularly suggest to their clients ‘lists’ of 
jurisdictions that offer legal benefits. However, the legal migration of workers or 
of companies from one country to another can be tactically complicated and have 
far-reaching objectives. 
Choice of law enables the application of a certain law or group of laws from a 
distance, sometimes even regardless of the location of the person. In contract law, 
parties frequently incorporate a choice of law or choice of court clause in their 
contracts, without even being present within the jurisdiction they choose. By 
choosing a certain law, parties can give effect to certain contractual provisions or 
render them inapplicable, while the jurisdiction of the court can impact the 
outcome of the entire dispute resolution. Therefore, party autonomy and the 
choice of law and forum can have a tremendous impact on the outcome of 
contractual relations. 
                                                        
432 The working force that moves from one place to another is said to be ‘voting with its feet’ 
the policies of the hosting country. However, migration is not always undertaken after one 
has made a reasoned evaluation of the legal situation. Most often migrating workers have 
strong economic incentives for moving between countries. Bellavista (2006) 5. 
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The effects of party autonomy can also affect third parties, extending beyond the 
reach of those directly involved.433 Affected third parties can incur externalities 
in the form of costs or benefits, or sometimes both. When benefits exceed costs, 
third parties find themselves in a positive position. In contrast, if costs exceed 
benefits, third parties are forced to bear others’ costs. The negative effects of a 
legal situation are sometimes channelled to third parties. Those who benefit from 
party autonomy, while dumping all the negative effects on third parties, have no 
incentive to change their behaviour, which raises concerns and can increase 
conflicts in society. One solution to this is government intervention aimed at 
reducing party autonomy and preventing negative behaviour. Another solution is 
to make parties internalise their negative effects, which would also result in a 
more efficient use of resources and party autonomy. Nevertheless, this autonomy 
should not be restricted at the first hint of externalities being dumped on third 
parties; the situation needs to be considered carefully. While considering their 
actions, however, governments juggle parameters and efficiency indexes, and the 
task does not appear to be easy.  
Furthermore, party autonomy is often distorted by the bargaining power of one of 
the parties − this being the ability and potential to influence a negotiation process. 
It derives from different sources, most notably from a party’s economic power 
and its market position. The bigger the party’s economic power or the stronger its 
market position, the more bargaining power he has, which can greatly enhance his 
possibility of asserting his interest in making a choice of court. The party with the 
greatest bargaining power will impose his will in a negotiation process, and thus 
will neutralise the ability of the other party to express his autonomy. Vulnerable 
parties receive special protection from the government, which either restricts the 
scope of party autonomy in favour of weaker parties or creates special rules that 
protect vulnerable ones. Consumers are usually the weakest parties in terms of 
bargaining power, and for this reason legislation limiting consumers’ autonomy 
tries to protect them. 
Information asymmetry also strongly influences party autonomy. Often, one of 
the parties possesses better information, which improves his knowledge regarding 
the choice of law or court. The information might have been obtained by investing 
in research or information sources, or be due to the party’s own abilities. 
Governments try to protect vulnerable parties from information asymmetries by 
limiting their autonomy, or by obliging parties to share information prior to 
choosing a court. As is true of bargaining power, consumers comprise one of the 
most vulnerable groups. More frequently in the EU, regulations require merchants 
                                                        
433 For example, third parties that want to intervene in a litigation, can do so only at the court 
chosen by the parties. 
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to divulge information to consumers in order to decrease any disparity with 
respect to information. However, information is a valuable asset to many 
producers, and divulging it can harm their status among other producers. 
4.1.3 The market and forum shopping 
As mentioned above, party autonomy and choice of court have been regulated by 
the Brussels Regime, which safeguards vulnerable parties (e.g. consumers and 
employees), limits that autonomy for certain types of disputes (e.g. immovable 
property), and protects parties’ autonomy with regard to the remaining situations. 
This legal regime creates the conditions for the existence of the market for dispute 
resolutions, which allows litigants to use this market to choose the court best 
suited to their interests. This process is often referred to as forum shopping.434 
The term has gained a negative connotation,435 and is often considered to be a 
negative externality of party autonomy.436 However, demonising forum shopping 
is a reflection of the fear of seeing law and legal proceedings (including courts) 
as a good that can be marketed and purchased. This fear is based on the law being 
perceived as a sacred object that should not be considered as a good offered in 
shops.437 This study considers the reality to be somewhat different. First, legal 
researchers and academics praise and study party autonomy, which creates the 
conditions for ‘wandering around courts’ and ultimately choosing one of them. 
Second, law schools teach the basics of party autonomy and the possibilities of 
choosing from among different courts. Third, lawyers as products of the above-
mentioned schools use party autonomy to defend their clients as best they can, 
while being accused of forum shopping. Fourth, governments approve regulations 
and procedures to optimise party autonomy and choice of law practices. Fifth, for 
a long time, international law has been busy making choice a common practice. 
All of this demonstrates that forum shopping is not discouraged: on the contrary, 
it seems to be encouraged.438 In view of this, considering forum shopping to be a 
negative process seems hypocritical. 
                                                        
434 Sometimes called rule shopping, Charny (1991). 
435 Algero (1999) 80. 
436 Barendrecht (2012) 52. 
437 Alpa (2004) 45. Section 1.2.3 elaborates more on the ‘shopping’ metaphor. 
438 Landes and Posner consider that conflict of law rules prevent forum shopping among 
jurisdictions, while allowing more freedom in shopping for alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Landes and Posner (1979) 258. Reflecting on this, it can be said that forum 
shopping and choice of court are related to the qualities that courts and court adjudication 
have. Courts serve the interest of the state by resolving cases considered important to social 
peace. Cases not considered to be very important are allowed to be decided by ADR 
mechanisms. Therefore, freedom in shopping for ADR is considered to be more extensive. 
Section 4.2 analyses this topic in detail. 
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It can be said that forum shopping, like any type of shopping, has both a bright 
and a dark side. Quite possibly forum shopping gained its negative reputation 
when being used to avoid certain laws in one jurisdiction, with negative 
consequences for the government of that jurisdiction, or for vulnerable parties. 
For example, some companies active in one jurisdiction have their registered seat 
in another, with the intention of avoiding particular legislative restrictions in the 
jurisdiction where they are active. While this move can be legal, it makes it 
difficult for governments to exercise control over these companies, and it can 
hinder consumers’ possibilities of protecting their rights. In the case of large 
corporations, enormous amounts of taxable capital can evade taxation, causing 
governments considerable problems. Such forum-shopping practices affect not 
only small countries but also large and powerful economies. One infamous use of 
forum shopping involves the choice of court, and has been called ‘the Italian 
Torpedo’. The practice consists of filing a claim with a court renowned for its 
long proceeding times. This affects the possibilities of the other party having a 
speedy proceeding, and may give a tactical advantage to the user. One of the most 
famous ‘Italian torpedo’ cases to be brought in front of the ECJ is Erich Gasser 
GmbH v MISAT.439 In this case, MISAT first seized an Italian court even though 
the parties had agreed to file any complaint with the Austrian courts. Given that 
proceedings in Italian courts require relatively more time to be concluded than in 
Austrian courts, MISRAT considered it advantageous to file the case in Italy. The 
strict rules on lis pendens that facilitated this situation have since been revised. 
Article 31(2) in conjunction with Article 25, 26, and 29 of the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation allows the court agreed upon by the parties to ascertain jurisdiction, 
while the court first seized has to stay proceedings. This argument suggests that 
forum shopping has its problems. These can be treated, however, by targeting 
them and not simply by considering forum shopping to be ‘the problem’. 
4.1.4 Characteristics of the market 
Returning to the civil justice system market, it is necessary to describe its main 
characteristics, which will help the analysis in the next sections. The price in a 
market is an important indicator for the interaction between demand and supply. 
In a market where demand and supply are price takers, the price of the good traded 
is the equilibrium between the price asked by the demand and the price offered by 
the supply. This requires a sufficiently large number of suppliers, with none 
having sufficient power to influence the supply. Similarly, demand must be large 
enough to make sure the role of a single member has no influence on its general 
output. In a situation where supply is controlled by a small (monopoly) or a larger 
                                                        
439 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl 2003 European Court Reports 2003  
I-14693 9 December 2003 (Court of Justice). 
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(oligopoly) group, the price of the product tends to be higher than in the situation 
described above. In a situation where demand is controlled by a small group of 
people (monopsony), the price tends to be lower.440 
However, the situation involving the civil justice system market is different. First, 
the system is not a single good − it is composed of several services, which are 
often offered separately. Second, given that the system is composed of several 
services, users pay for each of them separately. This means that users who pay a 
price for the whole civil justice system are rare if non-existent. Third, it makes 
more sense to speak about the price of individual components than the price of 
the system in its entirety. Fourth, the prices of the different components are not a 
direct result of the interaction between demand and supply; prices in many 
European countries are decided by governments. Fifth, the price of any of these 
goods does not reflect the real cost of the good. In fact, civil justice systems are 
often subsidised, while courts are not ‘for profit’ institutions.441 These arguments 
hint at a preliminary conclusion: namely, that governments are not motivated 
by direct economic profit in the provision of civil justice systems − other motives 
must be found and considered. If direct economic profit does not motivate 
governments to provide civil justice systems, it means that suppliers are not profit 
maximisers, and therefore they lack the incentives to be more efficient and to 
maximise their profits. Nonetheless, this is deceptive. Civil justice systems and 
the court system do strive to be more efficient and innovative.442 Efficiency in 
providing services and reducing costs, and innovation in providing new solutions 
to existing problems become important in a globalised world. In the following 
sections, the discussion will return to the source(s) that motivates suppliers to 
achieve efficiency and innovation. 
                                                        
440 Chapter 2 considered the heterodox view on competition to be more suitable for the 
description of the civil justice systems competition. For heterodox economics, price is not 
the result of interaction between demand and supply, and the orthodox price mechanism 
should be discarded. The current section does not aim at tackling this debate, but at analysing 
some of the factors that influence the price in the civil justice system market.  
441 For a detailed overview of the costs of civil procedure in the EU, see Reimann (2011). The 
EU e-Justice Portal also contains a report on the costs of proceedings in every Member State. 
Some of them allow courts to lower fees further to accommodate vulnerable social groups. 
The national reports and the overall study can be found at <https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_costs_of_proceedings-37-en.do> accessed 22 December 2017. 
442 For example, the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands has drafted a court reform that aims 
at innovating the system: see <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-
veiligheid-en-justitie/inhoud/innovatie-veiligheid-en-justitie> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Also the German Brochure ‘Law – Made in Germany’ focuses on the efficiency of the 
German system. Both these examples show that governments are interested in making courts 
and the system more efficient and innovative. 
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Another characteristic of the civil justice system market is related mainly to the 
characteristics of the supplier. Governments as suppliers face no risk of 
bankruptcy resulting from their behaviour.443 Even if governments face this risk, 
it is not a consequence of their exposure in the market; even in the most bankrupt 
state, at least some form or element of the civil justice system remains. In a normal 
market situation, unsuccessful firms would go bankrupt and vanish. Suppliers 
would try to avoid the same fate by improving productivity and adapting to the 
demand’s requirements, because failure to respond to signals from the market 
would deplete the firms’ capital and thus bring about their collapse. It should be 
said that the lack of a prospect of failure removes incentives for efficient 
behaviour and innovative creativity. Governments know that they will not go 
bankrupt even though their civil justice system or their court does not innovate. It 
can be argued that a civil justice system that is not efficient or that does not keep 
up with changes in society creates social frictions and general discontent. Such 
frictions can erupt into social upheavals able to overthrow governments and 
radically change societies. Innovation and creativity require resources and 
generate costs that are not justified by the price of the product or the profits 
derived from it. This means that incentives for innovation in civil justice systems 
should come from other sources and not from the prospects of market gain. 
Keeping a civil justice system sufficiently efficient and innovative to avoid social 
unrest and promote economic development is a considerable incentive for 
governments. However, this can also be seen as an incentive to make a minimal 
effort to provide a governmental service, and it does not explain the attempt to 
provide a system that is better than minimal. Furthermore, it is more a political 
incentive than an economic one derived from the market. 
If the market does not provide incentives for innovation, suppliers can become 
passive by copying the innovations of other suppliers, or by not innovating at all 
if profit is missing. However, the civil justice system market is not isolated from 
outside interferences. It is closely related to other internal markets and cross-
border markets. Before continuing with the description of these markets, a brief 
clarification is needed. As previously mentioned, a civil justice system is 
composed of several goods. Among these, court adjudication seems to be the most 
                                                        
443 During 2015, the government of Greece found itself in the position of having little liquidity. 
Two solutions were proposed: one was to allow Greece to default on its debts, to exit the 
Euro currency system, and to restructure and resuscitate its economy. This is an example of 
how a country can go bankrupt even within the EU. Bankruptcy for Greece was speared by 
the intervention of what is referred to as Troika (European Central Bank, European 
Commission, and International Monetary Fund). Despite looming bankruptcy, courts in 
Greece continued their work. Furthermore, it could be said that the economic crisis in Greece 
or other European countries was not the result of their activity in the civil justice system 
market, but of other economic factors. 
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important, and the one that attracts most attention. Given that internal markets and 
cross-border markets also have non-government suppliers, it makes more sense to 
focus on comparing the adjudication services provided in these markets. Internal 
markets are the internal dispute resolution markets. In these, courts organised by 
the government compete with private dispute resolution mechanisms organised 
by private parties. Demand is produced by litigants in strictly national cases, and 
are unable to submit their claim to external institutions. External markets are the 
dispute resolution markets between courts, organised by the government and 
dispute resolution mechanisms organised by international private parties. Demand 
in this market is created by litigants that have the possibility of submitting their 
case to institutions outside the state’s border. Governments supply the same 
product in each of these markets and with the same price. Therefore, the signals 
and the incentives for suppliers are multiple, and not only related to the situation 
in a single market. At this point, it becomes important to know which of these 
markets is more important, and which one provides more incentives − if any – for 
governments to change. 
Considering these characteristics, the civil justice system market does not 
resemble a perfect competition market. Perfect competition requires a large 
number of suppliers and a large number of demanders who have no influence on 
the market. In this situation, self-interested parties are the price takers. Self-
interested means that both parties, while trying to maximise their preferences over 
their set budgets, do not exercise any influence over the market.444 In the civil 
justice system market, the price of civil justice (the good) is not a result of the 
supply-demand interaction. The governments − as supply − are not always self-
interested, as their mission is not necessarily to maximise preferences. These 
characteristics suggest that the civil justice system market is not a perfect 
competitive one. While it is true that perfect competition is an idealised situation, 
the market for civil justice systems seems to be far from that ideal. 
4.1.5 Incentives to compete 
Incentives derived from internal and cross-border markets are different from each 
other, and therefore have a different impact on governments. For a better 
understanding, it is necessary to give a brief description.  
First, the internal dispute resolution market is created by a supply side composed 
of state-run courts and private dispute resolution mechanisms; the demand side is 
                                                        
444 Khan, M. Ali, ‘perfect competition’. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second 
Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 22 December 2017 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_P000056> 
doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1267. 
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composed of litigants, usually residents of that jurisdiction; and the good in the 
market is ‘dispute resolution’. Private dispute resolution mechanisms, including 
arbitration and various forms of mediation, are also known as alternative dispute 
resolutions (ADR). ADRs are not always alternative, owing to mandatory rules 
obliging them to litigate in state courts. Furthermore, disputes can be submitted 
to ADRs only in the event of an agreement between the parties. As regards the 
good, courts and ADRs have differences in terms of organisation and procedure, 
although the results are similar.445 Compared to the civil justice system market, 
the demand side in an internal competition is also composed of individuals and 
small companies. ADRs are in competition with each other but also with courts. 
They are usually for-profit organisations that increase their revenues by increasing 
the volume of cases they handle. They compete to attract as many litigants as 
possible, while improving and innovating their performance. 
It can be argued that courts do not compete to increase their profit, but to make 
sure that every member of society is able to access fair and fast justice. Fair and 
fast courts impact the perception of justice in the society, and the satisfaction of 
voters with the government. Voters can express their opinion on the services 
offered in courts. Thus, social and political pressure create incentives to improve 
and innovate court services. For governments, the only source of these incentives 
is the internal market. 
In order to attract and please voters,446 governments need to make sure they offer 
high-quality public services combined with reasonable prices. Such a price must 
be one that does not exclude litigants who have a low income, and that does not 
make litigation costs prohibitive, but at the same time covers part of the costs of 
the process and offers some relief regarding the burden of the court budget. While 
ADRs, and in particular arbitration, are more profit oriented, it has been argued 
that they can be as expensive as court litigation if not more so.447 Courts are less 
expensive than ADRs because they are subsidised by governments. However, in 
many countries, governments are trying to reduce the burden that courts place on 
the state budget. A way to decrease this burden is by reforming courts by making 
                                                        
445 A mediation process is very different from a court process, and an arbitration proceeding is 
different from both of them. Private dispute resolution providers also compete between each 
other for a share of the market, and they can be also seen as separate markets: e.g. one for 
arbitration or one for mediation. See for example O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014). 
446 This refers to those persons who have voting rights in one jurisdiction, either as nationals or 
as domiciled. 
447 Drahozal (2008). This study was conducted in the US, and it is not clear whether it can be 
generalised for the EU. However, it can be said that on the same open market at any moment 
there cannot be two prices for the same kind of article. This can be a reasonable explanation 
as to why the cost of court adjudication is comparable to other dispute resolution 
mechanisms (at least in certain cases). 
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them more efficient, and by encouraging the use of private dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Budget concerns may create an additional incentive for innovation 
in the court system, while comparable costs within the private sector create the 
conditions for discharging part of the burden into ADR alternatives. The trend to 
lower the burden of courts can also be explained in simple economic terms. It is 
reasonable to think that firms increase in size when they make a profit, and 
decrease when they fail to make a profit. The fact that governments try to reduce 
the workload of courts can be an indication that the profit derived from them does 
not justify the expenses they entail. However, another explanation can be that 
governments are interested in reducing courts’ dispute resolution market failures 
by adding other markets.448 
Second, the cross-border dispute resolution market is composed of governments 
trying to attract litigants, including international litigants who use the possibility 
of choosing cross-border dispute resolution. As well as governments, the supply 
side is also composed of ADRs. The demand side is composed of cross-border 
litigants that have the possibility of choosing between courts of different 
jurisdictions and international ADRs. These litigants are mostly businesses 
mobile enough and with sufficient information to successfully use a cross-border 
dispute resolution mechanism. The cross-border dispute resolution market is 
similar to the civil justice system market.449 These similarities can be found in the 
services offered (as the good in the market), in some of the potential litigants (as 
the demand side), and in the courts (as supplies in the market). The price of 
services offered by the courts is the same as that offered in other markets. It does 
not cover the costs and does not create profit for the government. Hence, the 
activity of courts in the cross-border dispute resolution market is not directed 
towards profit. Therefore, the market does not provide incentives to increase 
revenues. Given that direct incentives from profit are missing, either some form 
                                                        
448 Adding markets would solve the monopoly problem facing the delivery of justice in many 
states. Adding alternatives to the court dispute resolution seems to be one of them. However, 
market failures that are caused by non-competitive behaviour are difficult to correct while 
still trying to hold onto the market. Another solution in this case would be to search for non-
market solutions, common for many public good markets. Ledyard, John O., ‘market 
failure’. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. 
Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 22 December 2017 <http://www. 
dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000056> 
doi:10.1057/9780230226203.1029. 
449 The two markets overlap in many of their constitutive elements, while giving the impression 
that one is part of the other. However, this study does not consider either one to be part of 
the other. 
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of indirect incentive needs to exist, or incentives must come from outside these 
markets. 
This section introduces the most important elements of the civil justice system 
market with a particular focus on the EU perspective. Based on this section, the 
following conclusions can be made. The market is centred on a good (civil justice 
systems, which mainly serve for the resolution of conflicts), which is supplied by 
governments and demanded by cross-border litigants. Party autonomy creates the 
basis for the existence of the demand side, but is restricted in order to protect 
vulnerable parties and public interests. Furthermore, the market seems to be far 
from competitive.450 Some incentives for innovation that are expected from a 
market appear to be absent here, which means that participating governments 
receive incentives from other sources. Furthermore, the civil justice system 
market does not seem to be oriented towards direct profit from the sale of the 
goods. Suppliers are ‘fuelled’ by other interests to participate in this market. Some 
behaviours can be explained by the nature of the supply and demand as well as by 
the nature of the good offered in the market. Dispute resolution as a good and its 
importance for the competition for civil justice systems is discussed in the next 
section. 
4.2 Civil justice systems as a good 
As previously mentioned, the civil justice system market creates competition 
opportunities between governments as to who will be most successful in attracting 
cross-border litigants. Governments’ (supply) and litigants’ (demand) interest 
revolves around the good on offer, which is the civil justice system of a state. The 
system is composed of many goods, among which court adjudication is the most 
important. This section describes and critically appraises the civil justice system 
as a good, the nature of this good, and what this implies for the competition. First, 
it gives a critical overview of the definition of and the relation between goods, 
public goods, private goods, and merit goods. Second, it gives a description of the 
nature of goods in the civil justice system market. The last part of this section 
offers conclusions on how the nature of the goods might influence the market and 
the competition. 
                                                        
450 This is true from the orthodox economics perspective; from the heterodox perspective, the 
market is suitable for the development of competition. 
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4.2.1 Goods: definition and types 
There is no universal definition of the term ‘goods’. In general, objects and 
processes that benefit a person are called goods (or services).451 However, some 
objects or processes are not beneficial: on the contrary, they are harmful. These 
negative objects and processes are referred to as ‘bads’. Therefore, labelling an 
object or process as goods or bads depends on the value it creates. This value 
cannot be absolute or abstract, because human and social needs change in time 
and space. It is reasonable to think that goods and bads have a subjective value, 
which is relative to personal situations or standpoints. For example, a peanut is a 
good to most people because it tastes good and provides nutrients. But for a person 
allergic to peanuts it is not a good, it is a bad. However, the same peanut can be a 
good for the allergic person if he decides to trade it and benefits from the trade. 
The example of the peanut shows that the same object can be a good and a bad at 
the same time, as its value is dependent on the modalities that it employed, and 
on the subsequent subjective benefits. Therefore, an object can be a good and a 
bad, depending on its usage. 
With the development of science and human society, almost every object and 
process is considered a good. To better understand and study them, goods have 
been categorised in different ways based on some of their characteristics. From 
an economic standpoint, some categories are common goods and credence goods. 
Common goods are those that benefit all members of a community.452 Credence 
goods are those provided by an expert who also determines buyers’ needs, since 
buyers cannot assess the quality and quantity of goods they need, and as a 
consequence the market is characterised by fraud and by high prices.453 
4.2.1.1 Good with excludability and rivalry 
One of the most common ways to categorise goods is to use their characteristics 
of excludability and rivalry.454 Excludability means that during the production or 
the consumption of the good, it is economically and practically possible to exclude 
some users from consuming it. Rivalry means that if a person consumes the 
good(s), the quality and the quantity of the good(s) available for other consumers 
diminishes. These characteristics can range from full excludability to non-
excludability, and from rivalry to non-rivalry. Their combination can create 
different categories of goods as well. For example, goods that are excludable and 
                                                        
451 The terms ‘goods’ and ‘services’ are used interchangeably in this chapter. An orthodox view 
considers goods only to be tangibles, while intangibles are considered to be services. That 
difference is not made here. Mankowski (2016) 194. 
452 Moltchanova (2011) 165. 
453 Themeli (2016) 19; Hadfield (2000) 968. 
454 These definitions are mostly used and created by economists. Legal definitions of public 
goods and private goods are difficult to find if they exist at all. 
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involve rivalry are private goods; goods that are non-excludable and involve 
rivalry are open-access resources; goods that are excludable and involve non-
rivalry are congestible resources; goods that are non-excludable and involve non-
rivalry are public goods.455 For instance, if a show of fireworks is on display, it is 
difficult if not impossible to stop people from looking at it; hence, the show is 
non-excludable. And regardless of how many people are watching the show, its 
availability to others is not diminished (non-rivalry); hence, the show of fireworks 
is a public good. An example of a private good is a bus ride. A bus has limited 
space as well as limited access possibilities. On the one hand, the producer of the 
bus ride can easily limit access to the bus and exclude any person from accessing 
it, thus making the good excludable. On the other hand, the more people that enter 
the bus, the lower the quality of the bus ride becomes, and the more difficult it 
becomes for other people to use – to enter − the bus, thus making the good an 
object of rivalry. Therefore, a bus ride is a private good. Like public goods, private 
goods can be produced and supplied by private persons as well as by public 
institutions. However, given that it is difficult to limit the use of non-excludable 
goods by consumers, pricing them and collecting revenues is also difficult. 
Consumers of non-excludable goods will try to avoid payment or will understate 
their preferences for the good (so that they can pay less), while private producers 
will be dissuaded from producing these goods, even if there is an enormous 
demand. 
4.2.1.2 Merit goods 
Another type of good was described in 1956 by Richard Musgrave in a paper on 
normative theories of public households.456 In this paper, he advanced the concept 
of merit goods457 as a solution for the difficulties in describing the various goods 
provided by the government. Since the conception of the term merit goods, several 
authors have contributed to the development of the notion, but a commonly 
accepted definition has not been reached.458 However, the notion of merit goods 
can be useful to describe the civil justice system as a good. Therefore, it is 
important to have a working definition of merit goods as well as a short, non-
exhaustive description of its development. As first described by Musgrave, merit 
goods are considered as goods that individuals do not know that they want, but 
                                                        
455 Open-access resources are also called common pool sources, and congestible goods are also 
called club goods. For this, see Bodansky (2012) 651; Foldvary (2011) 434; Van Aaken 
(2010) 153. 
For public goods see: Van Aaken (2010) 153; Lemieux (2012) 8; Rubin (2007) 26; Bratspies 
(2010) 147; Foldvary (2011) 434; Kaul (2009) 550. 
456 Musgrave (1956).  
457 Musgrave uses the term merit wants (the negative aspect which is labelled demerit wants), 
while for public goods he uses the term public wants and sometimes social wants. 
458 Musgrave (2008). 
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the state produces them because they are important.459 Elaborating further, Head 
defined merit goods as ‘those of which, due to imperfect knowledge, individuals 
would choose to consume too little’.460 In his view, merit goods are needed 
because they have elements of social goods,461 because better informed people 
might be justified in imposing their decision upon others, and because the ideal of 
consumers’ sovereignty and the reality of consumers’ choice may be different.462 
The common denominator of these definitions is that the government intervenes 
in the market to produce or force consumers to use a good that they do not 
consume enough.463 In this regard, a government’s intervention can be viewed as 
paternalistic or autocratic, but as Ver Eecke points out, from the perspective of a 
welfare state, microeconomic efficiency is not a government’s only goal. 
Therefore, the government needs to intervene in order to restore justice and human 
dignity.464 While outlining all the research done on merit goods, Musgrave 
concluded that the best way to describe merit goods would be to consider them as 
values created during a historical process of interaction among individuals, and 
transmitted thereafter as community values.465 Some examples of merit goods 
would be free education, public holidays, regard for the environment, restriction 
of drug use and prostitution, taxation, and so forth. There is little to disagree with 
regarding the importance of these goods. Nevertheless, private parties are 
unwilling to produce either some of them or enough of them, while consumers are 
ignorant with regard to their needs for these goods. It is submitted that merit goods 
are not an addition to the public goods-private goods duo. The term merit goods 
is another way to describe and categorise goods that can also fall into the public 
goods–private goods continuum. In other words, a good can be both a private and 
a merit good at the same time. 
                                                        
459 Musgrave (1956) 341. 
460 Head (1966) 3. 
461 In Musgrave’s terminology, social wants and public wants are interchangeable and 
comparable (if not the same as) with public goods. Head uses the same terminology. 
462 Head (1966) 3. 
463 These contradict the free market principles, where consumers’ autonomy and freedom is 
paramount in creating the mechanisms of demand and supply. If demand is steered by the 
government or ‘manipulated by it’ it would distort the free market. As pointed out by the 
proponents of merit goods, individuals are not always able to make a choice (or a good 
choice) because of ignorance and irrationality. Ignorance is caused by a lack of basic 
information or by incomplete information. Irrational choice happens when even though 
consumers have complete and accurate information, in the eyes of an observer, they make 
‘irrational’, ‘inferior’, or ‘contrary to their interest choices’. These problems with 
consumers’ ability to make choices creates the need for merit goods. Head (1969) 216; Ver 
Eecke (1998) 134, Musgrave (2008). 
464 Ver Eecke (1998) 144; Musgarave (2008). 
465 Musgrave (2008). 
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4.2.1.3 Labelling goods as public goods 
Some non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods (or some that almost have these 
characteristics) are needed for the normal functioning of a society, but private 
parties are not interested in providing them, for the reasons mentioned above.466 
At this point, governments intervene in the market to produce these goods.467 
Nevertheless, not every good produced by the government is non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous. Some of the goods have the characteristics of private goods, while 
others are less easy to categorise and define. If we accept in general that the 
government’s role is to serve public interest, it goes without saying that the goods 
produced by government institutions should be available to all members of 
society. Therefore, while the government produces goods ranging from public to 
private, they should try to make these goods as accessible as possible. 
However, two problems arise. The first problem is that governments are not 
interested in making all goods available to the public: for example, state secrets, 
military equipment, drugs, and so forth. In addition, some goods produced by the 
government and intended for the general public are private goods in character. 
With their excludability and rivalry, they cannot be available to everyone. And as 
previously mentioned, it is common practice for governments to have secrets.468 
The second problem is more difficult. While governments know from experience 
and maybe from theory that certain goods are excludable and rivalrous, they 
would like these goods to be available for everyone in their jurisdiction. To 
achieve this, governments try to make these goods non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, pushing them towards the public good side. This is done not only by 
producing them and facilitating their availability but also by politically protecting 
the access and the quality of these goods. Some goods, despite not being public 
goods, are considered public goods for political purposes. The government is so 
powerful that it can impose its point of view on any person under its jurisdiction. 
It should be remembered that the concept of goods is a subjective one, where the 
value of something as a good is decided by the subject with whom the good is 
                                                        
466 Non-excludability is the characteristic that makes it difficult to price the goods and to collect 
the revenue. This means that goods ranging from pure public goods to open-access resources 
can be economically non-attractive to private producers. 
467 Governments often intervene to mitigate public bads produced by society (economy) without 
having a market solution. An example of this is environmental pollution. Some other bads 
are resolved by other social structures and mechanisms such as courts. For example, 
damages to a person or property are compensated by court orders. 
468 For this study, this point could lead to a philosophical debate. If we claim to be ruled by a 
democratic state, where the power lies with the people − or voters as holders of sovereignty 
− the government would also be open and hold no secrets from its citizens. This is not only 
a duty towards the people as sovereign but is also necessary to allow the electorate to have 
an opinion related to state matters. 
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related, and in this case it is the subjective stance of the government to consider 
the goods as public. For example, public roads or streets are essentially a private 
good, as they have excludability and rivalry. However, the government 
produces,469 and tries to maintain (making them non-rivalrous) and make them 
accessible (non-excludable). These attempts are aimed at making roads and other 
similar goods as comparable as possible with the definition of public goods. 
Therefore, and because of the point of view of governments on this issue, these 
kind of goods are usually called public goods. Thus, in everyday life and 
informally (settings not strictly academic) they are considered as public goods. It 
is plausible to consider that the government − with its subjective stance and active 
attempts − creates a category that can be called political public goods. In other 
words, if the government considers a good to be a ‘public good’, then it is a 
political public good, regardless of its rivalry or excludability. As a consequence, 
the government will try to make this good as non-excludable and as non-rivalrous 
as possible.  
4.2.2 The civil justice system as a good and goods of the civil justice 
system 
 
4.2.2.1 Civil justice system as a good 
The term civil justice system as used in the present chapter and throughout this 
thesis refers to the system of dispute resolution organised by the state and 
regulated by rules of civil procedure. It begins even before litigation is initiated, 
continues with the court process, and concludes with the enforcement of the court 
decision(s). In other words, the civil justice system is a combination of institutions 
and procedural laws organised by the state and directed at resolving disputes. 
Procedural law is created and organised by national law-making institutions, and 
in many European countries, it is collected in codes of civil procedure; amending 
or changing procedural laws is usually more difficult than changing or amending 
other laws. Procedural law plays an important role in a dispute, and can outweigh 
the importance of substantive law, switching the odds of winning from one side 
to the other. In view of this, parties need to pay close attention to the choice of 
procedural law. However, parties use certain non-state procedural rules that 
greatly influence their ability to litigate. In many industries, participants are 
obliged to resolve conflicts within certain rules and using certain dispute 
resolution mechanisms. This greatly distorts party autonomy and the demand 
side’s output. 
                                                        
469 A counter-argument might be that the cost of using roads is paid indirectly by way taxes. 
Nevertheless, this is not the real price.  
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As regards institutions, a civil justice system is composed of all the judicial and 
extra-judicial governmental institutions that are set up to handle civil disputes. 
Each country has a different set of institutions based on history and tradition, and 
that are often a source of national pride. One of the most important − if not the 
most important − institution is the court. And although the organisation of courts 
is different in all EU Member States, their mission and function remain the same: 
namely, the resolution of disputes. Broadly speaking, courts produce two 
categories of goods: administrative services and dispute resolution services. The 
first one includes administrative services such as issuing certificates and 
managing files. The second one, dispute resolution, remains the most important 
service provided by courts. When choosing a jurisdiction, many parties consider 
only the court within that jurisdiction, without examining the other elements 
attached to it. However, in doing so, parties adopt − also part of − the civil justice 
system of the court they choose. Therefore, by choosing a court, parties select the 
whole set of goods attached to or related to it. 
4.2.2.2 Services provided by courts 
Dispute resolution as a good (service) has long been analysed. In 1979, William 
Landes and Richard Posner described court adjudication as a service composed 
of three subservices.470 The first and the most important of these is conflict 
resolution, the process whereby a conflict between parties is adjudicated by a 
judge based on predefined rules. A second service deriving from dispute 
resolution is law creation. By adjudicating on cases, courts create precedents and 
rules of behaviour for other courts and parties involved in similar conflicts. 
Precedents are a primary source of law for common law countries, while in civil 
law countries they also play an important role in the development of law. The 
third subservice is adjudications by courts, which also has an educative value. It 
can show parties in conflict as well as prospective litigants how to interpret and 
apply laws and procedures. Moreover, it can help researchers and academics to 
understand and analyse how laws are applied in practice. In civil cases, court 
adjudication can serve to clarify and to make court decisions more predictable. 
For example, if two parties enter into a contract, court decisions on similar cases 
can show the parties what to expect if they adjudicate in a court, and how to 
modify their actions accordingly. Predictability increases a litigant’s ability to 
predict costs, to predict the outcome of a trial, and to better elaborate litigation 
strategies. Although a court’s conflict resolution service is only a small part of the 
civil justice system, it is the most important, and it is here that the focus and the 
                                                        
470 Landes and Posner (1979) 236. 
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interests of the parties converge. However, the question remains: What kind of 
goods are court services? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to discuss the position of court 
adjudication471 among other dispute resolution mechanisms. In broad terms, 
disputes can be resolved in two ways: one is by fighting, while the other is by 
talking. Resolving conflicts by talking can be done with or without the help of a 
third party, in which case disputes are resolved by reconciliation or negotiation. 
Obviously, parties in conflict sit together and try to reach an agreement and to 
respect it. The result is up to them. Third parties may sometimes be involved with 
the enforcement of the agreement, but this does not change much for the dispute 
resolution mechanism. Mechanisms that involve a third party include mediation, 
arbitration, and court adjudication. In all of them, a third neutral party decides 
upon the conflict. In mediation, a third party helps the conflicting parties to 
resolve their disagreement. In arbitration, a third party − agreed upon by the 
conflicting parties − decides on how to resolve the conflict after hearing both 
sides. Mediation and arbitration can also be conducted by persons not qualified in 
law, but whose main purpose is to arrive at a solution to the parties’ problem. In 
court adjudication, a third party decides on the merits of the case after hearing the 
parties. Hearings are conducted by judges usually qualified in law, and with 
sufficient knowledge of legislation. Currently, courts are organised by the 
government, but in the past this was not always true. According to Landes and 
Posner, the provision of judicial services predates the creation of the state,472 
which means that courts were organised by communities without state support. 
D’Amico explains that court adjudication in Greek city states was essentially a 
private good, because not everyone could use it and not everyone was entitled to 
it.473 Court adjudication was organised by private parties, and cases were handled 
by persons that knew the law. At some point, the government understood the 
importance of court adjudication as a conflict resolution mechanism, and took 
possession of it.474 From that moment, the state considered court adjudication to 
be a public good, and as such tried to make it accessible to every member of the 
community.  
                                                        
471 Court(s) in this regard means all the services that modern-day as well as ancient courts 
provided. 
472 Landes and Posner (1979) 235. 
473 D’Amico (2010) 641. 
474 Powell and Stringham (2009) 510. The authors give the example of the Anglo-Saxon kings, 
who made courts a state affair. D’Amico (2010) gives the example of courts in the Greek 
city states. 
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4.2.2.3 A bundle of goods 
Is court adjudication really a public good? Public goods are associated with 
production and supply problems that affect the market and the possibility of 
suppliers competing.475 Therefore, it is important to investigate the nature of court 
adjudication and its various components. Court adjudication helps in 
administering justice and provides a public service. Generally, countries have 
different modalities of organising court adjudication. Regardless of the 
differences, the role of court adjudication and its function is recognised all over 
the world. Its main function is to resolve disputes, while other functions can be 
labelled as administrative in that they are not immediately related to the resolving 
of disputes. These functions include education and the creation and development 
of law. Given that public goods are associated with production- and market-
related problems, governments bundle several public goods together with at least 
one private good in order to better produce and distribute them.476 Currently, the 
original good provided by courts − dispute resolution − is bundled with other 
goods provided by modern public courts. While court adjudication originally 
involved only conflict resolution, modern courts combine it with education and 
the creation and development of law. Nevertheless, these goods are different from 
each other. 
Conflict resolution in courts resembles more a private good, and it is excludable 
in two instances: first, agents can be prevented from using courts, and second, 
some disputes can be prevented from being resolved in courts.477 Moreover, courts 
are affected by rivalry, which is a result of their inability to hear an unlimited 
                                                        
475 On the one hand, it is considered that public goods allow free riders, while on the other hand, 
they coerce forced riders. It is also difficult to charge for public goods, which makes them 
non-efficient to produce. Public goods are also afflicted by externalities. Lemieux (2012) 9; 
Kaul (2009) 552; Bratspies (2010) 147. 
476 Ware (2013) 909-913. 
477 It has been explained elsewhere that disputes are essentially private goods or at best 
congestible resources. They are excludable (a conflict is limited to a small number of agents) 
and involve rivalry (conflicts engaged in by other parties will be to the detriment of the 
parties involved). However, the government is interested in resolving conflicts and 
furthering social peace, so it provides and organises courts as conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Moreover, governments are not interested in all the parties who are involved 
in a conflict, nor are they interested in all the conflicts in the society. On the one hand, for 
example, many jurisdictions limit the possibility of referring to the court only to a certain 
category of people: lawyers, nationals of that jurisdiction, adults, and so on. On the other 
hand, only certain conflicts can be litigated in court: for example, most courts will not litigate 
a conflict between two individuals on which colour is best − blue or red. Hence, governments 
consider only certain conflicts to be of ‘public interest’ and only those conflicts (even though 
private goods) can be submitted to a court’s dispute resolution service. Themeli (2016) 23-
26. 
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number of disputes at the same time. Many courts face more disputes than they 
are able to process, which, apart from creating concerns for human rights 
violations, can also render their dispute resolution function useless for the 
interested parties. The maxim ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ best summarises 
this situation. As regards the law creation service provided by courts, and 
following the definition given by Musgrave, law created by courts can be best 
described as a merit good,478 because this law mirrors to a large extent the 
common values of the community. Moreover, laws are goods that citizens do not 
know that they need before they are approved, or do not ‘consume’ enough of 
them. Apart from being described as merit goods, the description of laws can be 
stretched to include not only congestible resources but also private goods. The 
scope and application of laws can be limited to a small group of people making 
them excludable, but their consumption would not come at the expense of other 
users.479 Nevertheless, the law is considered a public good (a political one), and 
law-making is one of the government’s most important responsibilities. The third 
good to be included in the court dispute resolution bundle is education. Education 
is considered a classical example of merit goods, and depending on the way it is 
described, it can fluctuate between being a congestible resource and a public 
good.480 From this, it seems that the diverse goods comprising court adjudication 
have different characteristics. It can be argued that court adjudication as a bundled 
good is more similar to the good that forms the most important part of it: namely, 
dispute resolution. However, for political reasons, courts have been considered a 
public good, or rather, as political public goods. 
4.2.3 Competition and the goods 
As discussed above, the civil justice system as a good is composed of many other 
goods and services. Among them, court adjudication seems to be the centrepiece 
in the mosaic, and comprises three goods, each of which has different 
characteristics, ranging from private to merit. Those composing court 
adjudication are conflict resolution, law-making, and legal education. It is 
reasonable to think that the majority of litigants would consider dispute resolution 
to be the most important. An exception would be the case of a litigant who 
repeatedly uses a jurisdiction’s courts for similar cases: in other words, a repeat 
player. It can be argued that repeat players are interested not only in the resolution 
of the conflict but also in the law-making and the educative effect of the court 
                                                        
478 Musgrave (2008). 
479 Abuse of law can be considered an example of where the use of law can be at the expense 
of other users. However, abuse of the law is an illegal way to use the good, and is not what 
the law-maker (the court) intended. Very often abuse of the law is considered a crime. 
480 Head (1966), Musgrave (1956) 341, Musgrave (2008), Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) 1368, 
Brennan and Lomasky (1983) 201, Ver Eecke (1998) 135, Head (1969) 216-218. 
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decision. However, one-shot players have little or no interest in law-making or 
education. For example, imagine a company with a continuing business in a 
jurisdiction; it is in the interests of this company to establish precedents in its 
favour and to educate third parties with regard to certain behaviour. One-shot 
players do not have future stakes in the jurisdiction where the dispute is submitted, 
and therefore are interested only in the conflict resolution service. The balance 
between repeat and one-shot players can determine the development of the civil 
justice system as a good. 
In a scenario where one-shot players are the majority of the demand side, goods 
other than dispute resolution would be a burden and an expensive by-product.481 
Ambitious jurisdictions would try to attract litigants by having lean and agile 
courts, and at the same time client-oriented and focused dispute resolution 
services. Being lean and agile would mean that courts and their producers have to 
compromise and do away with functions not requested by the demand. As a 
consequence, the production of law and education would need to be transferred to 
other state institutions. While courts became more client oriented, their public 
mission would become vague and more similar to that of arbitration. At this stage, 
it is natural to imagine that the state would be interested in charging the full costs 
of the proceeding to the parties.482 However, some problems might arise. First, 
and as previously discussed, it is important to understand the incentives that states 
have in entering into competition, and the incentives that markets give them to 
compete. Without sufficient motives, governments would be reluctant to enter the 
competition game. Second, client-oriented courts with higher prices would pose 
the risk of pricing out vulnerable social groups. A solution to this would be to 
apply different rates to vulnerable parties.483 Yet another solution might be the 
creation of special courts or chambers for the external market and other courts or 
chambers for the internal market. Nevertheless, having different prices and 
courts/chambers would increase costs for the production of justice, because the 
training and rules for the two systems would be different. The tension between 
court adjudication serving the needs of the market and a court without barriers for 
vulnerable parties mirrors in broad lines the tension between public goods and 
private goods. Court adjudication and dispute resolutions in particular are 
essentially private goods; however, if − for political reasons − governments 
                                                        
481 It should be said that the demand side is not only influenced by its frequency in litigating in 
a certain jurisdiction. Other elements are also important in influencing its behaviour. These 
elements are discussed in Section 4.2. 
482 An increase in court fees can occur even before this stage. 
483 Several jurisdictions in the EU apply reduced fees for vulnerable parties. For more, see 
Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka (2009) 33-34. See as well ‘Study on the Transparency of 
Costs of Civil Judicial Proceedings in the EU’ (2007), available at <https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_costs_of_proceedings-37-en.do> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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continue to consider court adjudication to be a public good, first it will or already 
does deform the market, and second, the courts will not be under the full influence 
of the market. Therefore, the prospects for competition do not seem promising. 
In a scenario where repeat players composed the majority of the demand side, all 
the court’s services would be interesting for litigants. Law-making and education 
together with dispute resolution would better suit the strategies of repeat players. 
Governments would have little to change in the current settings of their court 
system. However, the source of incentives that governments derive from 
competition remains problematic. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, these sources can 
play a pivotal role in shaping the course of the competition between jurisdictions. 
Going back to the current scenario, repeat players usually choose the same 
jurisdiction, either because they are obliged to or because they choose to. For 
example, a Portuguese company, present in many markets, decides to divert to 
Spain all the litigations in which it is involved. In this case, the Portuguese 
company explicitly chooses the Spanish jurisdiction. Precedents along with the 
education of legal professionals becomes very important for the Portuguese 
company in order to increase its success rate in other similar cases, and to exploit 
the repeat-player’s advantage in terms of knowledge and the mass production of 
litigations. In the EU, as provided by the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, cases in 
which a company is forced to make a choice of court are justified by the protection 
of vulnerable parties and public policy.484 For example, companies in consumer 
cases are often obliged to litigate in the court of the customer’s domicile.485 For a 
multinational company, this means that they will be present in multiple 
jurisdictions at the same time. Their repeat-player advantage is reduced in 
comparison to the first scenario.486 Furthermore, some companies can expect a 
continuous amount of litigation based on the behaviour of consumers, laws, the 
jurisdiction’s legal culture, product characteristics, and so on. This means that 
even though companies are not expressly choosing the court, they are still 
                                                        
484 This situation covers Article 10-16 on jurisdictions in matters relating to insurance; Article 
17-19 on jurisdictions over consumer contracts; Article 20-23 on jurisdictions over 
individual contracts of employment; and Article 24 on exclusive jurisdictions. In general, 
choice of court is also limited in the event that parties do not have an agreement regarding 
the choice of court. 
485 As previously mentioned, choice of court in consumer cases is very limited. Consumers as 
a vulnerable party are protected and given the opportunity to litigate in their home 
jurisdiction. The Brussels I (recast) Regulation and in particular Article 18 give the right to 
consumers to bring proceedings in the courts of the Member State where the other party is 
domiciled or in the court where the consumer is domiciled. 
486 It can also be argued that companies will be present repeatedly in all the jurisdictions, putting 
them in a repeat-player position in each jurisdiction. However, this is not a situation in which 
companies can choose. Hence, their repeat-player situation is a forced one, and does not 
contribute to the civil justice system competition. 
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interested in the law-making and the court’s educational function. Consumers will 
tend to choose their home jurisdiction, unless they consider the jurisdiction of the 
other party to be more favourable. The absence of choice greatly hampers the 
market and, as a consequence, threatens the development of competition. 
The balance between repeat players and one-shot players can play a substantial 
role in shaping the goods offered in the civil justice system market.487 If one-shot 
players comprise the majority of the demand side, they will steer the demand to 
be interested only in courts’ dispute resolution services. Governments interested 
in competing will try to make courts more ‘slender’ and market oriented. One 
option would be to unbundle the services connected to the dispute resolution and 
free the court from the responsibility of producing them. Nevertheless, law-
making and education as merit goods will still be produced by other law-making 
and education institutions. This can be a win-win situation. By reducing the 
caseload burden, governments can make courts more efficient at resolving 
disputes. Orienting government policies towards market-oriented courts would 
influence a relaxed attitude towards a court’s dispute resolution mechanism as a 
political public good. In a situation like this, the mechanism would slowly move 
to its origin as a private good. For litigants, better courts with a client-oriented 
setting can better serve their interests. This situation can be problematic for 
vulnerable parties, who can be priced out of the court services. A solution already 
in use by some jurisdictions is to allow vulnerable parties to pay a discounted 
price or to have separate courts. Both these solutions would increase the costs of 
justice for the government. 
If the demand side were dominated by repeat players, the situation would not 
change that much for the court system as a good. Competition would be hampered 
by an almost non-existant demand (taking into account the protection of 
vulnerable parties). Repeat players are interested in all the services that courts 
provide, which means that governments do not have to unbundle goods from 
dispute resolution. However, what is described here does not take into account 
market incentives, which remain unclear. It does not take into account political 
responses and rhetoric, which do not always follow market logic. Finally, it does 
not take into account the influence of interest groups that are part of the demand 
and the supply side. These aspects are discussed in the following sections. 
                                                        
487 This should be combined with other factors like the willingness of governments to enter into 
competition, and sufficient incentives for them to do so. 
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4.3 Lawyers and companies: the demand side of the civil 
justice system competition 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the civil justice system market and competition are 
composed of and influenced by the interaction between supply and demand, and 
by the characteristics of the good in the market. For civil justice systems, the good 
is in fact a bundle, which is treated as a single good. Among them, court 
adjudication is the most important, and is a bundle of three services: conflict 
resolution, law-making, and education. The fact that the good is a ‘conglomerate’ 
of goods − and the most important of these is a bundle of other services − makes 
this market unique. Certain obstacles exist here that obstruct its development and, 
as a consequence, limit the development of competition and competition-related 
processes. An important issue, referred to in Section 4.1, involves the origin and 
source of the incentives that jurisdictions have in competing with each other. A 
first step in tackling this issue is to take a closer look at the demand for civil justice 
systems. The demand side consists of parties that search for the jurisdiction and 
the court system that best suit their needs.488 This section is an analysis of the 
demand side; it first describes the composition of the demand side in the EU, and 
then it analyses the role and the interaction of various demand groups, and the 
consequences of this interaction with respect to the competition and the market in 
general. 
4.3.1 Characteristics of the demand 
 
4.3.1.1 Interest and choice 
The civil justice system was defined as the system of court adjudication organised 
by the state and regulated by rules of civil procedure, including actions or 
omissions even before a conflict arises, but relevant when a conflict starts, 
continuing with the court process and concluding with the enforcement of the 
court decision(s). Potential customers of civil justice systems in the EU can be 
any person or company that makes a choice of court following the requirements 
of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation. The demand side is a part of the set of 
potential customers, and has special qualities and characteristics. One of these 
qualities is interest in the civil justice system, which should possess at least two 
cumulative characteristics: first, there needs to be an interest in past, present, or 
future disputes; second, it needs to be directed at choosing the civil justice system 
of a jurisdiction in order to address the dispute. 
                                                        
488 O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014) 89; Coyle (2011) 1933, 1934. 
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Individuals and companies with related interests in the civil justice system can be 
jointly called litigants. However, the term ‘litigants’ can be misleading for two 
reasons: first, the demand is composed not only of litigants but also of parties that 
have passed their litigation phase and are searching for a jurisdiction in which to 
enforce their claim; second, part of the demand side is also composed of 
individuals and companies that are not involved in litigations, but anticipate being 
involved in them in the future: for example, parties in a contract that includes a 
choice of court clause. Despite the misleading nature of the term litigants, it 
describes very well the nature of the demand side, which is always related to 
litigations, whether in the past or in the future. 
Given that the interest of litigants in a jurisdiction is expressed through a choice 
of court, it goes without saying that choice is detrimental to the output of the 
demand side and to the development of competition.489 The quality of choice can 
vary between being affected and being genuine. A genuine choice exists when the 
process of decision-making and the expression of choice is free of psychological 
and practical obstacles. As regards practical obstacles, the possibilities for 
litigants to choose should be allowed and clearly defined by law. In the EU, the 
Brussels I (recast) Regulation sets the basis for the choice of court. As previously 
mentioned, the possibilities regarding choice of court are not unlimited, as there 
are certain restrictions aimed at protecting vulnerable parties and the public 
interest. Moreover, in the EU context, litigants should have sufficient knowledge 
of twenty-eight different legal systems. This can be an insurmountable obstacle, 
even for the most experienced comparatist. For laypersons, individual lawyers, 
and small law firms, acquiring knowledge of all the Member States’ legal systems 
is virtually impossible. Potentially, large law firms have the means and the 
resources to undertake a comparative analysis of all the legal systems and to select 
courts accordingly. However, due to the costs involved, even large law firms can 
be expected to avoid having to investigate every jurisdiction. Furthermore, with 
so many potential choices, a choice overload can be expected. Choice overload 
relates also to the second obstacle in choice making: namely, psychological 
obstacles. Apart from the problems of choice overload, litigants may be subject 
to forced choice, a situation in which a person potentially has many options but in 
practice can choose only one. Reasons for this vary: for example, if two 
contracting parties with different levels of bargaining power are negotiating, the 
stronger party will force his will on the weaker. 
Choice is considered to be affected when psychological and practical obstacles 
influence choice making. On the one hand, an affected choice can completely 
obscure litigants’ real wishes; on the other hand, an unaffected choice is a genuine 
                                                        
489 Refer to Section 2.5 for a brief introduction to choice and to psychological implications. 
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choice. Choice greatly influences the output of the demand side, and this output 
is made up of the signals that suppliers seek in order to adjust their policies or to 
create new ones. Adjusting or creating new policies to attract litigants creates 
competition. A genuine choice made by the demand side gives clear signals to 
suppliers about their products. And if the suppliers’ response is not affected, the 
resulting competition will most likely bring about the positive effects associated 
with competition. However, an extreme genuine choice in the civil justice system 
market seems unlikely. A litigant’s choice is affected almost every step of the 
way. As a consequence, suppliers tend to respond to choices that do not seem 
intuitive, which raises questions as to the outcome of competition. Will it produce 
the positive effects associated with it? Or will competition produce negative 
effects? Or will these effects be a combination of both negative and positive? An 
answer here is difficult, because it is highly dependent on the affected choice. 
Empirical studies are needed to target this issue, and longitudinal studies on the 
effects of competition may answer the question on the effects of competition. 
4.3.1.2 Litigants’ mobility 
Mobility is another characteristic of the demand side’s existence. It is essential 
that litigants be mobile so that they can visit the jurisdiction they have chosen and 
use its legal system. A mobile demand side should be psychologically and – in 
the practical sense − physically free. Psychological and physical obstacles are 
sometimes so integrated with each other that it becomes difficult to recognise 
them. Psychological obstacles to mobility are those related to choice of court 
which, as described above, can limit the ability to choose and the desire to move 
to other jurisdictions. 
From a practical point of view, obstacles to mobility can come from legislative or 
non-legislative sources. In the EU, the principles of free movement of goods and 
services and the abolition of border control have further facilitated mobility. The 
Brussels Regime has also made it possible for litigants to be mobile and to choose 
easily between the courts of different Member States.490 
Litigant mobility creates costs associated with knowledge and time, as a mobile 
party needs to know beforehand the attributes of the jurisdiction it is moving to; 
therefore, knowledge is necessary. It can be expected that individuals, and small 
and medium-size firms, have limited knowledge of all the jurisdictions in the EU. 
                                                        
490 The Brussels I (recast) Regulation allows parties to agree in favour of the courts in any 
Member State (Article 25). Exceptions to this rule are set to protect special contractual 
relations, in particular for insurance (Art. 15), consumer (Art. 19), and individual 
employment contracts (Art. 23). These rules aim at protecting weaker parties. Rules on 
‘Exclusive jurisdiction’ also restrict choice of court possibilities and parties’ mobility (Art. 
24), for the purpose of protecting the broader public interest. For more see Section 3.1. 
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For large firms that employ in-house lawyers, it can be easier to learn how foreign 
courts function. For all of parties, knowledge can be gained from experience or 
study, and both of these involve prohibitive costs. In the EU, for instance, this 
would mean having to study a considerable number of jurisdictions. Litigants 
would be in the position of either educating themselves about jurisdictions with 
which they were unfamiliar, or restricting their choice possibilities to jurisdictions 
with which they were familiar. Due to the costs and difficulties relating to this 
type of education, it can be assumed that the second alternative would be used.491 
In line with the choice paralysis predictions, persons facing a high number of 
possibilities would restrict their options, or would be paralysed and not make a 
choice at all. For mobility, this means that despite the high number of potential 
choices, for psychological and cost reasons, choice makers would restrict their 
choice possibilities. However, the larger the monetary resources a person had, the 
more possibilities he would consider. 
To increase their mobility, potential litigants can employ a lawyer, as lawyers are 
educated and trained in local law, and can also be familiar with several 
jurisdictions.492 Providing training relating to other jurisdictions can be easier for 
lawyers, although is still expensive.493 Moreover, the choice-making process is 
the same for lawyers as for laypersons, with the choice paradoxes influencing 
their ability to make a choice.494 Nevertheless, lawyers can create networks with 
colleagues in different countries, and take advantage of the network’s collective 
knowledge.495 Furthermore, giant law firms have offices in several countries, and 
can rely on the expertise of their local lawyers. This means that litigants are able 
to increase their mobility by increasing the number of lawyers employed.496 In 
other words, wealthy individuals and companies that can afford lawyers’ expenses 
can raise their mobility potential. 
Mobility also creates costs related to travel, accommodation, and language, and 
these costs are relative to the litigants’ location. Generally, the farther away from 
                                                        
491 Low considers that in-house lawyers should encourage firms to think more about applicable 
law. Low (2013) 384. This can be extended to the choice of court. Imposing a restriction on 
choice possibilities can restrict potential benefits resulting from litigation strategies.  
492 Low (2013) 376. 
493 Even though the training can be easier and less expensive for lawyers, they might find it 
more interesting not to do the research, but to rely on their networks, and on their ability to 
keep clients litigating in the same jurisdiction. Romano (1985) 275. 
494 Low (2013) 363. 
495 On the network effect of lawyers and their effects on choice of law and court, see Sanga 
(2014) 917. 
496 This can be done either by hiring several lawyers or by hiring a law firm. Law firms invest 
as much lawyers’ time and as many human resources as their client can afford and is willing 
to pay for. 
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the chosen court, the more expensive the travel. Although travel-related costs 
create a barrier to mobility, they are, however, less important to wealthy litigants, 
who can afford expensive travel. It now becomes clear that the profile of mobile 
litigants resembles that of a wealthy litigant. Moreover, while court hearings can 
be fast, they require at some point a physical presence, which means that a foreign 
litigant is obliged to find and spend some time in temporary accommodation in 
the jurisdiction where the court is located. Accommodation expenses add to the 
total costs of mobility, and define more clearly the profile of a mobile litigant as 
being a wealthy person. 
Another barrier to mobility is language, as litigants are generally reluctant to 
dispute a case in an unfamiliar language. It is well known that the translations 
required when litigation is in a foreign jurisdiction are very costly. Litigation is 
often a matter of details and interpretation or words and sentences, which means 
that litigating about a contract in a language different from that of the contract can 
be counterproductive for both parties.497 Hence, language can be an obstacle to 
the mobility of litigants, which is to the detriment of competition. It is also 
possible that litigants employ lawyers with sufficient knowledge of the court’s 
language, but this entails costs that not every litigant can afford. To curb this 
situation, some jurisdictions have considered using English as the official 
language in court proceedings.498 However, this is a matter of nationalism, and is 
                                                        
497 In 2010, some German courts held proceedings in English. These were accompanied by 
language problems that are evidenced here: <http://transblawg.eu/2010/05/12/first-german-
court-hearing-in-englisherste-verhandlung-auf-englisch-lg-bonn/> accessed 22 December 
2017. 
If the language of the contract and the evidence related to it are the same as the official 
language of the court, the litigating parties will incur fewer translation costs compared to a 
case in which the language of the contract and the language of the court are different. 
498 Kern (2012) gives an overview of the situation in continental Europe. Of all the jurisdictions, 
Germany seems to be predisposed to move forward to using English as a working language 
in courts. 
From 1 January 2016 until 1 June 2017, the Rotterdam District Court – Private Law Division 
had the option of using English as the working language for cases in the areas of maritime 
and transport law, or the international sale of goods conducted exclusively between 
professional parties. Both litigating parties needed to agree on the use of English during the 
court proceedings. Dutch could be still used by the court during certain procedural steps. 
The final decision was delivered in Dutch. This was an experiment aimed at accommodating 
requests of commercial parties, and at testing the potential of English as a working language 
for the courts. For more, see the rules published by the court service of the Netherlands: 
<https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Procedure-Rules-for-proceedings-
in-English.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
The Netherlands Commercial Court is expected to open its doors in 2018. The court judges 
international commercial cases using English during the proceedings. The government 
claims the benefits it will generate will be between 60 and 75 million Euro per year once the 
court reaches its maturity. For more, see (in Dutch): <https://www.rechtspraak. 
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a strongly debated topic. Using English in courts implies an extra burden on the 
courts’ budgets,499 as judges need to be trained in using English, and laws and 
procedures need to be updated and translated into English.500 Some laws or even 
constitutions need to be changed to make it possible for English to be the language 
of courts. Due to the associated costs, language is an obstacle to the mobility of 
less wealthy litigants. 
Given that mobility is dependent on costs, litigants are expected to compare costs 
to the benefits derived from these costs. If a litigant is confident he will win in a 
distant and unfamiliar jurisdiction that uses a different language, he will be happy 
to invest in language skills, in travel and accommodation costs, and maybe in the 
services of a local lawyer. This sounds easier than it is, however, although it 
should be part of the litigant’s strategy to win a dispute.501 
4.3.1.3 Inactive demand 
Broadly speaking, competition entails an interaction between demand and supply. 
One party offers a product and the other makes use of it. Parties should be 
sensitive to each other’s responses. Interactions create premises for the 
development of competition between, on the one hand, producers to attract 
consumers and, on the other hand, between consumers to acquire the offered 
product. Competition within the demand and the supply side creates the 
conditions for the evolution of marketed goods, and is expected to provide more 
efficient rules.502 There are cases, however, in which one side of the market is 
active while the other is inert, and does not respond to the market’s stimuli. In the 
civil justice system competition, the supply side can be inactive and unresponsive 
to the demand side’s interests or requests. In this situation, litigants and lawyers 
tend to lobby and to increase pressure on their governments to be more responsive. 
The problem here lies in the power that different groups have in influencing 
governments, and the outcome of this influence. The more political power a 
lobbying group possesses, the more chances it has to model the civil justice 
system according to its needs. Lawyers as a well-organised group are better at 
lobbying, and have more possibilities of influencing the government to model the 
                                                        
nl/Organisatie-en-contact/Organisatie/Raad-voor-de-rechtspraak/Nieuws/Paginas/Plan-
voor-speciale-voorziening-handelsconflicten-definitief.aspx> accessed 22 December 2017. 
499 Governments at this point need to have a clear picture of the costs and benefits of 
competition. If revenues justify the investment, governments will be more than happy to 
invest in language training for judges. 
500 Sometimes the pressure to use English as a court language comes from interested groups 
such as lawyers. Kamar (2006) 1752-1753. 
501 This and similar strategies are discussed in Section 4.5. 
502 Lander and Posner (1979) 258. 
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civil justice system.503 Lawyers are more interested in pushing forward civil 
justice system policies that increase the demand for their services, and policies 
that restrict the entrance of other lawyers into the market. This means that lawyers 
are more interested in attracting parties from abroad, thereby making their home 
jurisdiction more attractive to foreign litigants and restricting other lawyers.504 
If the demand side of the market is not responsive to the activities of the supply 
side, competing governments will try to promote their jurisdictions by raising the 
awareness of potential clients. This can be done in two ways: one is by increasing 
the number of potential customers that they can reach, while the other is by 
making courts more efficient. Increasing the number of potential customers also 
means attracting cross-border litigants and lawyers. Making courts efficient will 
decrease the costs of courts for the governments, and will offer fast courts and 
procedures to litigants. An easy way to find litigants is to find their lawyers, so 
governments that try to attract litigants will first try to attract lawyers. This means 
that the attention of competing governments might be delegated to attracting 
lawyers. However, many factors still need to be reckoned with, and they raise 
questions such as: What incentives do governments have to compete? What are 
the political implications to competition? What will result from the interaction 
between the local and the international demand side? 
Section 4.3.1 provided an overview of the demand’s characteristics. The demand 
side of the civil justice system competition is composed of individuals and 
companies with past, present, or future stakes in litigation. From among several 
jurisdictions, litigants choose one or more that they consider would most benefit 
their litigation prospects. The choice, however, can be hampered by practical and 
psychological obstacles, which can completely restrict choice possibilities, and as 
a result damage competition. Litigants need to be mobile enough to travel to the 
jurisdiction(s) of their choice, but mobility is affected by legal and physical 
(practical) barriers. Legal barriers in the EU are few, and are mostly related to the 
protection of vulnerable parties or to particular legal situations. Physical 
(practical) barriers to mobility in the EU include lack of knowledge regarding the 
characteristics of the courts in all Member States, lack of knowledge of the 
                                                        
503 O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014) 87, 89-90; Coyle (2012) 1930-1931, some examples 
at 1932, 1960; Ogus (1999) 412-416. 
504 Lawyers are interested in increasing their profits. They can do this either by increasing their 
current client base or by increasing their clients’ need for a lawyer’s services. The first option 
means attracting cross-border litigants and encouraging them to litigate in the lawyer’s home 
jurisdiction. The second option is by making procedures and laws more complicated and 
more difficult to understand for non-lawyers. Nevertheless, lawyers are not a homogeneous 
group, and their interests range between the two options. See Heinz, Nelson, Laumann and 
Michelson (1998).The struggle of these two ‘opposing’ groups of lawyers plays an important 
role in shaping the demand side and, in a broader sense, a country’s civil justice system. 
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language of the courts, and costs related to travel and accommodation. Costs can 
be acceptable, however, if the litigant is confident about recovering them as a 
result of the court’s decision. Lawyers can help parties to be more mobile, because 
lawyers generally have some knowledge of the courts and professional networks, 
which can help them overcome language and knowledge barriers. However, 
lawyers themselves are a source of further costs for litigants. Therefore, it can be 
expected that wealthy individuals or companies would be the most mobile 
litigants, and, As a consequence, they will be the target of suppliers. It can be 
assumed that wealthy individuals and companies are involved in expensive 
litigations that generate more court fees and other expenses in the jurisdiction they 
choose. Mobility and choice also relate to the demand side’s response. 
Responding to the offer is essential in the communication between demand and 
supply. If the demand is interested in the civil justice system competition, but the 
supply is not responsive, interest groups from the demand side will lobby their 
governments to yield to the demand side’s requests. It can be expected that the 
strongest lobbying group is composed of lawyers, and governments therefore will 
have the tendency to approve policies that help local lawyers. If the supply side is 
more interested in attracting litigants but litigants are not responding, 
governments will respond by attracting lawyers and litigants from other 
jurisdictions as well as increasing the efficiency of courts and procedural laws. 
4.3.2 Litigants and lawyers 
As previously mentioned, litigants would need the help of a lawyer to enhance 
their legal mobility. However, lawyers are not only used to improve the choice of 
court experience or to facilitate mobility; on the contrary, they are used mostly to 
better litigate the case in a particular jurisdiction. Lawyers help litigants to create 
and execute an appropriate litigation strategy, and part of this strategy involves 
the choice of court. Therefore, the lawyer-client relationship deserves careful 
attention. 
Lawyers comprise a group of professionals specialised in law, and historically 
they emerged as a group of learned, wealthy individuals who had sufficient 
knowledge of the law. In the Early Middle Ages, lawyering was mostly handled 
by the Christian clergy, but with the spread of education to the economic elite, 
well-educated individuals began to engage in lawyering. The class of lawyers 
emerged in this way, and, with the secularisation of the state, they soon replaced 
the clergy in handling legal cases. Lawyers quickly restricted − and still do − 
access to their profession and to the possibility of practising law. Obstruction is 
in the form of legal barriers such as the impossibility for non-lawyers to practise, 
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the extensive bar regulations,505 and the restriction of foreign lawyers to 
practise.506 The possibility of practising law is limited by a knowledge barrier 
between lawyers and non-lawyers, and by the complexity of laws and regulations 
that make it difficult to engage in legal proceedings. Furthermore, it is in the 
interest of lawyers to inflate the demand for their services. However, there is a 
trend in the EU to keep lawyers out of certain kinds of disputes.507 
Legal as well as knowledge barriers exist for non-lawyers, which make it 
impossible for them to litigate in courts. Legal barriers oblige litigants to be 
represented by lawyers in certain instances. At the same time, the complexity of 
the law and its procedures makes it impossible for untrained parties to engage in 
litigation. Another barrier is set by the bar associations and by extensive 
regulation. Membership in the local bar association gives lawyers the right to 
exercise their profession within a particular jurisdiction. However, bar association 
membership and legal provisions tend to restrict foreign lawyers from exercising 
in a jurisdiction different from their home jurisdiction. 
Lawyers have acquired a significant role in negotiating legal relations and in 
resolving conflicts, and their presence is even more important in cross-border 
transactions. As previously mentioned, some parties are inclined to use the 
services of a lawyer − even if not required to by law − in order to have a better 
overview of the legislation and jurisdictions, and to increase their mobility 
prospects. However, litigants have different financial capabilities, and not all of 
them can afford more than one lawyer or qualitatively expensive lawyers. Studies 
suggest that there is considerable difference between lawyers providing services 
                                                        
505 Noailly and Nahuis (2010) 178. Regulation is also geared to keep laypersons away from 
practising law and from interfering with the lawyer-client relationship. See Cheatham (1965) 
439. 
506 In the EU, the activities of lawyers outside their jurisdictions is regulated by the Lawyers’ 
Services Directive of 1977 (Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate 
the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services, OJ L 78, 26.3.1977, p. 17–
18), the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive of 1998 (Directive 98/5/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of 
lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification 
was obtained, OJ L 77, 14.3.1998, p. 36–43), and the Recognition of professional 
qualifications Directive 2005 (Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255, 
30.9.2005, p. 22–142). These directives give the right to lawyers wanting to exercise their 
profession in a host state to do so following certain rules. These rules mainly regulate the 
provision of the service and the relation with the local bar association. Despite the 
regulations, language and differences in legal regulations between countries create barriers 
that few lawyers can get past. See as well O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014) 87. 
507 Hodges (2006) 1399. Examples of this are the European Small Claim Procedure and some 
forms of alternative dispute resolution. See as well Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka 
(2009) 5. 
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for big companies and those providing services for individuals.508 These 
differences result in different sectors within the same profession, and while 
movement between these sectors can occur, lawyers tend to choose and remain in 
only one of them. Furthermore, lawyers tend to specialise in one particular field 
of law, and to remain in that field for a long time or for their entire career. 
While discussing characteristics of the demand side, it was concluded that wealthy 
firms and individuals better fit the demand profile in the civil justice system 
market. These wealthy persons also employ lawyers who are different from those 
in the other less wealthy groups. The lawyers’ market tends to increase more 
quickly for wealthy clients, while entry into the ‘wealthy’ sector seems to be more 
difficult.509 For the civil justice system competition, it means that lawyers can be 
grouped into those serving wealthy clients and those serving less wealthy clients. 
The first group is more inclined to encourage and engage in the civil justice 
system market and competition, while the second group does not have these 
characteristics, or at least has them to a lesser extent. Usually, lawyers who handle 
wealthy clients come from large law firms, where they deal mostly with 
companies, and with individuals that are usually related to the client companies.510 
In summary, lawyers are divided into categories that reflect the wealth of their 
client, and these categories are almost insulated from each other. Lawyers of 
wealthy clients are mostly organised in law firms, and are a distinct category that 
is most likely to play an active role in civil justice system litigation. 
4.3.3 The relationship between litigants and lawyers 
It is clear that the demand side is composed not only of litigants but also of 
lawyers. Litigants usually lack relevant information about law in general and 
foreign jurisdictions in particular, and thus they employ lawyers to assist them. 
Examining the relationship between litigants and their lawyers might lead to a 
better understanding of the demand side and its output.511 
Lawyers offer legal services in the lawyers market, and this service is almost 
always used during litigation cases.512 The same can be said as well about contract 
negotiations.513 However, lawyers are always the agents of litigating or 
contracting parties, a situation that is considered to create principal-agent 
problems.514 The interests of lawyers with regard to the case and the civil justice 
                                                        
508 Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Michelson (1998) 751. 
509 Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Michelson (1998) 772. 
510 Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Michelson (1998) 773. 
511 Ogus (1999) 409. 
512 Iossa and Jullien (2012) 678. 
513 Cuniberti (2014) 455. 
514 Vogenauer (2013) 24; Cuniberti (2014) 455; Romano (1985) 273. 
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system can be different compared to the interests of their clients. For example, 
lawyers would be more interested in litigating a case that their clients would be 
happy to settle. Or in general, lawyers would be interested in maximising the 
duration of the litigations so that their clients would be obliged to hire them for 
longer periods,515 while clients would be more interested in having short 
litigations. The intervention of lawyers can undermine the intentions and the 
wishes of clients, and because the output of the demand side would be distorted, 
the civil justice system competition would be affected as well. 
Some studies claim that lawyers tend to dominate the attorney-client relationship, 
and even the court,516 a situation that affects wealthy as well as non-wealthy 
litigants.517 In many instances, the costs of a lawyer518 are much higher than those 
of the courts,519 which for clients is a very important financial characteristic. 
Furthermore, court systems have evolved, and are designed to rely on the presence 
and expertise of lawyers.520 Parties in a conflict often find themselves in a 
dilemma. Assuming that both parties have the same knowledge of the law, they 
will be ‘equally’ equipped before the court, and will reduce their litigation costs 
if both of them do not hire a lawyer. However, not knowing each other’s strategy, 
                                                        
515 This is, however, arguable. In normal market situations, it might be expected that 
competition lawyers would lower the litigation time in order to be more attractive to clients. 
Nevertheless, given the structure of the market, a collusion of lawyers to maintain or increase 
litigation time should not be excluded. Lawyers’ litigation culture also plays a role in their 
behaviour, given that in some cultures it is expected that lawyers will intentionally delay the 
litigation. The impression during this study is that lawyers are not interested in reducing the 
litigation time. 
516 Christie (1977) 4; Nolan-Haley (1998) 1380; Cummings and Eagly (2001) 457; Mather 
(2003). 
517 For example, Hodges argues that consumer cases in the US are controlled by lawyers rather 
than by clients. There is an explanation related to costs and their recovery, but the fact is 
well visible. Hodges (2006) 1395. 
518 It is debatable as to whether lawyers’ services can be standardised. In the past, the opinion 
of researchers leaned on the idea that lawyers provide a personalised service, but it is now 
accepted that some services can be standardised, while others cannot. Standardised and non-
standardised services have different production techniques and charging methods. Many law 
firms try to standardise their services to attract more clients and to lower the cost per unit of 
service produced. As regards the civil justice system competition, it can be added that the 
standardisation (especially of contractual terms) plays a negative role in the competition. If 
lawyers try to standardise the production of contracts and have standard terms for the choice 
of court, this will be to the detriment of the civil justice system competition. Some forms of 
standardisation can be seen in certain industries (e.g. shipping, diamond), where predefined 
dispute resolution methods and venues become complicated to change. Needless to say, the 
outlook for the civil justice system competition does not seem promising for these industries. 
For more on the standardisation of lawyers’ services, see Engel (1977) 830; Hazard, Pearce 
and Stempel (1983) 1088-1101; Sanga (2014) 904. 
519 Reimann (2012) 204, 212; Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka (2009) 14, 18. 
520 Christie (1977) 12; Reimann (2012) 226. 
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and lacking confidence with regard to laws and procedures, parties hire a 
lawyer.521 The lawyer serves as a guarantee in case the other party hires a lawyer, 
increases the potential to analyse laws and procedures, and offers a form of 
comfort and assurance to litigants that the litigation is in good hands. By hiring a 
lawyer, both parties make a financial investment with a view to increasing their 
winning potential. 
The demand for lawyers increases with the increase of wealth in society,522 
especially as society has become more litigation oriented. And the more that 
litigation becomes fashionable, the more that lawyers as a group create a culture 
of litigation.523 In line with their power and interests, lawyers become a lobbying 
group in order to defend their status, and they trigger legal reforms in their own 
interests. The lawyers market is financially important for economies, and 
therefore it is protected by the state as being a contributor to the economy.524 For 
litigants, lawyers’ services are also a form of assurance before and during the 
litigation process. Litigants feel more protected, and partially because of this, they 
tend to spend relatively large amounts of money for lawyers, in the hope of buying 
the best possible service they can afford. Research suggests that good service from 
lawyers provides two gains for litigants: first, by improving accuracy it improves 
the final decision of the judge, and second, it compels incompetent judges to 
deliver decisions that are biased towards them. Judges affected by decision bias 
tend to adjudicate in favour of the most well-known or demonstrably better 
lawyer.525 
The desire of litigants to hire a high-quality lawyer is hampered by their inability 
to assess their personal needs and by their not knowing where to find an 
appropriate lawyer.526 Clients being unable to determine their own needs means 
that lawyers are given the opportunity to assess these needs, and to have a chance 
to exaggerate them. This situation is reflected in the fees paid to lawyers, which 
are considered by many clients to be far too high.527 Moreover, with the increasing 
                                                        
521 Without considering that in many jurisdiction lawyers are required in high-value cases or 
cases before higher level courts. 
522 Cheatham (1965) 440. 
523 Hodges mentions how the alteration of revenues for lawyers can alter the litigation culture 
of a jurisdiction; see Hodges (2006) 1397. 
524 Miller (2013) 74-76. See also Section 5.2 for certain financial details of the legal market in 
Denmark, France, the UK, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The lawyers market 
is included in the legal market, and it can be argued that it makes up a considerable part. 
525 Iossa and Jullien (2012) 678. 
526 Cheatham (1965) 438. 
527 Iossa and Jullien (2012) 679. This opinion regarding lawyers’ fees and attitudes is the source 
of many jokes about them. See Litovkina (2016) for an academic study (not immediately 
related to this study) on jokes about lawyers. 
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globalisation of trade and a steadily growing urbanisation, it becomes impossible 
for clients to know whether a lawyer is capable.528 Despite often feeling more 
protected with regard to their cases, clients frequently feel uncertain about the 
lawyer they have chosen. 
This situation means that lawyers are able to control their clients by dominating 
the strategies and their clients’ approach towards resolution of the dispute. In 
addition, the less wealthy the client, the more control the lawyer has.529 Lawyers 
create a bond with their clients, which once established is difficult to break, and 
this bond allows lawyers to high-jack their clients’ conflicts and to manoeuvre 
them according to their own wishes. Data from the survey conducted for the 
present study showed that lawyers consider themselves to be holding the reins in 
their relationship with clients.530 Responding lawyers were asked if they discuss 
choice of court with their clients, and the responses showed that 62.1% of them 
do so about 50% or more of the cases, while 46% of them discuss choice of court 
in 70% or more of the cases. It is understandable that lawyers and clients would 
discuss issues related to the case, including choice of court. However, the question 
did not lead to details about the intensity or the quality of these discussions, which 
can be assumed to exhaust every query that the clients have. The next step would 
be the choice of court itself. Asked how often choice of court was made by the 
client and not by the lawyers, 63% responded that the client made this choice in 
30% or less of the cases. This low percentage indicated that lawyers consider 
choice of court to be mostly their own prerogative. In addition, even in instances 
where clients choose the court, their choice might be the result of a lawyer’s 
suggestion. Eighty-four percent (86.4%) of the respondents considered that clients 
followed their suggestions on choice of court in 70% or more of the cases. This 
suggests that even when clients choose the court, they might be following their 
lawyer’s advice. If this is true, it means that choice of court depends largely on 
the strategies created by lawyers. Therefore, it can be said that lawyers are the 
demand side’s driving force. 
4.3.4 Why lawyers dominate clients 
The demand side of the civil justice system market is composed of individuals 
and companies with stakes in past, present, and future litigations. These litigants 
                                                        
528 Certain websites offer possibilities of reviewing lawyers, but it can be argued that reviews 
can be easily manipulated and be statistically incorrect with regard to the actual quality of a 
lawyer. One example of a more reliable evaluation of lawyers is the Lawyer Litigation 
Tracker, a project started in 2017 by The Lawyer, and that aims at reviewing the performance 
of court lawyers in the UK and Singapore. For more, see <https://www.thelawyer. 
com/lawyer-litigation-tracker-explained> accessed 6 March 2017. 
529 Cummings and Eagly (2001) 458. 
530 For charts and analysis, see Section 5.3.4. For detailed data, see the Annexes section. 
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have to be wealthy and mobile enough to travel between different jurisdictions, 
and they hire lawyers to increase their mobility potential along with their chances 
of success in a legal dispute. Given that both litigants and lawyers represent the 
demand side of the market, their combined interests should in fact comprise the 
total demand side of the market. As previously mentioned, lawyers tend to 
dominate their clients when it comes to choosing a court, which means that 
lawyers can impose their strategies as well as their strategic interest on their 
clients. This section analyses why lawyers dominate their clients, and its 
implications for the civil justice system market and competition. 
As previously indicated, the lawyers market is characterised by a division between 
lawyers serving wealthy clients and those serving less wealthy clients. This 
division comes with certain consequences. First, some studies observed that the 
majority of lawyers focus on commercial cases, and their clients are mostly 
corporations. Second, the number of working hours a lawyer dedicates to a client 
increase according to the wealth of the client. Third, the legal profession has 
become increasingly commercial.531 For the civil justice system, this means that 
the majority of lawyers will be representing wealthy clients, who are also the most 
likely to create the demand in the civil justice system market. This further 
identifies the demand side of market. Based on this reasoning, the demand in 
terms of civil justice systems can be seen as composed of wealthy individuals and 
companies, served by a special group of lawyers. 
However, this does not answer the question as to why lawyers tend to dominate 
their clients. The answer is to be found in the structure of the market for lawyers 
and the legal profession itself. First, the legal profession is naturally entropic in 
reasoning, which means that laws, procedures, and their interpretation becomes 
more and more complex. Lawyers try to convince others or try to propose new 
ideas by identifying similarities and differences that had not previously been 
noticed. Focusing on similarities and differences between cases increases 
complexity; on the one hand, it obliges lawyers to spend more time on a case, 
while and on the other hand, makes it difficult for non-lawyers to engage in the 
                                                        
531 This was discovered in Chicago by Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Michelson (1998). The 
findings compare a study conducted in 1975 with a similar one conducted in 1995. Even 
though the study took place in Chicago, the conclusion and the findings can be extrapolated 
to the EU situation. This extrapolation can be argued, taking into consideration that US and 
UK law firms comprise almost three quarters of the top one hundred law firms in the world. 
Law firm statistics are discussed in Chapter 5; detailed data can be found in the Annexes 
section. 
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legal profession.532 It is obvious that complexity and the time spent on a case 
increase the costs of the proceedings for litigants.533 
Second, a lawyer’s service is a credence good, this being a kind of good produced 
by an expert who knows more about the quality of the good than the consumer 
does.534 This means that the expert producer can dictate how much of the service 
the client will buy; he can also provide one service instead of another, and he can 
even inflate prices. In the lawyers market, lawyers are the experts in the field of 
law, and have extensive knowledge of laws and procedures, while clients find 
themselves overwhelmed by the complexity of the law and by the impossibility 
of understanding it. The complexity of legal services also makes it difficult for 
other experts in the field to evaluate the services provided by a lawyer.535 This 
difficulty, often combined with the impossibility of holding lawyers accountable 
for the outcomes of their opinions, creates the conditions for uncertainty about the 
value of the services. Having no reference points, clients face difficulties in 
choosing a lawyer based solely on the quality of his services.536 Therefore, in the 
belief that a higher price indicates superior quality, clients choose the lawyer who 
offers his expertise for the highest affordable price. Factors used as a spider web 
by lawyers ‘to trap’ potential clients include mentioning other famous or wealthy 
clients, mentioning their win/loss ratio, displaying expensive artwork, and 
adorning walls with academic background records.537 
Third, the lawyers market is of a superstar variety, where the difference in quality 
between producers is small, while the difference in earnings is enormous. 
Classical examples of this are artists and sportsmen, who have small differences 
in quality but huge differences in earnings.538 In instances where lawyers can 
influence the outcome of a legal case, the result will depend on the quality of the 
lawyer on one side compared to the quality of the lawyer on the other side. In 
legal disputes, very often the winner takes everything that is at stake. As a 
consequence, parties are willing to pay a great deal for a very small increment in 
the quality of their lawyers.539 Hampered by the law’s complexity and the 
                                                        
532 Hadfield (2000) 967; Vogenauer (2013) 24. 
533 While the costs of the proceedings increase for clients, the revenue for lawyers increases as 
well. Therefore, lawyers benefit economically from the complexity of the law. Ogus (1999) 
412. 
534 Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) 5-6. 
535 Hadfield (2000) 969.  
536 This was also discussed in Section 4.3.3. Refer also to footnote 528. See also Iossa and 
Jullien (2012) 678. 
537 Hadfield (2000) 972. 
538 Schulze (2003) 431. 
539 This quality is something that clients cannot be sure about. Complexity and the credence 
good characteristics of the lawyers market make it difficult to assess precisely the qualities 
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difficulty in assessing a lawyer’s quality, a client will choose the most expensive 
one. Companies and individuals that can afford to pay the most expensive lawyers 
compete to have their services. It can be predicted that big law firms will serve 
the largest companies, and that very few big law firms will exist within a certain 
market. Thus, a stratification of lawyers and clients can be expected, and can also 
explain the findings of Heinz et al. (1998) on the division of lawyers into 
categories. 
Fourth, facing the complexity of the law − a credence good − and owing to the 
effects of a superstar kind of market, lawyers’ clients see their expenses rise very 
quickly. Furthermore, the client-lawyer relationship develops slowly and requires 
time and resources from both parties. These resources represent sunk costs, which 
are costs that once incurred cannot be recovered. Lawyer’s costs are difficult to 
be transferred to a new lawyer-client relationship, and are difficult to be 
retrieved.540 The existence of sunk costs makes it more difficult for clients to 
switch between lawyers in the event that they are not satisfied, and lawyers can 
take advantage of this by inflating initial costs, which will increase the exit costs 
for their clients. Once the cost trap has been effective, the prices and costs for the 
clients become ‘normal’, thus locking a client and his lawyer together.541 Apart 
from the financial side, the lock is helped as well by the inability of the client to 
assess the quality of the lawyer and the complexity of the law itself. 
Fifth, litigation resembles sunk-cost auctions, which take place when the bidding 
done during the auction cannot be recovered. In the legal market, litigations 
resemble auctions, where the disputed amount is the auction prize. In order to win, 
litigants invest time and money, and a large part of the money invested goes to 
lawyers. These costs can be partially recovered only if the case is won, otherwise 
they are sunk costs. During the course of the litigation, parties find themselves in 
a kind of auction where they are forced to invest in a lawyer in order to win the 
case. The problem here is that parties are willing to pay as much as they can in 
order to win the case and to avoid financial loss. This gives lawyers the advantage, 
as well as the possibility of extracting fees based on the wealth of their clients 
rather than on the quality of the service offered.542 
                                                        
of the lawyer. Furthermore, comparing the qualities of one’s lawyer with that of the 
adversary’s is even more difficult. Nevertheless, experience and practical knowledge can 
provide some information on the quality of lawyers. 
540 Hadfield (2000) 977. 
541 Kamar (2006) 1759. This refers to the high costs related to changing lawyers during a 
reincorporation within the US. Similar high costs are possible for litigants who want to 
change their lawyer. 
542 Hadfield (2000) 982; Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka (2009) 6. 
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Sixth, the structure of the lawyers market has elements of a monopoly market, 
with the monopoly created by artificial and natural barriers to entering the practice 
of law. Artificial barriers are created by laws or regulations that restrict entry into 
the profession or require special training to become a lawyer. Most notably, to 
become a qualified litigating lawyer, bar association membership is required, and 
entry into the bar requires a specific education, a period of training, and (often) 
an entry exam. Bar associations can restrict the number of lawyers to be accepted 
into the profession in order to extract profit from the limited number of lawyers 
available in the market. However, the restriction placed on foreign lawyers creates 
a major disruption in the civil justice system market, increasing the costs for 
parties and restricting parties’ mobility. Natural barriers to entering the lawyers 
market consist mainly in the accumulation of knowledge and the ability to create 
and assimilate complex reasoning. Experience for lawyers is an important key to 
their success. Novice lawyers require more time and effort to analyse and respond 
to tasks compared to experienced colleagues, and with the further specialisation 
of lawyers, experience becomes even more important.543 Experienced lawyers can 
decide when and with whom they want to share their experience. Intelligence and 
complex thinking pose another barrier to entering the market. Studies show that 
lawyers’ intelligence tends to be above average, and given that demonstrably high 
intelligence is not widely spread within the global population, this natural barrier 
creates an obstacle that is insurmountable for many. 
Based on the above reasoning, it can be concluded that lawyers have considerable 
power over their clients, and its source is to be found in the characteristics of the 
lawyers market. Law and legal procedures have a natural entropy that increases 
their complexity over time, and complexity works to the benefit of lawyers. The 
demand for them increases as well as the time they need to resolve legal problems. 
Increasing the complexity of the law seems to increase the costs of the legal 
service,544 and clients are unable to determine the real value of a legal service 
given its credence good nature, which enables lawyers to extract high fees. At the 
same time, clients find themselves confronted by a complex credence good that 
increases their uncertainty with regard to the service they are purchasing. To avoid 
regret and possible financial loss, clients pay as much as they can afford, hoping 
that the lawyer’s high price indicates the quality of his service. This drive to pay 
the highest price quickly escalates lawyers’ costs, which are sunk costs, and drags 
clients into a sunk-cost auction. As a consequence, lawyers costs increase rapidly, 
and the possibility of changing lawyers becomes very expensive. It can be said 
                                                        
543 Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Michelson (1998) 772-773. 
544 Even though complexity increases in time, companies or individuals can get to know a 
jurisdiction’s legal situation, and reduce the costs of complex laws. Sanga (2014) 918-922. 
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that lawyers have a superior position compared to their clients.545 Financially and 
psychologically, clients are stuck with their lawyer, and are forced to submit to 
their strategies and approach to the case. For the civil justice system market, this 
means that lawyers represent the demand side’s greatest power; they are not 
simply agents, but are a force to be reckoned with, and one that pushes forward 
its own agenda .546 
4.3.5 Influence of lawyers on the civil justice system competition 
Having examined the factors that place lawyers in a dominant position, and taken 
into account that lawyers might be the decisive players in the demand side’s 
output,547 it is a fitting time to consider the role of lawyers in the civil justice 
system market and competition. This section examines the following questions: 
What interests do lawyers have in the civil justice system competition? What is 
their role in the competition? What is the result of their role and interest? 
The legal market’s characteristics described in Section 4.3.3 give lawyers the 
possibility of imposing legal strategies and behaviour upon their clients. As a 
consequence, in the event of diverging interests involving their clients, lawyers 
can − or would − further their own interests over those of their clients, including 
interests in the civil justice system market and competition.548 Lawyers would be 
interested in the competition only if they had a share of the market, and their 
revenue increased as a result.549 However, lawyers are not a homogeneous 
                                                        
545 It is suggested that lawyers even hamper the existence of the legal market. O’Hara O’Connor 
and Rutledge (2014) 89. 
546 Christie (1977) 4. 
547 This claim is based on the fact that that lawyers dominate their clients, and that clients accept 
the legal strategies prepared by their lawyers. From this derives the fact that lawyers make 
the choice of law and choice of court for their clients. However, it can be said that clients 
make the choice of lawyer, which in turn can have repercussions in the choice of law and 
the choice of court. Sanga (2014) 925. 
548 The competition for incorporation in the US provides examples of how lawyers’ self-interest, 
rather than the merits of the state, determines the domicile of the company. Kahan and 
Kamar (2002) 685. 
549 It should be remembered that lawyers operate in a superstar type of market, which creates 
categories based on the wealth of the clients. The more clients a lawyer has, the more 
experience, human capital, and fame can be acquired, and the higher in the categories a 
lawyer can be placed. The higher the category of the lawyer, the wealthier the clients, and 
the more profit can be extracted. It follows from this that lawyers would be interested not 
only in competition if their profit increased but also if they had a share in the market, and if 
an increase in number of cases occurred at a faster rate compared to the rate of new lawyers 
entering the market. Kahan and Kamar (2002) 705. 
A case where lawyers have been active in promoting the competition between jurisdictions is 
the competition for incorporations. Incentives have been not only direct but also indirect. 
See Charny (1991) 432. 
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group.550 The division of lawyers into categories and groups leads to them having 
different interests in the competition. And given that wealthy clients are the group 
most likely to create the demand in the market, lawyers of wealthy clients would 
be the ones interested in the competition of jurisdictions. 
Broadly speaking, in the EU context, competition can increase lawyers’ revenue 
in two ways.551 The first way would be to increase their customer pool.552 This 
means that while attracting litigants and other persons in need of legal advice, 
competing governments would increase the pool of customers for local lawyers, 
who in turn could take advantage of the increasing number of clients in order to 
increase their own profit.553 The increase in revenue could be significant if the 
increase in customers were accompanied by a marginal increase in the number of 
lawyers. Governments and lawyers’ lobbying groups (chambers of advocates in 
primis) would favour increasing the jurisdictional reach of their courts, while at 
the same time keeping foreign lawyers at bay, and keeping the supply of local 
lawyers under control. 
The second way to increase lawyers’ revenue would be to increase their market 
reach. This would require that lawyers qualified in a certain jurisdiction be 
allowed to practice in other jurisdictions as well. Allowing this would extend the 
boundaries of the lawyers market and possibly increase lawyers’ income. 
However, such a situation would result in certain difficulties. Usually, a lawyer is 
trained, experienced, and qualified to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. 
Therefore, any foreign lawyer would find it hard to compete with local lawyers, 
who are more familiar with the language, the laws, and that jurisdiction’s practice. 
Moreover, difficulties in penetrating an already existing market would add to the 
problems regarding language and experience. At the first sign of competition, 
local lawyers would lobby their politicians to stop the competition of foreign 
lawyers. Therefore, it can be claimed that lawyers would have no incentive to 
promote a civil justice competition that would allow an influx of foreign lawyers 
                                                        
550 Lawyers’ heterogeneity can obstruct their lobbying ability and prevent them from rent 
seeking. See Van den Bergh (2000) 449. 
551 A third way for lawyers to increase their revenue would be to increase their fees. Raising 
fees is independent of competition, as lawyers can do this without the help of competition. 
Moreover, competition from other lawyers trying to enter the market can push the market 
down. Predicting a change in fees is more difficult, considering that the lawyers market price 
is not a direct result of the demand and supply interaction, but is influenced by other factors, 
as analysed in Section 4.3.3. 
552 Vogenauer (2013) 63. 
553 Some law firms incentivise lawyers who bring in work from outside their jurisdictions. 
Cuniberti (2014) 455. 
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in their jurisdiction, even though they have a natural shield against foreign 
lawyers, and even though this might increase the size of their market. 
Lawyers also have considerable lobbying power to influence the civil justice 
system market, apart from the normal market mechanism as part of the demand. 
Lawyers interested in competition have the characteristics of a powerful interest 
group, as they are small, single-task oriented, and well organised.554 They have 
also been considered to have significant influence on politicians,555 whom they 
not only lobby but team up with in order to promote their own jurisdiction.556 
Moreover, lawyers seem to assert considerable pressure on courts to be 
competitive and to attract foreign litigants.557 Their lobbying activity has two 
objectives: one is to force the government to increase their jurisdiction’s 
competitiveness, while the other is to generate the creation of laws that increase 
benefits for lawyers as a group.558 
Therefore, lawyers are interested in a competition process that would bring more 
customers into their jurisdiction, while avoiding competition from foreign 
lawyers, and at the same time maintaining control over the local supply. An 
attractive system would need to be innovative and up to date, and possess the 
complexities of the legal market. The entropic nature of the legal market requires 
innovation and new solutions to problems arising in new and old industries. 
Furthermore, innovation is needed not only to attract foreign clients but also to 
keep local clients from fleeing. The other aim of lobbying is to create laws that 
would increase the income of both local and foreign clients.559 This means that 
while laws, procedures, and institutions are innovated, they should not be 
simplified. Lawyers need a certain level of complexity in order to sell their 
expertise. 
To summarise, lawyers have considerable power over their clients, which allows 
them to impose their choice of law and of court strategies. Choice of court, which 
lawyers are able to influence, is what creates the demand for the civil justice 
system market. Lawyers exercise their influence by lobbying governments and 
                                                        
554 Van den Bergh (2000) 449. However, the lobbying power of lawyers varies from one 
jurisdiction to another. See: Ogus (1999) 413. 
555 Called by Kamar a ‘symbiotic relationship’, see Kamar (2006) 1745. Vogenauer (2013) 63; 
Coyle (2012) 1931. 
556 Coyle (2012) 1930. See also Section 5.2.2 on the Law Society and British government 
collaboration. 
557 Coyle (2012) 1932. O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge also examine a competition where 
judges and courts attract cases. O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014) 100. 
558 For tort lawyers as an interest group, see Rubin and Bailey (1994) 814. For lawyers’ 
influence in corporate law reform in the US, see Kahan and Kamar (2002) 705. 
559 O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014) 89; Calliess and Hoffmann (2009) 115. 
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courts to be more competitive in the international market. For this competition to 
be beneficial for lawyers, laws and institutions need to innovate, maintain a 
certain level of complexity, attract foreign clients, and protect lawyers from 
outside competition. 
4.4 Governments and courts: the supply side of the civil 
justice system competition 
The analysis of the civil justice system competition is not complete without a close 
look at the supply side. It goes without saying that a market exists only when there 
is a good that is demanded by one or more persons, and is offered by one or more 
suppliers.560 The position and the behaviour of the supply side shapes and 
influences the position and the behaviour of the demand side.561 If there is only 
one supplier in the market, that market is a monopoly. Monopolies have been 
associated with reduced productivity, with lack of competition, and with inflating 
the market price. Some monopolies are the result of a supplier’s attempt to 
eliminate all competition and to become the sole supplier. Other monopolies, 
however, are the result of factors outside the suppliers’ ability to exert influence. 
Among factors that hinder the possibilities of new suppliers entering the market 
are the high entry costs or the scarce production resources. The good traded in the 
market often creates premises for a monopoly. In fact, some goods, like the city’s 
electricity network, the water pipeline, or the gas pipeline, are costly to produce 
and to maintain, and so the government steps in as sole supplier of these utilities, 
and thus becomes a monopoly. Even if these networks are privatised, the new 
owner will still be in a monopoly situation. Electricity, gas, or water networks are 
considered public goods.562 Similarly, courts and a country’s civil justice system 
are also considered public goods.563 The provision of courts and the civil justice 
system lies in the hands of the government, the sole supplier. This section analyses 
the role of the government in this capacity in view of the competition of 
jurisdictions in the EU. Special attention is paid to the characteristics of the supply 
                                                        
560 These conditions are not exhaustive, however, and even if all the conditions for competition 
exist, it does not mean competition will develop. Coyle (2012) 1930.  
561 The same is also true of the demand side. 
562 Keeping in mind the analysis in Section 4.2 regarding the definition of public goods, users 
cannot be easily excluded from their use, and their usage does not produce rivalry. This 
makes these goods public goods. However, it should be remembered that providing and 
maintaining the network is different from supplying electricity, gas, and water. These 
utilities are essential for everyday life in modern societies, and have attained the status of 
political public goods, together with their distribution network. 
563 Section 4.2 provides an analysis of the civil justice system as a good. 
183 
 
side, to its incentives to participate in the civil justice system competition, and to 
its interaction with the demand side and the good in the market. 
4.4.1 Supply side characteristics 
It can be said that any particular market has its origin either in the demand side or 
in the supply side. In the first instance, consumer demand and the prospects of 
financial gain lure producers to supply the good requested, and thus create a 
market. In the second instance, suppliers that have already produced, or are 
capable of producing a good, create a market by enticing consumers to use the 
good. In the civil justice system market, it is not clear which side originated the 
market, although the supply side tends to increase the pool of the demand side.564 
In the EU, from the introduction to the Brussels Convention to the present 
Brussels I (recast) Regulation, party autonomy has been extended to include non-
residents of the EU or parties without an apparent connection to the EU. In 
accordance with Article 25 of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, litigating parties 
can choose the court of any Member State. Compared to the older versions of the 
Regulation, the wording of the Recast does not require any of the parties to be 
domiciled in the EU.565 The recast Regulation also increases the potential pool of 
litigants, and therefore the size of the demand side. It would be too bold to claim 
that the aim of Article 25 is to increase the size of the civil justice system demand 
in the EU, but the resulting effect on the size of the demand is clear. 
Furthermore, some EU Member States have been promoting their jurisdiction as 
venues for international litigants, in an apparent attempt to increase their visibility 
beyond the borders of their jurisdictions. In 2007, The Law Society of England 
and Wales published a brochure titled ‘England and Wales: The jurisdictions of 
choice’ with the subtitle ‘dispute resolution’.566 The brochure was sponsored by 
three large English-based international law firms and supported by eleven others. 
A foreword by the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor Jack Straw 
clearly shows the government’s support of this initiative. Moreover, in the same 
brochure, the Secretary of State for Justice calls attention to the perfect suitability 
of English courts to welcome international litigants. This theme is mentioned 
throughout the brochure, where the reader is reminded of the long experience of 
                                                        
564 Eidenmüller (2011) 714. Lawyers’ interest in having a bigger pool of clients was described 
in Section 4.3. 
565 The old version required one of the parties to be domiciled in the EU, which afforded some 
opportunity to extend jurisdiction beyond the EU. Of course, party autonomy as intended by 
Article 25 of the recast Regulation is limited by mandatory jurisdiction rules applicable to a 
particular legal situation, as is apparent from paragraph 5 in the Article. Section 3.1 offers a 
detailed analysis of the Brussels I (recast) Regulation. 
566 The brochure has disappeared from the Law Society’s webpage, but copies can be found 
online.  
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English courts in dealing with international cases. The English High Court is 
promoted as being experienced in hearing evidence in foreign law and deciding 
according to that foreign law.567 At the same time, the brochure presents English 
civil procedure as being more flexible than other prescriptive civil procedure 
codes.568 Clearly the intention of the authors and the promoters of the brochure is 
to entice litigants into the jurisdictions of English courts. By creating this 
brochure, they aim not only to present the English jurisdiction as a ‘wonder’ of 
litigation but also to attract litigants not familiar with English courts. In 
continental Europe, Germany and France took the Law Society’s move as a 
challenge, and − after much insistence from lawyers − Germany, published a 
brochure in 2008.569 Published as part of a promotional campaign called ‘Law – 
Made in Germany’ − which includes the brochure and a website − it featured the 
subtitle ‘global, effective, cost-efficient’.570 To date, three editions of the brochure 
have been published, with the third (2014) version being available in English, 
French, Russian, Chinese, Arabic, and Vietnamese. The brochure was introduced 
by Germany’s Federal Minister of Justice, and aims at promoting the use of 
German contract law, company law, and courts, with the courts being described 
as independent, fast, and cost effective. Moreover, the brochure enumerates the 
benefits of German procedural law. It certainly does not hide its intention of 
attracting international litigants. Considering the languages into which it has been 
translated and the content of the brochure, it can be said that one of its goals − or 
at least an indirect one − is to increase the pool of customers for German courts. 
While Germany and England are trying to increase their pool of customers and to 
attract new ones, the Netherlands and France are in a more defensive mode. The 
tone in the Netherlands is that of a producer that is losing clients,571 and it appears 
to have gone on the offensive, promoting itself as an attractive option for 
commercial litigation. It is expected that in 2018 the Netherlands Commercial 
Court will begin to operate, and was created to litigate international commercial 
cases in English.572 The tone in France is that of a civil law owner that is losing 
                                                        
567 Page 12 of the brochure. Eversheds, as one of the sponsors, maintains a copy in its website. 
See: <http://www.eversheds.com/documents/LawSocietyEnglandAndWalesJurisdiction 
OfChoice.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
568 Page 8 of the brochure. 
569 Calliess and Hoffmann (2009) 117; Koetz (2010) 1243. 
570 Link to the website <http://www.lawmadeingermany.de> accessed 6 March 2017. Link to 
the English version of the brochure <http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/Law-
Made_in_Germany_EN.pdf> accessed 6 March 2017. 
571 Tjittes (2014) 261-262.  
572 The launch of the court experiences some delays. It is expected that the court will open its 
doors before the end of 2017. The website of the Netherlands Commercial Court contains 
updates about the current status <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
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to the common law. To fight back, the Fondation pour le droit continental was 
created in 2007, with the aim of promoting the use and development of continental 
law.573 While this seems less ambitious compared to the English and German 
brochures, the support from all the major French legal institutions seems to have 
increased its prestige. It can be argued that while the Foundation has a global 
presence and promotes the civil law system and the continental courts, indirectly 
it reaches potential customers of continental courts. These English, German, 
Dutch, and French examples demonstrate a core characteristic of the supply side 
of the competition in the EU: namely, the perpetual attempts to increase the size 
of the demand side, either through legal changes or marketing campaigns.574 
The civil justice system that is promoted through brochures and promotions is a 
set of goods and services with different characteristics and different providers. 
Some services that form part of the civil justice system have the characteristics of 
private goods, or public goods, or merit goods.575 The main components of the 
civil justice system − court adjudication and procedural law − are products of 
government institutions. Courts produce adjudication, while parliaments approve 
the law used by courts. Considering that a civil justice system is a complex 
mechanism, it goes without saying that its production is complex as well. Courts 
and parliaments are interdependent, and together they form the supply side in the 
civil justice system market. However, from the point of view of the demand side, 
the supply side looks unified and compact, with the executive branch of the 
government as sole provider. In other words, while producers of the civil justice 
system are several institutions, the sole perceived supplier in the market is the 
government,576 which resembles a monopolist supplier in one particular 
jurisdiction. 
The government’s position as a monopolist supplier raises concerns, as 
monopolies are associated with lack of competition, price fixing, lack of 
efficiency, barriers to entering the market for other competitors, accountability, 
and problems relating to knowledge. As a result, monopolist suppliers do not meet 
the market’s demand.577 The existence of a monopolist supplier implies a single 
                                                        
573 From the website of the Foundation: ‘It [the Foundation] promotes the radiation of the 
Romano-Germanic law around the world and in particular in cooperation with States and 
international organizations concerned’. See more at <http://www.fondation-
droitcontinental.org/en/the-foundation/#sthash.TvMqNZtx.dpuf> accessed 22 December 
2017. 
574 As in other markets, an early entrance into the competition would give a first-move 
advantage to other jurisdictions. Brochures play this role as well, as they allow competing 
states to stay ahead of the others. See in this regard Romano (1985) 226. 
575 See Section 4.1 to read more on this. 
576 O’Hara O’Connor and Rutledge (2014) 89. 
577 Ogus (1999) 406-407. 
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producer and consequently the absence of competition.578 However, while the 
government is the only supplier of civil justice as a whole, there are other suppliers 
that produce single goods. In fact, dispute resolution – one of the services included 
in a civil justice system – is produced by many actors in the forms of arbitration 
and mediation.579 These mechanisms are highly competitive.580 Procedural rules, 
another good that is part of the civil justice system, can also be provided by private 
parties, and can regulate many aspects of the business sectors. For example, 
football federations all over Europe have rules and dispute resolution mechanisms 
to regulate interactions between their members. And despite the monetary 
interests and the social impact of these rules, they exist and proceed without 
needing the state. 
It is also true that courts have fixed fees that do not respond to market signals. 
However, it should be noted that the civil justice system is considered a public 
good with merit good characteristics. The government is interested in producing 
and subsidising it so that it remains affordable for most members of the 
community. As a result, the fixing of prices is not monopolist court behaviour 
intended to extract maximum profit, but a political choice to make litigation 
affordable.581 
The debate with regard to lack of efficiency on the part of public authorities has 
been going on for a long time. Courts and law-making institutions have been seen 
as lacking the efficiency that characterises private providers in competitive 
conditions.582 However, as mentioned earlier, courts compete with other dispute 
resolution providers in attracting litigants, which promotes an efficient use of the 
                                                        
578 Trachtman suggests that a monopoly regarding regulatory jurisdiction may provide benefits 
that outweigh those of competition. These benefits arise from the economies of scale in 
producing dispute resolution mechanisms and regulations. Moreover, competition in itself 
does not always produce positive effects. In some markets where acquiring information is 
difficult, states should make sure they enable customers to obtain and digest the information. 
Competition diminishes the role of the government as a regulatory authority, and jeopardises 
its authority as regards protecting public interests. Trachtman (2000) 337, 340-344. 
579 This is mentioned in Section 4.1. For a more in-depth analysis, see Themeli (2016) 22-25. 
580 Eidenmüller (2011) 722. 
581 In February 2015, the Law Society expressed its opinion against changes in the court-
oriented fees proposed by the government in England. The Law Society considered it wrong 
to treat courts as profit or commercial centres. Clearly court fees are considered to be outside 
market rules or influences (as stated by the Law Society) because of their vital social 
function. See Enhanced Court Fees - The Government Response to Part 2 of the consultation 
on Reform of Court Fees and Further Proposals for Consultation - The Law Society response 
- February 2015, available at <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/ 
consultation-responses/enhanced-court-fees/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
582 For Caplan and Stringham, public suppliers have no incentive to be efficient, and even if 
they want to be they do not know how. Caplan and Stringham (2008) 519. 
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courts.583 Furthermore, courts serve a political function, which is to maintain 
social peace and to offer reliable conflict resolutions, as a weak court system can 
create fractures that lead to violent unrest in a society. These are some of the 
reasons that governments try to offer efficient services in courts. 
Describing the government as a monopolist in the production of civil justice 
systems, however, is not entirely correct.584 Governments have the monopoly in 
terms of violence in a society, which gives them a considerable advantage over 
other private providers. The monopoly of violence gives governments the 
prerogative to check decisions from other dispute resolution providers, especially 
in cases related to the execution of these decisions, and may lie at the root of the 
confusion regarding the government as a monopolist in the market. 
In the EU, suppliers in the civil justice system market are the governments of 
Member States. Their main characteristic lies in the continuous attempt to expand 
the demand side by extending the scope of application of choice of court rules, 
and the promotion of their jurisdictions on a global scale. Governments seem to 
have a monopoly in providing the civil justice system in a jurisdiction, which is a 
good composed of several services. However, other producers offer services that 
can replace and substitute the single elements of a country’s civil justice system. 
This means that while governments as suppliers structurally resemble a 
monopoly, their behaviour does not. 
4.4.2 Components of the supply side 
The civil justice system is a compound good composed of several services with 
different producers scattered within the same jurisdiction, and these are usually 
institutions that are more or less independent of the government. Among others, 
contributors to the supply side are courts, parliaments, councils of the judiciary, 
and the government’s executive branch. The role of these institutions varies from 
one jurisdiction to another, but governments coordinate them in order to compose 
a single offer from the supply side.  
Courts are among the most recognisable of the supply-side institutions, and in 
some jurisdictions they are organised by councils of the judiciary. Usually, 
Councils of the judiciary are responsible for the judge’s appointment, dismissal, 
and career. However, Councils do not have powers of dispute resolution, and 
cannot influence a judge’s decision. If dispute resolution can be considered the 
                                                        
583 To counter this argument, it can be said that governments have no incentive to attract 
litigants, and they are more than happy to see litigants use other forms of dispute resolution. 
However, they are also afraid that the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole will suffer. 
Coyle (2012) 1930. 
584 Ogus (1999) 407. 
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most important service of the civil justice system, courts are the most important 
institutions. Nevertheless, courts rely heavily on government subsidies to 
function, while governments rely on the work of courts to ensure social peace. 
Furthermore, courts serve governments’ competition interests, whereby 
governments extract profits while courts do not. From an economic standpoint, 
courts should be opposed to the civil justice system competition as long as a judge 
receives the same salary while his workload increases. 
Parliaments are the law-making institutions in all EU Member States, and they 
contribute to the competition by approving or repealing laws of civil procedure. 
The law-making process is highly technical and political, and from a technical 
perspective, the drafting and the approval of a law takes considerable time and 
effort, which in a competitive market is essential. A competitive jurisdiction 
should be quick to approve new procedures so that it can respond to the demands 
of the market and the moves of other competitors. However, parliaments have a 
political agenda that is established by the winning party or coalition. The agenda 
is influenced by many factors, and is often the result of compromises that do not 
take into account the fact of the civil justice system competition. Parliament 
members may feel that their electorate does not consider the competition a 
priority, or even something to be concerned about. Competition brings benefits to 
the government and to lawyers, but common voters do not have any immediate 
benefit. The lack of these benefits for voters creates the conditions in which 
parliament members do not support unpopular competitive reforms. Furthermore, 
competitive reforms might need to wait for approval after more populist 
parliamentary actions have been approved. 
Governments are also affected by political pressures. Governments are the 
results of political elections in which the winning party or coalition of parties must 
by and large adhere to political promises made in the election campaign, during 
which a political agenda was presented to the electorate. If reforms aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of the civil justice system are not popular, 
governments will find it difficult to win the electoral support or to implement 
these reforms. However, reforms to improve the competitiveness of a jurisdiction 
and reforms to improve the judicial system are intertwined. While addressing 
electoral issues, these reforms serve competition purposes as well. Moreover, 
governments are also under pressure from lobbying groups with stakes in the civil 
justice system competition. Lawyers as well as businesses can exercise 
considerable pressure and promote reforms in their own interest. 
Actors on the supply side of the competition include courts, parliaments, and 
governments. All other conditions remaining equal, courts have a natural interest 
in avoiding competition if it means being confronted with more caseloads. 
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Parliaments are the institutions that approve laws required in the competition 
process. On the one hand, parliamentary work follows procedures that requires 
time and becomes an obstacle to a speedy response to competition. On the other 
hand, members of parliament try to gratify their voters and supporters. Any 
common voter has no direct interest in the competition of jurisdictions, which 
means that he will not pressure his parliamentarians for this, while groups with an 
interest in the competition are more willing to lobby. As the executive branch, the 
government has more incentives to enter the competition race. Nevertheless, 
governments are constrained by political promises and unpopular reforms. If 
promises are broken or unpopular reforms are executed, any government will have 
a difficult time being re-elected. Lobbying groups are able to change this situation, 
however, and push for reforms that are unpopular but that encourage the 
government and the system to be more competitive. An analysis of these parties’ 
incentives can lead to a better understanding of their actions. 
4.4.3 Supply side incentives 
Section 4.1 mentioned the existence of suppliers’ incentives in the civil justice 
system competition. The origin of these incentives has a considerable influence 
on supplier behaviour and its market. In the foreword to the previously mentioned 
English brochure, Jack Straw, the Secretary of State for Justice, referred to the 
benefits that England derives from attracting foreign litigants. These benefits 
affect mainly the legal sector, but also London’s position as a financial hub. The 
Netherlands has the same reasons for entering into the competition process.585 
Financial benefits are evidently among the reasons that governments decide to 
compete, and these benefits can be direct or indirect. Direct financial benefits are 
those that stream from the fees paid by litigants for the court adjudication process. 
Indirect financial benefits derive from taxes or other expenses paid by litigants. It 
might be added that indirect benefits also include certain non-financial benefits 
for some parties. 
For a jurisdiction to have direct benefits would mean collecting enough fees to 
cover the expenses encountered in preparing a court hearing. However, courts are 
mostly subsidised by the government, and they do not make a profit.586 Direct 
benefits in the sense of profit do not seem likely to be an incentive to participate 
in the competition. Hence, as well as direct benefits, jurisdictions that enter into 
the competition should also have indirect benefits. The sum of both should 
outweigh the total costs of the effort. Despite a government’s wishes, doing this 
                                                        
585 Tjittes (2014) 261-262. Some financial reasons were also mentioned in footnote 498. 
586 Ware (2013) 899; Ver Eecke (1998) 135. 
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calculation is difficult, and can be determined only by having the government 
enter the competition process.587 
Indirect benefits are more complicated to measure but perhaps more important.588 
Going back to the English brochure’s foreword, the Secretary of Justice points out 
that the legal service industry and commerce will benefit from attracting 
international litigants to English courts.589 The benefits of having a competitive 
commercial court have been calculated at between 60 and 75 million Euro,590 with 
the legal industry and commerce apparently the principal beneficiaries. Other 
beneficiaries also include certain producers of services, such as courts and the 
government itself. 
Legal business in England is very important. English law firms are among the 
biggest in the world, and have important international clients. Part of their success 
is based on their expertise in English law and English courts. This is because 
England being their home jurisdiction they have a starting advantage compared to 
non-English law firms, as English law and English Courts are very often chosen 
in cross-border cases. The Netherlands has an important legal industry as well. 
Dutch law firms are also interested in attracting commercial litigations, while at 
the same time exploiting their own knowledge of the Dutch system. It is obvious 
that these law firms are highly interested in pushing the government to compete 
and to attract litigants. Furthermore, they are interested in international litigants, 
because these tend to be large and to spend more.591 A law firm’s profit from 
representing international litigants is taxable by the government, which makes it 
an indirect profit. Taxes are another source of indirect profit, and are collected 
from hospitality services like hotels, restaurants, and bars where international 
litigants are likely to go. The English and Dutch examples can be extended to any 
jurisdiction that tries to attract litigants. 
Incentives for the supply side to compete are also influenced by other factors. 
Among the actors are judges, especially those of higher courts, as they find it 
                                                        
587 Stringham and Zywicki (2011) 292. Competition should be used as an alternative only if it 
provides greater benefits than other institutional choices. This means that the competition 
for jurisdiction should be compared to other institutional alternatives as well, and not only 
be justified by a costs and benefits analysis. Trachtman (2000) 348. 
588 Eidenmüller (2011) 713. 
589 ‘Of course, that has a knock-on effect and the success of the legal services sector plays an 
unquantifiable role in helping London to maintain its position as a major centre for global 
commerce.’ England and Wales the Jurisdictions of Choice (2007) 5. 
590 For more, see (in Dutch) <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-en-contact/ Organisatie/ 
Raad-voor-de-rechtspraak/Nieuws/Paginas/Plan-voor-speciale-voorziening-handelscon- 
flicten-definitief.aspx> accessed 22 December 2017. 
591 Romano (1985) 248. 
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flattering to be mentioned in textbooks as well as in decisions of other courts. 
Being mentioned in textbooks or in decisions also improves their professional 
reputation and career opportunities. This moral profit serves as an incentive for 
judges to favour participation in the civil justice system competition. These 
ambitious judges influence their governments to be more attractive to 
international litigants, as these litigants have more complicated cases that at the 
same time are similar to those handled by other courts. Resolving one of these 
cases would resonate throughout the EU, enhancing the reputation and self-
esteem of judges that issued the decision. 
A last − though not least important − incentive for governments to compete relates 
to the general appeal of a jurisdiction to investors. Investors play a significant role 
in the economic development of many countries, and these economies are geared 
towards attracting as many investors as possible. This requires, among others 
things, good institutions and laws, as they form part of the civil justice systems, 
and are considered carefully by investing companies. Companies consider fast 
courts and clear procedural laws to be a precious asset to protect their investment. 
Competition may create the conditions to have efficient and clear rules, and 
therefore help countries attract investments that in turn increase the welfare of a 
state by making voters happy with the government in charge, and increasing its 
chances of being re-elected. 
The final calculation of the incentives is not easy. Governments are faced with the 
most difficult task, which is to calculate the final benefit. This means weighing 
costs with direct and indirect benefits, but while direct benefits are easy to 
measure, indirect benefits are more difficult.592 Furthermore, certain groups, like 
lawyers and judges, lobby the supply side to compete with other jurisdictions. 
Courts and judges are glad to be cited and mentioned in the decisions of foreign 
or lower courts. This strictly personal benefit is an incentive for certain judges to 
push the government to attract foreign litigants that in turn bring business to 
another group: namely, lawyers. Lawyers and law firms increase their profit when 
the number of litigants increases; thus, financial benefit is the incentive for 
lawyers to lobby for more competitiveness and for attracting foreign litigants. 
4.5 The process of court adjudication competition 
The civil justice system competition results from the interaction of the demand 
and the supply side. The four previous sections of this chapter analysed the good 
and the market that gives rise to the competition, and the various characteristics 
                                                        
592 It can be argued that indirect costs can arise as well. Indirect costs ought to be part of the 
final calculation of benefits. 
192 
 
and actors that compose the demand and the supply side of the market. Demand 
is created by litigants wealthy enough to be cross-border mobile, while the output 
of the demand is dominated by lawyers organised mainly in large law firms. The 
interest of lawyers and clients can be different and even contradict each other. 
While clients seek a speedy and successful court process, lawyers seek to increase 
their profit from a court case. The interest of lawyers can be furthered by having 
a longer case-processing time and more complex laws, while the interest of clients 
can be furthered by having a shorter case-processing time and simplified laws. As 
the supply side, competing governments find themselves in the position of 
interpreting or understanding the needs, behaviour, and activity of the demand 
side. This undertaking is complicated by, among others, political and social 
factors. Political factors include influences from lobbying groups such as lawyers 
and judges, while social factors include the response of the population to changes 
in the court system − which is primarily manifested through their vote − but also 
the influence of reforms aimed at enhancing competition regarding the quality of 
life of the population. Building on these previous sections, the current section 
analyses how litigants can be expected to make a choice of court, and what factors 
are considered to be the most important. 
4.5.1 Competition from a unilateral choice of court 
The demand side of the civil justice system market is composed of litigants593 or 
prospective litigants, who either face a situation where the conflict has already 
arisen, or are prospective litigants facing a potential future litigation. Assuming 
that they want to resolve the conflict, and that they did not make a choice of forum 
before the conflict arose, they can either agree to choose a conflict resolution 
mechanism − which is a remote possibility after the start of the conflict − or one 
of them − the claimant − files a suit in a court. The situation in which one of the 
parties decides to ask a court to resolve the conflict creates the conditions for a 
unilateral choice of court demand, which is characterised by the ability of one 
party to make a choice of court and to initiate the process, and the relative inability 
of the other party to take the same steps. In other words, it is a situation in which 
one party takes the initiative to choose the court where the conflict will be 
adjudicated, and invests this court with the necessary procedural and financial 
means. 
In a unilateral choice of court situation, the claimant has the advantage of taking 
the first step and deciding where to file the suit. The result is that two scenarios 
can arise. In the first, the litigants are obliged to address a specific court for legal 
                                                        
593 The litigant is considered to be the lawyer and the client acting as a single unit. 
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reasons, or because of the usage or practice in a certain industry.594 Competition 
cannot start at this point, because the demand side is deprived of choice options. 
In the second, where the parties are not bound by any obligation, the claimant has 
the possibility of finding the court most suitable for his needs. 
In the EU, rules on jurisdiction are regulated by the Brussels I (recast) Regulation, 
which applies to civil and commercial cases, with exceptions listed in Article 1. 
Apart from the application of exclusive or weaker party jurisdiction rules, the 
Regulation’s general rule requires claimants to start proceedings in the 
defendant’s court of domicile.595 However, Articles 7-9 offer one or more 
alternatives. Generally, these alternatives relate to events or situations that create 
a connection with the dispute. It should be noted that while claimants have the 
advantage of the first move, their choice is not unlimited. Limits are set to prevent 
the possibility of defendants abusing claimants. 
In view of the limited choice allowed by the Regulation, claimants should be 
careful when choosing a court, and properly calculate their possibilities. The 
claimant’s main interest is in winning the dispute and forcing the other party to 
comply with the court’s decision. Exceptions to this rule exist in cases where the 
claimant files suit in order to block the other party’s actions in other courts, or the 
claimant is interested in making the other party incur legal costs, or in winning 
time through court actions. Other possibilities may exist as well. Choice of court, 
therefore, is a difficult puzzle to unravel. Considering this and aiming at fleshing 
out basic elements that influence claimant’s choice of court, the analysis in this 
section simplifies the intentions of the claimant. It also  assumes that he is 
interested in winning the case, while trying to maximise or minimise one other 
element. Three elements are considered and analysed in the following sections: 
namely, cost, benefit, and utility. Some claimants may try to combine all or some 
of these elements when making a choice of court. Apart from these, the following 
assumptions about claimants are made: they have knowledge of all the 
jurisdictions in the EU; they have knowledge of the laws in these jurisdictions; 
and they have enough time to invest in the trial. 
4.5.1.1 Choice of court for cost-minimising claimants 
While benefits come only in the event of a victory, litigation costs are certain in 
both victory and defeat. Claimants are usually interested in keeping litigation 
costs low. With this as a starting point, this section examines the elements that a 
cost-minimising claimant considers when making a choice of court. It is assumed 
                                                        
594 This should be considered a forced choice (see also Section 2.5 on Choice of Law). Even 
though it is possible for one or both of the parties to choose a court, trade usage and industry 
practice suppress their choices. 
595 See Section 3.1 for a detailed description of this. 
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that the claimant is interested only in winning the case and minimising the costs, 
hence other objectives or tactical moves are not considered. Cost-decreasing or  
-increasing factors like cost shifting – which is examined in the following sections 
− are also not considered. Based on these assumptions, a claimant will be facing 
only his own costs during the course of a litigation. Among the most common 
costs associated with litigation are court fees, lawyers’ fees, translation costs, 
travel and accommodation costs, and administration costs.596 
Usually, court fees are proportional to the value of the claim or are fixed for claims 
that are below a certain threshold. It can be expected that in commercial cases this 
threshold is exceeded often and easily, meaning that court fees are a function of 
the claimant’s claim and of the court’s coefficient to calculate the fee. Therefore, 
for the same claim, a claimant can expect different costs in different 
jurisdictions.597 
Moreover, another source of costs involves lawyers’ fees. Two methods can be 
assumed to be the most used: one is by charging hourly fees, while the second is 
by charging a fixed amount − a lump sum for the whole service. A combination 
of both is also possible.598 Therefore, lawyers’ costs for a claimant would be equal 
to the hourly charges plus any fixed amount. Assuming that there is no difference 
between sectors, lawyers’ experience, and countries, hourly charges depend 
primarily on the length of the litigation, meaning that the longer it takes, the more 
the lawyers’ costs will accrue.599 Among others, the following factors can 
influence those costs for the claimant: complexity of the case and legal 
procedures, number of lawyers hired, instance of the court, degree of lawyer-
client familiarity, and the litigation jurisdiction. The degree to and the way in 
                                                        
596 For litigation costs in the EU, see Reimann (2011), Hodges, Vogenauer & Tulibacka (2009) 
and Illmer (2010). 
597 Let us assume that court fees are C. If the monetary value of the claim is, court’s fee can 
be expressed to be C = ƒ(). The simplest form of the function is C = c, where c is a 
coefficient used to calculate the court fee. Calculations of court fees, however, can be more 
complicated than this, and include more coefficients and factros. For simplicity, c will be 
used in the following analysis. 
On costs of litigation in Europe, see also Dori and Richard (2017). 
598 Contingency or success-oriented fees are also applicable in some cases in the EU. However, 
they are the exception to the main rule. See Reimann (2011) 220, Hodges, Vogenauer, 
Tulibacka (2009) 28. 
599 For a claimant, lawyer’s costs (L) are the sum of hourly charges (hL) plus any possible fixed 
amount (fL). As mentioned, hourly charges (hL) are a function of the litigation’s duration 
(), therefore, hL = ƒL(). The relation between  and hL depends on many factors, however, 
the longer it takes for a litigation the higher will be the cost of the lawyer. Other factors to 
be considered when calculating a lawyer’s costs are the complexity of the case, the 
jurisdiction of litigation, and the parties involved in the conflict. Finally, the total cost for 
the lawyer for a litigant would be L = hL + fL or L = ƒL() + fL. 
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which these factors influence the lawyer’s costs can be very different.600 
Considering that the claimant is trying to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction, two 
scenarios can exist: either the claimant uses one lawyer in his home jurisdiction 
and another one in the jurisdiction where the litigation takes place, or he uses a 
lawyer only in the jurisdiction where the litigation takes place. In the first 
scenario, lawyers’ costs would be equal to the costs of both home and foreign 
lawyers.601 It can be assumed that litigating in a foreign jurisdiction increases the 
complexity of the case, especially if the case is connected loosely with that 
jurisdiction. The more that complexity increases, the more lawyers charge. 
Evidently, litigating in the jurisdiction best connected with the case is motivated 
by the prospect of lower lawyers’ costs. To this reasoning, it should be added that 
a lawyer’s familiarity with a foreign jurisdiction decreases the complexity of 
procedures factor, given that the more familiar a lawyer is with a system, the less 
complex he should consider that system to be. 
Other cost sources are travel, accommodation, and communication. Making a 
choice of court means that claimants will often have to choose a jurisdiction that 
is not their home jurisdiction. This choice creates some costs that relate to the 
distance between the claimant’s home jurisdiction and the location of the court.602 
Travel costs depend primarily on the distance between the location of the claimant 
and of the court.603 The greater the distance, the higher the costs will generally be. 
Within the EU, communication costs can also increase with the distance, which 
means the greater the distance, the higher the costs. Accommodation costs can 
                                                        
600 All of these factors can be considered as coefficients that influence the costs of lawyers (L). 
Among others, the complexity of the case and the legal procedures () also influence other 
litigation costs: for example, the translation of documents (tA). As regards the costs of 
lawyers, the complexity of the case and the procedures influence both the hourly rates and 
the lump sums that lawyers charge, where the more complex the case or procedures, the 
more the costs increase. Considering also the case’s complexity coefficient, lawyers’ costs 
would be L = hL + fL or L =  ƒL() +  fL. The same reasoning can be followed as well 
for the other factors: for example, the instance of the court. High instance courts 
automatically increase the costs. E.g. L = hL + fL, where  is the court’s instance price-
increasing coefficient. 
601 The total cost would be L = L1 + L2, where L1 is the cost of the home jurisdiction lawyer 
and L2 is the cost of the foreign jurisdiction lawyer. It goes without saying that both L1 and 
L2 can be expressed as L1 = hL1 + fL1 or L1 = ƒL1() + fL1 and L2 = hL2 + fL2 or L2 = ƒL2() + 
fL2. 
602 It can be argued that distance also increases the complexity of the procedure (). The greater 
the distance between two jurisdictions, the more differences in culture, law, and litigation 
they might have. While the distance in itself does not increase the absolute value of the 
procedure, it increases the relative complexity for the claimant, which is reflected in higher 
costs. 
603 In some situations, costs might be lower owing to the presence of good connecting hubs that 
serve many transportation options and maintain low travel costs. 
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vary per season, country, city, kind of accommodation, and number of persons 
accommodated. Nevertheless, accommodation costs are also dependant on the 
duration of the court process. This means that the longer the court hearing 
continues, the more accommodation costs will accrue. Assuming that the claimant 
will always − or most of the time − need accommodation in the foreign jurisdiction 
during the progress of the court process, the longer it takes to resolve the case, the 
more accommodation costs will increase. As a result, costs related to the distance 
between the claimant’s location and the location of the chosen court are the sum 
of travel, accommodation, and communication costs. It goes without saying that 
these are directly related to the distance between the claimant’s home and the 
litigation venue, but are also related to the length of the litigation process. If a 
claimant chooses his home jurisdiction, travel and communication costs will be 
zero or near zero.604 
A claimant that chooses a foreign court may incur costs related to the certification 
and/or the translation of documents. Because these relate to the administration of 
the litigation, they can also be called administrative costs. Costs for the 
certification of documents include notarial costs, or costs for the certification of 
documents by other institutions, and so on. Translation costs are related to the 
translation of documents into a language recognised by the court. It can be 
assumed that the more complex the case or procedures, the more documents are 
needed, and the more translation costs increase. These costs can be kept down if 
the language of the documents used by the parties is the same as the language of 
the court, or at least if the claimant uses the same language as the court. In this 
regard, English as the language mostly used in cross-border contracts and in 
English-speaking courts creates an advantage in terms of minimising translation 
costs. Bordering countries that use the same language are also suitable for the 
purpose of reducing translation costs. For example, German claimants that go to 
                                                        
604 Let us assume that costs related to distance are D. This way, travel costs are (tD), 
accommodation costs are (aD), and communication costs are (cD). Travel costs (tD) are 
dependent upon the distance between the claimant’s location and the court’s location. This 
means that if  is the distance between the two locations tD = ƒtD(). It goes without saying 
that the greater the distance, the greater the costs. Distance can also influence 
communication costs. In this case, cD would also be cD = ƒcD(). Accommodation costs 
depend on the length of the court process, meaning that aD = ƒaD(). The shorter the litigation 
time, the lower the accommodation costs for the claimant. In total, costs related to the 
distance between the claimant and the court are D = tD + aD + cD, or D = ƒtD() + ƒaD() + 
ƒcD(). If the claimant chooses his home jurisdiction ( = 0), travel costs (tD) and 
communication costs (cD) will be zero or near zero. 
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Austria to litigate can save translation costs because the same language is used in 
both countries.605 
This section analyses the strategy of a cost-minimising claimant. It is assumed 
that the claimant is only interested in winning the case and in minimising his own 
costs. An example of this kind of claimant would be a small company with limited 
litigation budget; or a company that does not see so much value in the claim itself, 
but is concerned with minimising costs. Factors that might increase or decrease 
costs, like cost shifting, are not considered here. The court’s fee, the lawyers’ fees, 
distance-related costs, and administration costs comprise the bulk of the total 
litigation costs. This means that for the same case, the cost of litigation abroad 
depends on factors that are different for each jurisdiction. These factors are the 
court’s fee coefficient, the duration of the litigation, the distance between the 
litigant’s location and that of the court, and the complexity of the case and the 
procedures. A claimant interested in keeping litigation costs low will try to keep 
these factors as low as possible. While some of the factors are outside the 
claimant’s control, like the complexity of the case, some others, like complexity 
of the procedures, duration of the litigation, and distance between home and court, 
are relative to the court chosen. A cost-minimising claimant will be interested in 
choosing a familiar court with noncomplex procedures and fast proceedings – two 
factors that are related to each other. In general, the more complex the procedures, 
the slower their pace. Therefore, choosing a familiar jurisdiction with noncomplex 
procedures might increase the speed of litigation and reduce costs. In addition, a 
claimant will be interested in finding a court as near as possible to his location. 
Proximity to the court will keep distance-related costs low, and at the same time 
decrease complexity-inflating factors such as social and cultural differences. For 
example, a claimant from Spain might find courts in Portugal and France better 
because the distance is relatively short, and the legal, social, linguistic, and 
cultural differences are likely to be smaller compared to courts in Cyprus or 
Estonia. In summary, a cost-minimising claimant will try to choose a court that 
has low court fees, is close to his location, is known to process cases quickly, and 
uses relatively noncomplex procedures.606 
                                                        
605 Let us assume that costs related to the administration of a litigation are A. Administrative 
costs are composed of costs related to the certification of documents (cA), and to the 
translation of documents costs (tA). The complexity of a case can increase the number of 
documents needed, and therefore the translation costs. As a consequence, tA would be a 
function of the case’s complexity coefficient, tA = ƒtA(). In total, administrative costs would 
be A = cA + tA, or A = cA + ƒtA(). 
606 If claimant’s costs for litigation abroad are , then  is equal to the court’s fee (C), lawyers’ 
fees (L), distance-related costs (D), and administration costs (A). This means that  = C + L 
+ D + A, or  = ƒ() + (hL + fL) + (tD + aD + cD) + (cA + tA), or  = c + [ƒL() + fL] + 
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4.5.1.2 Choice of court for benefit-maximising claimants 
The above analysis considers the choice-related reasoning of a claimant that aims 
to minimise costs. A cost-minimising claimant will calculate the costs of all the 
possible jurisdictions, and choose the one that offers the lowest. However, some 
claimants may decide to choose the court that maximises their benefits. Benefits 
would come in the event of success in the litigation, so here it is assumed that the 
claimant is sure to win. The benefit from a litigation would be equal to the 
monetary and moral benefits derived from winning it, plus the costs that would 
have been shifted to the other party. Monetary benefits are equal to the claimed 
amount adjusted by the court’s accuracy coefficient, which measures the degree 
to which the court tends to accept the claim of the claimant. For specific cases, 
circumstances, and parties involved, courts can have varying degrees of accuracy 
with regard to accepting a claim.607 More in general, a court’s accuracy depends 
on internal and external factors, with the latter including the quality of the lawyer 
and the accuracy of the claim. Lawyers that are more highly skilled can argue the 
case better, which helps the court to issue an accurate decision. Internal factors 
are the extent of the expertise, training, and professionalism on the part of judges. 
The higher the expertise, and the more highly trained and professional judges are, 
the more accurate the decisions will be. This means that a benefit-maximising 
claimant will be interested in courts with experienced and well-trained judges. 
Moreover, claimants also attach moral values to a court case, which produce 
moral benefits. These values may include reputation, feelings, moral obligation, 
and so forth. It is difficult to monetise the worth of moral benefits, because each 
person holds a different set of principles and ethics; even companies have 
different sets of standards and ideals to which they adhere. Consequently, each 
claimant attributes a different value to moral benefits as well as a different 
monetary significance. Moral satisfaction depends on the court’s accuracy 
coefficient and the duration of the proceedings. The length is inversely related to 
moral satisfaction, which means that moral satisfaction decreases over time. The 
                                                        
[ƒtD() + ƒaD() + ƒcD()] + [cA + ƒtA()]. Evidently costs  are dependent on the court’s fee 
coefficient (c), the length of the litigation (), the distance between the litigant’s location 
and the location of the court (), and the complexity of the case and the procedures (). A 
cost-minimising claimant will try to control (minimise) c, , , and part of . As a result, the 
claimant will be naturally inclined to choose a court that offers low court fees, is near his 
location, promises short litigation times, and offers noncomplex procedures. 
607 Let us assume that the claimant is sure to win; that  is the claimant’s claim in his suit;  is 
the accuracy coefficient of which the court accepts the claimant’s claim; and  is the 
amount granted by the court decision. In this case,  is 0<≤1. If  is equal to one (=1), the 
court accepts the claim entirely; if  is between one and zero, the court partially accepts the 
claim; and if  is equal to zero, the claim is rejected. In this case,  cannot be zero, because 
it is assumed that the claimant is successful in his claim. 
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more time that passes from the start of the litigation, the more the claimant’s moral 
satisfaction decreases.608 
The third source of benefits is cost shifting, which is the practice of fully or 
partially transferring costs from the winning party to the losing party. Each 
jurisdiction has its own rules in this regard.609 Generally, some court fees and 
lawyers’ costs are paid by the losing party.610 To simplify, this analysis considers 
that each jurisdiction uses a return coefficient to calculate cost shifting. 
Considering these assumptions and the reasoning, a benefit-maximising claimant 
will be interested in choosing a jurisdiction that offers the highest cost-shifting 
coefficient. 
The above analysis considers that the total benefit derived from winning a case 
will be the sum of the monetary benefit, the moral benefit, and the cost-shifting 
benefit. A possible example of this type of claimant, would be a large company 
that does not pay so much attention to litigation costs, but is interested only in 
extracting all the possible benefits from the litigation. Naturally, a benefit- 
maximising claimant will choose the court that best fulfils this objective. Courts 
that offer high cost-shifting rates and have high accuracy coefficients will be the 
most natural choice.611 Court accuracy depends on the quality of the judges and 
                                                        
608 As regards moral benefits, let us assume that M represents a claimant’s maximal moral 
satisfaction gains from winning the case,  is the accuracy coefficient to which the court 
accepts the claim,  is the length of the litigation. Ideal moral benefits from winning a case 
would amount to M. The more time that passes from the start of the litigation until the 
decision of the court, the more the claimant’s moral satisfaction decreases ( ≠ 0 because 
zero would mean the withdrawal of the claimant from the case, which means no court 
decision at all and no satisfaction thereof). Assuming that moral satisfaction decreases 
uniformly over time, we have M/. It can also be assumed that the more time it takes for a 
court to reach a decision, the more moral benefits a claimant gains. However, these should 
be considered exceptional cases, as in normal situations it is safe to assume that moral 
satisfaction lessens over time. 
609 Hodges, Vogenauer, Tulibacka (2009) 19; Reimann (2011) 200. 
610 Cost-shifting rules allow the winning party to recover some costs incurred during litigation. 
These costs are recovered by shifting them to the losing party. Every jurisdiction uses a 
different method for calculating shifted costs, which usually is a function of the total costs 
of the parties. Therefore, if total costs are , shifted costs are ƒ(). The simplest form of this 
function is , where  is the return coefficient of the costs for a particular jurisdiction, and 
 are the costs incurred during litigation. If  is equal to one (=1) costs are shifted entirely, 
and the winning party recovers all costs, if  is equal to zero (=0), no costs are shifted. 
Therefore  is 0≤≤1. At the beginning of the analysis it is assumed that the claimant is 
interested only in maximising the benefit, regardless of the costs. So rather than calculating 
costs return () as a reduction of costs ( - ), it should be calculated as a benefit in the 
case of winning, and therefore added to the monetary and moral benefits. 
611 The analysis in this sections considers that if benefit is β, its total value can be calculated as 
β =  + M/ + . This calculation considers the coefficient of which the court’s decision 
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the courts. The more highly trained judges and the more experienced courts are 
more likely to make accurate decisions, and to be preferred by benefit-maximising 
claimants. 
4.5.1.3 Choice of court for utility-maximising claimants 
However, not all claimants cannot be sure about the outcome of a case as was 
assumed for the benefit-maximising claimant. This means that while some costs 
are certain, the benefits of selecting a particular jurisdiction are not. Therefore, 
when choosing a court, some claimants may try to maximise their utility. In this 
case, utility means the difference between all the possible benefits and all the 
possible costs. Possible benefits are all the benefits from litigating in a jurisdiction 
(as analysed above) adjusted by the success ratio in that jurisdiction. As 
previously mentioned, possible costs are all those related to litigating in a 
jurisdiction in addition to the possibility of incurring the shifted costs of the 
defendant. Thus, utility is composed of two parts: one measures possible benefits, 
while the other measures possible costs. 
The possible benefit of litigating in a particular jurisdiction is the result of all the 
benefits that can be gained from a jurisdiction adjusted by its success ratio. This 
ratio is the one between the cases decided in favour of claimants in similar cases, 
and the total number of similar cases adjudicated in that court. Success ratio can 
be implied from anecdotal evidence, but a better evaluation can be derived only 
from transparent and predictable courts. Transparency means the court has clear 
and easily acquired statistics, while predictability means the court is stable in the 
decisions it gives, is not afflicted by corruption, and offers clear, exhaustive, and 
consistent reasoning throughout similar cases. A utility-maximising claimant will 
be interested in maximising this component, which means that he will be 
interested in transparent and predictable courts that favour the claimant in that 
particular type of case, or claimants in general. 
                                                        
accurately accepts the claim () to be equal for both the moral and the monetary claim. 
However, some claimants consider their moral claim to be satisfied if the court also grants 
them satisfaction in the form of a partial monetary award, or provides no monetary award 
but a large moral award. The opposite can be true as well. In this case,  would be the 
coefficient of satisfying the monetary claim of the claimant, while M would be the 
coefficient of satisfaction for the claimant’s moral claim. This means that the benefit of the 
claimant can be expressed also as β =  + MM/ + , where 0≤≤1, 0≤M≤1, 0<, and 
0≤≤1. Because moral benefit is difficult to calculate it is easier for the study to assume that 
the coefficient for moral and monetary benefit is equal, so the simplified calculation would 
be β =  + M/ + . To conclude, when choosing a court, benefit-maximising claimants 
will try to choose a court that is accurate, fast, and offers high cost-shifting rates.  
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The second component of utility involves possible costs. These consist of 
unavoidable costs, which were analysed above,612 and possible costs shifted from 
the winning defendant. Unavoidable costs are always present, and depend on the 
court fee, the length of the proceeding, the distance between the court and the 
claimant, and the complexity of the case and procedures. The defendant might 
incur different costs because he does not pay the court fee, pays a different lawyer, 
and the distance from the court is different for him. To simplify the analysis, it is 
assumed that the defendant incurs costs similar to those incurred by the claimant. 
For the claimant, the possibility of incurring in cost-shifting is equal to his own 
shifted costs adjusted by the defeat ratio in a particular jurisdiction. The defeat 
ratio is the inverse of the success ratio. As a result, a utility-maximising claimant 
will be interested in reducing the possible costs in a jurisdiction. In jurisdictions 
where the success ratio is low, the claimant will be interested in low cost-shifting 
rates, while in jurisdictions where the success ratio is high, the claimant will be 
interested in high cost-shifting coefficients. For the remaining cost components, 
the same reasoning that was followed in Section 4.5.1.1 can be followed here. 
This means that a claimant will be interested in low court fees, fast and 
noncomplex procedures, and a short distance between his location and that of the 
court.613 
This section analyses the behaviour of a utility-maximising claimant. Utility is the 
difference between all possible benefits and all possible costs. Possible benefits 
depend on the success ratio of the claimant, on the accuracy of the court, and on 
the length of the litigation. Possible costs depend on the non-success ratio and 
other cost-related factors like court fees, complexity of the case and the 
procedures, distance from the court, and length of the proceedings. A utility-
                                                        
612 See Section 4.5.1.1. 
613 The possible costs of litigating in a jurisdiction is equal to the costs of litigation plus the 
possible costs shifted from the other party,  + (1 - )A, where  is the cost of the 
claimant, A is the cost of the defendant, and  is the return ratio of the costs for a particular 
jurisdiction. In this case,  is the success ratio of the claimant, which means that 1 -  is the 
defeat ratio of the claimant. Success ratio is the ratio between similar cases won by similar 
claimants and the total number of similar cases adjudicated by a given court ( = np/nt), 
obviously 0≤≤1. In general, A ≠ , but to simplify the analysis it can be assumed that A 
= . This means that the possible costs of litigating in a jurisdiction would be  + (1 - ), 
or (1 - ). Given that the claimant is interested in maximising the utility, the value of  
+ (1 - ) should be as small as possible. A claimant would be interested in having a small 
cost-shifting coefficient () if the possibility of winning () is low, and is interested in 
having a big cost-shifting coefficient if the possibility of winning () is high. From Section 
4.5.1.1, a cost minimising claimant is interested in reducing c, , , , . From the analysis 
in this section, a utility-maximising claimant has the same interest in reducing these 
elements, and in addition is interested in choosing a court that offers at the same time high 
 and high , or if  is low,  should be low.  
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maximising claimant must be careful to strike a balance between all the elements 
that influence his utility. It is easy to imagine that most of the claimants try to 
weigh up the costs and benefits from a litigation, and choose based on this 
assessment. It is not always the court that offers the highest benefits or the lowest 
costs that offers the highest utility. Choosing from among all the different factors 
is extremely challenging.614 
4.5.1.4 Concluding remarks on competition from a unilateral choice of court 
Section 4.5.1 analysed what influences the choice of court in a unilateral choice 
of court situation, where only one of the litigating parties − usually the claimant – 
chooses. The analysis is important for defendants trying to predict the claimant’s 
choice, for the claimant himself in choosing the best court, and for competing 
countries so that they can better deploy their resources in the civil justice systems 
competition. The analysis assumed that the claimant wants to win the case and 
maximise the benefits or the utility from the win, or minimise the costs of 
litigating in a given jurisdiction. An implied assumption is that claimants choose 
a court without considering other elements or institutions involving a civil justice 
system. If other elements are considered, the results might be different. From the 
onset, the analysis assumed that the lawyers’ and the clients’ interests are the 
same; that claimants have sufficient knowledge of all the jurisdictions; and that 
claimants have plenty of time to engage in litigation. 
From the analysis, it can be concluded that several factors persistently influence 
a claimant’s choice. These factors are the value of the court’s fee, the court’s 
                                                        
614 Some claimants decide to base their choice of court on the utility they derive from that court. 
Obviously, the jurisdiction that offers the most benefits will be chosen. In this analysis, 
utility means the difference between the possible benefits and the possible costs of litigating 
in a jurisdiction. This means that  = β – [ + (1 - )A], where  is the utility of 
litigating in a jurisdiction, β are the benefits of litigating in that jurisdiction,  are the costs 
of the litigant, A are the costs of the defendant,  is the success ratio of the claimant in that 
jurisdiction, 1- is the non-success ratio of the claimant or the success ratio of the defendant, 
and  is the cost-shifting coefficient of that jurisdiction. Assuming that A = ,  = β – [ 
+ (1 - )]. Expanding only β, we have  = ( + M/ + ) – [ + (1 - )],  = 
 + M/ +  -  -  + ,  = ( + M/) + (2 -  - 1). The expression 
2 -  - 1 is always negative for  and  between 0 and 1, which means that (2 -  - 
1) is also negative. In an ideal situation, the maximal benefit can be achieved if ,  and  
are maximised, as well as  and  are minimised. This also means minimising all the cost-
related factors like c, , , . Because ideal situations are difficult to achieve, a claimant 
must consider carefully all the factors in order to reach maximum utility. Considering the 
numerous factors and jurisdictions, at least in the EU, choosing a court seems to be extremely 
difficult. 
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accuracy, the duration of the litigation, the distance between the litigant’s location 
and that of the court, the complexity of the case and the procedures, and the court’s 
transparency and predictability. Considering these factors, the most attractive 
court for a claimant needs to offer fast proceedings, to have reliable and 
experienced judges that issue accurate decisions, to be near the claimant’s 
location, to be transparent and predictable, and to have the tendency to favour the 
claimant. Which of these factors has the most power to influence the claimant 
must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
The analysis assumed that claimants behave as though lawyers and clients have 
the same interests. However, both have different interests and incentives. It can 
be argued that, left to their own devices, clients behave like the claimant in the 
above analysis, whereas lawyers are interested in high-stake law suits, in 
relatively lengthy litigations, in short distances between their client and the court, 
in complex cases and procedures, and in courts that favour claimants. High-stake 
litigation, lengthy proceedings, and complex cases and procedures increase 
lawyers’ income, so they tend to prefer these types of cases. Meanwhile, lawyers 
that counsel clients from the same jurisdiction are interested in a short distance 
between the court and their home jurisdiction (bearing in mind that home 
jurisdiction are best for lawyers). This allows lawyers to maintain some influence 
over their clients. Lawyers from jurisdictions that welcome claimants are 
interested in predictable and transparent courts that help claimants better calculate 
their winning chances. Nevertheless, lawyers need a certain degree of legal 
uncertainty in order to maintain the demand for their services as well as a 
relatively high price for their services. 
This unilateral choice of court demand instigated by the claimant should also 
generate a response from suppliers. The state as a supplier wants to meet the 
demand side’s request for lower costs, more benefits, and more possibilities of 
winning for claimants. For example, a government can lower costs by reducing 
court fees, or by using a procedural language accessible by parties. Moreover, 
governments must also increase the success ratio for claimants. They can do this 
in two ways: one is to appeal to courts to favour claimants, and the other is to 
approve laws that increase the chances of claimants winning their cases. These 
steps need to be accompanied by an increase in the transparency and predictability 
of courts so that the success ratio can easily be calculated. However, it must be 
noted that court fees are a small part compared to those of lawyers. Hence, 
governments perhaps need to try to regulate the lawyers market in a way that 
reduces the burden they impose on clients, and thus make litigation in their 
jurisdiction less expensive. An even better strategy might be to tackle all these 
issues at the same time, and increase the overall attractiveness of the jurisdiction. 
The analysis in this section assumed that governments act following the signals 
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of a unilateral choice of court. Section 4.5.2 analyses competition from a bilateral 
choice of court, where a choice of court is made by both parties. 
4.5.2 Competition from a bilateral choice of court 
Competition from a bilateral choice of court can take place when the choice of 
court is made by both future litigating parties. Article 25 of the Brussels I (recast) 
Regulation is the most important provision as regards choice of court in the EU. 
The Article allows parties, regardless of their domicile, to choose any court or 
courts of Member States in order to resolve their present or future disputes, 
providing that the agreement complies with the requirements of this and other 
Regulation Articles.615 Parties can choose the court before (ex ante) or after (ex 
post) the conflict arises. In ex ante situations, the conflict has not started. The 
parties do not know whether there will be a future litigation, they do not know the 
nature and the value of the future litigation, and they do not know their future 
position − they know only that they are entering into a contractual relationship 
with another party. A common example of this situation is that of two parties 
about to enter into a contract without knowing their future litigation position. In 
an ex post situation, the parties decide to choose a court after the conflict arises. 
In this situation, parties are sure that there is a conflict, they know the nature of 
the conflict, the value of the claim involved in the dispute, and their future position 
in front of the court. The information that parties possess and the point in time 
when they make their choice of court play an important role in their choice-of-
court strategies. 
To analyse how the choice of court is made in bilateral choice of court cases, the 
same path as for the unilateral choice of court is taken, and similar calculations 
are used. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that clients and lawyers pursue 
the same interests,616 and that the parties have the same bargaining power, have 
equal financial power, are equally concerned about the duration of the litigation 
before the court, and are charged similarly by their respective lawyers. Where 
appropriate to the analysis, certain departures from these assumptions are made. 
The analysis focuses on parties that are interested in winning the litigation, and at 
the same time are trying to either minimise their costs, or maximise their benefits, 
or minimise their risk, or maximise their utility. Parties, however, can try to 
maximise or minimise two or more of the above-mentioned objectives, as will be 
discussed. The analysis first considers choice of court before the conflict arises, 
                                                        
615 Chapter 3 offers an overview Article 25. 
616 On the relationship between client and lawyers, see also Section 4.3.3. 
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and later considers choice of court after it arises. The same examples used in 
Section 4.5.1 are valid in this section as well. 
4.5.2.1 Choice of court for cost-minimising parties 
In this scenario, the parties are equally interested in keeping the costs of litigation 
as low as possible. Some major sources of costs for both parties are lawyer’s fees, 
together with distance- and administration-related costs. Court fees are another 
source. They are relative to the disputed claim, differ from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and are paid by only one of the parties (the claimant). 
From the breakdown of costs analysed in 4.5.1.1, the cost of a lawyer is equal to 
the hourly charges and eventual fixed charges. A lawyer’s hourly rate depends on 
the complexity of the case and the procedures, as well as on the duration of the 
case. Based on the assumptions stated in the introduction to Section 4.5.2, these 
costs are roughly the same for both parties.617 Therefore, to keep lawyers’ costs 
down, both parties are interested in having speedy court proceedings and in 
reducing the complexity of the case and the procedures. This claim is valid for 
both ex ante and ex post situations. 
Costs related to the distance between the litigants and the court are for travel, 
accommodation, and communication. Borrowing from the analysis in Section 
4.5.1.1, travel costs and to a certain extent accommodation costs depend mostly 
on the distance between the location of the party and the location of the court. 
Accommodation costs depend mostly on the duration of the litigation. This means 
that travel costs and communication costs will be different for the parties, while 
accommodation costs will be similar. Obviously the party whose location is 
farthest from the court will incur more costs.618 The reasoning does not change 
                                                        
617 It is assumed that the parties have the same financial power, so they can afford the same 
category of lawyers. They have the same amount of time, and neither of them is under time 
pressure. In general, parties are assumed equal. Given that they are involved in the same 
case, the time and the complexity factor will be the same for both. Therefore, in the 
eventuality of a conflict, lawyer’s costs for both parties will be almost the same. If lawyers 
costs are L1 and L2 for each party, hourly rates are hL, and fixed charges are fL, then L = hL 
+ fL. Given that the hourly rates hL are a function of time , then hL = ƒL(). This means that 
L = ƒL() + fL. Based on the assumptions and because the duration of the litigation is the 
same for both parties, lawyers costs for both parties will be roughly the same, which means 
L1 = L2. 
618 Distance costs consist of travel costs (tD), accommodation costs (aD), and communication 
costs (cD). Travel and communication costs are functions of the distance () between the 
litigant and the court, meaning that that tD = ƒtD() and cD = ƒcD(). Meanwhile, 
accommodation costs are a function of the length of the litigation, and is equal for both 
parties, so aD = ƒaD(). The distance for party one is 1, while for party two is 2. This means 
that the distance costs (D1) calculation for party one is D1 = tD1 + aD1 + cD1 or D1 = ƒtD(1) 
+ ƒaD() + ƒcD(1); for party two the calculation is D2 = tD2 + aD2 + cD2 or D2 = ƒtD(2) + 
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for the ex ante and ex post situations. Both parties are equally incentivised to 
select a court that is nearby and that is fast. 
Administration fees are another source of costs, and these are incurred by parties 
when litigating in a foreign jurisdiction. The main components of administrative 
costs are related to the certification of documents and to translation. Costs related 
to the certification of documents include, among others, costs of notarial acts and 
costs of stamps. Translation costs include those related to translating documents, 
evidence, contracts, and communications into a language accepted by the court. 
If the language of the contract and the court are the same, translation costs 
decrease or become almost zero. Translation costs are also affected by the 
complexity of the case and the procedures. The more complex the procedures or 
the case, the more documents are expected to be used, and therefore more 
translation is needed. Given that the complexity is equal for both parties, 
translation costs can be expected to be the same for both parties. As with 
translation costs, and for the same reasons, complexity can also affect the costs of 
document certification. Given that parties cannot control the complexity of the 
case, they can try to keep the costs low by choosing a court that uses the same 
language as that in the contract.619 
While drafting a contract and negotiating the choice of court, parties interested in 
minimising litigation costs are interested in a court that offers speedy proceedings, 
noncomplex procedures, procedures in a language used by the parties, and a forum 
near the location of both parties. With a fast court and noncomplex procedures, 
parties hope to keep lawyers’ costs and administration costs low. Choosing a court 
that uses the same language as the parties keep administration costs low. Here it 
can be assumed that most of the cross-border commercial contracts are in English, 
French, or German. Therefore, cost-minimising parties are interested in a court 
that conducts proceedings in one of these languages. Distance is also a source of 
costs. When distance decreases for one party, it generally increases for the other. 
A compromise choice would be a court that is the same distance from both parties. 
However, this choice can be to the detriment of the quality or speed of the 
litigation, making equidistance an economically unsound compromise. It can be 
                                                        
ƒaD() + ƒcD(2). Obviously, the party located farthest from the court will incur the most 
costs. This calculation remains the same for ex ante or ex post situations. 
619 Administration costs (A) consist of certification of documents costs (cA) and translation 
costs (tA). Both costs are affected by the complexity of the case or the procedures (), and 
increase the more complex a case − or procedures − becomes. Therefore cA = ƒcA() and tA 
= ƒtA(). For both parties, these costs are comparable because the complexity is equal for 
both. However, translation costs can be reduced by choosing a court that uses the same 
language as the contract or the majority of the documents exchanged between the parties. 
This calculation remains the same for ex ante or ex post situations. 
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expected that parties will each propose their own best alternative, rejecting each 
other’s proposal until they reach a compromise. A compromise court is not 
necessarily the best one, but is the best that accommodates both parties’ needs. 
Moreover, a compromise court means that both parties incur the same costs. For 
cost-minimising parties, the court needs to – in terms of the costs for litigating in 
it − fall within the boundary of the maximal acceptable costs of each party. 
An ex post choice of court situation might be affected by court fees. In this 
situation, parties can better predict who will be the claimant and who will be the 
defendant. The potential claimant can be expected to bear the burden of paying 
the court fees.620 Naturally, potential claimants are interested in a court with low 
fees. Initially, potential defendants will have no interest in court fees. However, 
careful defendants will be interested in a court with low fees, just in case they are 
involved in a counter claim or required to use court services. Again, juggling 
between different factors becomes even more difficult. As regards ex ante 
situations, parties are not aware of their future position, so they might disregard 
these cost-creating elements during their calculation. Nevertheless, given that 
court fees will always be potential costs for parties, they will consider a court with 
low fees. 
To summarise, cost-minimising parties in ex ante and ex post situations are 
equally interested in choosing the following characteristics from a court: fast 
proceedings, relatively close to their locations, proficient in a language used by 
the parties, and using noncomplex procedures. Such characteristics will minimise 
lawyers’ costs as well as distance-related and administrative costs. An issue of 
disagreement might be the choosing of a court that is equidistant. While this might 
be difficult, parties might accept marginally higher costs in exchange for a non-
expensive court. In ex post situations, potential claimants have a strong interest in 
choosing a court that offers low court fees. In the end, cost-minimising parties 
will have to balance all the above-mentioned factors in trying to select the most 
suitable court.621 Small companies can be good examples of cost minimising 
                                                        
620 In some countries − the Netherlands for example − both parties have to pay court fees. 
621 As analysed above, litigation costs are the sum of the court’s fee (C), the lawyer’s fee (L), 
distance costs (D), and administration costs (A). The court fee (C) is a function of the claim’s 
value () and the court’s fee coefficient c. In ex post situations, the court fee is important 
primarily for the potential claimant. However, if the intention of the parties is to minimise 
costs, low court fees would fall within both parties’ strategies. Lawyers’ costs are 
comparable for both parties in ex ante and ex post situations, and depend on the timespan of 
the litigation (). Distance costs depend on the duration of the litigation (), and on the 
distance () between the location of the parties and that of the court. To minimise costs, 
parties would be interested in shorter proceedings conducted in nearby courts. 
Administration costs are dependent on the complexity of the case and procedures (), and 
the language of the court. Courts using less complex procedures and proceeding in languages 
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parties, which in view of limited financial resources, focus their interest in 
minimising costs. 
4.5.2.2 Choice of court for benefit-maximising parties 
Benefit-maximising parties are assumed to be equally interested in winning the 
litigation and at the same time in maximising the benefits derived from this win. 
This analysis considers three sources of benefits. The first is the direct financial 
benefit; the second is the moral benefit; and the third involves benefits from cost 
shifting, which transfer some of the litigation costs from the winning to the losing 
party. As is proposed here, only the winning party derives benefits from litigating, 
meaning that benefit-maximising parties will think of themselves as future 
winners. The analysis also considers ex ante and ex post situations.622 
                                                        
used in international business or known by the parties, would contribute to the reduction of 
costs for parties and become interesting for cost-minimising parties. Therefore,  = C + L + 
D + A or  = c + [ƒL() + fL] + [ƒtD() + ƒaD() + ƒcD()] + [cA + ƒtA()]. If parties are 
equal, an ideal court should give 1 = 2, but this might be difficult. Chances are that 1 ≈ 
2, where both 1 and 2 are within the boundaries of the accepted minimal costs for each 
party. 
In an ex ante situation, the cost for the parties will be  = [ƒL() + fL] + [ƒtD() + ƒaD() + 
ƒcD()] + [cA + ƒtA()]. According to this calculation, the only difference between parties is 
the distance from the court. An equidistant court might be good solution to have comparable 
costs for both parties; however, compromising on the distance might increase other costs. It 
can be expected that parties will propose their best alternatives to each other until their 
preferences meet. 
Ex post parties are aware of the conflict they are involved in, and can predict their role in 
the possible litigation. For the potential claimant, the costs related to litigation are p = C + 
L + D + A or  = ƒ() + [ƒL() + fL] + [ƒtD(p) + ƒaD() + ƒcD(p)] + [cA + ƒtA()]. Costs for 
the potential defendant are d = L + D + A or  = [ƒL() + fL] + [ƒtD(d) + ƒaD() + ƒcD(d)] 
+ [cA + ƒtA()]. It is assumed that only the claimant pays the court fee, which means that for 
the defendant ƒ() = 0. Timespan () and complexity () are the same for both parties. Both 
parties would try to minimise  and . However, the distance between the parties and the 
court (p and d), and the court fee coefficient (c) for the potential claimant, creates a 
situation where parties have different costs for the same court. Therefore, parties will have 
different preferences regarding courts. Parties interested in making a choice of court will 
settle for a compromise choice. In other words, for a choice that tries to equalise the costs, 
while at the same time trying to minimise them. 
Considering ex ante and ex post situations, the most important elements for cost-minimising 
parties choosing a court are distance, complexity of the case and the procedures, language 
of the court, court fee, and duration of the litigation. 
622 This scenario assumes the parties want to win the case and to maximise benefit at the same 
time. Benefit maximising parties consider only the benefits of winning the case. As analysed 
in 4.5.1.2, benefits (β) are of a financial, moral, and cost-shifting nature. Financial benefits 
are , where  is the accuracy coefficient of the court and 0≤≤1, while  is the value of 
the claim. Moral benefits are M/, where M is the moral claim and  is the length of the 
litigation. Cost shifting benefits are , where  is the cost-shifting coefficient, and 0≤≤1, 
and  are the costs incurred during the litigation. This means that β =  + M/ + .  
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Financial benefits depend on the value of the claim and on the accuracy of the 
court. In ex ante and ex post situations, parties are equally interested in the court’s 
accuracy, regardless of their future position. Both parties benefit from a court that 
accurately accepts the claim if they are claimants or accurately rejects the claim 
if they are defendants.623 Furthermore, moral benefits depend on the duration of 
the litigation and the accuracy of the court. The longer the litigation, the more the 
moral benefits decrease, and the more accurate the court, the higher the moral 
benefit. In both ex ante and ex post situations, parties are interested in fast 
proceedings and accurate courts. The third source of benefits for litigants comes 
from cost shifting. Cost shifting transfers part of the winner’s costs to the losing 
party, and depends on the cost-shifting coefficient and the costs related to that 
jurisdiction. Assuming that ex ante parties think of themselves as winners, they 
are equally motivated to choose a court that offers high cost-shifting coefficients. 
Ex post parties can predict their future position, along with some of the costs 
associated with the case. In view of this, parties consider the best combination to 
maximise their benefits.624 
Benefit-maximising parties are assumed to consider three kinds of benefits: 
namely, financial, moral, and cost-shifting. This assumption implies that parties 
consider only litigation scenarios where they emerge as winners. Large companies 
                                                        
623 In an ex ante situation, parties are not aware of the conflict, their position in the future, and 
the financial or moral value of the claim. However, parties know that any future litigation 
will have a financial and a moral value, meaning that in any future litigation 0< and 0<M. 
To maximise their benefits, parties will be interested in high  and low . In other words, 
parties will be interested in accurate and fast courts. Cost shifting consists of costs incurred 
( = ƒ() + [ƒL() + fL] + [ƒtD() + ƒaD() + ƒcD()] + [cA + ƒtA()]) adjusted by the cost-
shifting coefficient (). Given that parties are interested in benefit maximisation, they will 
be interested in courts that offer comparatively more cost shifting. Considering the analysis 
about financial, moral, and cost-shifting benefits, it can be said that parties will be equally 
interested in a fast and accurate court, which at the same time has a comparatively high cost-
shifting coefficient. 
624 In ex post situations, parties know the conflict they are involved in, know the financial and 
moral value of the conflict, and can predict their future position. From the claimant’s 
perspective, the financial benefit will be , while the moral benefit will be Mp/, where 
Mp is the moral value of the case for the claimant. For the potential defendant, there is no 
financial benefit, because the claim is made by the claimant (so  = 0), while the moral 
benefit will be Md/. The cost-shifting benefit for the potential claimant will be p, where 
p is the litigation cost for the claimant. The cost-shifting benefit for the potential defendant 
will be d, where d is the litigation cost for the defendant. From the analysis, financial, 
moral, and cost-shifting benefits seem to be different for both parties. For the potential 
claimant, benefits will be βp =  + Mp/ + p, while for the potential defendant benefits 
will be βd = Md/ + d. Clearly, benefits for the parties are different in terms of sources 
and magnitude. However, some factors (, , ) influencing the benefits for both parties are 
the same. It can be said that ex post benefit-maximising parties are equally interested in a 
fast and accurate court, and that has a comparatively large cost-shifting coefficient. 
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with considerable resources or repeat players that can spread costs over many 
litigations, are good examples of benefit maximising parties. Based on these 
assumptions, ex ante benefit-maximising parties prefer to choose an accurate and 
fast court, which at the same time shifts a large number of litigation costs to the 
losing party. Ex post benefit-maximising parties have a better idea with regard to 
the conflict and their position in it, and have the same incentives as ex ante parties: 
namely, fast and accurate courts. However, knowing the case at hand, potential 
claimants are interested in a court that offers a better combination of claim value 
with court accuracy. The problem here is that diverging interests between parties 
might become an obstacle to reaching an agreement. To overcome this, ex post 
parties might choose a compromise court that is not the best in terms of benefit 
maximisation but is acceptable for two parties with slightly different incentives. 
It is also true that in practice ex post choice of court cases are rare. The reason for 
this might be the aggravated situation between the parties, but also what they 
consider when choosing a court. Clearly, even if parties are interested in 
maximising their benefits, the elements that maximise their benefits are different, 
and are also reflected in the different interests of the parties. 
4.5.2.3 Choice of court for utility-maximising parties 
In Section 4.5.2.2, parties were assumed to consider themselves as winners and 
trying to maximise their benefits. However, while success and benefits are not 
always guaranteed, costs persist in both victory and defeat situations. In view of 
this, some parties consider maximising their utility. Utility is the difference 
between the potential benefits of litigating in a jurisdiction and the potential costs 
for litigating in that jurisdiction. Potential benefits are the benefits as analysed in 
Section 4.5.2.2, adjusted by the success ratio. Potential costs are those incurred 
inevitably during litigation in addition to costs shifted by the other party in the 
event of litigation loss. The success ratio is the ratio between similar cases won 
by a particular party (claimant or defendant) and the total number of similar cases 
adjudicated by the court.625 The success ratio for the claimant is equal to the defeat 
                                                        
625 This scenario assumes that parties are interested both in winning the case and in maximising 
their utility. Utility () is the difference between the possible benefits and the possible costs 
of litigating in a jurisdiction. All the benefits of a jurisdiction, calculated in the previous 
section, adjusted by the success ratio in that jurisdiction create the potential benefits. The 
success ratio is the ratio between similar cases won by similar claimants, and the total 
number of similar cases adjudicated by a given court ( = np/nt), obviously 0≤≤1. In this 
analysis, the success ratio () of the claimant is used. This means that potential benefits 
would look like: ( + M/ + ). The possible costs are the sum of all the unavoidable 
costs and the possible costs shifted from the other party in the event of litigation loss. 
Assuming that the costs of both parties are , the possible costs of litigation are  + (1 - 
), where  are unavoidable litigation costs, 1 -  is the non-success ratio, and  is the 
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ratio for the defendant and vice versa. In the following analysis, success ratio 
refers to the success ratio of the claimant. For an accurate estimation of the success 
ratio, courts need to be transparent and predictable, as this allows parties to collect 
the data they need from the court, and to accurately predict its decision. 
Parties in ex ante situations are not aware of the conflict they might become 
involved in, or of their future position in the dispute. Moreover, parties are not 
aware of the costs they will incur in a potential litigation. To maximise their 
utility, parties are interested in maximising their benefits and in minimising their 
costs, combined with a high success ratio. To maximise their possible benefits, ex 
ante parties are equally interested in accurate and fast courts. To minimise their 
potential costs, the court should be fast and inexpensive, located close to the 
parties, offer noncomplex proceedings, and use the same contractual language as 
the parties. Regarding success rate, parties unaware of their positions are 
interested in choosing a neutral court, which offers claimants and defendants the 
same success ratio. Given that parties are unaware of their future position, it can 
be expected that they wish to avoid choosing a court that in the future will be more 
favourable to their adversaries. And because the parties are interested in a neutral 
court, and are not sure about the conflict in which they will be involved at some 
future time, it is reasonable to think that ex ante parties are interested in low cost-
shifting coefficients. The choice of court becomes very difficult for a party trying 
to balance his own interests and at the same time negotiating with a party who has 
the same pressing needs.626 
In ex post situations, parties are aware of the conflict and can predict their future 
position. Also here, any utility-maximising party is interested in maximising his 
benefits while minimising costs. Benefits and costs are different for claimants and 
defendants, and it can be expected that negotiating parties will each propose their 
favoured options until they agree on a common choice. It is reasonable to think 
that both the potential claimant and the potential defendant will not agree on a 
court that appears to favour the other party. Therefore, parties tend to favour a 
                                                        
cost shifting coefficient of the court. Considering this, the utility of the court can be 
expressed as  = ( + M/ + ) – [ + (1 - )]. 
626 In ex ante cases, parties are unaware of the future conflict, the value of the conflict, and their 
eventual position. Their potential utility will be  = β – [ + (1 - )], or borrowing 
from the analysis in Section 4.5.1.4,  = ( + M/) + (2 -  - 1). The parties will 
be equally interested in high court accuracy (), fast proceedings (), short distances from 
the court (), and noncomplex procedures (). Being uncertain about their future role in the 
litigation, parties will try to choose a court that is neutral ( = 0.5), but if the court tends to 
favouri one of the parties ( ≠ 0.5), they will prefer low cost-shifting coefficients so they do 
not incur unpredictable costs. Finding a balance between all the elements listed here and 
negotiating with another similarly exigent party makes choice of court a difficult process 
that should not be underestimated. 
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neutral court and to choose their compromise court from among the neutral ones. 
Naturally, to maximise benefits, parties are interested in accurate and fast courts 
that have high cost-shifting rates. To minimise costs, parties are interested in fast 
courts, located relatively close to their location, having noncomplex procedures, 
and using the same language as the parties. As regards success ratio, a party 
chooses a court that offers a high cost-shifting coefficient if chances of winning 
are high, and a low cost-shifting coefficient if chances are low. It is clear that only 
a coincidence might allow the parties to choose the court that offers both of them 
maximal utility. Most probably they will have to settle for a compromise court.627 
However, it should be noted that if parties are aware of the conflict, they can also 
predict which court will have jurisdiction. In knowing this, each party can 
calculate their utility in this court and use it as a benchmark during the negotiation. 
For example, if party A and party B are involved in a conflict, they can predict 
that Court X has jurisdiction. Their utility from Court X is a and b, respectively. 
During choice of court negotiations, they will accept only the one that offers a 
utility higher than a and b at the same time. This complex calculation should be 
added to the already complicated situation between the parties. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that ex post choice of court is rare. 
This analysis assumes that some parties try to maximise their utility when making 
a choice of court. Utility is the difference between potential benefits and potential 
costs in a jurisdiction, and costs and benefits are adjusted by the success ratio of 
a particular jurisdiction. In ex ante situations, parties are not aware of the future 
conflict, the value of the conflict, or their position in the litigation. Given the 
                                                        
627 In ex post situations, parties are aware of the conflict, its value, and their potential position 
before the court.  
The utility that the potential claimant derives from the conflict is p = βp – [p + (1 - 
)d] or p = np/nt ( + Mp/ + p) - [p + (1 - np/nt)d]. The utility for the potential 
defendant is d = ( - 1)βd – [d + p] or d = [(np/nt) - 1] ( + Md/ + d) - [d + 
(np/nt)p]. It is clear that success ratio (), moral benefits (M), and costs  create 
differences in the utility of claimants and defendants. Therefore, the potential claimant and 
the potential defendant will have different preferences for courts. When negotiating the 
choice of court, parties can be expected to try to aim for a high level of success ratio, and at 
the same time to negate any success ratio advantage for the other party. It can be expected 
that the only court acceptable for both parties will be a neutral one ( = 0.5), as this will 
give both parties equal possibilities of winning. Therefore, ex post utility- maximising 
parties can be expected to first consider the neutrality of the court, and then to maximise the 
difference between benefits and costs. 
The alternative to choosing a court in ex post situations is to apply the private international 
law rules and find the competent court. Each party can compare the utility derived from an 
assigned court and the utility of a negotiated court. If the utility of the negotiated court is 
higher than that of the assigned court for both parties, it is reasonable to think that they will 
choose to negotiate. However, parties might be reluctant to negotiate if the conflict is so 
great that they have lost interest in communicating with each other. 
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latter, they can be expected to choose a neutral court, in order to avoid any 
uncomfortable position in the future. From among the neutral courts, parties can 
be expected to choose the one that will maximise their utility. In view of this, the 
best court should have the following characteristics: transparency, predictability, 
accuracy, fast proceedings, noncomplex procedures, proximity to the parties, and 
use the same language used between the parties. In ex post situations, parties are 
aware of the conflict, its value, and their future position. Each party is interested 
in a court that maximises his success ratio. However, during negotiations, no party 
is inclined to give the other more opportunities to win. Hence, parties will likely 
settle for a neutral court. Once they agree on a neutral court, the reasoning is 
similar to the ex ante situation. Both situations, although different, incentivise the 
parties to choose the same court characteristics by taking different paths. Ex post 
negotiations may not be considered easy, and parties involved in a conflict might 
for many reasons be reluctant to negotiate with each other. The analysis here 
looked at parties that are still able to negotiate and are trying to agree on a court. 
4.5.2.4 Concluding remarks 
This section offered an analysis of the choice of court in bilateral choice of court 
situations. Bilateral choice of court, a part of the broader process of court 
adjudication competition, is a situation in which two parties choose the court that 
will adjudicate their conflict. Choice of court can be made in two situations: 
namely, before the conflict has started (ex ante) and after the conflict has arisen 
(ex post). To simplify this analysis, each party is assumed to want to win the case, 
and at the same time to try to either minimise costs, maximise benefits, or 
maximise utility. Other potential interests of the parties, such as intentional delay, 
future reputation, future relationship, economic and bargaining power, and extra-
legal interest were not considered. 
Section 4.5.2.1 analysed choice of court for cost-minimising parties. The analysis 
did not take into account any reduction of costs for repeat players in a particular 
jurisdiction. In both ex ante and ex post situations, parties prefer courts that offer 
low court fees (ex post defendant is not interested in this), fast proceedings, 
noncomplex proceedings, and are near each party’s location. Complexity of 
procedures is also related to the speed of litigation: the more complex the 
procedures, the more time the proceeding is likely to take. Difference in language 
is another source of costs for parties. A court that uses the same language in which 
the parties are contracting is more convenient for them. Different courts offer 
these elements in varying degrees. While some of the cost elements are absolute 
and apply equally to all parties, other elements are relative and depend on the 
parties, such as distance from the court and the language of the court. Therefore, 
the court where one party minimises its costs the most does not necessarily 
coincide with the court where the other party minimises its costs. During their 
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negotiation on choice of court, parties can be expected to propose their second or 
third best option to each other until their preferences meet. This means two things. 
First, litigation costs are not always related only to the characteristics of the court 
but also to its proximity to litigants. For example, litigating in Portugal might be 
less expensive, but the cost differences for a Spanish and an Estonian party might 
be a reason for not choosing that court. Second, and as a consequence of the first, 
less expensive courts will not be the default choice of parties, since other 
elements/factors are instrumental. 
A second situation analysed was choice of court for benefit-maximising parties. 
It is assumed that parties consider themselves to be winners, so they are only 
interested in maximising their benefits. This assumption considers ex post 
situations, in which one of the parties is expected to lose and therefore has 
incentives that are different from those of the other party. Benefits consist of 
financial and moral benefits, and of costs shifted to the other party. Financial and 
moral benefits are directly related to the court’s accuracy. Ex ante and ex post 
parties, regardless of their position, are equally interested in this aspect. A court’s 
accuracy depends on its independence, and on the quality and experience of its 
judges. Benefit-maximising parties are interested in courts that offer a better 
combination of these characteristics. Because a moral benefit is inversely related 
to the duration of the litigation, parties are interested in a court that offers speedy 
proceedings. The benefits of cost shifting depend on the costs incurred in one 
jurisdiction and on the costs-shifting coefficient of its court. A benefit-
maximising claimant is interested in finding a good balance between maximising 
costs and cost-shifting coefficients. The interest of the benefit-maximising parties 
seems to coincide, which suggests that agreeing on a court might be relatively 
easy for these parties. 
A third situation analysed involved utility-maximising parties. Utility is the 
difference between possible benefits and possible costs of litigating in a 
jurisdiction. Possible benefits are those that can be acquired from a jurisdiction 
adjusted for its success ratio. Possible costs are the sum of the unavoidable costs 
and possible costs in the event of defeat. Possible costs in the event of defeat are 
those shifted from the winning party adjusted for the defeat ratio in that 
jurisdiction. Parties assess a court’s success ratio in different ways, and the higher 
the transparency and the predictability, the easier it is to assess. Therefore, for 
utility-maximising parties, a court’s transparency and predictability are very 
important elements. In this analysis, the success ratio of the claimant was 
considered, this being the ratio between similar cases won by similar claimants 
and all the similar cases decided by the same court. Utility-maximising parties are 
expected to maximise their possible benefits and to minimise their possible costs. 
However, the more the success ratio increases for one party, the more it decreases 
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for the other. Parties in ex ante situations can be expected to choose a neutral court 
to avoid any inconvenient situation in the future, while at the same time trying to 
maximise their possible benefits and to minimise their possible costs. Parties in 
ex post situations know their position in the conflict. They can predict which court 
has jurisdiction over their conflict, based on private international law rules, and 
predict what their utility is in this jurisdiction. This serves as a benchmark during 
negotiations with the other party regarding choice of court. For the negotiation to 
be successful, parties need to choose a court that offers each of them higher utility 
than the court assigned by private international law rules. 
The analyses, however, did not consider complicated cases in which parties have 
different interests. For example, one party tries to minimise its costs while the 
other tries to maximise its benefits. Regardless of what parties choose to maximise 
or minimise, the duration of the litigation, the complexity of the procedure before 
the court, the distance between parties and the court, the success ratio, and the 
language of the court will always be important. 
In real life, choice of court can also be influenced by factors not considered here. 
For instance, one of the parties might be interested in obstructing the litigation by 
choosing a slow court. Or parties might choose one court out of habit rather than 
on its merits. Other strategic moves can also influence the parties: for example, 
its presence in one market, or an interest in the precedents in one jurisdiction. The 
analysis was based on certain assumptions. First, it was assumed that parties’ 
bargaining power is equal, which means that no party is powerful enough to 
impose its choice on the other. However, bargaining power is often imbalanced, 
and it can be expected that dominating parties will impose their preferences on 
weak ones. The dominating party’s preferences resemble the unilateral choice of 
court analysed in Section 4.5.1, despite the fact that two parties are involved in 
the choice making. Second, the analysis assumed that lawyers and clients have 
the same interests and pursue the same goals. However, the major concern of 
lawyers is to maximise their profit while minimising their effort. As analysed 
above, supposing that lawyers benefit from lengthy proceedings, complex 
procedures, and inaccurate courts, their suggestions would be in conflict with the 
interests of the parties. Here again, the lawyer-client relationship and the 
characteristics of the case play a role. Chapter 3 and Section 5.3 in particular 
provide empirical evidence with regard to the court preferences of lawyers 
working in Europe’s largest law firms. A survey conducted for this research 
provided data not only on jurisdiction preferences but also on the most preferred 
elements with respect to these jurisdictions and to court systems in general. 
The analysis in this section focused on the demand side of the civil justice system 
market. The findings of the analysis are important to both academics and 
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governments as suppliers of this market. Competing jurisdictions must do their 
best to accommodate parties’ preferences, while parties express their own 
preferences by choosing a court. Governments therefore need to consider limiting 
litigation time, simplifying procedures, increasing the transparency and 
predictability of the courts, and reducing court fees or making litigation less 
expensive in general. However, governments have many objectives listed 
according to their social or political priority: for instance, infrastructure, public 
health, emigration, and defence. Hence, while accommodating the demand side’s 
preferences and facilitating litigation for international litigants, governments try 
to consider where this objective stands in comparison to others. Balancing 
objectives and finding the right priority is a challenging economic, social, and 
political responsibility. Striking the right balance between different objectives 
seems to be a common denominator for litigants, lawyers, and governments. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter discussed elements of the market and the competition regarding civil 
justice systems, as well as two types of court adjudication competition, and 
Section 4.1 discussed the civil justice system market, Section 4.2 analysed the 
kind of good traded in this market, and Sections 4.3 and 4.4 examined the 
characteristics of the demand and the supply side of the market, respectively. 
Section 4.5 presented a dissection of the competition from a unilateral and 
bilateral choice of court, focusing more on the elements considered important by 
the demand side during negotiations on choice of court. 
The market 
The analysis of the civil justice system market in Section 4.1 focused on party 
autonomy, forum shopping, market characteristics, and incentives to compete. 
Party autonomy is of vital importance for the existence of the justice system 
market, which depends on the ability of the demand side to choose from among 
different offers, while the ability to choose depends on the autonomy of the 
demand. Over time, party autonomy has come to mean that any person is free to 
choose any legal arrangement considered appropriate. In private international law, 
party autonomy means that any person has the right to choose the law and court 
best suited to his purposes. Understandably, party autonomy is limited, with these 
limitations aimed at protecting weak parties or government prerogatives, as 
analysed in Chapter 3. These restrictions must be seen as defences to protect 
weaker parties against abuses of power by stronger parties, which could result in 
unfair restrictions of party autonomy. Party autonomy is also constrained by other 
forces operating in the market. Section 4.1.1.1 focused on two of these: namely, 
bargaining power and information asymmetry. Bargaining power can be 
understood as the ability to influence the outcome of a negotiation. In a 
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negotiation, the party with the greatest bargaining power imposes its will on the 
other, effectively neutralising the latter’s autonomy. A party that has more or 
better information than the other has a similar advantage. Information asymmetry 
and bargaining power are good examples of the fact that while parties have 
autonomy, its quality and quantity is imbalanced, and it influences the outcome 
of negotiations. For the civil justice system market, this means that certain actors 
having superior bargaining power and information can impose their will to the 
extent that it negates the preferences of the other parties. 
Using party autonomy to choose a court, negotiating parties create the premises 
for forum shopping. Section 4.1.1.2 argues that forum shopping is a strategy 
commonly used by lawyers, and the term has acquired an undeserved negative 
connotation. The use of forum shopping to frustrate weaker parties, or to impede 
a fair course of justice, has unfortunately tarnished its reputation. These negative 
uses, however, should not incite law-makers to rush legislation that limits forum 
shopping. The Italian Torpedo and lis pendens are good examples of problems 
related to the strategy, which were resolved without restricting forum shopping or 
party autonomy. Hence, rather than throwing the baby out with the bath water, it 
is better to separate them, and to help forum shopping serve our needs more 
effectively. 
The civil justice system market is distinguished by its specific characteristics. 
These features, analysed in Section 4.1.1.3, are supplier bankruptcy, relation to 
other markets, price, and type of good being traded. One of the most important 
characteristics is the absence of risk that suppliers will go into bankruptcy. This 
means that even in a situation of deep crisis, some form of civil justice organised 
by the government will exist. Given this reason, suppliers seem to be unresponsive 
regarding incentives to increase efficiency and innovation. The analysis 
considered that, if this lack of response is true, incentives for governments to 
participate in the civil justice system market should come from outside of the 
market. The civil justice system market is connected to other markets that 
influence both demand and supply, and the price of goods is not a result of the 
supply-demand interaction. Governments set this price arbitrarily, and it tends to 
be lower than the real value of the good. Reasons for this price setting are to be 
sought in the kind of good the justice system produces, and in the incentives 
received by the market. 
The good in the market 
The analysis in Section 4.1.1.3 and 4.1.1.4 suggested that governments’ incentives 
to innovate do not come directly from the civil justice systems market. It was 
suggested that they need to come from other sources, and one of these can be the 
good offered in this market. In particular, the good encourages governments to 
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maintain, support, and innovate for reasons not related to the market. Section 4.2 
examined civil justice systems as a good. The analysis was divided into two parts, 
with the first providing an overview of the classification and definition of goods. 
Considering their excludability and rivalry, goods can be divided into private and 
public goods. Some, however, are considered public goods despite lacking this 
category’s characteristics. These goods are usually of social significance, and 
depriving even a small part of society of these goods would amount to social 
injustice and threaten social peace. Governments therefore eliminate any rivalry 
or excludability from these goods, effectively making them similar to public 
goods. The attempt by governments to change the nature of these goods is a 
political act, and therefore these goods should be labelled political public goods. 
Clarifying the difference between public goods and political public goods is 
important for the analysis in the second part. The private-public good dichotomy 
is often referred to when the civil justice market is being described, but this 
classification has certain problems. To overcome these, it was submitted that the 
term ‘merit goods’ would describe court adjudication or the civil justice system 
in general better than the public good-private good duo. Merit goods are values 
created during a historical interaction process among individuals, and is 
subsequently transmitted as community values. The concept of civil justice 
systems is an important social value, which helps peace to be maintained. 
Considering it as a merit good leads to a better understanding of the role of the 
governments in dealing with civil justice systems and their behaviour in the 
market. 
The second part of Section 4.2 analysed the civil justice system as a good, and 
how its characteristics influence and are influenced by the competition among 
systems. The analysis showed that the system is a bundled good, and that court 
adjudication is the most important good in the bundle. Moreover, court 
adjudication is a bundled good, and includes dispute resolution, law creation, and 
legal education. Of these, dispute resolution is the most important for the demand 
side. The general agreement is that court adjudication as a bundle is a public good. 
However, a careful analysis shows that courts as a good do not fall within the 
definition of public goods. Court dispute resolution is not much different from 
other dispute resolution mechanisms used in many societies. The public good 
label applied to court dispute resolution seems to be a political act, which means 
that courts should be better understood as political public goods. As mentioned 
previously, an even better categorisation of courts would be merit goods. The 
merit good classification better indicates the social value of court dispute 
resolution, and therefore better justifies the role of the government as its supplier. 
Governments that act as suppliers in the civil justice system competition risk 
disrupting the harmony between the goods bundled in court adjudication. Section 
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4.2.3 submits that competing governments would be more interested in 
developing and focusing resources on dispute resolution. The remaining goods in 
the bundle would be left to other suppliers to produce and develop. Law- making 
would focus on the parliaments, and legal education would concentrate on 
educational institutions. This scenario involves intense competition where most 
of the demand side is composed of non-repeat players, in which case governments 
would be incentivised to maintain the bundle as is, and to develop simultaneously 
all the goods within the bundle. 
The demand side 
The civil justice system market is created by the interaction between the supply 
and the demand. Section 4.3 analysed the demand side, with a particular focus on 
its characteristics and composition, and on the relation between its different 
components. The demand side is composed of litigants or potential litigants that, 
based on private international law rules, are able to litigate outside their own 
jurisdictions. Natural and legal persons can be part of the demand side, and for 
the demand side to have qualitative output, litigants should exercise their choice 
of court uninhibited by practical and psychological factors. While some 
psychological factors have been discussed in detail in Section 2.5, Section 4.3.1.2 
provides an analysis of practical factors related to mobility. A functional demand 
side should be mobile enough to move for litigation purposes from one 
jurisdiction to a jurisdiction of choice. Mobility is affected by legal possibilities, 
by parties’ knowledge regarding other jurisdictions, by parties’ financial ability, 
and by the availability of lawyers. The analysis showed that wealthy litigants are 
the most mobile actors, able to invest resources in acquiring knowledge and in 
lawyers in order to increase their mobility. This implies that large companies or 
wealthy individuals are the most mobile and probably the most active actors. 
Lawyers are one of the factors able to increase the mobility of a litigant. Lawyers 
as professionals specialised in law not only help litigants to be more mobile but 
are pivotal to the results of the litigation. There exists a clear distinction between 
lawyers of wealthy and less wealthy clients. It can be expected that lawyers of 
wealthy clients are interested in the competition of civil justice systems, and use 
their lobbying power to induce governments to compete. Lawyers exercise 
considerable power over their clients, which often weakens their ability to make 
legal choices, and allows lawyers to impose their own strategies. Section 4.3.3 
showed that lawyers’ source of power resides in the type of market and the 
characteristics of the service they offer. The lawyers market is stratified to 
represent the wealth of their clients, and in each strata, a superstar kind of market 
emerges, which resembles a monopoly type of market. This means that clients of 
a certain wealth are trapped within a particular market level, where differences in 
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prices do not justify differences in quality. The ‘superstar’ lawyers in each strata 
act as monopolists, which gives them the possibility of inflating prices. 
Lawyers have considerable power over their clients, due to the nature of their 
services: namely, the entropic nature of legal reasoning, the credence good 
characteristic, and litigation’s similarity to a sunk-cost auction. The reasoning of 
a legal professional is inevitably entropic, which means that the more time that 
passes, the more complex the reasoning becomes, thus undermining the value of 
clients’ past experiences, and making them dependent on lawyers. This 
dependency is increased even more by the credence good characteristics. 
Credence goods are produced by experts, and the consumer faces difficulties in 
assessing his own needs with regard to quality and quantity. Markets with these 
kinds of goods are characterised by high prices and fraud. Lawyers use this 
characteristic to charge high fees, and as a result they create sunk costs, which are 
difficult to recover or transfer, and that serve as a mechanism to lock the supplier 
and the consumer together. Furthermore, litigation is a sunk-cost auction, where 
two parties − claimant and defendant − invest considerable resources hoping to 
win and to have some of the investment returned. These characteristics result in 
lawyers having tremendous power, and being able to impose legal strategies on 
their clients, to impose high fees, and − more important for this research – to 
decide the choice of court. 
The supply side 
The analysis showed that lawyers have considerable power over their clients and, 
as a consequence, over the output of the demand side in the civil justice system 
market. Section 4.3.4 concludes that it is in lawyers’ interest to increase their 
revenue by expanding their market beyond the borders of their jurisdiction. Thus, 
lawyers as a group are interested in the competition of civil justice systems. 
However, lawyers are also interested in avoiding competition from lawyers 
outside of their jurisdiction. As a powerful lobbying group, lawyers are expected 
to push governments in these two directions: first, to expand the market beyond 
the national borders, and second, to restrict foreign lawyers’ access to the market. 
Governments are the supply side, which means all the state bodies that produce 
goods on offer, along with courts, parliaments, and executives, produce important 
elements relating to the market. Section 4.4.3 analysed the incentives that these 
state bodies and governments in general have to participate in the competition. 
There appears to be no direct economic incentive for governments to compete, 
since given that courts are mostly subsidised, they do not make a profit. Judges 
have some incentive to compete, as their decisions might travel beyond the 
borders of their jurisdiction and their name become known. Apart from this 
reason, however, the other incentives should be indirect. It was submitted that 
some of the indirect incentives for governments would be an increase in taxation 
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revenue and in investment. A competitive jurisdiction would increase the taxable 
profit for local lawyers, which would increase taxation revenue for the 
government. Competitive legal institutions are also attractive to business and to 
investors. Investments increase social welfare, which increases revenues for the 
government, but most importantly makes voters happy. Indirect benefits need 
careful consideration, however, because they are relatively easy to identify but 
difficult to calculate. It is not surprising that many governments are not able to 
see what benefits they might derive by participating in the civil justice system 
competition. Chapter 5 provides insights into the economic significance of the 
legal market for some jurisdictions, and their attitude towards the competition of 
civil justice systems. 
Competition from a unilateral and bilateral choice of court 
The last section in this chapter analysed litigants’ choice of court preferences in 
different situations. The aim of the analysis was to discover some of the elements 
that influence the choice of court process. Section 4.5.1 considered situations 
where choice of court is made by the claimant. Given that the choice is made 
unilaterally, this situation can be called unilateral competition. The analysis 
assumed that the claimant is interested in winning the case and at the same time 
in minimising costs, maximising benefits, or maximising utility. Cost-minimising 
claimants choose the court that most lowers their litigation costs. Litigation costs 
were calculated to be dependent on the court fee, the duration of the litigation, the 
distance from the court, and the complexity of the laws and the procedures. A 
cost-minimising claimant will choose a court that offers low court fees, fast 
litigation, is close to the claimant’s location, and has noncomplex laws and 
procedures. Another assumption is that claimants try to maximise their benefits. 
Benefits consist in the financial and moral benefits of winning a case, and in costs 
being shifted to the losing party. Benefits depend on the court’s accuracy, the 
duration of the litigation, and the court’s cost-shifting coefficient. A benefit-
maximising claimant chooses a court that is accurate, fast, and has a high cost-
shifting coefficient. The final situation considered was that of a utility-
maximising claimant. Utility is the difference between all the possible benefits 
and possible costs of litigating in a jurisdiction. These benefits and costs depend 
on the same elements considered above, with the addition of the court’s success 
ratio. Obviously, a utility-maximising claimant is interested in choosing a court 
that offers a high success ratio in addition to maximising benefits and minimising 
costs. 
Section 4.5.2 considered situations where choice of court is made by both the 
defendant and the claimant. Given that the choice is made by both parties, this 
situation can be called bilateral choice of court. It was assumed that both parties 
have the same bargaining power and the same interests regarding the dispute. 
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Parties can choose the court in two situations: before (ex ante) and after (ex post) 
litigation has started, with potential differences in the choice of court process. 
Again, the analysis assumed that the parties are simultaneously interested in 
minimising costs, maximising benefits, or maximising utility. The choice 
preferences of cost-minimising parties in both ex ante and ex post situations are 
the same. Both parties will choose a court that offers fast litigation, low court fees, 
noncomplex laws and procedures, and that is a short distance from the location of 
the parties. Two issues should be underlined here: first, the distance between court 
and parties is not the same. Therefore, parties need to compromise for a court that 
is equidistant; second, agreeing on an equidistant court compromises the other 
factors. As a result, finding the appropriate court becomes very difficult. It can be 
assumed that the court chosen by the parties will not always be the one that offers 
minimal costs. The second assumption was that both parties try to maximise their 
benefits. Benefits depend on the court’s accuracy, the length of the litigation, and 
the court’s cost-shifting coefficient. In ex post and ex ante situations, both parties 
are interested in a highly accurate and fast court. As regards cost shifting, ex ante 
parties prefer a high cost-shifting coefficient to maximise their benefits, but ex 
post parties prefer a higher or lower cost-shifting coefficient, depending on their 
position in the litigation. The third assumption involved cases in which parties try 
to maximise their utility. Utility is the difference between possible benefits and 
possible costs adjusted by the success ratio in that jurisdiction. In both ex ante and 
ex post situations, parties are interested in a court that does not offer advantages 
to either the claimant or the defendant. A neutral court would better suit the 
interests of both parties. However, reality is more complex. Parties need to take 
several factors into account when making a choice of court, and while a court 
might excel in one of them, the court chosen will on average have a better overall 
score. 
Section 4.5 provides a clear list of factors that parties consider when making a 
choice of court. Some of the elements are even more complex than they look. 
Court fees include not only the upfront fee that is paid to the court but also other 
court costs incurred during litigation. The complexity of the procedures or the law 
relate also to the differences in language between the parties and the court. Courts 
that try to be attractive must also try to employ the language most used by parties: 
namely, English. Court accuracy is closely related to the quality, experience, and 
independence of judges. Finally, a success ratio also depends on a court’s 
transparency and predictability. The more transparent and predictable that courts 
are, the better the parties can calculate their success ratio. However, Section 4.5 
is mostly theoretical. Empirical data would provide valuable information 
irrespective of whether these predictions were true in real life. Chapter 5 takes on 
this task by analysing data from the European Justice Scoreboard on the situation 
regarding legal systems in the EU, as well as data involving a survey on the court 
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preferences of lawyers in the EU. These data are combined with the theoretical 
findings discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 An empirical overview of the civil 
justice system competition in the EU 
Chapter 4 contains a theoretical analysis of the market, the good, the demand, and 
the supply with respect to the civil justice system competition; furthermore, it 
provides an assessment of various elements that may influence parties’ choice of 
court. The current chapter delivers empirical insights into the civil justice 
competition in the EU, with the aim of illustrating and enriching the theoretical 
analysis in Chapter 4. To this end, the work is divided into three parts: the first is 
an overview of the EU Justice Scoreboard, and its significance for the competition 
process; the second is an overview of the attitude of some Member States 
regarding the competition; and the third presents the results of a survey on the 
choice of court, conducted with professional lawyers working at the largest law 
firms in the EU. The survey results are examined in light of the results in Chapter 
4 and other sections of the chapter in order to map differences between what was 
analysed theoretically and found empirically. 
5.1 The role of the EU in promoting an effective and 
competitive civil justice 
Despite a seemingly super partes position in the civil justice competition, the role 
of the EU as a whole is important. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the European Commission was given increased powers to establish a common 
European Area of Justice, which, together with the role of the EU institutions in 
it, exercises considerable influence in the civil justice system competition. This 
section briefly summarises the most relevant steps taken by the European Area of 
Justice initiative, and provides an overview of the EU Justice Scoreboard. This 
creates the premises to contextualise the EU’s position and its role in the civil 
justice system competition. Furthermore, the analysis of the Scoreboard aims at 
determining how the systems of Member States compare to each other based on 
the reported results.  
5.1.1 A European Area of Justice: justice and economic growth 
For the EU, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the premises for more cooperation 
in cross-border civil cases, and was aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of 
the internal market, by improving cross-border procedures, promoting common 
rules between Member States, and eliminating legal obstacles to the civil 
proceedings. The Treaty was the first step towards a European Area of Justice. 
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With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission received 
more competences in improving and enhancing a genuine European Area of 
Justice, which means an area of freedom, security, and justice without internal 
frontiers. In this respect, the European Parliament and the Council have become 
co-legislators in most areas of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters,628 
areas in which the EU has been particularly active in preparing and implementing 
regulations that facilitate cross-border trade.629 
Reforms directed at creating a European Area of Justice have been based on four 
principles: enhancing mutual trust; supporting economic growth (recovery) 
through qualitatively better judicial systems; making justice simpler for citizens; 
and protecting fundamental rights.630 However, future improvements to the 
current situations require more trust between Member States, facilitating the 
mobility of citizens and companies, and contributing to economic growth through 
better justice systems. These challenges have prompted the EU to adopt the EU 
Justice Agenda 2020, which ‘sets out the political priorities’ to be pursued towards 
a common area of justice.631 These political priorities are divided into two groups: 
Justice for Citizens and Justice for Growth. 
Justice for Citizens aims at increasing and safeguarding the rights of citizens in 
the EU, improving the resolution of cross-border justice problems, and addressing 
certain issues related to criminal cases. Justice for Growth aims at supporting 
companies, and at motivating economic growth and stability. The Commission 
considers that improving access to justice and facilitating the resolution of 
disputes will contribute to a positive business climate and be a competitive 
advantage compared to other jurisdictions. Policies aimed at improving access to 
justice and facilitating the resolution of disputes will continue to be a high priority 
                                                        
628 Kramer (2011) 206; Heusel (2014) 19-25. 
629 The EU maintains a list of the directives and regulations in the area of judicial cooperation 
in civil matters. The list referred to as the European Judicial Atlas can be found at <https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_european_judicial_atlas_in_civil_matters-321-en.do> accessed 
on 22 December 2017. 
630 Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the European Union – The EU Justice 
Agenda for 2020. A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/future_justice_brochure_en.pdf> access-
ed on 22 December 2017. 
631 European Commission – Memo - The Future EU Justice and Home Affairs Agendas:  
Questions and Answers. Available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
174_en.htm> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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issue in the 2020 Agenda. It is considered that Justice and citizens’ rights should 
know no borders in the EU.632 
Civil justice and the court system play an important role in economic growth and 
financial stability.633 A robust and efficient judicial system assures the 
enforcement of contracts and the swift handling of litigation cases, and a system 
with superior qualities is valued highly by businesses, which need to be confident 
that contracts will be enforced and courts will handle litigations efficiently. 
Enforcement certainty and litigation efficiency have been taken up as challenges 
by the Commission, which combines different strategies methods to tackle 
them.634 Reforming and improving the judicial system is not only a challenge 
aimed at accommodating businesses but also a necessity for sustainable economic 
growth. 
It is clear at this point that EU institutions consider the justice system to be a 
means towards economic growth. This strategy is based on the idea that 
companies, when developing their investment strategies, take into account the 
quality of justice as well as of other institutions.635 Qualitative institutions 
guarantee predictability, certainty, fairness, and stability for businesses.636 
Moreover, an effective justice system helps companies to protect their entire 
business cycle from start to finish.637 This should make the EU not only an 
attractive place to visit but also an attractive place to stay. The European 
Commission considers that attractiveness can be improved by: 'better enforcement 
of commercial claims; simplifying the enforcement of judgments in cross-border 
                                                        
632 European Commission – Memo - The Future EU Justice and Home Affairs Agendas: - 
Questions and Answers. Available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-
174_en.htm> accessed 22 December 2017. 
633 Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the European Union - The EU Justice 
Agenda for 2020. A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/effective-justice/files/future_justice_brochure_en.pdf> access-
ed on 22 December 2017. 
634 More on this can be found at the European Commission - Press release - Towards a true 
European area of Justice: Strengthening trust, mobility and growth. Available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-233_en.htm> accessed 22 December 2017. 
635 European Semester Thematic Fiche - Effective Justice Systems. Available at <http:// 
ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/2015/effective_justice_systems_20151126.pdf> 
accessed 22 De-cember 2017. Although this fiche does not represent the official view of the 
European Commission, it is still in line with the ideas expressed in other official documents. 
636 As it was concluded in the analysis of competition from bilateral and unilateral choice of 
court (Chapter 4), the analysis points out that predictability and certainty play an important 
role in the choice of jurisdiction. 
637 EU Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality - Contributing to an attractive environment for 
businesses and investors, strengthening competitiveness and fostering social inclusion 
(Factsheet). Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/files/csr_factsheet_ 
2015_en.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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disputes; introducing rules to help creditors recover cross-border debt; 
modernising EU insolvency proceedings to help some firms stay in business 
which would otherwise not survive; encourage EU countries to make their judicial 
systems ever more efficient and implement necessary judicial reforms as part of 
their economic recovery programmes’.638 To this end, the Commission 
encourages Member States to improve the efficiency their court systems. The 
following part analyses The EU Justice Scoreboard, one of the tools used by the 
Commission to promote efficiency throughout the Union. 
Taking all these documents into consideration, the approval of the Lisbon Treaty 
gave more powers to the Council to regulate a European Area of Justice, the key 
priorities being trust, mobility, and growth. Trust implies more trust between 
Member States in recognising each other’s court decisions, while stimulating 
growth requires efficient and reliable courts. The European Commission tries to 
spur Member States to develop efficient procedures and reliable institutions. One 
of the tools employed in this endeavour is the EU Justice Scoreboard. The analysis 
found little − if any − interest in the civil justice system competition. Nevertheless, 
the initial claim in this section, that the EU plays an important role in the civil 
justice system competition, still remains. While it seems true that the EU lacks an 
active direct role in promoting the competition, an active indirect role should be 
acknowledged. This role delivers legislation that facilitates competition in the EU, 
policy papers that encourage the efficiency of the judicial system, and an annual 
scoreboard that compares Member States’ judicial systems with each other. 
5.1.2 The EU Justice Scoreboard 
 
5.1.2.1 A brief description of the Scoreboard 
Since the beginning of 2008, the EU and its Member States have been preoccupied 
with mitigating the effects of the financial crisis, and with recovering economic 
productivity. It has been concluded that helping the economic recovery requires 
legal and institutional reforms. Reforms aimed at an efficient and independent 
judicial system have been considered as one of the priorities of the European 
Commission. However, reforms cannot be designed and implemented without a 
proper analysis of the justice system in each Member State. To this end, the 
European Commission created the European Judicial Scoreboard in 2013, 
intending it to be a tool to provide comparative data about the systems of justice 
in each Member State. It is published every year, and allows Member States to 
compare their judicial systems, and possibly to draw conclusions and make 
improvements accordingly. In the words of Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the 
                                                        
638 Civil Justice. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/index_en.htm> accessed 
22 December 2017. 
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European Commission, ‘The new European Justice Scoreboard will act as an early 
warning system and will help the EU and the Member States in our efforts to 
achieve more effective justice at the service of our citizens’.639 In the same press 
release, Olli Rehn, Vice-President for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the 
Euro, states: ‘This new Scoreboard will help EU Member States to strengthen 
their legal systems, boosting their efforts to stimulate investment and job 
creation’. For the Commission, the Scoreboard is an important comparative 
instrument that, by confronting the civil justice system of Member States, 
encourages them to improve their performance. In the foreword of the 2016 
Scoreboard, Věra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender 
Equality, expressed the satisfaction of the Commission to see that ‘…Member 
States are actively seeking to improve their justice systems with measures ranging 
from significant reforms of procedural laws, scaling up the use of ICT in the 
justice system to further promoting the use of Alternative Methods of Dispute 
Resolution… .’640 
The scope of the Scoreboard covers litigious civil justice with particular attention 
paid to litigious civil, commercial, and administrative cases.641 This focus is 
intended to include the most sensitive areas of justice where commercial parties 
are mostly involved. It goes without saying that the underlying aim is to improve 
the serving of justice for commercial parties. Therefore, the Scoreboard excludes 
from its scope a considerable part of the justice court system even though criminal 
justice can have serious consequences for businesses. A weak criminal justice 
system, which is inefficient, or lenient with criminals and criminal acts (e.g. 
corruption, bribery, blackmail, extortion, tax evasion, money laundry, fraud), 
seriously affects the operations of a company. Furthermore, slow or inefficient 
criminal justice inevitably affects the performance of civil justice by requiring 
more human and financial capital.642 It can be said that the Scoreboard is not an 
attempt to diagnose the whole justice system of the Member States, but is an 
endeavour to emphasise the importance of civil justice in economic development. 
                                                        
639 European Commission Press release: EU Justice Scoreboard: European Commission 
broadens the scope of its analysis of Member States' justice systems. Available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-285_en.htm> accessed on 22 December 2017. 
640 The 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/
files/justice_scoreboard_2016_en.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
641 The 2013 EU Justice Scoreboard. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/justice_scoreboard_communication_en.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
642 Judiciary budget is fairly constant each year. This budget is allocated to criminal and civil 
justice according to their needs, but with criminal justice being preferred because of its role 
in society and its relationship with the government. Badly managed or poor criminal justice 
would swallow up more and more resources, to the detriment of civil justice. Genn (2012) 
7, 14. 
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To compile the 2013 Scoreboard, the European Commission with the help of the 
Council of Europe Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) collected data from the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and 
the World Justice Project. For the 2014 Scoreboard, the sources of information 
also include the Eurostat and the European Network of the Judiciary. In addition, 
the 2014 edition was the first to provide country fiches, which provide detailed 
information from each Member State, including statistics, a description of the 
organisation of justice, and reform agenda.643 The methodology with which the 
information was collected varies according to the sources. The CEPEJ was mostly 
compiled from information provided by Member State governments. 
The Scoreboard identifies three parameters for the justice system: efficiency, 
quality, and independence. The efficiency parameter is composed of three 
indicators: length of proceedings, clearance rate, and number of pending cases. 
The quality parameter is composed of elements such as accessibility of justice for 
citizens and businesses, adequate material and human resources, putting 
assessment tools into place, and using quality standards.644 However, it can be 
argued that these indicators are not the only measures, as quality of justice also 
depends on the quality of the education in a country, the amount of time available 
to judges to make a decision, the quality of the lawyers and of the legislation, and 
also of the decision itself. Meanwhile, the Scoreboard indicators seem to focus on 
the infrastructure of the court system including human and financial resources; 
therefore, these indicators seem to be more a display of the infrastructure quality 
of justice. It should be acknowledged that these indicators do play a role in the 
quality of the justice system, and that those mentioned above are difficult to 
measure. In light of these difficulties, the Scoreboard is a compromise between 
providing any measurement and providing the best measurement. The 
independence parameter is based on the perceived judicial independence and on 
structural independence. In the end, all these indicators lead to a type of summary 
or a conclusion. 
                                                        
643 Country fiches can be found within the Study on the functioning of judicial systems in the 
EU Member States, prepared by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. The 
2014 study is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepj_ 
study_scoreboard_2014_en.pdf>, accessed 22 December 2017. The 2015 study is available 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepj_study_scoreboard_2015_en.pdf> 
accessed 22 December 2017. The 2016 study on all the Member States (1st part) is available 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepj_study_scoreboard-indicators_
2016_en.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017, the country fiches is available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepj_study_scoreboard-country-
fiches_2016_en.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
644 Since the Scoreboard’s inception in 2013, the quality parameter has changed each year, and 
is now in the form described here. 
231 
 
5.1.2.2 Results and main findings of the Scoreboard 
The length of proceedings is of vital importance for business parties. As soon as 
the conflict is resolved, parties can go about their normal business. Lengthy 
proceedings are economically costly, and may hinder business development for 
both parties. However, one party may use lengthy proceedings (also called 
Torpedo strategies) to hinder the legal actions of the other, or to achieve other 
strategic gains. Considering the importance of the length of proceedings, the 2016 
Scoreboard provides data on the time needed to resolve litigious civil and 
commercial cases, and to resolve administrative and other cases. Some Member 
States did not provide data on all of the issues. The 2016 data645 show that 
Denmark, Estonia, and Austria (with Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and 
the Netherlands having similar results) had the fastest times in resolving civil, 
commercial, administrative, and other cases. Cyprus, Portugal, Greece, and Malta 
had the worst results.646 Comparing data from the four Scoreboards (2013, 2014, 
2015, and 2016), the ranking virtually does not change. In general, there was no 
trend to reduce the time needed to resolve the conflicts; on the contrary, the length 
of the proceedings increased in more Member States.647 Another indicator of the 
judicial system’s efficiency was the ability to resolve at least as many cases as 
came in, which is referred to as the clearance rate. Most Member States had 
clearance rates of 100% or higher, while Greece, Ireland, and Cyprus had 
percentages as low as 80% (Greece).648 Low clearance percentages creates 
backlogs in courts, may influence the speed at which cases are resolved, and can 
damage the quality of the decision. Possible factors contributing to the low 
clearance percentages are the legislation’s level of efficiency, the number of 
judges serving in the court, other infrastructural problems, and the judicial culture, 
and so on. Regardless of the cause, a low clearance rate can be a symptom of 
chronic problems within a system, and needs to be quickly addressed. Although 
the clearance rate does not immediately affect businesses, governments cannot 
afford to neglect this issue, precisely for the reasons mentioned above. 
                                                        
645 Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the UK did not provide data. 
646 Methods for measuring court proceedings are different in each Member State, as different 
procedural steps are considered at the beginning or the end of the litigation. However, as 
reported by the CEPEJ, Member States should also provide information about the method 
for calculating the start and the end of the proceeding. Generally, the date on which the case 
was referred to the court is considered as the start. European judicial systems: Efficiency 
and quality of justice, CEPEJ STUDIES No. 23, page 184 <http://www.coe.int/ 
t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2016/publication/CEPEJ%20Study%2023%20report%
20EN%20web.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
647 The data from the 2016 Scoreboard show that the time needed to resolve litigious civil and 
commercial cases had improved in many Member States. This is in contrast with the main 
findings, where the time needed to resolve other cases had increased.  
648 Belgium, Denmark, and the UK did not provide data. 
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As previously mentioned, the quality of justice parameter in the 2016 Scoreboard 
is composed of four elements: accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses; 
adequate material and human resources; putting assessment tools into place; and 
use of quality standards. Accessibility of justice for citizens and businesses is 
measured by how much information is given about the judicial system; how much 
legal aid is provided; the possibility of submitting a claim online; communication 
between courts and lawyers; communication with the media; the possibility of 
accessing judgments; and the possibility of accessing alternative dispute 
resolution methods. Adequate human and material resources are measured by the 
situation regarding the government’s expenditure on law courts, the number of 
judges, the number of lawyers, and the training possibilities for judges. The 
existence of assessment tools is measured by the availability of monitoring and 
evaluating court’s activities, electronic case management, and court surveys 
conducted among court users. Quality standards are measured by the presence of 
certain standards defined by the European Commission in relation to the justice 
system. Since publication of the 2013 Scoreboard, Member States have made 
progress in introducing and implementing online information about the judicial 
system. More effort is needed, however, to improve the electronic communication 
capabilities of courts and to maintain the pace of technological development. The 
financial situation of the judiciary in most Member States remains stable, but only 
a few have mechanisms for assessing the needs of the system in allocating their 
budget. Recognising its importance, Member States offer training to judges, but 
not all offer training sessions aimed at pending legal and practical problems. More 
effort is required in training judges with regard to communication in order to 
improve confidence in the judicial system. Most of the Member States have their 
own standards regarding the judicial system, and these are often very different 
from those of other Member States. Using results derived these standards makes 
any comparison difficult. Therefore, the assessment tools that might also be in 
place in any Member State should be viewed with caution. 
Another parameter considered in the Scoreboard is independence, and it consists 
of three indicators: perceived judicial independence, structural independence, and 
the work of judicial networks on judicial independence. Perceived independence 
remains problematic in almost half of the Member States, as respondents consider 
the ‘interference or pressure from economic or other specific interest’ and 
‘interference or pressure from government and politicians’ to be problematic. 
Overall, and in comparison to citizens, companies perceive courts to be more 
independent. The overview regarding structural independence indicates that 
Member States have established institutions and procedures to safeguard judges 
from arbitrary transfers or dismissals. Court finances are still dependent on the 
executive and legislative branch. Independence is also affected by the fact that in 
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most cases the court budget is prepared by the government and approved by 
parliament, while the judiciary is side-lined. 
Overall, the Scoreboard provides an overview of the justice situation in the EU. 
Despite its name, however, the Scoreboard does not offer any score or ranking of 
the Member States. Thus, it is in the hands of the Member States or interested 
parties to draw conclusions regarding the figures and the statistics. It must be 
remembered that creating a ranking announcing a winner or a loser was never the 
Scoreboard’s intention, as that would have resulted in major political 
embarrassment as well as in denial by Member States and in counterproductive 
rifts. In a broader perspective, however, the Scoreboard fits perfectly within the 
EU justice policies, which aim at a healthy judiciary with more efficient, 
qualitative, and independent courts. A healthy judiciary is after all part of the 
bedrock upon which a strong economy is based. 
Moreover, the Scoreboard joins a host of other empirical attempts to measure the 
health of the judicial system in the EU. Among others, the Scoreboard is 
complementary to the CEPEJ (European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice) Study on the functioning of judicial systems in EU Member States. 
Another source of data is provided by the Eurobarometer,649 which measures 
public opinion in EU Member States in different fields. Similar studies on the 
judicial system are carried out by the World Bank650 and the World Economic 
Forum,651 and they point to the attention being paid to the health of the justice 
                                                        
649 Since 2010, there have been several Eurobarometers dedicated to justice in the EU. In 2010, 
Special Eurobarometer 351: Civil Justice published data on a broad range of topics related 
to cross-border EU civil justice. For more, see <http://data.europa.eu/euodp/ 
en/data/dataset/S895_73_5_EBS351> accessed 22 December 2017. In 2013/2014, Flash 
Eurobarometer 385: Justice in the EU published data on the perception of justice by citizens 
of Member States both with regard to their countries and to the EU. For more, see <http://
data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S1104_385> accessed 22 December 2017. Two 
publications in 2016 were dedicated to the perceived independence of national justice 
systems in the EU. The first was Flash Eurobarometer 435: Perceived independence of the 
national justice systems in the EU among the general public. For more, see 
<http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2116_435_ENG> accessed 22 December 
2017. The second was Flash Eurobarometer 436: Perceived independence of the national 
justice systems in the EU among companies. For more, see <http://data.europa.eu/ 
euodp/en/data/dataset/S2132_436_ENG> accessed 31 January 2017. 
650 Every year, the World Bank issues a Doing Business Report that contains data on business-
related court issues. For the latest issue of the Report, see <http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017> accessed 31 January 2017. 
651 The World Economic Forum prepares reports on Global Competitiveness. This Report 
contains data on perceptions regarding independence of the judiciary, from a global 
perspective. For 2015-2016, see <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/Global_ 
Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdf> accessed 31 January 2017. 
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systems by major economic organisations. However, a ranking − as is done for 
many economic indexes − of the EU Member States has not yet been conducted. 
5.1.2.3 Calculating a score from the Scoreboard 
 
Methodology 
As mentioned above, the Scoreboard does not provide any ranking or final mark 
for the jurisdictions assessed. Because grading judicial systems can be politically 
thorny and sensitive, any classification would trigger harsh reactions from almost 
all the Member States. Furthermore, the aim of the Commission is to foster 
development and to offer comparative tools rather than to declare winners. 
Nevertheless, having a scoreboard without final scores seems counterintuitive, 
and is a source of temptation to compile them. What in fact might be the added 
value of scoring and ranking the jurisdictions? 
Scoreboard data can produce a ranking that can be used to compare the 
performance of Member States’ judicial systems. However, these data are derived 
from different sources and categorised into subject matters or indicators; hence, it 
would be more beneficial to calculate a score for each indicator and in the end a 
final score based on each of the Scoreboard’s indicators. This approach would 
emphasise the strong and weak points for each Member State, and would mitigate 
some of the problems that are addressed below. Moreover, the Scoreboard dates 
from 2013, this would allow for a longitudinal study, which would contribute to 
a better understanding of the competitive behaviour of Member States, and of 
whether reforms enacted by Member states result in improvement.652 
Even though the Scoreboard indicators are not meant to function as instruments 
to support the civil justice competition, a scored ranking can be useful to 
competing jurisdictions. A positive final ranking would be a good advertisement 
for the jurisdiction that scored best, and it could use this raking to promote its 
court system as well as to evaluate the success of possible reforms. Despite the 
fact that the ranking of Member States might lead to tension with regard to the 
European Commission, it could bring certain benefits as well. Faced with the 
eventual embarrassment of a low Scoreboard ranking, as well as the potential 
negative economic consequences, Member States might be more open to 
considering steps to reform their systems. Focusing on indicator rankings can 
better emphasise a system’s qualities and problems. However, Member States can 
use ‘the good scores’ in one indicator to counter negative results from other 
indicators. From the European Commission’s perspective, ranking jurisdictions 
                                                        
652 On general benefits of longitudinal stories, see Lynn (2009) 4-10; Elliott, Holland, and 
Thomson (2008) 237-239, 240-242. 
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for every indicator can facilitate reporting on and providing recommendations to 
Member States. Ranking would make Member States even more interested in 
providing information, because failure to appear in the Scoreboard ranking could 
be seen as equal to a bad placement. 
Creating a ranking, however, faces certain problems, one of which is that not 
every Member State provides data. Since data are not collected specifically for 
the Scoreboard, it is not sure whether the methodology for their collection is the 
same for all Member States. Differences in methodology could affect the quality 
of the data and the ranking of jurisdictions. Another difficulty has to do with the 
methodology of scoring jurisdictions for their achievements. While it is easy to 
score countries for their litigation speed, it is difficult to give scores to legal or 
administrative reforms. Furthermore, not all Member States provide data on all 
the elements, which influences the magnitude of the final score. For example, a 
Member State that scores 9, but that supplied data for all elements of the 
Scoreboard, can still be behind a Member State that scores 10, but provides data 
for only half of the elements. Because of this, any ranking derived from the 
Scoreboard would need to be viewed with caution and accompanied by the related 
caveat. 
Considering the potential usefulness of gauging a ranking from the Scoreboard, 
this section proposes a method for calculating the score and compiling a ranking. 
The Scoreboard is divided into three Parameters, with each divided into 
Indicators, and each indicator divided into Figures. Figures are the basic units of 
the Scoreboard, and provide data on a specific element of the judicial system for 
all the Member States. Figure 4, for example, provides information regarding 
‘Time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative, and other cases’. The 
Scoreboard ranks the Member States for every figure, but does not provide a 
score. To create the ranking, for each figure, the best performing Member States 
was scored with one point, the second best with two points, and the third best with 
three and so on, until the last one, which is scored with twenty-eight. This means 
that the lower the score, the better. The score for each indicator is the average 
score of its combined figures, as is the score for each parameter. The final 
Scoreboard score is the average score of the three parameters. As part of the 
methodology, it should be borne in mind that the calculation is performed to help 
in assessing the quality of the court system in relation to the competition of the 
civil justice system. Some of the figures were not considered to be important for 
the competition, and excluded them from the final calculation. Excluded figures 
are mentioned in the analysis below. A persistent problem with the Scoreboard is 
that not all the figures have complete data; some are missing partial or complete 
data from particular Member States. Those that miss data are not scored. For some 
of the figures, more than one Member State occupies the same position. In this 
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case, all Member States occupying the same position are scored the same. The 
analysis below is illustrated by way of charts for every indicator and parameter. 
A final chart for the Scoreboard is also provided, and the Annexes section contains 
detailed table scores for each figure.  
 
 
Efficiency of the justice sector 
Based on the methodology described above, calculated was the score for each 
figure, each indicator, and each parameter, and arrived at the final score. The first 
Scoreboard indicator is ‘Length of proceedings’ (Chart 1), which comprises 
Figures 4 to 6.653 The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Portugal did not provide any 
data for these figures; Luxembourg, Austria, and Greece did not provide data for 
two of the figures; and Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, and Cyprus did not provide 
data for one of the figures. Taking into account the Member States with data for 
all the figures in the section ‘Length of proceedings’, Estonia, Hungary, and 
Lithuania are in first three spots. Luxembourg, Austria, and Bulgaria score high 
as well, but did not supply data for all the figures. Slovakia, Italy, and Malta 
occupy the last three spots among the Member States that provided data for the 
three figures. Cyprus and Belgium also have comparable scores but did not supply 
data for all the figures. The ranking indicates that small jurisdictions have faster 
                                                        
653 Figs. 4-6: Fig. 4 ‘Time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases’; 
Fig. 5 ‘Time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases’; Fig. 6 ‘Time needed to 
resolve administrative cases’. 
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proceedings,654 while the bottom is occupied by Malta, Slovakia, and Italy (this 
last infamous for the Italian Torpedo). 
 
‘Clearance rate’ is the second indicator in the first index, and measures the ratio 
of the number of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases. Countries 
that resolve more cases than those registered annually in their courts have high 
clearance rates. Clearance rate may indicate the ability of courts to resolve in one 
year at least as many cases as are registered. However, this does not mean that 
these courts are fast. A case might still take a lot of time to be resolved in these 
jurisdictions. Clearance rate should be considered as an indication that the courts 
do not overburden themselves by accepting more cases than they are able to 
resolve. In the 2016 Scoreboard, clearance rate is measured by Figs. 7, 8, and 9.655  
From the calculation (Chart 2: Clearance rate), it is seen that Italy, Romania, and 
Latvia are the highest scoring Member States, while France, Lithuania, and 
                                                        
654 The reasons for this can vary. Small Baltic countries have a small population and have 
experienced a quick development. This might have improved their general efficiency with a 
positive after-effect for the courts. Moreover, it can be argued that the small size of the 
country implies fewer cases in number and fewer complications in their claims. This means 
that courts can be faster in proceeding and in deciding. However, this does not explain why 
Member States with comparable sizes, like Malta, Slovakia, Lithuania, or Slovenia, are so 
far behind Baltic countries. 
It should also be remembered that Member States have different methods of calculating the 
length of the proceedings. 
655 Measurements: Fig. 7 ‘Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases’; 
Fig. 8 ‘Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases’; and Fig. 9 ‘Rate of resolving 
administrative cases’. 
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Estonia are at the bottom of the table.656 Comparing Chart 1 to Chart 2, it seems 
that Member States that are in the first position in one of the charts are in the last 
position in the other. This means that there is a group of Member States that have 
high clearance rates and low speeds and a group with low clearance rates and high 
speeds. The first group is characterised by a decreasing number of cases registered 
in courts, but because of the slow proceedings more time is dedicated to each case, 
and probably more court hearings are organised. The opposite can be said of 
Member States in the second group. They see an increasing number of cases in 
their courts, but these require less time and probably fewer sessions to adjudicate. 
 
‘Pending cases’ is the third indicator in this parameter (Chart 3: Pending cases). 
Pending cases measures the cases still remaining after a certain period of time. 
Scores for this section can be influenced by the methodology used by each 
individual reporting Member State. The pending cases parameter is important, as 
it indicates the system’s efficiency and its ability to proceed within the timeframe 
set for a specific process. This indicator contains data from Fig. 10 to 12 on the 
Scoreboard.657 If only the Member States with data for all the figures are 
considered, Hungary, Estonia, and Sweden are the best jurisdictions in the list, 
while Croatia, Cyprus, and Italy are the worst. Obviously, the ranking of 
                                                        
656 Greece and Austria did not present data for two of the figures, while Bulgaria, Germany, 
Denmark, Cyprus, Belgium, and Ireland did not present data for one figure. The UK and 
Portugal did not present data for any of the figures. 
657 Fig. 10 ‘Number of civil, commercial, administrative and other pending cases’, Fig. 11 
‘Number of litigious civil and commercial pending cases’, Fig. 12 ‘Number of 
administrative pending cases’. The United Kingdom and Ireland did not provide data for any 
of these figures. Luxemburg, Austria, Portugal, Belgium, and Greece did not submit data for 
two of the figures. Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany and Slovakia did not submit data for one 
of the figures. 
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jurisdictions according to their proceeding speed mirrors the ranking of 
jurisdictions in the pending cases section. It goes without saying that a 
consequence of slow proceedings is an increase in the number of pending cases. 
Pending cases can be a good indicator of the system’s quality. Because each 
jurisdiction decides for itself the judicial timeframes, non-adherence can be 
interpreted as a lack of efficiency. Obliviously, lack of efficiency is a 
characteristic to avoid when choosing a court, and is an unfavourable factor for 
any competing jurisdiction.  
The fourth indicator in the efficiency of the judicial system index is ‘Efficiency 
in specific cases’, and it includes Figures 13 to 17.658 The inclusion of these 
figures in the Scoreboard is justified by their importance for commercial parties 
and investment stimulation. For this indicator, only five Member States provided 
data for all the figures. The problem here is that for some jurisdictions either the 
scenario presented for the Scoreboard does not apply in their legal order or they 
do not have data or cases. With this in mind, it becomes difficult to claim that the 
ranking for this indicator represents the efficiency of the system or the efficiency 
of the system in commercial situations. Owing to these problems, it is better to 
omit the fourth indicator from the final calculation for this index.  
                                                        
658 Fig. 13 ‘Insolvency: Time needed to resolve insolvency’; Fig. 14 ‘Competition: Average 
length of judicial review cases against decisions of national competition authorities applying 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU’; Fig. 15 ‘Electronic communications: Average length of 
judicial review cases against decisions of national regulatory authorities applying EU law 
on electronic communications’; Fig. 16 ‘Community trademark: Average length of 
Community trademark infringement cases’; Figure ‘Consumer protection: Average length 
of judicial review cases against decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU 
law’. 
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Given that the fourth indicator cannot be used to calculate the score for the 
Efficiency of Justice System parameter, the final score for this parameter derives 
from the first three indicators (Chart 4: Efficiency of justice system). It should be 
remembered that some Member States do not have data for all the figures. For 
example the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Ireland did not present data for two 
indicators, while Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, and Belgium are missing data for 
more than half of their figures. This creates differences in the quality of the final 
score, and makes comparison difficult. It means that the scores need to be 
considered with caution. Taking into account only the Member States with data 
for all the figures, the best would be Hungary, Sweden, and Latvia, while Spain, 
Croatia, and France are in last place. The indicators used for this parameter serve 
different purposes. The speed of the litigation shows how cases are handled by 
fast courts, and is a very important indicator for parties trying to choose a court. 
Clearance rate is an indicator that shows the extent to which courts can absorb 
new cases. However, it says nothing about speed. It is simply an indication that 
the court system, with its current infrastructure and resources, is able to absorb 
the current level of litigation. A clearance rate of 100% shows that courts work 
with a constant workload (assuming that the speed of litigation is the same); a rate 
of more than 100% shows that courts have a tendency to reduce their workload; 
and a rate of less than 100% shows that courts have a tendency to increase their 
workload. In my opinion, both sides of the 100% mark are problematic for the 
government, and the best position would be the middle. However, this creates 
some problems in organising the results. Member States that perform better are to 
be found in the middle of the table in the Clearance Rate indicator, which affects 
their final score. Member States that have slow proceedings, and that also have 
many pending cases, receive a small boost from the results of the Clearance Rate. 
This explains why some Member States with fast proceedings and few pending 
7
,1
7
7
,3
3
7
,6
7
7
,7
8
8
,0
0
8
,4
4
8
,5
6
9
,1
7
9
,7
8
1
0
,3
3
1
0
,6
7
1
0
,7
5
1
0
,7
8
1
1
,0
0
1
2
,3
3
1
2
,8
9
1
3
,5
6
1
3
,8
3
1
4
,4
4
1
4
,6
7
1
4
,8
9
1
5
,5
6
1
6
,6
7
1
7
,0
0
1
9
,0
0
1
9
,6
7
2
4
,5
0
0
,0
0
B
G
H
U A
T SE LV E
E
R
O D
K SI N
L FI LU P
L
P
T EL LT C
Z
D
E IT
M
T ES H
R FR SK B
E
C
Y IE U
K
Chart 4: Efficiency of justice system
241 
 
cases are in the first half of Chart 4 (Estonia, Denmark, the Netherlands), while 
some other slow proceeding Member States, with more pending cases, are in 
second half of Chart 4 (Greece, Italy, Malta). Nevertheless, two conclusions can 
be drawn from this. First, jurisdictions that perform constantly well are still at the 
top of the Efficiency of Justice System table, while jurisdictions that perform 
constantly badly are at the bottom. Second, in view of the civil justice 
competition, parties seems to be more receptive to the length of proceedings 
compared to the clearance rate and pending cases.659 This means that while the 
EU (and maybe Member States) evaluate the efficiency of a more complicated 
system, their potential clients use more simplified systems or other criteria. 
Quality of the justice system 
The second parameter of the Scoreboard is the Quality of Justice Systems, which 
includes Figures 18 to 43. This parameter contains four indicators, the first being 
Accessibility, which comprises Figures 18 to 27.660 These figures measure, among 
others, the availability of information about the judicial system for the general 
public, a court’s electronic communication, availability of judgments, and 
communication between courts and the media. The Accessibility indicator 
measures some very important elements of the civil justice system competition, 
including transparency, accessibility and availability of information, and legal 
certainty. These elements are significant influential factors with regard to parties’ 
choice of court decisions. They have an impact on costs, legal certainty, and the 
general evaluation of the court. Nevertheless, not all the figures present in this 
section are important: for example, ‘Annual public budget allocated to legal aid’, 
‘Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case’, and ‘Benchmarking 
of small claims procedures online’, and so forth. While the budget for legal aid or 
the threshold for receiving legal aid are important, the demand side of the 
competition is not interested in these elements. As was concluded in Section 4.3.1 
‘Characteristics of the demand’, actors on the demand side are mobile and wealthy 
enough to support their mobility. Furthermore, Member States as suppliers are 
more interested in having wealthy litigants than in financing the litigation of 
small, financially impaired parties. Following this reasoning, it is appropriate to 
omit some of the figures from the score calculation for this parameter. The result 
will be better tailored to the performance analysis of Member States in view of 
                                                        
659 See Section 5.3. 
660 Figs. 18-27: “Availability of online information about the judicial system for the general 
public’, ‘Annual public budget allocated to legal aid’, ‘Income threshold for legal aid in a 
specific consumer case’, ‘Electronic submission of claims’, ‘Benchmarking of small claims 
procedures online’, ‘Electronic communication’, ‘Relations between courts and the 
press/media’, ‘Access to published judgments online’, ‘Arrangements for online publication 
of judgments in all instances’, and ‘Promotion of and incentives for using alternative dispute 
resolution methods’. 
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the civil justice system competition. However, despite the fact that some figures 
are omitted from the score calculation, their importance for the general well-being 
of the justice system should not be underestimated. In general, a good score in 
any figure is an indication of quality and should not be ignored. 
Considering the discussion above, the score for the Accessibility of court indicator 
does not take into account Figs. 19, 20, 22, and 27.661 The United Kingdom did 
not present data for any of the figures, while Poland did not present data for two 
of the figures. From the calculations (Chart 5: Accessibility), Spain, Latvia, and 
Slovakia top the ranking, while France, Cyprus, and Greece occupy the lowest 
positions. In general, Eastern European Member States are better placed 
compared to their counterparts in the west. The score might indicate the eagerness 
of these Member States to embrace modern court access methods in order to 
combat their chronic court problems. 
  
                                                        
661 The figures used in compiling the ranking are ‘Availability of online information about the 
judicial system for the general public’, ‘Electronic submission of claims’, ‘Electronic 
communication’, ‘Relations between courts and the press/media’, ‘Access to published 
judgments online’, and ‘Arrangements for online publication of judgments in all instances’. 
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The second indicator of the Quality of Justice parameter is Resources (Chart 6: 
Resources), which include Figs. 29-37. These figures take into account the 
situation involving financial and human resources in all Member States. 
Resources are an important element of the civil justice competition, as 
comparatively high resources in a jurisdiction dedicated to the court system can 
indicate competition or a willingness to compete. Based on the conclusions in 
Section 4.3.1 ‘Characteristics of the demand’, court resources were not considered 
to be influencing factors for the demand side. However, resources can play an 
important psychological role in attracting litigants, similar to the way clients are 
attracted by lawyers.662 This means that a well-resourced court can be attractive 
to litigants despite other lacunae or other courts being more efficient or better 
options in general. That said, it should be remembered that extensive resources 
dedicated to courts do not immediately indicate a better court, but they can 
indicate a more competitive court, a court that is more willing to compete, or a 
potentially competitive court. 
Figures 29, 31, 32, and 36 are not included in the score calculation for this 
indicator (Chart 6: Resources).663 The United Kingdom provided data for only 
two of the figures, while Poland did not provide data for any of them. The results 
                                                        
662 This was mentioned in Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3, and 4.3.3. It was also developed by Hadfield 
(2000) 968-972. 
663 Fig. 29 ‘General government expenditure on law courts‘; Fig. 31 ‘Proportion of female 
professional judges at first and second instance and Supreme Courts’; Fig. 32 ‘Variation in 
proportion of female professional judges at both first and second instance from 2010 to 2014 
as well as at Supreme Courts from 2010 to 2015’; Fig. 36 ‘Percentage of continuous judicial 
training activities on various types of judicial skills’. Without understating their importance, 
these figures can be considered not relevant for the civil justice system competition, and are 
omitted from the score calculation. 
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show that Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Germany top the ranking, while Poland, 
France, and Cyprus are at the bottom. The table’s score is influenced mostly by 
the human resources figures of the Member States. The ranking is also influenced 
by the availability of training for judges, which accounts for three of six figures 
in this section. However, Member States have different approaches when it comes 
to training judges. Considering that a competitive jurisdiction would be interested 
in maintaining a well-trained and up-to-date judiciary, the results of this section 
can be a good indication of their interest in competing and maintaining a 
competitive judiciary. The last two indicators of this parameter are ‘Assessment 
tools’ and ‘Quality Standards’. The first contains figures aimed at measuring the 
ability of a Member State to assess its own judicial quality and efficiency. This 
section is not considered in the score of this index, because it provides data that 
are not relevant for the civil justice system competition. Moreover, the existence 
of an assessment tool does not say anything about the quality of the tool or the 
quality of the tool’s product. This problem could have been resolved by the 
‘Quality Standards’ section, which contains figures on ‘Defined standards on 
aspects related to the justice system’ and ‘Specific standards in selected aspects 
related to the justice system’. However, these figures only identify and list 
standards related to the justice system, and report on their availability in all the 
Member States. The Scoreboard does not discuss the quality of these standards. 
The final score relating to the Quality of justice system parameter is based on the 
results of the Accessibility and Resources indicators (Chart 7: Quality of justice 
systems). The best scoring Member States are Slovenia, Spain, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, while Greece, the Czech Republic, France, and 
Cyprus664 have the worst score. It should be reminded that in essence these results 
show the extent to which Member States have advanced in electronic 
communication and to which they invest in training judges. As previously 
mentioned, Eastern European Member States seem to have advanced in electronic 
communication, while at the same time they seem eager to train their judges 
(Chart 6). This can explain why eight Eastern European Member States are in the 
first half of the table. Even if the figures and the calculation do not show the entire 
picture as regards court accessibility or the overall quality of judges, the 
dedication of some Member States to improving in both these sectors should serve 
as an example with respect to competing in the civil justice system competition. 
                                                        
664 The UK was not mentioned because of an insufficiency of data. 
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Independence 
The final parameter of the Scoreboard is ‘Independence’, which consists of three 
indicators and comprises Figs. 44-57. The first indicator, ‘Perceived judicial 
independence’, includes Figs. 44-48. The second indicator, ‘Structural 
independence’, includes Figs 49-55. The third indicator, ‘Work of the judicial 
networks on judicial independence’, includes Figs. 56-57. The first indicator 
contains data on the perception of judicial independence among the general public 
and companies. Figs. 45 and 47 indicate the main reasons for the perceived lack 
of independence among the general public and companies, respectively. These 
figures are not included in the calculation of the score for this parameter. The 
second indicator is an overview of the judiciary organisation, including the 
organisation of the judicial councils and safeguards to judges’ positions, and so 
on. This indicator does not rank the countries, and apart from an overview 
concerning how the judicial power is organised, it does not make any qualitative 
analysis. Therefore, the figures for this section have been omitted from the scores 
of this parameter. The third and final indicator presents a comparative overview 
of certain legal safeguards aimed at protecting judicial independence, but does not 
provide an evaluation of their effectiveness.665 This section does not provide data 
from all the Member States, nor does it provide an analysis that can allow them 
to be ranked. As a consequence, the results of this section have not been 
considered in calculating the score for the Independence index.  
Considering the practical obstacles mentioned above, the score for the 
Independence parameter is calculated based on Figs. 44, 46, and 48. The final 
                                                        
665 This is how this section is presented in the 2016 Scoreboard. 
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score reflects the perceived independence of judges and courts among the general 
public and businesses (Chart 8: Independence). Results show that courts and 
judges in Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are 
perceived as being the most independent, while courts in Slovenia, Italy, Croatia, 
Bulgaria, and Slovakia are perceived as being the least independent. The results 
should be viewed with caution, however, for reasons related to the sensitivity and 
perception of independence by the respondents. The sensitivity of legal and 
natural persons towards independence is different among Member States for 
historical and cultural reasons, while the notion of independence is relative and 
sensitive with regard to the cultural background of the respondents. Nevertheless, 
the results of this index do not come as a surprise. Countries that ranked highest 
have established traditions in democracy and in lack of corruption,666 which helps 
them maintain a low perception of corruption. 
From the perspective of the civil justice system competition, the independence of 
the court and judges is a very important criterion. Independence increases 
predictability, quality, and assurance that the decisions will be based on facts 
rather than on extrajudicial factors. Therefore, parties would be interested in 
choosing a court with high levels of independence. On the basis of the Oxford 
                                                        
666 Data from the Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project and Transparency 
International provide more details on the perception of justice and corruption, respectively. 
In both of them, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany 
are in the top ten. See the Rule of Law Index <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table> 
accessed 22 December 2017, Transparency International <http://www.transparency.
org/cpi2015#results-table> accessed 22 December 2017. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
FI IE NL UK AT BE CY RO LT EL HU ES IT BG
Chart 8: Independence
Figure 44 Figure 46 Figure 48 Total
247 
 
survey,667 but also on the results of my own survey,668 independence of the court 
is seen as one of the most influential factors in choosing a court.  
 
A final score from the Scoreboard, and some conclusions 
Now that the score for all the parameters has been discussed, the final ranking can 
be calculated (Chart 9: Final Scoreboard score). The final score for each Member 
State is the average of their score for each figure considered above. Before 
continuing with the score, however, a caveat should be noted. As mentioned, some 
figures account for the personal perceptions of respondents, which means that 
they are based on values and feelings that can vary from one Member State to 
another. The reasons are to be found in the different psychological perceptions, 
and in different historical and legal developments. However, the Scoreboard data 
are considered to be qualitatively equal and therefore comparable. Moreover, only 
four Member States (Spain, Hungary, Italy, and Slovenia) provided data for all 
the figures considered here. Therefore, comparing Member States’ scores with 
each other should be done with caution, and always by considering the limited 
amount of data that was presented. The question at this point is how to compare 
data that have been derived from different sources. The approach adopted here is 
pragmatic. First, the final ranking of Chart 9 does not claim to give a score to the 
justice systems of Member States. Second, the aim of the scores in Chart 9 is to 
provide an average score not only of all the figures in the Scoreboard but also for 
                                                        
667 The results of the survey cannot be found on the website of the Oxford Institute of European 
and Comparative Law. A copy of the final results can be accessed at <http://www.fondation-
droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_civil_justice_survey_-
_summary_of_results_final.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
668 See Section 5.3. 
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every parameter and indicator. Third, the scores in Chart 9 can serve only to 
provide a diagnosis of the apparent health of the justice system. With these 
warnings in mind, we can proceed to the following analysis. 
The analysis of the final Scoreboard results, as illustrated in Chart 9, has the 
following steps. First, it lists the five top-scoring Member States, and provides an 
analysis of their best-scoring figure(s) in order to understand what places them in 
the top five. Second, it continues with the five lowest-scoring Member States in 
order to determine reasons for the lows. Third, the analysis expands on two 
Member States: The United Kingdom and Germany. The UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and France have been mentioned in the previous chapters as being 
actively interested in attracting litigants to their jurisdictions. Therefore, an 
analysis of their scores would be of interest to evaluate their ‘sincerity’ in 
advertising themselves, as well as their strong and weak points. Since the 
Netherlands and France will be covered by the first and second step of the 
analysis, the third step covers only the UK and Germany. Furthermore, the 
analysis tries to identify the most successful aspects of Member States at the top 
of the list. 
The best scoring Member States are Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Estonia, and Austria. Luxembourg provided data for all but seven figures, and is 
in the top five in the indicators Length of proceedings (Chart 1), Pending cases 
(Chart 3), and Resources (Chart 6). It is also in the top five in the Quality of justice 
parameter (Chart 7) and the Independence parameter (Chart 8). According to the 
scores, Luxembourg would appear to have some of the best trained judges among 
the twenty-eight Member States, as well as an implied economic dedication to the 
justice system. Confidence on the part of the public and businesses is also high. 
A high score in both of these parameters as well as a first place overall makes 
Luxembourg an ideal candidate in the civil justice system competition. Because 
of its independence and quality, litigants can rely on a predictable, transparent, 
and professional court. 
The Netherlands is one of the Member States mentioned in previous chapters as 
being interested in the competition; hence, finding the Netherlands at the top of 
this Scoreboard ranking is not a surprise. The Netherlands provided data for all 
but three of the figures, and it is among the top five in the Accessibility indicator 
(Chart 5), in the Quality of justice systems parameter (Chart 7), and in the 
Independence parameter (Chart 8). And although the Netherlands does not appear 
in the top five as often as Luxembourg, it is consistently ranked in top positions. 
It goes without saying that an independent and qualitative judiciary together with 
a court’s accessibility are traits eagerly sought by the demand side. Therefore, the 
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Netherlands, in addition to indicating its interest in the civil justice system 
competition, is well equipped to compete within the EU. 
Denmark is in third position, and provided data for all but five figures. The 
Danish legal system is among the top five in the Length of proceedings indicator 
(Chart 1) and in the Independence parameter (Chart 8). Denmark is another 
example of a jurisdiction with high ranking courts but that does not seem 
interested in the civil justice system competition. 
Estonia is in fourth position, and provided data for all but two figures. Estonian 
courts are in the top five in the Length of proceeding indicator (Chart 1) and the 
Pending cases indicator (Chart 3). Estonia would have topped the Efficiency 
parameter had it not been for the Clearance rate section. As was explained, it 
appears that fast courts have a low clearance rate, which would explain why 
Estonia is among the last Member State in this indicator (Chart 2). Estonia is also 
in the top half of the ranking in almost all of the indicators, which contributes to 
its final score. Despite being in the eastern part of the EU, and away from the 
spotlight of the large western economies, based on the score, Estonian courts 
deserve more attention − not only from litigants in search of an efficient court but 
also from other Member States in search of an example. 
The top fifth position is held by Austria, which provided data for all but eight 
figures. Austrian courts are among the top five in the Length of proceedings 
indicator (Chart 1), the Pending cases indicator (Chart 3), and the Efficiency of 
justice system parameter (Chart 4). According to the data, Austrian courts are fast 
and efficient in adjudicating and handling cases. From the perspective of the civil 
justice system competition, however, Austria does not seem to be active in 
promoting its jurisdiction. The ranking in the Scoreboard figures shows that 
Austria has a great deal to offer to international litigants. 
The second step in the analysis concerns the bottom five Scoreboard rankings. 
These positions are occupied by the Czech Republic, Poland, France, Slovakia, 
and Cyprus. The Czech Republic is fifth from the bottom, and provided data for 
all but one figure. In the Accessibility indicator, the Resources indicator, and the 
Quality of justice systems parameter, the Czech Republic is in the bottom five. In 
none of the indicators is the Czech Republic in the top five. For Czech courts, the 
problems seem to be the lack of innovation and the lack of resources dedicated to 
courts. However, improvements are needed with regard to other indicators as well. 
Poland is the second Member State ranking in the bottom five, and it provided 
data for all but six figures. The Polish judicial system is in the bottom five in the 
Resources indicator (Chart 6) and the Quality of justice system parameter (Chart 
7). Problems related to resources and accessibility, as in the Czech case, seem to 
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persist. However, for both the Czech Republic and Poland, the problems are not 
restricted to the Quality of justice system parameters; they persist through all the 
Scoreboard’s figures, which means that the whole judicial system needs to be 
improved. 
France is the third Member State ranking in the bottom five, and provided data 
for all but one figure. The French court system is in the bottom five in the 
Clearance rate indicator (Chart 2), the Accessibility indicator (Chart 5), the 
Resources indicator (Chart 6), the Efficiency of justice system parameter (Chart 
4), and the Quality of Justice parameter (Chart 7). The results are quite 
discouraging, considering that France promotes itself as an attractive venue for 
cross-border litigation. If the ranking represents the reality, litigants might be 
reluctant to choose France. It appears that France needs urgent and significant 
improvements to its justice system if it wants to compete with top-ranking 
Member States. 
Slovakia is the fourth Member State ranking in the bottom five, and provided data 
for all but three figures. However, the Slovakian court system is ranked among 
the top five in the Accessibility indicator (Chart 5), which is in contrast to the 
negative score in other indicators. Slovakia is in the bottom five of the Length of 
proceedings indicator (Chart 5), the Pending cases indicator (Chart 3), the 
Efficiency of justice system parameter (Chart 4), and the Independence parameter 
(Chart 8). Court efficiency and independence are among the most important 
elements as regards a choice of court system. Based on the scores, litigants would 
be advised to avoid Slovak courts, while the court system itself would find it 
difficult to compete in a civil justice system competition. 
Cyprus is in last place in the Scoreboard ranking, and provided data for all but 
six of the figures. The Cypriot court system is in the bottom five in the Length of 
proceedings indicator (Chart 1), the Pending cases indicator (Chart 3), the 
Efficiency of justice system parameter (Chart 4), the Accessibility indicator 
(Chart 5), the Resources indicator (Chart 6), and the Quality of justice systems 
parameter (Chart 7). It appears as though everything that can possibly go wrong 
goes wrong for the Cypriot justice system. In fact, Cyprus is constantly in the 
second half of the ranking in almost all of the charts. With these negative results, 
Cyprus should lead the list of courts to be avoided. 
The third step involves an analysis of Germany and the UK as two of the most 
active competitors. Germany is ranked twelve overall, and was in the top five 
only for the Resources indicator (Chart 6) and the Quality of Justice Systems 
parameter (Chart 7). Germany did not perform very well in the Efficiency of the 
justice system parameter (Chart 4). For this one, Germany was constantly in the 
second half of the chart. German courts are not particularly known for being slow 
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or causing delays. The results of the Scoreboard, however, show that other 
Member States seem to be more efficient than Germany. It would have been 
interesting to compare German court efficiency with that of the UK courts, but 
the UK did not present data for this parameter. The UK is placed better than 
Germany in the overall ranking, where it is in seventh position. The UK, however, 
did not present data for the Efficiency of the justice system parameter (Chart 4) 
or for the Accessibility indicator (Chart 5). In the Quality of justice systems 
parameter (Chart 7), the UK is in second-last position. The UK apparently does 
not score well in the figure for the training of judges (Fig. 35). This can be 
explained by the different training system in the UK or by a different approach to 
training judges. The seventh position overall for the UK places it in front of all 
but one of its competitors − the Netherlands. It would have been interesting to see 
how the UK compares with other Member States in the other indicators. 
Notwithstanding the results presented above, bottom-ranking Member States 
should not be overlooked or feel overshadowed by those in the top positions. First, 
no Member State is immune to being positioned at the bottom of the table. Cost 
reductions, reforms disregarding efficiency, and a reluctant attitude towards 
innovation can affect any Member State. Second, discussing the problems faced 
by bottom-ranking Member States can also help mid- or top-ranking Member 
States. Lessons can be learned not only on improving the situation of the court 
system but also on avoiding certain problems. 
5.2 Overview of competition activities in Member States 
Section 5.1 focused on two issues related to the justice system in the EU. The first, 
covered in Section 5.1.1, discussed the standpoint of the European Union on the 
development of civil justice systems, with particular attention being paid to the 
civil justice system competition. The discussion concluded that EU institutions 
seek to improve court system efficiency throughout the Member States; consider 
the court system to be an important contributing factor to economic growth and 
investment appeal; and compile statistics annually on the judicial systems of 
Member States. One part of these annual statistics is in the form of the European 
Judicial Scoreboard (the Scoreboard), which is a statistical instrument aimed at 
providing Member States with comparable data on their own and on other judicial 
systems. The Scoreboard was the second issue (Section 5.1.2) covered in Section 
5.1. Given that it provides scores and rankings for different figures, but not a final 
score for the judicial system, the aim of Section 5.1.2 was to prepare a ranking list 
based on the Scoreboard data. The list can be used to indicate which EU Member 
States score better or worse. Another aim is to confront the list with the survey 
responses discussed in Section 5.3, which examines the choice of court 
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preferences of lawyers practicing in the EU. The last aim of the ranking list is to 
position the judicial system of Germany, England and Wales, the Netherlands, 
and France among the other Member States, as these four jurisdictions are actively 
promoting their jurisdictions to attract cross-border litigants. 
This section focuses on the four judicial systems that seem to be most active in 
the European civil justice system competition. In addition, in focus are also 
Luxembourg and Denmark as two of the best Member States according to the 
ranking list in Section 5.1. Luxembourg and Denmark do not seem to be active in 
the civil justice system competition, but their highly efficient, fast, and transparent 
courts could be very appealing to litigants, very competitive, and a good example 
for other Member States. 
This section analyses what it is that England and Wales, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and France are promoting, and whether it is supported by the 
Scoreboard results or other reports. Since Luxembourg and Denmark are not 
active competitors, this section looks at the elements of their success and what 
their contribution to the civil justice competition could be. 
5.2.1 Denmark 
Denmark was ranked third in the final ranking list derived from the Scoreboard 
(Chart 9), and its strong points were highlighted in Section 5.1.2.3. To recap, 
Denmark is among the top five in Fig. 4 ‘Time to resolve civil, commercial, 
administrative, and other cases’, in Fig. 11 ‘Number of litigious civil and 
commercial pending cases’, in Fig. 13 ‘Insolvency: Time to resolve insolvency’, 
in Fig. 15 ‘Electronic communications: Average length of judicial review cases 
against decisions of national regulatory authorities applying EU law on electronic 
communications’, in Fig. 18 ‘Availability of online information about the judicial 
system for the general public’, Fig. 21 ‘Electronic submission of claims’, Fig. 23 
‘Electronic communication’, Fig. 24 ‘ Relations between courts and the 
press/media’, Fig. 25 ‘Access to published judgments online’, Fig. 34 
‘Compulsory training for judges’, Fig. 37 ‘Availability of training for judges on 
communication with parties and the press’, Fig. 44 ‘Perceived independence of 
courts and judges among the general public’, Fig. 46 ‘Perceived independence of 
courts and judges among companies’, Fig. 48 ‘World Economic Forum: 
businesses’ perception of judicial independence’. These figures show that 
Denmark excels in court transparency and perception of independence, and scores 
well in the speed of proceeding. Considering the analysis in Section 4.5, both 
transparency and court independence are important factors in choice of court for 
cross-border litigants. These characteristics would make Denmark a successful 
competitor in the civil justice competition. 
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The 2016 Scoreboard is accompanied by detailed country fiches for each EU 
Member State. Denmark’s fiche does not provide additional evidence about the 
country’s positive performance. However, the low number of first instance 
incoming cases is exceptional within Europe. Of all the Member States, Denmark 
has one of the lowest number of litigious civil (and commercial) cases. For 2014, 
there were 0.7 cases per 100 inhabitants, while the average for the period 2010-
2014 was 0.85 cases per 100 inhabitants.669 It can be argued that a low number of 
litigious civil cases could benefit the efficiency and transparency of courts, and 
these are also Denmark’s strongest points. A low rate of litigious cases can be a 
sign of a low litigious society, which can influence an absence of delay strategies, 
which on their own help to maintain a court’s efficiency. It can be also be a sign 
of successful ADR mechanisms that divert court cases to arbitration or mediation. 
A low litigation rate can also indicate low legal complexity and high legal 
predictability. Low legal complexity would allow conflicting parties to better 
understand the law and the procedures, while high legal/court predictability would 
allow them to more easily predict court decisions and legal outcomes. In such a 
scenario, parties would be interested in avoiding the extra costs of litigation and 
in settling out of the court.670 In turn, these elements can create a cycle, in which 
low litigation rates contribute to low legal complexity and high legal/court 
predictability, and low legal complexity and high legal/court predictability 
contribute to a low number of court cases. A low number of court cases also helps 
maintain an efficient court, and this way the cycle also encompasses other factors. 
Again, relating this to the analysis in Section 4.5, Danish courts could offer short 
proceeding times, low legal and procedural complexity, high court accuracy, and 
high court predictability. Each of these elements is important in both competition 
from unilateral and bilateral choice of court.  
A fast processing time and transparency are among the objectives identified by 
the Danish government as the focus areas for the period 2013-2018.671 The four 
main objectives for this period were a short processing time, more consistency in 
the performance of duties, contemporary communication, and continuity in being 
an attractive workplace. Details show that the Danish government wanted to 
improve even further the case processing time, to innovate communication with 
the public, and to make courts an attractive workplace. Two important topics with 
                                                        
669 Similar figures for litigious civil (and commercial) cases are also had by other Scandinavian 
Member States. Finland had 0.2 cases on average per 100 inhabitants for the period 2010-
2014. Sweden had 0.7 cases on average per 100 inhabitants for the same period.  
670 Denmark also scores high in promoting alternative dispute resolution methods. See Fig. 27 
on the 2016 Scoreboard. 
671 Objectives of the Courts of Denmark <http://www.domstol.dk/om/otherlanguages/english/
visionvaluesobjectives/objectivesofthedanishcourts/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
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respect to the civil justice system competition can be isolated here. First, the 
Danish legal system is not only efficient and transparent but it also benefits from 
the will of the government to maintain these high standards. Despite the 
comparatively high standards of Danish courts, however, the government does not 
seem to be interested in the civil justice system competition.672 This means either 
that the demand does not justify the effort to compete, or that benefits derived 
from competition do not justify participation. It can also be argued that there is no 
particular reason for the Danish government to abstain from competition. Second, 
good results in figures and statistics do not make a jurisdiction competitive or an 
actor in the competition process. The political will to participate, an awareness of 
the competitive potential, and a strong internal demand are absolutely essential. 
5.2.2 England and Wales (the United Kingdom) 
Despite being part of the United Kingdom, England and Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland have their own court systems, organised on a different basis and 
operating independently. Among them, England and Wales are the most active in 
promoting their jurisdiction to international litigants and commercial parties. 
London as an important commercial, financial, and administrative hub spearheads 
attempts to attract legal business and litigants from other jurisdictions.673 
London’s importance outshines the courts of other cities in England and Wales to 
the extent that when London is mentioned, England and Wales is meant, and vice 
versa. Since the focus of the government, litigants, and studies revolve around 
London, this section follows the same steps and focuses on England and Wales, 
with London as the point of reference. 
Because the Scoreboard does not distinguish between the different jurisdictions 
within the UK, the performance of England and Wales cannot be directly 
assessed. Another difficulty is created by the lack of data for the UK, which makes 
                                                        
672 A brochure on the court system in Denmark makes no reference to attracting international 
litigants or commercial cases. The brochure is directed more to the general public, 
underlining the positive aspects of Danish courts. The brochure and the information on the 
websites of the Danish Court Administration and the Danish Ministry of Justice likewise 
show no evidence of competitive action. For the English version of the brochure, see ‘A 
closer look at the courts of Denmark’: <http://www.domstol.dk/om/otherlanguages/english/
publications/Publications/profilbrochure_uk.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
673 ‘Factors influencing international litigants’ decision to bring commercial claims to the 
London based courts’ is a study commissioned by the Ministry of Justice of the United 
Kingdom and carried out in 2015 by Eva Lein, Robert McCorquodale, Lawrence 
McNamara, Hayk Kupelyants, and José del Rio from the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law (hereafter the BIICL Study). The findings suggest that London is 
frequently chosen in cross-border cases because of the reputation of its judges and the quality 
of English law. The study can be found at <https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
publications/factors-influencing-international-litigants-decisions-to-bring-commercial-
claims-to-the-london-based-courts> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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it difficult to compare the UK’s score with that of other jurisdictions, and, as a 
consequence, the score of England and Wales with that of other jurisdictions. Of 
twenty-nine figures analysed, the UK provided data for seven, resulting in the UK 
having an average score of 8.43. This score would put it in seventh place in the 
Scoreboard ranking. However, because of the persistent lack of data, this score is 
difficult to justify. On a positive note, figures for the Independence parameter 
(Chart 6) are complete for the UK, and here the UK is positioned seventh in the 
ranking, thus better than Germany (eighth) and France (twelfth). It should be 
noted that England and Wales were not distinguished from the other UK 
jurisdictions, so we cannot be sure of each jurisdiction’s contribution to the final 
score. Apart from this limited comparison, little can be derived from the 
Scoreboard. 
Empirical evidence suggests that England is one of the most popular jurisdictions 
for resolving disputes. The survey, conducted in 2015 by the present author for 
this study, found that the jurisdiction of England and Wales was considered the 
most attractive in the EU by 42.6% of the responding lawyers. The survey also 
revealed that 72.1% of the respondents consider England and Wales to be actively 
trying to attract litigants.674 Data from another survey, conducted in 2008 by the 
Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law, show that England was 
among the top three preferred forums selected by lawyers.675 England was the 
forum most preferred (17%) when lawyers were asked about their preferences in 
the choice of forum, and the second most preferred (14%) when the same lawyers 
were asked for a preference that was not their home jurisdiction.676 Interestingly 
enough, responding lawyers considered that English courts were the ones most 
chosen in cross-border transactions (38%). This difference in percentage between 
their preference and their perceived preference indicates that lawyers 
overestimated the attractiveness of English courts, meaning that while they 
choose English courts to litigate, they consider that this choice is made more 
frequently by them or their colleagues. This distinction should not be overlooked. 
If choice makers consider that a certain choice is the most frequent in their 
environment, they might face psychological difficulties in not making that same 
choice.677 The longer this situation persists, the more important that choice 
becomes, until it reaches the point of becoming the default choice in that 
                                                        
674 See Section 5.3, in particular the analysis on Question 14 and 20. 
675 The results of the survey cannot be found on the website of the Oxford Institute of European 
and Comparative Law. A copy of the final results can be accessed at <http://www.fondation-
droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_civil_justice_survey_-
_summary_of_results_final.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
676 A similar result was found in the survey conducted by the author of this thesis. 
677 For more, see Section 2.5. 
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environment. Choosing the most well-known option or the default possibility can 
be considered a ‘safe’ choice. If lawyers consider that the majority choose English 
courts, they might be inclined to do the same. If this becomes frequent, English 
courts can − or will be − the default courts of choice. If lawyers and clients think 
English courts are the ones most chosen, they will consider this as a ‘safe’ choice. 
This mechanism would affect how competition unfolds, with the risk of nullifying 
it. Several industries already use English courts as their default choice. Changing 
this would be difficult, and obviously a formidable obstacle to the jurisdiction 
competition. 
Both surveys show that for businesses and lawyers England is a popular place in 
which to litigate. This position is reinforced by the perception that England is the 
most often chosen venue, and that it is the most active Member State to engage in 
the competition of jurisdictions in the EU. The popularity and the positive 
perception of English courts is well known to the government in London. Official 
data show that since 2010, almost 80% of all Commercial Court cases in England 
and Wales have involved a foreign litigant. Since 2012, in almost 50% of the 
cases, all the parties have been foreigners. In most of the cases (60%), their value 
has been above £300,000, and 16% of the total have had a value above £1 
million.678 According to the Ministry of Justice, the legal sector contributed £23.1  
billion in 2009,679 £20.9 billion in 2011,680 £22.6 billion in 2013,681 and £25.7 
billion in 2015 to the UK economy.682 In 2009, the legal services sector generated 
£3.2 billion683 in exports, while in 2011 it generated £4 billion.684 The figures 
show that despite a fall in the general output of the legal sector between 2009 and 
                                                        
678 Lein (2015) 10. 
679 Ministry of Justice, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Services Sector’, available 
at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal-ser-
vices-action-plan.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
680 Ministry of Justice, ‘UK Legal Services on the International Stage: Underpinning growth 
and stability’, available at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-
reports/MoJ/legal-services-action-plan-0313.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
681 Ministry of Justice, ‘Legal Services: removing barriers to competition’, available at <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/535499/legal-serv-
ices-removing-barriers-to-competition.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
682 Ministry of Justice, ‘Transforming our Justice System: By the Lord Chancellor, the Lord 
Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals’, available at <https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553261/joint-vision-
statement.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
683 Ministry of Justice, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Services Sector’, available 
at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal-ser-
vices-action-plan.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
684 Ministry of Justice, ‘UK Legal Services on the International Stage: Underpinning growth 
and stability’, available at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-
reports/MoJ/legal-services-action-plan-0313.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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2011, the level of exports rose. This could indicate that foreign clients have 
increased in importance for English law firms. To support this, the Ministry of 
Justice considered that ‘ninety percent of the commercial cases handled by 
London law firms involve an international party’.685 The lucrative legal business 
in London also attracts foreign law firms; over two hundred of them have offices 
in London.686 It can be said that London is not only a hub for English lawyers but 
it has also acquired a cosmopolitan image that attracts non-British parties to 
litigate in it. 
The 2015 BIICL Study suggests that there are two primarily important factors in 
choosing English courts:687 the first is the experience of English judges, and the 
second is the prevalence of English law as choice of applicable law. Other 
secondary reasons influencing parties to choose London-based litigation are the 
well-established reputation of English courts; efficient remedies; procedural 
effectiveness; and forum neutrality. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice 
considers world-class, highly specialised practitioners and expert judges to be the 
main attracting features of the British court.688 However, users of English courts 
are also the target of other jurisdictions that compete with British courts, even on 
a global scale. The Ministry of Justice considers New York, Stockholm, Paris, 
Geneva, Dubai, Singapore, and Hong Kong as already competing or ready to 
compete with London.689 The only European cities on this list are Geneva, 
Stockholm, and Paris, of which only the last two are part of the EU. Most striking 
here is that for the UK Ministry of Justice, Germany and the Netherlands are not 
considered to be important or even potential competitors. According to the BIICL 
study, London’s courts face serious competition from the courts of New York, 
Singapore, and EU Member States (in general, with none specified).690 
Continental European courts are considered to offer more cost-efficient litigation, 
a good inquisitorial system, and faster results. However, the discrepancy between 
the findings of the BIICL study and the claims of the Ministry should not be very 
                                                        
685 Ministry of Justice, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Services Sector’, available 
at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal-ser-
vices-action-plan.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
686 Ministry of Justice, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Services Sector’, available 
at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal-ser-
vices-action-plan.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
687 Lein (2015) 2-3. 
688 Ministry of Justice, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Services Sector’, available 
at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal-ser-
vices-action-plan.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
689 Ministry of Justice, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Services Sector’, available 
at <https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/MoJ/legal-ser-
vices-action-plan.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
690 BIICL Study p. 4. 
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surprising, as the claims of the Ministry of Justice seem to be based on anecdotal 
evidence, while the BIICL study bases its claims on an empirical study.691 An 
undeniable fact is that on a global scale London is one of most attractive 
jurisdictions, and is actively trying to maintain and reinforce this position. 
Since at least 2003, the Ministry of Justice in partnership with the legal profession 
has been active in promoting the British legal sector − and with it London’s 
courts − overseas. Promotion as well as strategic trade agreements with emerging 
markets have been aimed at facilitating the access of UK legal services in these 
markets. To complement this, the Law Society of England and Wales has 
promoted links between countries like South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Malaysia, 
Qatar, and Oman. Similar promoting activities have been carried out by UK Trade 
& Investment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, the HM Treasury, the Bar Council, TheCityUK, 
and the City of London Corporation. The diversity and the number of actors 
involved demonstrate the enormous and complex economic and political interest 
in attracting legal business. To justify the promotion and the related interest, the 
UK government is constantly trying to reform the legal sector, including courts 
and related services. As part of the reforms, the Rolls Building was inaugurated 
in 2012 to host the Chancery Division of the High Court, the Admiralty and 
Commercial Court, and the Technology and Construction Court. Although this 
might not sound impressive, choosing the right English court is often complicated 
and difficult for foreign users. Having these courts under the same roof and 
simplifying the system seems to be the underlying purpose of this initiative. In 
September 2016, a joint publication by the Ministry of Justice, the Lord Chief 
Justice of England and Wales, and the Senior President of Tribunals laid out their 
common plan to transform the justice system over the next few years.692 This 
transformation is aimed at increasing accessibility to courts, improving the 
proportionality of costs, and improving and maintaining the image of a fair court. 
The government plans to spend £700 million in improving the courts’ structure 
and infrastructure, and aims to speed up the resolution of conflicts in courts, make 
costs proportionate to the case, make costs more predictable, and increase courts’ 
accuracy. Online innovations, changes in the costs calculations, mergers of courts, 
and structural reforms can be expected in the future. The feeling is that no matter 
what reforms the government in London enacts, it always plays the fanfare of 
success and of being ‘the best court in the world’. However, Brexit and its 
                                                        
691 This survey is discussed in Section 5.3.1.3. 
692 Ministry of Justice, ‘Transforming our Justice System: By the Lord Chancellor, the Lord 
Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals’, available at <https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553261/joint-vision-
statement.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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unpredictable consequences might change the rules of the game that London has 
become used to playing. 
5.2.3 France 
France is home to several arbitration institutions that attract litigants on a global 
scale.693 While arbitration services are aware of their role and try to maintain their 
leading position, French legal actors have been criticised for not sufficiently 
appreciating the importance of law as an economic instrument.694 With reference 
to the scores calculated in Section 5.1, France occupies the twenty-sixth position, 
while having provided data for all but one of the figures taken into account. France 
is placed among the bottom five in three indicators: Accessibility, Resources, and 
Clearance Rate. Of these, Accessibility and Resources are the most important in 
the civil justice system competition. A jurisdiction becomes unattractive when it 
is comparatively difficult to access its courts, and when these courts do not have 
enough resources. It can be suggested that lack of resources affects French results 
in other figures as well, which would explain why scores are mediocre and France 
never reaches the top. 
Despite the discouraging Scoreboard score, however, France is actively trying to 
promote its jurisdiction for international litigation. To this effect, in 17 January 
2011, the Paris Commercial Court opened the doors of a new division, which was 
able to assess evidence in several languages, among others English, German and 
Spanish.695 As explained by the President of the Court, the aim of this initiative 
was to increase the attractiveness of the court.696 While the initiative is to be 
applauded, the effects are limited. The initiative allows litigating parties to present 
                                                        
693 Some arbitration institutions with their seat in Paris are the French Association for 
Arbitration (AFA), the Centre for Mediation and Arbitration of Paris (CMAP), the 
International Arbitration Chamber of Paris (CAIP), Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris 
(CAMP), and Cour Internationale d’Arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale. 
In 2009, various institutions interested in promoting Paris as an arbitration venue created the 
not-for-profit organisation ‘Paris, the Home of International Arbitration’. This organisation 
promotes Paris as the world’s leading venue for arbitration. The aim of this organisation is 
not hidden. Fending off competition and maintaining the image of a good brand is the most 
obvious stance in a lucrative and aggressive business environment. The website of the Paris, 
the Home of International Arbitration is available at <http://parisarbitration.net/en/> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
694 Durand-Barthez, Pascal. 'Economic Aspects of Law: A Partnership between the Foundation 
and HEC Paris' <http://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/en/document/economic-
aspects-of-law-a-partnership-between-the-foundation-and-hec-paris/> accessed on 22 
December 2017. 
695 Kern (2012) 195-196. 
696 Gilles Cuniberti, ‘Paris, the Jurisdiction of Choice?’ (Conflict of Laws, 2 February 2011) 
<http://conflictoflaws.net/2011/paris-commercial-court-creates-international-division/> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
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evidence in a foreign language, but the rest of the process is conducted in French. 
While this is step forward, it can be imagined that litigants expect something 
more. To this effect, the Foundation pour le Droit Continental (Foundation)697 
and the Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Paris (HEC Paris) joined forces in 2011 
to gather information on the legal industry’s estimated economic weight in 
France. A noteworthy result of this collaboration was an empirical study on choice 
of law in international contracts in France.698 Four kind of contracts were 
surveyed: sales of goods; construction and similar contracts for large projects; 
mergers and acquisitions; financial contracts; and arbitration agreements. To the 
disappointment of the French researchers, however, the results showed that 
English law and US law were the most chosen, despite having no clear superiority 
over French law in particular and continental law in general.699 The study also 
suggests that the choice of law seems to be affected by psychological and other 
extra-judicial factors, which pose problems to competition, as they can be more 
difficult to detect and to respond to. 
The study insists that choice of law has economic consequences, and that this 
concept is not fully developed in France, which should pay more attention to the 
legal industry’s economic importance. As reported in the study, the turnover of 
the French legal sector for 2008 was €18.3 billion for a workforce of 160,000 
persons.700 The authors of the study consider this turnover to be inaccurate, and 
they estimate the turnover of the French legal business in 2008 at around €24 
billion. Data provided by the French national office of statistics provide more 
insights into the strength of the French legal sector. The turnover for the last few 
years has been €17.96 billion in 2009, €20.19 billion in 2010, €20.10 billion in 
2011, €19.89 billion in 2012, €19.72 billion in 2013, €19.61 billion in 2014, and 
€20.29 billion in 2015.701 These data suggest that the legal sector’s turnover has 
been somehow stable, especially since 2010. It should be noted that this is not the 
                                                        
697 The Foundation was created in 2007 to promote discussions and studies on Romano-
Germanic law. 
698 The results of the research are published in: Lenglart F. Choisir son droit-conséquences 
économiques du choix du droit applicable dans les contrats internationaux. 2012. 
699 Durand-Barthez (2012) 510. 
700 Durand-Barthez (2012) 516. 
701 Data obtained from the French institute of statistics, Institut National de la Statistique et des 
Etudes Economique (INSEE). Legal activities bear the statistical code M69Z1 Activite 
Juridique, part of the higher level section M69Z Legal and Accounting Activities (Activite 
Juridique et Comptables). On 21 November 2016, the website of the INSEE was overhauled, 
and does not provide detailed statistics for legal activities (activite juridique). Details are 
provided only for the higher level section Legal and Accounting Activities (Activite 
Juridique et Comptables). Aggregate data for both the legal and the accounting sector can 
be obtained at <https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2387899?sommaire=2387999> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
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total turnover of the French legal sector, as the activity generated by courts and 
in-house lawyers is missing. Thus, the total turnover can be expected to be higher, 
as suggested by Durant-Barthez. Court budget per capita in France was €60.5 in 
2010, €61.2 in 2011, €62.0 in 2013, and €64.1 in 2014,702 which is less than 
Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands had spent on their courts. It is worth 
mentioning that France achieved these results without a particular focus on 
competing with other jurisdictions or trying to attract more litigants, as was the 
case with the UK. If this is true, France might have more potential to exploit by 
engaging in competition. 
The websites of the Ministry of Justice of France and of the Chamber of 
Advocates are silent as regards competition. Of course, the Ministry of Justice 
maintains a brochure explaining and praising the French legal system. First, 
however, it is a brief description of the legal system in France (similar to the 
Danish brochure), and second, it is not aimed at attracting international 
litigants.703 Nevertheless, in contrast, French arbitrators take the promotion of 
their business very seriously. ‘Paris, the Home of International Arbitration’ is a 
not-for-profit association created in 2009 for the sole purpose of promoting Paris 
as a site of international arbitration.704 The long membership list shows the interest 
of law firms in promoting Paris as an arbitration venue and thereby procuring 
more work for themselves. Similar activities in promoting French courts by 
litigation lawyers are missing. As an exception to this, however, the Foundation 
has tried to stir up more promoting activities for French courts. The first step was 
the collaboration with the HEC and the study it produced. Because the study was 
designed and conducted by French authors and not by foreigners, it must have 
helped the Foundation realise that French law and courts are far from being the 
most popular in terms of choice of court.705 As a response to this, and in 
collaboration with German partners, the Foundation published a brochure titled 
                                                        
702 CEPEJ study on the functioning of judicial systems. France (2014 data), p. 211. 
703 The current brochure is titled ‘The French legal system’. It is dated 22 December 2012 and 
can be found on the website of the French Ministry of Justice: 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/french_legal_system.pdf> accessed 22 December 
2017. An earlier version of the brochure titled ‘French legal expertise’ made in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be found at <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/
expertise_juridique_francaise_an.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
704 Paris, the Home of International Arbitration <http://parisarbitration.net/en/> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
705 Other incentives to begin promoting French courts also resulted in the publication of 
brochures in England and Germany, promoting their respective legal system. While praising 
the qualities of the systems, the brochures indirectly had a negative effect on the reputation 
of France. 
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‘Continental law: global, legally certain, economic, flexible’.706 It was published 
in 2011, but has not been updated since then. While it is not certain who took the 
initiative to publish the brochure, the German contribution seems to outweigh the 
French one. This brochure also remains the last attempt at promoting or engaging 
in any sort of competitive activity in support of French courts. 
The legal sector in France seems to have made an important contribution to the 
economy, despite the relatively small amount per capita granted to the juridical 
system. Considering the case of arbitrators, international litigation seems to be 
interesting for French lawyers. This interest, however, is not translated into 
actions to promote the French court system but into responses to the English 
activities. English undertakings are aimed at promoting their common law system, 
while French actions try to promote the Romano-Germanic law system. In doing 
this, France has in Germany its strongest ally. 
5.2.4 Germany 
The Scoreboard results, analysed in Section 5.1, place Germany in the twelfth 
position, following the provision of data for all but five of the figures. Data show 
that Germany does not perform well in the ‘Efficiency of justice system’ 
parameter (eighteenth position), but does better in the ‘Independence’ parameter 
(third position), and in the ‘Quality of justice systems’ parameter (third position). 
The final score suggests that Germany’s court system is average compared to that 
of other Member States. The quality of the justice system is boosted also by the 
considerable budget allocated to courts, with courts and the judicial system 
receiving €105.8, €114.3, and €108.9 per capita in 2010, 2012, and 2013, 
respectively.707 This is almost double compared to the French court budget. 
According to the data of the German statistics authority, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
the turnover of the legal sector was €19.5 billion in 2012, €20.1 billion in 2013, 
and €22.2 billion in 2014.708 These figures are comparable with those of France, 
which is counterintuitive, considering Germany’s bigger population and its 
stronger economic power. However, this does not mean that the legal business is 
not lucrative for law firms, and outside the radar of the German government. In 
fact, there are several endeavours underway to promote Germany as an 
international litigation venue. 
As with France, Germany’s attention to the competition of civil justice systems 
was spurred by a Law Society brochure in 2007. It was surprising to German 
                                                        
706 The brochure is published in English and in German. It is offered on a dedicated website at 
<http://www.kontinentalesrecht.de> accessed 22 December 2017. 
707 CEPEJ study on the functioning of judicial systems. Germany (2014 data), p. 232. 
708 Statistisches Bundesamt: <https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/datau=Willkom-
men> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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scholars that the English were promoting aspects of their court system that were 
not as good as or worse than in Germany.709 In this regard, the federal Ministry of 
Justice of Germany prepared and published a brochure in 2008. The brochure is 
titled ‘Law Made in Germany’ and is still being updated and published in German, 
English, French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and Vietnamese.710 Clearly this is an 
attempt to promote German courts in all the most popular languages in the world 
(though Spanish is missing). The brochure is endorsed by lawyers’, notaries’, and 
judges’ associations, and it exalts three characteristics of the German system: 
namely, global, effective, and cost efficient. These characteristics are important 
for businesses, of course, and the brochure emphasises them even more. Examples 
are used to show cases where the superiority of German law saves either time, or 
costs, or efforts, or all of them together. However, there are no data available as 
to whether the brochure has been successful in making German law and courts 
better known, or whether it has brought more revenue to German law firms. 
Turnover data from the Statistisches Bundesamt cover only the period 2012-2014. 
Nevertheless, Germany collaborated with France to produce another brochure, the 
‘Continental Law’ brochure,711 although the brochure has not been updated since 
at least 15 May 2012, the last day that Michel Mercier was Minister of Justice of 
France. Evidently, German support was focused on the ‘Law Made in Germany’ 
project, while France lost interest. The Continental Law brochure was a surrogate 
copy of the German brochure, with almost the same motto and with additional 
examples that included not only German law but also French law. Inspired by 
prospects of market gain in view of Brexit, 30 March 2017 saw the launch of The 
Justice Initiative Frankfurt am Main.712 The initiative aims at promoting Frankfurt 
as a hot spot for commercial litigation in the EU. It started with a conference 
organised by the Minister of Justice of the Federal State of Hessen. Frankfurt is 
already an important financial centre in Europe, with many international firms 
being located there. It seems only logical that the local government is interested 
in attracting foreign litigants. The plan of measures for this initiative proposes the 
creation of a comprehensive strategy to strengthen Frankfurt as a hub for 
international dispute settlement, the establishment of a sections specialised in 
international commercial matters in the courts of Frankfurt, rethinking the design 
                                                        
709 Calliess and Hoffmann (2009) 117. In general, see also Kötz (2010). 
710 Law Made in Germany: <http://www.lawmadeingermany.de> accessed 22 December 2017. 
711 Continental Law: <http://www.kontinentalesrecht.de> accessed 22 December 2017. 
712 Peter Bert, ‘Frankfurt vs London – Brexit: An Opportunity for Frankfurt to Become a New 
Hub of Litigation in Europe?’ (Dispute Resolution in Germany, 15 March 2017) 
<http://www.disputeresolutiongermany.com/2017/03/frankfurt-vs-london-brexit-an-
opportunity-for-frankfurt-to-become-a-new-hub-of-litigation-in-europe/> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
264 
 
of the court process, and obtaining the lawyers’ support for the implementation.713 
The measures proposed seem to address important elements for the attractiveness 
of a jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that the drafters of the proposed measures 
consider the help of lawyers and other interested groups as crucial for the success 
of the initiative. It remains to be seen what the effects of this initiative will be. 
Germany shows clear signs of interest in attracting litigants in its courts, and in 
encouraging businesses to use its laws for their transactions. The Scoreboard 
results demonstrate that Germany has a qualitative and independent judicial 
system. In addition to these, qualities Germany’s role as the economic motor of 
Europe clearly explains its desire to increase the use of its law in international 
litigation. 
5.2.5 Luxembourg 
The Scoreboard results put Luxembourg in first place, following the provision of 
data for all but eight of the figures analysed in Section 5.1. Data show that 
Luxembourg is twelfth among the Member States for the ‘Efficiency of Justice 
System’ parameter, fourth in the ‘Quality of justice systems’ parameter, and 
fourth for the ‘Independence’ parameter. According to the data, the 
Luxembourgish court system appears to be among the most efficient and 
independent in the EU. The legal system in Luxembourg had a turnover of €1 
billion in 2011, €1.1 billion in 2012, €1.2 billion in 2013, and €1.4 billion in 
2014.714 These figures are important, considering the size of Luxembourg and the 
number of persons employed.715 In Luxembourg, the amount granted to the 
judicial system per capita was €143.5 in 2010, €152.3 in 2012, €142.7 in 2013, 
and €139.4 in 2014.716 The sum granted to the courts per capita is almost one and 
a half times higher than in Germany. From these figures, it is clear that the legal 
sector in Luxembourg is economically important, while the fact that Luxembourg 
is small (in size and population) could mean that the civil justice system 
competition would be lucrative for it. It is worth remembering that part of 
Delaware’s success and interest in the competition to incorporate is its small size. 
Perhaps Luxembourg can be the Delaware of Europe in the civil justice system 
                                                        
713 Matthias Weller, ‘The Justice Initiative Frankfurt am Main’ (Conflict of Laws, 31 March 
2017) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/the-justice-initiative-frankfurt-am-main-2017-law-
made-in-frankfurt/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
714 Data obtained from the Statistical Portal of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. Data can be 
accessed at <http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx> accessed 
22 December 2017. NACE 2 code for the advanced search function is M691. 
715 In total, 4407 persons were employed in the legal industry in Luxembourg in 2014. 
716 CEPEJ study on the functioning of judicial systems. Luxembourg (2014 data), p. 393. 
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competition, and the fact that it has an important financial industry could be an 
additional advantage. 
Two of the top one hundred European law firms are in Luxembourg, and four 
other top one hundred European law firms have branches there.717 Of the top one 
hundred global law firms, nine have branches in Luxembourg.718 Luxembourg as 
the home of European courts and institutions is a natural site to expand to include 
international law firms, which raises questions as to why law firms would 
establish themselves there. Is it for the courts? Or to be near EU institutions? Or 
are there any other reasons? The Oxford survey results do not show Luxembourg 
to be among the top preferences for the respondents. From the survey results 
conducted for the present research, Luxembourg’s courts were considered the 
most attractive by 1.92% of the respondents, as the second best by 1.48%, and as 
the third best by 2.81% of the respondents. One respondent commented that 
Luxembourg is ‘known for the quick instruction of cases in employment and 
commercial matters’. While the comment is not a final proof, it is in line with the 
Scoreboard findings as regards the efficiency of Luxembourg’s courts. However, 
the data is discouraging. Considering that 3.02% of the respondents operated 
mainly in Luxembourg, and 9.26% of the total respondents had had professional 
experiences with Luxembourgish courts, Luxembourg’s appeal seems low. It 
appears that even some of the lawyers operating there do not consider its courts 
attractive. 
Perhaps the government of Luxembourg should increase its marketing efforts to 
retain local litigants and to attract international clients. The only promotion 
regarding Luxembourgish courts and laws is being made via ‘Luxembourg for 
Finance’, which is a website maintained by the Agency for the Development of 
the Financial Centre (ADFC).719 ADFC is a partnership between the 
Luxembourgish Government and the Luxembourg Financial Industry Federation. 
The aim of Luxembourg for Finance is to promote the finance sector and to attract 
investors from abroad. Among the attractive elements advertised is the legal 
environment, with clear business-oriented law and fast competent courts. 
Although some promotion exists, it cannot be considered as being on the same 
                                                        
717 The list of the top one hundred European law firms was compiled by The Lawyers, and uses 
their declared turnover to make the classification. The list excludes British and US law firms, 
which are considerably bigger than European law firms. The report for 2014 was accessed 
at <http://www.thelawyer.com/analysis/intelligence/european-100-2014/european-100-
2014-ranking/> accessed 27 October 2016. The link has been removed, and the report can 
be purchased through The Lawyer website. 
718 The American Lawyer (2014). 
719 For the English version of the website, visit <http://www.luxembourgforfinance.com/en> 
accessed 22 December 2017. 
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level as the German and English efforts. Luxembourgish promotion is aimed at 
investors with a limited knowledge of law, and the reason for promoting the legal 
element is to show that Luxembourg is fully equipped with laws that facilitate 
financial investments. 
It is surprising to see that while the legal sector is an important contributor to the 
economy of Luxembourg, little is done to promote it. While some Member States 
do not have courts as qualitative as those of Luxembourg, they promote them with 
pride. The reasons for Luxembourg’s passive attitude should be further studied, 
since the suggestion would be for Luxembourg to start promoting its courts to 
international litigants. 
5.2.6 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is one of the four EU Member States that displays clear signs of 
willingness to compete and attract international litigants. In the Scoreboard 
results, the Dutch judicial system is second. The Netherlands scored tenth in the 
Efficiency of the Judicial System parameter, fifth in the Quality of Justice Systems 
parameter, and fifth in the Independence parameter. The positive note from the 
Scoreboard is that the Netherlands never appeared in the lower half of the table, 
making it comparatively better than most of the Member States. The quality of 
the civil justice system is without doubt a contributor to the economy of the 
country. The turnover of the Dutch legal sector was €1.19 billion in 2010, €1.23 
billion in 2011, €1.15 billion in 2012, and €1.1 billion in 2013.720 However, while 
in all the other Member States analysed here the legal industry’s turnover has 
increased annually, in 2012 and 2013 the Netherlands experienced no apparent 
growth. To maintain the judicial system, the Dutch government spent €125.5 per 
capita in 2010, €127.3 per capita in 2012, €128.6 per capita in 2013, and €123.4 
per capita in 2014.721 
Six Dutch law firms were in the list of the top one hundred European law firms.722 
One of them, Loyens & Loeff, was among the global top one hundred, according 
to The American Lawyer.723 Thirteen of the top global law firms have offices in 
                                                        
720 Data on the legal service turnover can be obtained from the website of the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) at <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb> accessed 22 
December 2017. The code required to access the legal sectors’ turnover statistics is M691. 
721 CEPEJ study on the functioning of judicial systems. Netherlands (2014 data), p. 436. 
722 The top one hundred European law firms is compiled by The Lawyers, and uses their 
declared turnover to make the classification. The list excludes British and US law firms, 
which are considerably bigger than European law firms. The report for 2014 was accessed 
at <http://www.thelawyer.com/analysis/intelligence/european-100-2014/european-100-
2014-ranking/> accessed 27 October 2016. The link has been removed, and the report can 
be purchased through The Lawyer website. 
723 The American Lawyer, October 2014. 
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the Netherlands. Considering the sizes of local law firms, the presence of 
international law firms in the country, and their contribution, it can be argued that 
the legal market is very important for the Dutch economy. Data from the Oxford 
Survey suggests that the Netherlands was the preferred litigation forum for 6% of 
the respondents, but this dropped to 3% if the respondents were not able to choose 
their home jurisdiction. In the last case, the Netherlands is placed fourth among 
all the other EU Member States. Only Germany, France, and England fared better. 
More recent data from the survey conducted for this research in 2015 show that 
11.51% of the respondents consider the Netherlands to be the most attractive 
jurisdiction in the EU, 16.91% consider it to be the second best option, and 
10.53% consider it to be the third best option. This share of respondents means 
that the Netherlands is the third most preferred jurisdiction in the EU. The analysis 
should take into account that 14.93% of the respondents were from the 
Netherlands, which might have influenced their choice.724 Some of the 
respondents highlighted specific elements that led them to prefer the Netherlands. 
Indications strongly suggest that the court system in the Netherlands is highly 
qualitative and potentially competitive within the EU. 
The quality of the Dutch courts and the resulting potential benefits have long been 
under scrutiny in the Netherlands. The aims in these regards have been to make 
courts more efficient in handling cases and to reduce the financial burden for the 
public pocket. Such aims involve not only improving the legal framework of the 
courts but also their infrastructure.725 Infrastructure in courts has been improved 
by implementing state-of-the-art information technology, and by facilitating long-
distance communication with court users. As regards the legal framework, two 
developments are worth mentioning. The first is the ‘Act on collective settlement 
of mass damage claims’ (Wet collectieve afwikkeling van massaschades, 
WCAM), which was adopted in 2005 and modified in 2013. The WCAM allows 
                                                        
724 See Section 5.3. 
725 Publications of the Dutch Council for the Judiciary provide more details about this. See 
Agenda for the Judiciary 2008-2011 <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollection 
Documents/Agenda-for-the-Judiciary-2008-2011.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017; The 
Financing System of the Netherlands Judiciary <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollection 
Documents/The-Financing-System-of-the-Netherlands-Judiciary.pdf> accessed 22 
December 2017; ‘Europeanisation of law’: Consequences for the Dutch Judiciary <https://
www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Europeanisation-of-the-law.pdf> accessed 
22 December 2017; The value of the judicial infrastructure for the Dutch economy 
<https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/The-value-of-the-judicial-
infrastrucure.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017; Quality of the judicial system in the 
Netherlands <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Quality-of-the-judi-
cial-system-in-the-Netherlands.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017; Strategic Multi-Annual 
Planning for the Netherlands Judiciary <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/ SiteCollection-
Documents/Strategic-Multi-Annual-Planning.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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large groups of harmed individuals to agree to a settlement with the party 
suspected of having caused the damage. Parties follow the procedures set out in 
the law to reach an agreement out of court, while the role of the court is minimal, 
consisting mainly of supervising the process and issuing a final decision based on 
the settlement negotiations. Settlements in other Member States might be 
complicated, costly, and time consuming, which makes the WCAM an attractive 
procedure for international litigants.726 In addition to this, the Dutch government 
is currently discussing the introduction of a collective damage action. While the 
proposal is under discussion, it remains interesting to see how much international 
litigation it will attract.727 In this regard some concerns have been raised by the 
Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) of the US Chamber of Commerce, which 
considers the EU’s approach to collective redress as dangerous for the delivering 
of justice and economic development.728 In a study prepared on this issue, the ILR 
mentions the Netherlands and England as the most competitive jurisdictions in 
this area, while Brexit is expected to provide an advantage to Dutch courts.729 The 
ILR considers that the Netherlands might be at risk of harming large companies 
with predatory law suits financed and supported by specialised law firms.730 
Nevertheless, it should be also considered that the ILR conveys the interest of 
commercial companies, which find mass litigation annoying at best, and therefore 
oppose collective damage actions. How competitive the Netherlands will be, what 
effects will collective damage actions will have, remains to be seen. The second 
development is that the Netherlands has decided to create a specialised 
commercial court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC), which will deal 
with international commercial cases. The law creating the court was under 
discussion until 1 February 2017. It is now expected that the court will open its 
doors in Amsterdam on 1 January 2018, with the intention of hearing one hundred 
                                                        
726 In fact, the WCAM procedure has already been used for a number of global settlements. For 
more, see Kramer (2014). 
727 Ianika Tzankova, ‘The Dutch bill on collective damages action’ (Conflict of Laws, 29 
November 2016) <http://conflictoflaws.net/2016/new-dutch-bill-on-collective-damages-
action/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
728 Lisa A. Rickard, ‘A European Crossroads for Collective Actions’ (Institute for Legal 
Reform, 24 March 2017) <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/a-european-
crossroads-for-collective-actions-i> accessed 22 December 2017. 
729 The study of the ILR can be accessed here <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
uploads/sites/1/
The_Growth_of_Collective_Redress_in_the_EU_A_Survey_of_Developments_in_10_Me
mber_States_April_2017.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
730 Dutch News, ‘US Chamber of commerce warns of risks of Dutch class action system’ (29 
September 2017) <http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2017/09/us-chamber-of-
commerce-warns-of-risks-of-dutch-class-action-system/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
269 
 
cases a year at the first instance level and twenty-five at the appellate level.731 It 
is anticipated that the court will create €60 to €75 million worth of benefits per 
year for the government, while the costs are expected to be less than €3 million 
per year.732 The benefits seem clear for the government. On the one hand, 
complicated cases that might congest courts will be diverted to a specialised court, 
while on the other hand, concentrating international commercial cases in one court 
will allow for the better specialisation of judges, the faster handling of the cases, 
and fewer costs in general. The reform comes with benefits for litigants as well. 
A specialised court, with fast proceedings and specialised judges, creates the 
conditions for more accurate, more predictable decisions, and for lower costs. In 
addition, the NCC may hold proceedings in English, which further reduces costs 
for parties. The aim of the court is clear: namely, to facilitate litigation for 
international business and possibly to attract parties from abroad. 
The case of the Netherlands is very interesting compared to the other Member 
States considered in this section. The Netherlands has a very good Scoreboard 
result, which would be the best promoting asset in the civil justice system 
competition. This promotion, however, is almost entirely absent, which is 
interesting given that the Netherlands is taking concrete steps to attract 
international litigants. However, both the WCAM and the NCC can be seen as 
steps that are more serious than the various brochures published by other Member 
States. 
5.3 A survey on the choice of court in the European Union 
This section offers the description, the data, and the analysis of a survey conducted 
in October and November 2015 for the purpose of this research. The survey was 
aimed at lawyers working for the biggest law firms in the European Union, and 
they were mainly asked questions related to their practical professional experience 
of choice of court. While Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter can be seen as 
dedicated to the supply side of the civil justice system, this section takes on the 
demand side of the market and its preferences. Annexes with detailed 
                                                        
731 Or at least the law on the NCC will enter into force on 1 January 2018. See ‘Moving towards 
the Netherlands Commercial Court’ <https://legalknowledgeportal.com/2017/02/23/ 
moving-towards-the-netherlands-commercial-court/> accessed 22 December 2017; 
Planning of the Netherlands Commercial Court <https://netherlands-commercial-
court.com> accessed 22 December 2017. 
732 Raad voor De Rechtspraak, 'Plan tot oprichting van de Netherlands commercial court' Raad 
voor de Rechtspraak (November 2015) <https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollection-
Documents/plan-netherlands-commercial-court.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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questionnaires along with detailed data can be found following the concluding 
chapter of this book. 
5.3.1 Overview of similar surveys 
At this stage, it is appropriate to reflect on some surveys, whose aim is somewhat 
similar to the one discussed in this section. Three empirical studies are considered 
important for this research. Reflecting on previous empirical research helps this 
study to better define the approach to the empirical aspect, as well as to more 
effectively delineate the methodology, and to determine what questions of interest 
were not covered or not sufficiently investigated. 
5.3.1.1 Civil Justice Systems in Europe: a study by the Oxford Institute of 
European and Comparative Law and Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal-
Studies 
Starting in chronological order, the first to be examined is the survey Civil Justice 
Systems in Europe (2008) conducted by the Oxford Institute of European and 
Comparative Law and the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal-Studies.733 The authors 
have published only the ‘Final Results’, which are processed data regarding every 
question in their survey. No details of their methodology or analysis of the results 
have been published so far, and, considering how much time has passed, nothing 
is expected in the future.734 The foreword to the ‘Final Results’ provides some 
information on the methodology used to conduct the survey. Based on this and on 
the content of the survey, the authors’ aim seems to have been to investigate which 
law and court are the most preferred by businesses in Europe. In addition, the 
survey also asks questions related to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
and to the general perception of party autonomy. The survey was conducted by 
means of telephone interviews with one hundred businesses spread across Europe. 
It is not clear how and why these businesses or jurisdictions were selected. The 
lack of methodology descriptions makes the results of this survey vulnerable to 
criticism. Considering this, any replication of this survey seems difficult. It is 
hoped that in the future, the authors will provide more information on the survey. 
The majority of the respondents came from eight Member States (France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the UK, and Belgium). Timewise, the 
survey was conducted in two parts, with some respondents contacted between 
January and March 2008, and others between June and July 2008. Questions were 
                                                        
733 The results of the survey cannot be found on the website of the Oxford Institute of European 
and Comparative Law. A copy of the final results can be accessed at <http://www.fondation-
droitcontinental.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/oxford_civil_justice_survey_-
_summary_of_results_final.pdf> accessed 22 December 2017. 
734 The exception is an article by Vogenauer (one of the leaders of the survey project), in which 
the author provides a brief analysis of the survey. See Vogenauer (2013). 
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grouped into seven sections, and respondents were asked about themselves, about 
their company, their general view on the civil justice system, their choice of 
governing contract law, choice of dispute resolution forum, harmonisation of 
national civil justice systems in Europe, and alternative dispute resolution. 
Ninety-one percent of the respondents were part of their firm’s legal department. 
Companies included in the sample were relatively large, with 95% of them having 
more than two hundred and fifty employees, and with global headquarters in 
France, Italy, Germany, and the US. Their business activities included, among 
others, manufacturing and construction, technology, consumer and retail, and 
health care and lifesciences. Respondents were based mainly in Germany, 
England, Italy, and France (68% of the total number of respondents), and more 
than half (59%) were ‘reasonably familiar’ with the civil justice system of another 
jurisdiction. The US, England, France, and Germany were the jurisdictions with 
which respondents were more ‘reasonably familiar’.735 
From these results, it seems that the average respondent was a professional 
working in the legal department of a large international company. Knowing a 
respondent’s qualities and his/her competences generally provides useful 
information on his/her ability to answer a survey’s core questions in a meaningful 
manner. In this case, however, the average respondent’s profile does not provide 
enough information regarding competency – in this instance, the ability to make 
a reasoned decision based on one’s acquired knowledge and experience, and to 
make this decision applicable and impactful. In other words, the best respondents 
should be ones with extensive work experience,736 and in a top-level position in 
their organisation. Work experience is related to the knowledge acquired while 
practicing a profession, while position within the hierarchy of the company is 
related to the ability to influence that company’s choice of forum or choice of law. 
Taking this into account, it can be argued that the results of the survey would have 
been more beneficial if it had indicated whether respondents were experienced 
professionals able to exert that type of influence.  
Choosing companies to answer a survey on the choice of forum bears risks. These 
are mainly related to the companies’ ability to make an independent choice of law 
or choice of forum decision, and three factors need to be considered. First, the 
company’s bargaining power. Companies with strong bargaining power are able 
to impose their choice on other contracting parties, including choice of court 
                                                        
735 Question 5.3 ‘Do you happen to be reasonably familiar with the civil justice system of 
another jurisdiction?’, followed by Question 5.4 ‘Yes, the civil justice system(s) of...’. 
736 Extensive work experience does not automatically translate into reasoned decisions. It does 
serve, however, as a vehicle to acquiring knowledge and then actively using it in any 
professional setting. 
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clauses. Bargaining power is influenced by a number of factors that can be 
grouped into five categories: demand and supply conditions, market 
concentration, private information, patience and risk aversion, and negotiation 
skills and strategy.737 Taking these elements into account, the size of the company 
does seem to be an influencing factor in terms of bargaining power. Size can 
influence one of the factors mentioned above, but cannot be equated to any one 
of them. For the survey in question, this means that the size of companies does 
not say much about their bargaining power, and consequently about their ability 
to make independent choice of court decisions. It can be argued that the best 
respondents for such a survey would be leading companies in a certain market, 
able to whip up the demand for the choice of court and choice of law. 
Second, companies are known to rely on external lawyers to help them with 
certain legal issues, and the extent of this reliance varies. Some companies need 
external lawyers on an everyday basis, while others do not need them at all. 
Between these two extremes there can be many combinations of collaborations 
between external lawyers and companies. Companies also require the presence of 
external lawyers in cases when a choice of court needs to be made. In this respect, 
two situations can be distinguished: one in which an external lawyer is not present 
during the choice of court process, and one in which an external lawyer is present. 
If an external lawyer is not present, companies choose the court and the forum 
that they consider appropriate. If an external lawyer is present, it can be argued 
that he/she makes the choice of court and the company follows the lawyer’s 
advice. In fact, the reason external lawyers are hired is to advise. Furthermore, 
managers tend to follow the external lawyer’s advice so that any blame for a poor 
choice can fall on the lawyer.738 From my survey, responses suggest that even 
though lawyers (respondents) discuss with their clients the choice of court 
agreement, clients rarely make the final decision.739 In the end, it seems more 
probable that lawyers (external lawyers) make the choice of court decision, and 
are therefore the best group to be surveyed. 
Third, choice of court is also influenced by the type of contract parties enter. 
Standard contracts in a certain market oblige market actors to use them with little 
                                                        
737 Choi and Triantis consider these factors to be important in determining the price during 
negotiations. Negotiations are a conformation of the parties’ bargaining, the result of which 
is the price of a good. The same bargaining power is used to draft other clauses in the 
contract, including the choice of court clause. Therefore, the elements considered by Choi 
and Triantis can be extended to the situation where choice of court is applied. Choi and 
Triantis (2012) 1675.  
738 The characteristics of the lawyers market and of the law allow lawyers to dominate the 
lawyer-client relationship, and therefore to make the choice of court decision. See discussion 
in Section 4.3. 
739 This conclusion is based on the responses to Questions 10 and 11. See Section 5.3.3. 
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possibility for change. These situations do not allow parties to choose, and 
therefore their contribution to the demand side of the market is dubious at best. 
Standard contracts deserve special attention and more dedicated research. These 
three factors underline the unpredictability of a company’s ability to make an 
independent choice of court decision. Choice of court seems to be closely 
connected with lawyers and, where applicable, with external lawyers. As a 
consequence, lawyers as a group and especially lawyers in large law firms appear 
to be better equipped to provide insights into the choice of court process. 
The part related to the choice of dispute resolution forum comprises questions 28 
to 36. Respondents consider the possibility of making a choice of court decision 
to be very important (61%),740 but only 48% of them often choose a foreign 
forum.741 When choosing a foreign court, respondents preferred the jurisdiction 
of Switzerland (19%), England (14%), France (13%), and Germany (10%), while 
the rest preferred other jurisdictions.742 Respondents (38%) considered England 
to be the jurisdiction chosen most often.743 This contrast between what 
respondents choose and what they think is the most chosen jurisdiction can 
influence the choice of court behaviour, as it shows that respondents are not aware 
of the choice patterns of other respondents. When they consider England to be the 
most popular choice, they have a distorted view of the reality, which can induce 
respondents (as choice makers) to choose English forums as a repeated bias or 
conformist choice (behaviour). A conformist choice is one made in compliance 
with what is believed to be the most common behaviour in a society.744 It should 
be clear that a conformist choice is made in the event that parties do not have a 
determined preference. However, the Oxford survey respondents are companies, 
which do not always choose the court themselves; it would be interesting to see 
how lawyers as another class of respondents would respond to Question 32. 
In Question 33, respondents were asked to rate the importance of certain factors 
in making a choice of court decision. For respondents, the three most important 
factors were ‘quality of judges and courts’, ‘fairness of the outcome’, and 
‘corruption’.745 If choice makers were to use these factors to make their choice of 
forum, the results of Questions 30, 30.1, and 30.2 would resemble the ranking of 
the jurisdictions in the EU Justice Scoreboard. In other words, these particular 
qualities so important to respondents are used to evaluate Member States in the 
                                                        
740 Question 28. 
741 Question 29. 
742 Question 31.1. 
743 Question 32. 
744 See Dwairy in conjunction with Harsanyi. Dwairy (1997) 2 and Harsanyi (1969) 529. For 
more on choice, see also Chapter 2. 
745 This should be understood as ‘lack of corruption’.  
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Scoreboard. Therefore, the Scoreboard ranking has to do with which Member 
State offers these factors comparatively better. Because respondents seek these 
factors, and they are offered better by Member States at the top of the Scoreboard 
ranking, it could be expected that answers to Questions 30, 30.1, and 30.2 would 
resemble the Scoreboard ranking. However, this is not the case. Low-ranking 
jurisdictions appear to be selected more often than those placed higher. Some 
(non-exclusive and non-excludable) reasons for this might be the lack of 
knowledge of the qualities of all/some jurisdictions, the difference in time 
between the survey (2008) and the establishment of the Scoreboard (2013), and 
the use of these factors as qualification factors. Qualification factors would mean 
that choice makers create qualification sets in their mind, one of which contains 
jurisdictions that have at least a certain level of the factors they want, and another 
that contains jurisdictions that do not have these factors. Once the sets are created, 
the jurisdictions in each are considered equally qualified to be in that set, and the 
factors used to characterise the set are no longer used to characterise its elements. 
It is noteworthy that almost the same factors considered to be the most important 
in choosing a forum (Question 38) are considered the most significant 
disadvantages of the least preferred jurisdictions (Question 40).746 The discussion 
will return to this reasoning in the following sections. 
The Oxford survey has certain methodological flaws that need to be taken into 
account while interpreting its results, but it is also one of the first surveys to 
provide data on the choice of court in Europe, showing that Switzerland, England, 
Germany, and France are the jurisdictions most often chosen. Respondents 
considered ‘quality of judges and courts’, ‘fairness of the outcome’, and ‘[lack of] 
corruption’ as important factors in choosing a forum. However, considering the 
survey’s responses, and in light of the Scoreboard’s results seen in Section 5.1, a 
discrepancy can be seen. While England, Germany, and France are among the 
most popular jurisdictions, they are not among those ranked at the top of the 
Scoreboard. It can be assumed that factors other than those mentioned in the 
survey play a role in the choice of forum in Europe. 
5.3.1.2 French Fondation pour le droit continental – HEC Paris Survey 
In 2011, the Foundation pour le droit continental together with HEC Paris (école 
des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Paris) conducted a survey on the choice of 
law in international contracts, and the motivations for making these choices. The 
authors published the survey results in a book and in a paper summary.747 The 
survey did not ask about choice of court preferences, however, but about 
                                                        
746 This is developed further in Section 5.3.4.3. 
747 Durand-Barthez and Lenglart (2012) and Durand-Barthez (2012). This section is based on 
the summary by Durand-Barthez (2012). 
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procedural law preferences in arbitration agreements. Some of the conclusions of 
the present research (as described below) point out that choice of law (procedural 
law) is influenced by psychological factors. The conclusion of the Fondation-
HEC survey indicates that psychological factors should be considered when 
analysing the survey’s responses. 
Of the one hundred and twenty respondents, the majority worked as in-house 
lawyers in major firms. International contracts were divided into four groups: 
‘sales of goods, construction and similar contracts for large projects’, ‘mergers 
and acquisitions’, ‘financial contracts’, and ‘arbitration’, and results were slightly 
different for each group. This survey is important for the conclusions that one of 
its authors drew in considering choice of court to be influenced by ‘non-legal 
factors’ and ‘psychological factors’. 
For the ‘sales of goods’ group of contracts, the survey’s analysis suggests that in-
house lawyers are mainly responsible for drafting them. Choice of law clauses are 
often some of the last to be discussed, and the party that insists the most on the 
choice of law clause often has to offer concessions on other clauses. Because this 
is not always desirable, parties frequently avoid hefty negotiations regarding the 
choice of law, which means that rather than choosing a law, lawyers prefer to 
avoid ‘immature law’.748 Of course, in certain cases and situations, specific legal 
requirements are needed, which make choice of law almost obligatory. Another 
important factor in the choice of law is the language of the contact. Since 
contractual terms expressed in one language are difficult to translate into another 
language, parties prefer to use the law of the language in which the contract was 
drafted. Because English is the most used language, it plays an important role in 
making parties choose the law of England in their contracts. As the study’s authors 
point out, legal considerations in choosing the applicable law are sometimes 
overshadowed by other factors. 
In merger and acquisition contracts, external lawyers play an important role in 
drafting the documents and of course choosing the law clauses. Despite 
differences, merger and acquisitions contracts and sales of goods contracts have 
similarities in the choice of law modalities. As regards financial contracts, the 
survey revealed that these kinds of contracts are dominated by the law of common 
law countries. Moreover, standard forms of contracts are also common, which 
makes it difficult to exercise the choice of law possibility. The survey’s authors 
point out that psychological considerations also play a role in the choice of law 
process in financial contracts. Important factors here might be the extended 
network of English law firms, the general feeling that common law is better 
                                                        
748 Durand-Barthez (2012) 509. 
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equipped for these kinds of contracts, and the role of English as the contractual 
language. As the authors point out, non-legal considerations seem to play a role 
in the choice of procedural law of arbitration agreements as well, and include 
location of the city, the perceived neutrality of a jurisdiction, or the intention of 
granting a concession as a trade-off against an unconnected advantage. 
Clearly, the HEC survey was focused more on the choice of law issue. However, 
making a choice of procedural law or choice of court would follow the same path 
as the choice of law, and would face the same problems. An important factor 
highlighted by the survey’s authors is the presence of psychological and extra-
legal considerations. These considerations are difficult to predict and to measure, 
which makes them difficult to mitigate. Jurisdictions seeking to attract law users 
or court users should also address the psychological and extra-legal considerations 
that influence choice makers. 
5.3.1.3 British Institute of International and Comparative Law survey 
In 2014, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL), with 
the support of the Ministry of Justice of the UK, conducted an empirical study to 
improve the Ministry’s understanding of the reasons that parties make certain 
choice of law and choice of court decisions.749 The aim of the study was to gain 
an understanding of litigants’ and professionals’ experience with the English legal 
system, with a particular focus on the factors that influence decision makers to 
choose English courts and English law. In the years prior to the BIICL study, the 
Ministry of Justice had been trying to design and to implement some reforms 
related to the justice system.750 The study consisted of semi-structured interviews 
with individuals active in the field of international commercial litigation, a web-
based survey, and a forum debate with experts. 
One hundred and sixty-one people responded to the survey, which was one of the 
components of the empirical study together with the interviews. However, the 
authors had distributed the survey throughout their network without any sample 
or population delineation, and because of the problems related to this approach, 
the authors considered the study to be only a reflection or personal perspective of 
the 215 persons who were surveyed or interviewed. This caveat should discourage 
any attempt to generalise conclusions based on this study. Most of the respondents 
                                                        
749 Eva Lein, Robert McCorquodale, Lawrence McNamara, Hayk Kupelyants, and Jose Del 
Rio, 'Factors Influencing International Litigants’ Decisions to Bring Commercial Claims to 
the London Based Courts' (London 15 January 2015) Ministry of Justice Analytical Series 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396343/ 
factors-influencing-international-litigants-with-commercial-claims.pdf> accessed 22 De-
cember 2017. 
750 See Section 5.2.2. 
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were lawyers (43%), while the rest were working in academia, in companies, in 
the judiciary, and so forth. Geographically, the respondents were located mainly 
in the UK (51%) and the EU (32%), with the remainder located as far away as 
Canada, Peru, Albania, Hong Kong, and Australia. Professionally, two-thirds of 
the respondents had had at least one experience with English courts in the previous 
five years, while one-third of the total had litigated more than once in English 
courts in the same period. Most of the respondents had been involved in 
commercial claims (88%), while claims exceeding £1,000,000 constituted more 
than 60% of their work. For half of the respondents, cross-border cases had 
composed more than 60% of the cases they had dealt with in the previous five 
years. 
Despite the survey’s methodological flaws, its results provided some insights into 
respondents’ choice of court behaviour. Respondents considered several 
influencing factors with respect to choosing English courts. As mentioned in the 
report, the top two factors were ‘reputation/experience of judges’, and ‘the 
combination of choice of court clauses with choice of law clauses in favour of 
English law’.751 Other important factors included efficient remedies, procedural 
effectiveness, and neutrality of the forum, market practice, the English language, 
effective UK-based counsel, and speed and enforceability of judgments in foreign 
jurisdictions. Other supplementary factors included quick interim relief, 
neutrality, fairness and transparency of the judicial system, disclosure regime, 
absence of jury trials, absence of punitive damages, and excellent infrastructure 
and professional support. On the negative side, factors that discouraged litigants 
from choosing English courts were the high costs of solicitors and barristers, the 
‘cumbersome’ nature of the adversarial system, costs of disclosure, and judicial 
proceedings not being streamlined. Respondents were also asked about which 
courts they considered to be competitors to English courts. On the basis of the 
responses, the biggest competitors were New York, Singapore, and other EU 
Member States. Other EU Member States were considered a separate category, 
which offered an inquisitorial system, better cost control, and quicker results. 
This survey’s results provide little information about to which EU jurisdiction the 
respondents would consider submitting their cases. More interesting statements 
have to do with the factors influencing respondents in their choice of English 
courts; some of these are extra-legal (reputation, market practice, English 
language, effective UK-based counsel), others are almost non-legal factors 
(combination of choice of law and choice of court, neutrality of the forum), while 
the remaining factors have more to do with perceived benefits of the English 
procedure. Among these benefits, respondents cited procedural effectiveness, 
                                                        
751 Lein (2015) 15. 
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speed, and excellent infrastructure. As was suggested by the HEC survey, non-
legal factors play an important role in the choice of court process, although their 
weight and their exact role cannot be distinguished in this study. In terms of 
quantity, extra-legal factors are almost half of the top factors mentioned by the 
BIICL survey respondents. A common suggestion that stems from both the HEC 
and the BIICL survey is that more studies are needed to understand the weight 
and the role of extra-legal factors in influencing those who decide on choice of 
court. 
5.3.2 Aim of the survey 
The aim of research is to provide a better understanding of the civil justice system 
competition in the European Union. Competition of jurisdictions is inherently 
connected with choice preferences, and with the habit patterns of choice makers. 
Chapter 2 provides a short overview of, among others, competition of jurisdictions 
for incorporations, competition in tax law, competition in labour law, and 
competition in environmental law. Quite often these studies include empirical 
research to back up or test theoretical analysis.752 Empirical evidence contributes 
with facts about the distribution of choices and elements that influence choice. 
Surveys on the civil justice system competition, described in Section 5.3.1.1 to 
5.3.1.3, contribute to the theoretical discussion. Vogenauer, using data from the 
Oxford survey, argues that the civil justice system competition does not exist.753 
Based on data from the HEC survey, Durand-Barthez suggests that choice of law 
is influenced by psychological rather than legal factors.754 The report of the BIICL 
survey contradicts the findings of Vogenauer by concluding that English courts 
are in competition with other courts. Another finding from the BIICL survey 
concurs with Durand-Barthez’s suggestion that choice makers are influenced by 
psychological or extra-legal factors. In line with the aforementioned studies, the 
present research is based on the need to enrich the theoretical part with data on 
choice of court in the EU. 
Thus, the general aim of this empirical research is to contribute to the theoretical 
analysis developed in Chapter 4, which analysed the market for civil justice 
systems in the EU along with the different elements that compose it. Among the 
                                                        
752 Kessler and Rubenfeld on civil justice systems: Kessler and Rubenfeld (2007); Eisenberg 
and Miller on choice of law and choice of forum in the US: Eisenberg and Miller (2009); 
Ringe on company law: Ringe (2013); Geys and Osterloh on company incorporation: Geys 
and Osterloh (2011); Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca on tax competition: Baskaran and 
Lopes da Fonseca (2014); Moser on international sales contracts: Moser (2015); Sanga on 
choice of law: Sanga (2013); Cuniberti on choice of law in arbitration agreements: Cuniberti 
(2014). 
753 Vogenauer (2013). 
754 Durand-Barthez (2012) 510. 
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analysed elements was its demand side, which consists of natural and legal 
persons who want to resolve a civil conflict in the courts of a Member State. In 
addition to natural and legal persons, lawyers play an important role in the choice 
making process, and, as such, they contribute a great deal to the output of the 
demand side. 
The main aim of this empirical research is to collect more data on choice of court 
preferences by lawyers. As previously mentioned, lawyers have been subjects of 
empirical research only incidentally, while the theory developed in Chapter 4 
considers them to be the driving force behind the demand side. More data on 
lawyers’ preferences regarding choice of court would lead to a better 
understanding of the demand side’s preferences. On the basis of the analysis in 
Chapter 4, it appears that lawyers would be interested in choosing their own 
jurisdiction. In situations in which lawyers cannot choose their own jurisdiction, 
they would be interested in choosing a jurisdiction that is near their location, has 
noncomplex procedures, and is accurate and fast. Therefore, data on lawyers’ 
court preferences would contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical 
analysis, and possibly support it with empirical evidence. Another aim of this 
empirical research is to collect data on factors that lawyers consider important 
when making a choice of court. Data on legal factors or psychological factors 
would provide helpful insights into the theoretical discourse. A third aim of this 
research is to collect data on who lawyers think makes the choice of court in a 
lawyer-client relationship. Research so far has been focused on asking legal or 
natural persons about their choice of court preferences, with lawyers appearing 
only incidentally as respondents in those surveys. However, in Section 4.3, it was 
suggested that lawyers dominate the lawyer-client relationship and are also the 
party responsible for making the choice of court. A better understanding of this 
would allow researchers to adjust their focus and competing governments to 
adjust their promotion strategies. A final aim of this empirical research is to 
confront lawyers’ preferences of jurisdiction along with the factors considered 
important by lawyers with the results of the Scoreboard from Section 5.1. 
Confronting these preferences will test for any inconsistency in choice making. 
5.3.3 Methodology 
The theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 concluded that the demand side of the civil 
justice system market is created by individuals and companies mobile enough to 
move between jurisdictions in order to resolve their conflicts. Mobile individuals 
and companies are those that have at least financial resources to sustain costs 
related to mobility. In other words, these individuals and companies tend to be 
wealthy. Chapter 4 concluded that the client-lawyer relationship is dominated by 
the lawyer, without prejudice to the characteristics of the client or the lawyer. As 
a result, lawyers in large law firms can be considered as the actors that effectively 
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make the choice of court decision. Based on these conclusions, the obvious target 
population for this empirical research is lawyers working in large law firms with 
a seat in the EU, which is the geographic limit of this study. 
To better identify the target population, I used the list of the top one hundred law 
firms in the world in terms of revenue.755 Published by The American Lawyer 
journal in October 2014,756 it consists mainly of American and British law firms 
with offices in many jurisdictions. Using the websites of these law firms, I drew 
up a list of lawyers working for them in the EU. It was not possible to collect this 
information from all the websites, thus some law firms in the list did not receive 
the survey. However, these international law firms are not necessarily the biggest 
in each European jurisdiction. To compensate for this, I used the list of the top 
one hundred continental European law firms in terms of revenue.757 This list was 
published by The Lawyer in 2014.758 I also made a list of all the lawyers working 
in the EU, but again faced some difficulties in accessing information on some of 
the law firms. In total, however, I collected contact details of 27,303 lawyers. I 
could not create a list only of lawyers qualified or experienced in cross-border 
choice of court, because I was unable to access the personal information for every 
lawyer, but I assumed that non-experienced or non-qualified lawyers would not 
participate in the study. Moreover, I was unable to filter lawyers based on the 
department/section in which they were working, because many of them have past 
experience with cross-border choice of court or other experience related to the 
choice of court. It was also clear that most of the respondents would have choice 
of court experience in transactions and contracts rather than direct litigation 
experience. 
Considering the size of the target population, their distribution, and the resources 
available to me, I considered a survey was the best method of getting feedback 
from the basic units of the legal population. The survey contains several questions 
reflecting the above-mentioned aims of the empirical research, and there are four 
research questions related to as many hypotheses. The first question − ‘Which 
jurisdiction in the EU do lawyers prefer to litigate in?’ − is related to the 
hypothesis that lawyers are interested in choosing a jurisdiction that is near their 
location. This means that they prefer to choose either their own or a neighbouring 
jurisdiction. The second question − ‘Which elements do lawyers consider 
                                                        
755 Annex: List of law firms included in the study. 
756 The American Lawyer (2014) 104. 
757 Annex: List of law firms included in the study. 
758 The Lawyer publishes an annual report on the top one hundred law firms in Europe. The 
latest issue for 2016 can be accessed at <http://reports.thelawyer.com/reports/european-100-
2016> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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important when making a choice of court decision?’ − is related to the hypothesis 
that lawyers use non-legal factors to make a choice of court decision. The third 
question − ‘In the relation lawyer-client, who makes the choice of court decision?’ 
– is related to the hypothesis that lawyers dominate the lawyer-client relationship, 
and as a result are the driving force behind the demand side’s output. The fourth 
question − ‘Do lawyers make a consistent choice of court decision?’ – is related 
to the hypothesis of the second question. One set of questions asks respondents to 
mention, in general, the characteristics they consider most important when 
making a choice of court decision. Another set asks respondents to indicate the 
jurisdiction they choose most often, and to state its best characteristics. A 
consistent choice would be one in which the characteristics considered important 
in general by the choice maker are the same as the characteristics of the particular 
choice he/she makes. 
In designing the survey, I made extensive use of the academic literature on 
empirical research.759 Before distributing the survey, I consulted with researchers 
from the Erasmus School of Law, who specialised in empirical studies and in 
choice of law and choice of forum, and who had experience as lawyers. I owe 
these people a large debt of gratitude.760 Pilots were conducted to test the time 
required to complete the questionnaire and to make sure the questions were clear. 
The survey was divided into four parts,761 the first containing only questions about 
the personal characteristics of the respondents, and its intention was to identify 
their professional and educational development. Professional experience, 
professional specialisation, and academic education are all elements that shape 
the respondent’s world view and therefore his/her choice of court behaviour. The 
second part contains questions related to the jurisdiction preferences of the 
respondents as well as the factors considered important when making a choice of 
court. The third part contains questions related to the perception of the 
competition of civil justice systems in the EU. The fourth and last part contains 
the final remarks.  
The survey was prepared using the SurveyMonkey Website, and was organised 
in seven pages to facilitate online access. Results show that a number of 
respondents dropped out after each page. I decided to distribute the survey via 
email using the SendGrid website, which allows for mass email campaigns 
                                                        
759 Alassutari, Bickman, and Brannen (2008); Gideon (2012); Bryman (2015); Saris and 
Gallhofer (2014); Stoop, Billiet, Koch, and Fitzgerald (2010). 
760 For their help, I would like to thank Prof. Xandra Kramer, Dr. Willem-Jan Verhoeven, Dr. 
Pieter Desmet, Prof. Martijn Scheltema, Lisa van Reemst, Jing Hiah, and Prof. Frank 
Smeele. 
761 Annex: Survey Questionnaire. 
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without compromising the reputation of the sending IP address or email account. 
I prepared an email introducing the survey and inviting the recipient to take 
participate. A customised link was included in the body of the email,762 and 
redirected the viewer back to the SurveyMonkey-hosted questionnaire. Before 
starting the questionnaire, the respondent was presented with a description of the 
research and a banner of the Erasmus School of Law of the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam. Respondents were assured with regard to their privacy and the 
confidentiality of their responses. The questionnaire was distributed for the first 
time on 27 October 2015, and two reminders were sent to the target population at 
intervals of 14 and 15 days, respectively (10 November 2015 and 25 November 
2015). These intervals made it possible to send the survey on different days of the 
week, and to avoid days when some recipients might not be at work or had 
recurrent busy schedules. More than three reminders would have resulted in 
technical difficulties, as email servers would have begun to categorise the 
reminder emails as spam and sent them to the recipients’ junk folder. 
On 27 October 2015, the questionnaire was sent to 27,095 (100%) email 
addresses, while 208 of 27,303 email addresses were considered invalid by 
SendGrid.763 Of the sent emails, 362 were bounced back by the recipients’ servers, 
and thus were not delivered. In total, 24,370 (89.94%) emails were delivered, and 
480 (1.97%) of the recipients clicked the incorporated link. From October 27 to 
November 9, there were 275 responses to the survey, of which 174 were complete. 
The second reminder was sent on 10 November 2015 to 26,578 (100%) email 
addresses.764 The email was delivered to 23,743 (89.33%) addresses; 5855 
(24.66%) of the recipients opened the email, and 285 (1.2%) of them clicked the 
incorporated link. From November 10 to November 24, there were 166 responses 
to the survey, of which 102 were complete. The third and final reminder was sent 
on 25 November 2015 to 26,458 (100%) email addresses. The email was delivered 
to 23,984 (90.65%) addresses; 5643 (23.52%) of the recipients opened the email, 
and 185 (0.77%) of the recipients clicked the incorporated link. From November 
25 until 27 October 2016, when the link was disabled, there were 88 responses to 
the survey, of which 54 were complete. In total, there were 529 respondents, of 
which 330 completed the entire survey. 
                                                        
762 The link to the survey was <https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/choice-of-court>, and was 
available until 27 October 2016. Recipients of the link could submit their responses up to 
and including the last day. 
763 This happened either because the recipients were no longer working at those law firms or 
because the email was presented in a wrong format on the law firm’s website from which it 
was copied. 
764 Unsubscribed, invalid, and email servers that risked blacklisting my sending IP were 
removed. 
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Given that the initial target population was 27,303 and the response rate was 529 
(330 complete questionnaires), the survey’s response rate was 1.93% (1.2% 
complete questionnaires).765 However, some persons in the target population did 
not receive the email. Considering only the email addresses that received the 
invitation email (24,370), the response rate was 2.17%. However, as was reported 
by SendGrid, not all the email recipients opened the email, and only some of them 
clicked the provided link. Because SendGrid is used primarily to send marketing 
emails, the email inviting some of the recipients was marked as MARKETING. 
Because of this, chances are high that these recipients did not open the email. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that some of the recipients did not have the 
necessary experience and knowledge to participate in the survey. This was a direct 
result of the way the target population was framed, which included not only 
eligible elements but also over-covered non-eligible elements. Supposing that 
only the eligible elements opened the email, these would have amounted to 17,624 
unique clicks (including data from the reminders as well). Considering these 
figures, the response rate would be 3% (1.87% completed questionnaires only). 
Following the same reasoning, it can be argued that only those who clicked the 
link provided in the email had the necessary experience and knowledge to be 
eligible respondents. If only unique clicks are considered, the response rate was 
55.7% (36.8% completed surveys only) based on 950 unique clicks (this includes 
data from the reminders as well). 
Apart from the response rate, non-responses deserve some attention.766 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some of the email recipients did not participate in the 
survey because they did not have time. Lawyers tend to have busy schedules, and 
time for them is often at a premium. I received anecdotal evidence in support of 
this in an email from a recipient asking me to extend the response deadline 
because of her busy schedule. Furthermore, other anecdotal evidence suggests that 
some lawyers constantly receive invitations to participate in surveys, which can 
explain their aversion to such emails. However, it is heart-warming that the 
majority of the respondents were partners or senior associates, which 
demonstrates that experienced respondents were more willing to participate. 
Finally, it should be remembered that response rates to surveys have decreased 
over the years, and email surveys have lower response rates compared to other 
types.767 
                                                        
765 Scholars do not agree on how to define a response rate. Bethlehem considers it to be equal 
to the number of responses over the number of eligible elements. See Belthlehem (2009) 
212-218. Similar definitions are also provided by Bautista (2012) 43 and Hibbers, Johnson, 
and Hudson (2012) 54.  
766 On how to improve response rate, see Manzo and Burke (2012) 327. 
767 Hibbers, Johnson, and Hudson (2012) 73. 
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The questionnaire contained twenty-seven questions. Five of them were open, and 
respondents were to write what they considered appropriate; seven offered the 
possibility of multiple answers; two offered a matrix of answers; and the rest 
offered a choice of only one answer. Almost all of the questions provided space 
for comments. It was not possible to skip a question, but respondents could 
complete and send the survey – even unfinished − at any time. 
5.3.4 Analysis and findings 
This section provides an analysis of the survey and presents the main findings. 
The analysis is divided into three parts: the first discusses respondents’ 
demographics; the second discusses choice of court preferences; and the third 
discusses respondents’ opinion of civil justice systems in the EU. 
 
 
5.3.4.1 Respondent demographics 
The first part of the questionnaire is a set of questions aimed at collecting data on 
respondents’ professional and academic qualifications. Question 1 asked 
respondents to determine their position in the structure of their law firm. They 
could choose between ‘Junior Associate’, ‘Associate’, ‘Senior Associate’, 
‘Partner’, ‘Counsel’, ‘Of Counsel’, and ‘Other’. Because these options were not 
described, respondents could self-assess their position, as positions among law 
firms vary in name and description. However, it is considered important for two 
reasons. First, respondents high in the hierarchy of the law firm are more likely to 
influence the behaviour and the choice preferences of that law firm or of the team 
they are leading. In a certain way, they represent a group larger than their own. 
Second, respondents placed in the hierarchy of a law firm are expected to have 
extensive work experience. This increases their likelihood of being familiar with 
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more than one jurisdiction, and the possibility of having more experience with 
choice of court clauses. 
Partners and Senior Associates composed the vast majority of the respondents 
with 40.6% and 27%, respectively. The figures could be slightly higher if 
responses from ‘Other’ are considered. In ‘Other,’ some of the respondents 
specified that they were ‘Salaried partners’ or ‘Associated partners’. Considering 
also the responses of uncompleted surveys, the share of ‘Partners’ and ‘Senior 
associates’ declines, which shows that these two groups were more interested, and 
perhaps qualified to finish the survey.768 This can be an indication that the topic 
of the survey in particular and the research in general is considered important by 
more senior lawyers. 
Question 2 was open, and asked respondents to name the field of law in which 
they were specialised. The five legal specialities most mentioned were ‘corporate 
law’, ‘litigation’, ‘mergers and acquisitions’, ‘intellectual property law’, and 
‘finance’. Each of these fields involves a great deal of cross-border transaction 
and litigation. Despite the fact that some lawyers do not work in a law firm’s 
litigation department, they are often involved in making a choice of court either 
by advising a client or by drafting a choice of court clause in a contract. For a 
better perspective, it should be mentioned that lawyers in certain fields of law 
work with model contracts, which provide a choice of court clause. Amending or 
                                                        
768 Including unfinished questionnaires, there were 529 responses. The first question was 
answered by all the participants. Junior Associate 7.94% (42); Associate 18.34% (97), 
Senior Associate 27.03% (143), Partner 36.67% (194), Counsel 6.05% (32), Of Counsel 
2.27% (12), Other (please specify) 1.70% (9). 
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changing these model clauses is not very frequent, which implies that transaction 
lawyers might not have as much experience as they have.  
 
As was mentioned in the results of the HEC and the BIICL survey, language plays 
an important role in choosing a court. With English being almost the lingua franca 
used in drafting international contracts, parties may choose English courts to 
better litigate in the language of the contract and to save translation and 
administration costs. Lack of language abilities can also influence choice of court 
options for parties, leading them to choose only courts that use a language with 
which they are familiar. Question 3 aims at collecting data on respondents’ 
language abilities. Respondents were asked to mention all the official languages 
of the EU in which they had full professional proficiency. Respondents could 
choose more than one language, but did not have the possibility of mentioning 
their mother tongue. Data from the survey show that a large majority of the 
respondents were proficient in English.  
The other most known languages were German, French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, 
and Spanish. Considering that many respondents included their mother tongue in 
their responses, unrefined data from Question 3 should be viewed with caution. 
Unrefined data do not give a good idea of the ability of lawyers to speak a 
language other than their mother tongue. However, this can be corrected. 
Assuming that the respondents’ mother tongue is the language of the jurisdiction 
in which they mainly operate (asked in Question 5), it is possible to calculate the 
extent to which each language is popular outside its borders.769 Results show that 
                                                        
769 The problem is that for some jurisdictions it is difficult to make this assumption. For 
example, in Belgium, the official languages are Dutch and French, so a respondent’s mother 
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while figures decline for all the languages, English figures decline least, and 
French declines less than German, to become the second most widely used 
language. These results show that English remains the best known language, with 
the potential to become the only language to be used in cross-border transactions. 
Three possible consequences may derive from this. First, English is and will 
remain the communication and legal language for cross-border lawyers. Second, 
the use of English might create a bridgehead for an invasion of English legal terms 
− or perhaps that bridgehead already exists. Third, using the English language and 
possibly English legal terminology increases the pressure to choose an English 
court.  
Cuniberti, in a study on the choice of law in Asian international contracts, suggests 
that it is influenced by the place where the respondent was educated.770 If this is 
true for the choice of law, it can also be true for the choice of court. Question 4 
aims at collecting data on the respondents’ bachelor, master, doctoral, and other 
kinds of education. Respondents were asked to name the jurisdiction where they 
had graduated, by writing down their input in an open field. For this question, it 
cannot be assumed that a lawyer working mainly in a given jurisdiction had 
graduated there, although it can be expected that the two are related. Results show 
                                                        
tongue can be one of the two; in Luxembourg, the official languages are Luxembourgish, 
German, and French; in Wales, the official languages are Welsh and English. Taking these 
problems into account, it was assumed that for half of the Belgian respondents, the mother 
tongue was Dutch, and for the other half, it was French. For respondents from Luxembourg, 
the mother tongue was assumed to be French. For respondents from the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, English was assumed to be their mother tongue. German was assumed to be the 
mother tongue for German and Austrian respondents. 
770 Cuniberti (2016) 76-79, 86. 
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that the majority of the respondents had graduated in Germany, followed by the 
Netherlands and the UK.771 However, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US show 
an increase in the number of master graduates compared to bachelor graduates. 
This can be explained by the quality of the education provided in Dutch, British, 
or American universities, but it can also be explained by the choice of law and 
choice of court. Given that English law is considered to be the law most chosen 
in the EU, law firms view British legal education as an asset in terms of their 
lawyers.  
Question 5 asked respondents to name the jurisdiction where they mainly operate, 
meaning the location where they conduct most of their work as lawyers. The aim 
of Question 5 is to collect data that can be used to better determine respondents’ 
demography and to enhance understanding of responses to the other questions. It 
is obvious that the location is not equal to the nationality. Data show that the 
majority of the respondents conduct their professional activity in Germany 
(28.48%), the Netherlands (13.94%), England and Wales (8.48%), Denmark 
(7.28%), and Sweden (7.28%). It is interesting to note the high number of 
respondents located in the Netherlands, which cannot be explained by the number 
of Dutch lawyers in general. The high number of respondents should be taken into 
account when analysing some of the responses. A possible reason for the 
relatively large number of Dutch lawyers is my affiliation with the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam and my use of the Erasmus School of Law’s logo on the 
Introduction to the survey. If this is true, future studies can use endorsements from 
local universities and their logos to increase the response rates from particular 
jurisdictions.  
                                                        
771 Here the UK includes England, Wales, and Scotland. 
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Question 6 asked respondents to name jurisdictions in the EU where they had had 
professional experience. Respondents could choose more than one jurisdiction, 
but professional experience was not defined. Respondents used their own 
assessment to consider one or more experiences relevant to this question, and were 
able to mention other jurisdictions in the comments box. Experience in more than 
one jurisdiction improves knowledge with regard to their courts, and facilitates 
lawyers’ mobility. Lack of mobility would be to the detriment of the civil justice 
system competition. One of the aims of Question 6 was also to collect data on the 
most familiar jurisdiction. Regardless of how good a jurisdiction is, if lawyers or 
litigants are not familiar with it, chances are slim that it will be chosen.  
Question 6 data shows that most of the respondents had experience with Germany, 
England, the Netherlands, and France. However, controlling responses for the 
home jurisdiction of the respondents highlights another perspective. It shows that 
most of the respondents have had experience with England, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Austria. As regards jurisdictions outside of the EU, respondents 
mentioned experiences in the US, Canada, Singapore, Russia, Switzerland, and 
so forth. Considering all the answers (excluding comments), respondents have had 
professional experience with 1066 courts, which means that on average one 
respondent has had professional experience with 3.23 courts. Considering the 
Question 6 results, it can be said that almost all the respondents have had 
experience with courts regardless of the department in which they worked. On 
average, every respondent was familiar with somewhat more than three 
jurisdictions. The bad news for the civil justice system competition is that even a 
group of relatively experienced lawyers like the respondents to this survey have 
had experience with only an average of three jurisdictions. Law firms can 
compensate this by creating teams of lawyers with different experience or share 
knowledge with law firms in other jurisdictions. This increases the chances that 
63
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the choice of court is made only between the limited number of jurisdictions 
known to the lawyer, while at the same time other jurisdictions with potential 
benefits for the case are disregarded.  
Question 7, the final question in the demographic section, asked respondents how 
many years of experience they had had in the legal field. The majority of them 
had 11 or more years, which confirms the conclusion from Question 1 that 
respondents were mostly experienced lawyers. Not only this, but experienced 
lawyers were also more inclined to complete the survey, while the rate of 
uncompleted surveys was higher among less experienced respondents. 
Experience is an important factor in the choice of court process, thus the opinion 
of experienced lawyers is invaluable input for the survey data. 
5.3.4.2 Choice of court in the EU 
Part 2 of the survey covers questions related to the choice of court preferences 
and to opinions of the respondents. In Question 8, respondents were asked how 
important they considered choice of court be. Results show that 88.8% of the 
respondents considered the possibility of choosing a court important or very 
important.772 Some respondents commented that ‘[choice] opens strategic options 
for the client’, or ‘[choice] will oftentimes determine the further course of the 
litigation and thus has a significant impact on prospects of success’, or ‘[choice] 
enables contract parties to make their agreement  tailor-made and take into 
                                                        
772 Results including uncompleted surveys give almost the same result, despite the demographic 
differences. This is an indication that being able to choose a court is appreciated by non-
experienced, low-ranking lawyers.  
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account the specific rules of a jurisdiction that they both prefer’. Other comments 
indicated that the possibility of choosing for arbitration was also important, and 
sometimes more important than choosing a court. The comments show that 
respondents considered choice of court a useful tool that can could the outcome 
of the litigation. Results of this question are in line with those of the Oxford 
survey, where 61% of the respondents considered choice of dispute resolution 
forum to be very important.  
Question 9 asked respondents how often they had made a choice of court in the 
previous 12 months. More than half (65.1%) stated they had made a choice of 
court at least frequently. While frequently was not defined, the scale in the survey 
implies that these options included frequencies of more than half of the cases they 
had dealt with. Some respondents commented that while they had chosen 
frequently, it was for arbitration rather than for a court. Other comments 
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emphasised that in certain situations respondents were not able to make a choice 
of court, either because the choice had already been made, or they did not have 
the legal possibility of making it, or it was the competence of their colleagues. 
These data show that for lawyers working in large international law firms, 
choosing the court is a very common practice.  
One of the conclusions of Chapter 4 is that lawyers dominate their clients and 
make decisions autonomously. It is expected that lawyers take the lead and decide 
on their own, or clients let lawyers decide what court to choose. Question 10 asked 
respondents to show how often they discussed choice of court with their client(s). 
Results show that 45.7% of the respondents discussed choice of court with their 
clients in about 50% or less of the cases, and the remaining respondents discussed 
the matter with their clients more often. If responses from incomplete surveys are 
taken into account, the rate of respondents that discuss choice of court with their 
clients in about 50% or less of the cases clients increases to 51.3%. This increase 
can be an indication that senior lawyers handle more delicate cases that need to 
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be discussed with their client. However, this data do not show who really makes 
the decision.  
On this issue, Question 11 asked respondents to indicate how often choice of court 
is made by the client and not by the lawyers. Of the respondents, 28.1% consider 
that clients make the choice of court decision in 50% or more of the cases. Almost 
the same result (28.4%) is obtained if uncompleted surveys are considered.773 
Data from questions 10 and 11 show that while lawyers discuss with their clients 
choice of court options, the decision is left in hands of the lawyers or the lawyer 
makes the final decision. While the results do not prove lawyers’ domination in 
the relationship with their client, it provides data that support this theory, and 
show that lawyers are actually the real choice makers.  
 
                                                        
773 On the other end of the scale, 41.9% of the lawyers consider that clients make the choice in 
10% or less of the cases. Or 64.9% of the respondents think that clients make the choice in 
30% or less of the cases. 
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In addition, Question 12 asked respondents to indicate how often clients followed 
their advice on choice of court. The vast majority of the respondents (88.8%) 
consider that clients follow their lawyer’s advice. These data add further support 
to the idea that the lawyer is dominant in the client-lawyer relationship. 
Commenting on Question 11, a respondent stated that clients make the choice of 
court ‘but always having received (and nearly always having acted in accordance 
with) our advice on the question’. Another respondent also pointed to an 
interesting situation where the lawyer proposes two or more jurisdictions, and the 
clients decide between them. Hence, in this situation both the lawyer and the client 
feel they made the choice. Nevertheless, it can be argued that even in this situation 
the choice is made by the lawyer, who presents the options. Given that for the 
lawyer all the options are equally good, the client has the privilege of choosing 
from among them. Another respondent’s comment that best summarises this 
discussion was ‘they [clients] think I am an expert’. It is this image of expertise 
that places lawyers in their dominating position.  
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A comment in Question 8 stated that choice of court is important ‘to assure 
synchronisation with applicable law in contacts’, and reflects a common practice 
of matching the applicable law with the court of that jurisdiction. In other words, 
procedural law becomes a function of substantive law.774 Question 13 asked 
respondents to indicate whether substantive law or procedural law had a greater 
influence on their choice of court. Data show that the majority of the lawyers 
(34.55%) consider both laws important. However, the percentage of lawyers that 
consider substantive law to any degree is bigger compared to those that consider 
procedural law at any extent. These data, however, provide no definitive answer. 
In this regard, anecdotal evidence suggests that the results of this questions might 
be influenced by the percentage of lawyers experienced in litigation or in 
transactions. Many respondents commented that choice of court was influenced 
primarily by other factors, and substantive law was only a secondary one.775 In 
view of this, it appears that the dichotomy between substantive law and procedural 
law does not exist as a separate factor category, but as one of the factors that 
influence decision making in relation to the choice of court. Questions 14 to 19 
                                                        
774 Of course, there are cases where procedure is of the essence, or where substantive law is of 
the essence. In these cases, the most important aspect dictates the other choices.  
775 Some of the comments mentioned ‘home advantage’, ‘functionality of the legal system…’, 
‘…reasons of enforceability/practical reasons’, and ‘… court’s reputation…’ as factors that 
are more important than substantive law or procedural law.  
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follow up on this issue, and collect data on jurisdiction preferences and factors 
influencing respondents when they choose a court.  
Question 14 asked respondents to name the three most attractive jurisdictions with 
respect to their court litigation.776 They could choose to name only one or to 
choose none. Results show that Germany is considered the first most attractive 
jurisdiction by 31.5% of the respondents, followed by England and Wales (25.2%) 
and the Netherlands (11.5%). As regards the second most attractive jurisdiction, 
respondents consider it to be England and Wales, with 22.3% of the preferences 
followed by Germany (18.1%) and the Netherlands (16.9%). The third most 
attractive jurisdiction is considered to be England and Wales with 16.8% of the 
preferences followed by Germany (15.1%) and the Netherlands (10.5%).777 Some 
respondents commented that they consider Switzerland, the US, and Norway to 
be attractive jurisdictions, and arbitration to be an alternative to court, but this was 
not included in the survey’s options. As indicated in some of the comments, 
choosing a court depends on the case at hand. However, there are characteristics 
equally important to all cases, which play an important role. For example, some 
respondents’ comments on costs suggest that England is the best option ‘…but it 
can be prohibitively expensive’; another respondent wrote: ‘the UK because of 
                                                        
776 Assuming that lawyers would have, on average, practical knowledge of three jurisdictions, 
Question 14 asked them to rank the three. The assumption on which the question was drafted 
was confirmed by the results of Question 6, where it was found that respondents, on average, 
are familiar with 3.23 courts. 
777 The most chosen option was ‘none’, with 20.4% of the preferences. 
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the language, but you have to consider the costs’; or ‘the UK is most likely to get 
a correct result, but very expensive’; and another consider said: ‘Litigating in 
Germany is quite cheap…’. Other comments involved the speed of 
Luxembourgish courts, the claimant friendliness of Dutch courts, and the 
efficiency and high quality of Dutch and German courts. In addition to qualities 
of the court or the case, some respondents commented that their choice was biased 
in favour of their home jurisdiction. One respondent commented: ‘differences 
[between different jurisdictions] are minor and priorities mostly due to national 
bias for one's own courts (“the devil you know”)’.778 Home bias, as the tendency 
to choose the court of one’s home jurisdiction was also acknowledged by the 
Oxford survey. Home bias deforms the result of the survey, and gives an 
advantage to the jurisdiction from which most respondents came. To overcome 
this problem, I decided to control responses for the home jurisdiction bias. 
 
From the Question 14 results, I removed data where respondents had picked their 
own jurisdiction as one of the three options. However, I considered home 
jurisdiction of the respondents in the answer they provided in Question 5. It should 
be also recognised that controlling for the home bias, contains a certain degree of 
arbitrariness. While a respondent is considered biased when choosing his home 
jurisdiction, it can be that their choice is based only on the merit and not on the 
bias. This means that both charts for Question 14 should be considered together 
during the analysis. Controlling data this way showed that England and Wales 
with 42.6% was the first most attractive jurisdiction followed by Germany 
(22.3%) and the Netherlands (5.4%).779  
                                                        
778 Words in square brackets are mine. 
779 In this case, the option ‘none’ (19.6%) is also the third most chosen option. 
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Immediately noticeable was the increase in the choice of England and Wales and 
the decline of all the others.780 Despite the decline, Germany was the second most 
attractive jurisdiction, with two times fewer preferences than England and Wales, 
and almost five times more than the Netherlands, in third place. Clearly, home 
bias plays a role in the choice making of lawyers. This was observed by the Oxford 
survey, and was also predicted by the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4. Lawyers 
have a great deal of knowledge, and have invested time and resources in their 
home jurisdiction, which gives them a competitive advantage over foreign 
lawyers. In addition, choosing the home jurisdiction can be less expensive, and 
might increase the benefits for local clients. Therefore, choosing the home 
jurisdiction seems to be almost the default choice for many lawyers. Removing 
this default choice reveals England and Wales as the option that most attracts 
lawyers. Although predictable, the choice is puzzling. While England and Wales 
do not seem to excel on the EU Justice Scoreboard,781 England still remains the 
best choice for many lawyers. A possible reason for the discrepancy can be that 
the factors considered by lawyers are different from those measured by the 
Scoreboard. 
  
                                                        
780 The second and third most attractive list gives almost the same result for the first two 
positions as the first most attractive one. England and Wales (24.1%, 20%) and Germany 
(18.2%, 17.4%) are the first two. The Netherlands (16.8%) and France (9.6%) are the third-
best options for the second- and third- most attractive jurisdictions. It is remarkable to note 
the increase regarding Austria, from 2.7% as the first most attractive option to 11.2% as the 
second most attractive option. 
781 See Section 5.1. 
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Considering the above, Question 15 asked respondents to rank the first three 
elements/factors that they considered attractive in the jurisdiction they chose in 
question 14.782 Data show that ‘quality of judges and courts’ is considered the first 
most attractive element/factor with 16.4% of the preferences, followed by 
‘predictability of the outcome’ (11%) and ‘familiarity with the jurisdiction’ 
(9.3%). Among the second most important factors are ‘quality of judges and 
courts’ (11.6%), ‘speed of the dispute resolution’ (11%), and ‘predictability of the 
outcome’ (8.2%). For the third most important choice, respondents considered 
‘quality of the judges and court’ (13.3%), ‘speed of the dispute resolution’ 
(12.4%), and ‘predictability of the outcome’ (8.4%) as the top three. Language as 
an element/factor of influence for the choice of court was considered as such only 
by 4.4% of the respondents. This is surprising, given that some Member States 
consider changing the procedures as a step to becoming more attractive to 
international litigants. This does not mean that language is not important, but other 
elements are higher in the priority list, and maybe governments should pay 
attention to them as well.  
Data show that most of the respondents come from countries in north-western 
Europe. The same region is home to most of the jurisdictions with regard to the 
top ten responses to Question 14. Furthermore, countries in this region also score 
well in the Scoreboard (see Section 5.1). It can be argued, however, that these 
                                                        
782 Responses were a list of 21 predefined options. 
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survey results are the outcome of an implicit bias on the part of these particular 
respondents. Hence, along with a supposed home bias, respondents suffer from a 
region bias, which would lead them to choose courts that were in their 
neighbourhood. At this point it, would be interesting to make regional surveys of 
lawyers and to examine the choice preferences of this particular group. These 
supposed biases, however, should not hide the real merits of qualitative 
jurisdictions. North-western jurisdictions are also chosen, and maybe primarily 
because they have good courts, as the results of the Scoreboard demonstrate. 
Calculations in Section 5.1 ranked and scored figures that compared Member 
States with each other. These figures tried to encompass all the elements that make 
a judicial system efficient and that facilitate litigation. In a certain way, these 
elements should coincide with those that lawyers consider important. It was 
expected that the figures used to prepare the Scoreboard should coincide with or 
be similar to the results of Question 15. However, the Scoreboard has only three 
elements that coincide with the answers to Question 15: ‘length of proceeding’ 
related to ‘speed of the dispute resolution’, ‘information about the judicial system’ 
can be related to ‘familiarity with the jurisdiction’, and ‘quality of judges’ is 
related to ‘quality of judges and courts’. While there is no doubt that the 
Scoreboard and the figures it uses are important, the perception is that parties take 
into account other factors when making a choice of court.783 Comments from 
respondents to Question 15 suggest that the alternatives provided were almost the 
complete list of reasons they think that ‘All aspects one can choose from are 
important. Lack of corruption is of course fundamental, but also the reliability of 
procedural law, the judges, the predictability of outcome and speed are also 
paramount’, or ‘these [the list provided in the questionnaire] are the criteria I 
would normally consider when choosing jurisdiction’. Another respondent 
commented that ‘speed, reliability and expertise also lead to predictability and 
trust; all this also comes with a number of other factors such as quality of local 
lawyers, business experience etc.’, ‘…a ranking is difficult to establish’. From 
these comments, it appears that factors provided to the respondents are considered 
almost equally important. More data related to influencing factors and elements 
are provided infra by Questions 18 and 19.  
  
                                                        
783 The Scoreboard’s aim is not to serve as a chart for court-hunting lawyers or parties, but to 
provide Member States with a tool to help determine the health of their justice system. 
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While Question 14 asked respondents to indicate the jurisdictions they find 
attractive, Question 16 asked them to indicate the three least attractive jurisdiction 
with regard to litigation proceedings. Respondents could choose to indicate only 
one jurisdiction or choose the option ‘none’. Results show that the trio composed 
of Italy, Romania, and Greece is consistently in the top three of the least attractive 
jurisdictions. The option ‘none’ is also frequent for this question, and may indicate 
respondents’ lack of practical experience, of strategy, or of experience in 
answering these types of questions. Comparing this list with the list of Member 
States placed last in the Scoreboard, only four of nine are on both of them, with 
Italy and Greece in both. Italy is infamous for the slow pace of its courts, known 
as the ‘Italian torpedo’.784 Scoreboard results show that disputes in Italy need 
around 400 days on average to be resolved. The only Member States worse than 
Italy are Malta, Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus. However, Italy’s poor result in 
Question 16 can be attributed in part to the notoriety of the term ‘Italian torpedo’ 
and some infamous cases such as Gasser. One of the members of the trio, Greece, 
does not have Italy’s bad reputation, but owing to the economic and political 
instability of the last few years, Greece has been the centre of mishaps. Romania, 
while scoring decently in the Scoreboard and avoiding the bottom ten position, is 
nonetheless considered one of the least attractive jurisdictions. In this case, other 
reasons like a reputation for corruption, or being an eastern country, might play a 
role. An interesting fact is the appearance of England and Wales, and France 
                                                        
784 Regarding the infamous slow pace of Italian procedures, some respondents commented: ‘In 
Italy, it takes ages before you get a judgment’; ‘Italy is third choice due to extremely long 
and slow procedures’; ‘The two above are slow (Italy) …’. 
2
6
,8
%
2
2
,2
%
1
2
,9
%
9
,6
%
9
,3
%
2
,5
%
2
,5
%
2
,2
%
1
,6
%
1
,6
%
1
0
,2
%
2
2
,1
%
1
3
,9
%
1
2
,5
%
9
,2
%
4
,0
%
4
,0
%
5
,6
%
1
,7
%
3
,6
%9
,1
%
2
8
,1
%
9
,5
%
6
,7
%
7
,0
%
4
,2
%
4
,9
%
2
,5
%
2
,8
%
4
,2
%
Q16: In your opinion, which jurisdictions in the 
EU have the least attractive civil justice system 
as regards litigation proceedings?
1st least: 365 2nd least: 303 3rd least: 285
302 
 
among the top nine of the least attractive jurisdictions. While France scores very 
low on the Scoreboard, and can be expected to be on this list, England and Wales 
are unattractive due to the high costs and its common law system. Commenting 
on England’s unattractive high litigation costs, respondents pointed out ‘…the 
cost of English proceedings is horrendous’, ‘… [English] lawyers' fees are 
enormously high, which is a deterrent for many clients’; while as regards common 
law as an unattractive feature ‘The common law system is unattractive for the 
clients from non-common law systems’, and ‘It takes ages for a lawyer to read 
any English judgment’.  
Some comments provided by respondents to Question 16 point out ‘speed of 
proceeding’ and ‘costs’ as factors for considering a court unattractive. Question 
17 asked respondents to rank three elements/factors considered to make the 
jurisdiction in Question 16 unattractive. The elements/factors were predefined, 
and were similar to those provided in Question 15. Respondents could choose 
only one element/factor, and ‘none’ was also a choice. This question also had a 
space for comments. Data show that respondents consider ‘slow pace of the 
dispute resolution’ (23.3% of the respondents), ‘presence of corruption’ (15.6%), 
‘lack of quality of judges’, and ‘presence of bureaucracy’ (both 7.4%) as the most 
important factors in considering a court unattractive. The second most important 
factors are again ‘slow pace of the dispute resolution’ (16.8%), ‘unpredictability 
of the outcome’ (12.3%), and ‘lack of neutrality’ (9.9%). The third most important 
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Q17: Bearing in mind the jurisdictions that you 
consider least attractive, in your opinion what 
are the elements/factors that make these 
jurisdictions less attractive?
1st important: 365 2nd important: 333 3rd important: 312
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factor was ‘unpredictability of the outcome’ (17%), ‘slow pace of the dispute 
resolution’ (11.9%), and ‘presence of corruption’ (9%).785 Comparing these 
results with those of Question 16, the factors chosen here seem to reflect some of 
the characteristics of the jurisdictions considered as unattractive. Other factors, 
apart from those already mentioned, also seem to be very important. It is 
interesting to note that costs are not among the top ten factors that make a 
jurisdiction unattractive. At the same time, high costs as a factor earned England 
and Wales a place among the top ten unattractive jurisdictions. These two facts 
indicate that while costs in general are not a primary factor in making a court 
unattractive, for England and Wales they are. Comparing results from Questions 
15 and 17, the factors considered important in both questions are not the same. 
These results can be an indication of how lawyer’s choice of court process 
unfolds. It is submitted that this process has three phases. In the first phase, a 
lawyer uses factors considered important (mentioned in Question 17) to build a 
set of the most unattractive jurisdictions. In this phase, a list is created with all the 
undesirable and dangerous jurisdictions. Any jurisdiction on this list would be 
unacceptable for a negotiating lawyer. In the second phase, lawyers build a set 
with the most attractive jurisdictions by applying the factors they consider 
important (mentioned in Question 15). This phase ‘qualifies’ attractive 
jurisdictions and leaves out jurisdictions that are either unattractive or unknown. 
While unwanted jurisdiction are immediately discarded from any consideration, 
unknown jurisdictions are more ‘exotic’. The tendency would be to discard them 
because they are unknown, but further investigation could make them acceptable. 
The third phase is choice making, where lawyers pick a jurisdiction from the list 
created in phase two. Choice in phase three is made by taking into account the 
case, the requirements of the client, the opposing party, and other relevant factors. 
The whole process divided into these three phases does not have to be elaborate, 
as it can be expected that the process is short and instinctive. While many 
jurisdictions are unknown to many lawyers, they fall into the ‘unknown’ set and 
are neither part of the unattractive set nor of the attractive set. Unattractive and 
attractive sets are important during the negotiation phase, as here each party 
proposes an option for the choice of court clause. If the choice falls within one of 
the sets, each lawyer knows instinctively what to do: namely, avoid unattractive, 
welcome attractive. If a proposal falls into the unknown set, negotiations will stop 
until the parties determine whether the proposed jurisdiction is attractive or 
unattractive. 
                                                        
785 The option ‘none’ was the third most preferred option, with 12.6%, 11.4%, and 14.7% as 
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd most important choice, respectively. Some respondents commented that 
they did not have enough experience with all the jurisdictions, and therefore they selected 
the option ‘none’. 
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Question 18 asked respondents to indicate how important certain elements/factors 
are for the choice of court. The same elements/factors offered in Questions 15 and 
17 were offered here. This time, for each element/factor, respondents could 
indicate whether it was ‘not at all influential’, ‘slightly influential’, ‘somewhat 
influential’, ‘very influential’, ‘extremely influential’, and N/A. I gave 1 point to 
the option ‘not at all influential’, 2 points to ‘slightly influential’, 3 points to 
‘somewhat influential’, 4 points to ‘very influential’, and 5 points to ‘extremely 
influential’, and calculated the average score for each element/factor based on the 
number of respondents for each of them. Calculating the average for each 
element/factor revels that ‘quality of judges and courts’, ‘lack of corruption’, 
‘neutrality’, ‘speed of the dispute resolution’, and ‘enforcement possibilities in 
that jurisdiction’ are considered the five most important elements when choosing 
a court. ‘Quality of judges and courts’ and ‘speed of the dispute resolution’ are 
also present in the top five answers to Question 15. Results from Questions 15 
and 18 could have been expected to be the same, however it should be considered 
that they are relevant for different phases of the choice making process. The 
elements/factors ranked in Question 18 play a role in the second phase of the 
process, which qualifies jurisdictions in terms of whether or not they are 
attractive. In the third phase, the elements/factors of Question 15 are used to make 
the actual choice. In fact, among the top five elements/factors in Question 15 are 
‘familiarity with the jurisdiction’ and ‘client’s familiarity with the jurisdiction’, 
which are useful when discussing precise and concrete jurisdictions.  
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Q18: How influential are the following 
elements/factors when you make a choice of 
court?
Respondents: 333
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Question 19 asked respondents to evaluate the importance of certain 
elements/factors when trying to avoid a court. The same elements/factors used in 
the other questions were used in Question 19. The modalities for responding to 
this question and their analysis are the same as for Question 18. Results show that 
the first six elements/factors mentioned are ‘presence of corruption’, ‘lack of 
neutrality’, ‘lack of quality of judges and courts’, ‘unfairness of the outcome’, 
‘unpredictability of the outcome’, and ‘slow pace of the dispute resolution’. 
Compared with the results of Question 17, five of the first six elements/factors in 
both lists coincide. Considering a court unattractive and avoiding a court is the 
same. In fact, they occur together in the first phase of choice making, in which 
lawyers as choice makers create a set of ‘unattractive’ jurisdictions.  
5.3.4.3 Respondents’ view on the civil justice system in the EU 
In the third part of the survey, respondents were asked questions related to the 
civil justice system in the EU. Question 20 asked respondents to indicate the 
Member States that actively attract or promote their court system. More than one 
choice was possible. Data from Question 20 show that England and Wales are 
considered by 72.1% of the respondents to be the most active in attracting litigants 
or promoting their courts. Germany (34.5%) and the Netherlands (30.6%) follow 
the second and third place.  
For this question, the home bias might play a role in distorting the data. On the 
one hand, controlling for the home jurisdiction removes the distortion produced 
by the home bias, while on the other hand, it provides data as to how much the 
competitive activities of each jurisdiction are known outside of their borders.  
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Q19: How influential are the following 
elements/factors when you avoid a 
certain court?
Respondents: 333
306 
 
The control was done by removing from the Question 20 results the responses of 
those lawyers who mentioned the same jurisdiction that they had mentioned in 
Question 5 (jurisdiction where they mainly operate). Results show that a large 
majority (69.6%) of the respondents still consider England and Wales to be the 
most active in attracting litigants. The Netherlands and Germany exchanged 
second and third place, while having almost the same number of respondents. 
Considered as an active competitor in Section 5.2, France follows Sweden, 
Austria, and Luxembourg in the ranking. For 16.1% of the respondents, none of 
the jurisdictions in the EU is making any effort to attract litigants or to promote 
itself. Apart from the result of France, the result of the other jurisdictions was 
expected. In fact, I would have expected Germany’s score to be higher than that 
of the Netherlands. Evidently the brochure ‘Law Made in Germany’ is not enough 
to promote German courts. Perhaps more marketing is needed.  
72,1%
34,5%30,6%
16,1%10,9% 9,1% 8,8% 7,9% 4,8% 3,3% 2,4% 1,8% 1,8% 1,5%
Q20: According to you, which of the following 
jurisdictions in the EU actively attracts litigants 
to (promotes) its court system?
Respondents: 330
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23,1%23,9%16,1%
7,8% 8,5% 8,2% 6,7% 3,7% 3,0% 2,1% 1,8% 1,8% 1,5%
Q20: According to you, which of the following 
jurisdictions in the EU actively attracts litigants 
to (promotes) its court system?
Controlled for home jurisdiction
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Questions 21 and 22 asked respondents to compare common law and civil law 
courts. Question 21 asked respondents if there was a considerable difference 
between common law and civil law countries. Respondents generally agree that 
the difference is considerable. However, this difference was pointed out only 
episodically as a factor in choosing or avoiding a court. In other words, apart from 
procedural differences, there should be no differences in difficulty between the 
two systems. On this issue,  
Question 22 asked respondents to compare the difficulty of litigating in a common 
law country and a civil law country. Data shows that respondents do not consider 
litigating in common law countries easier than in civil law countries. In fact they 
are mostly neutral in this regard. 
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Q21: The differences between civil law courts 
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Respondents: 330
308 
 
Questions 23 and 24 asked respondents to compare some regions of Europe with 
respect to their court system. Question 23 asked respondents whether they agreed 
with the statement ‘Generally, courts in Western Europe are more reliable than 
courts in Eastern Europe’. The aim was to determine whether a general negative 
opinion exists regarding Eastern European courts. Any such opinion can create a 
bias in the choice of court. Data shows that respondents, who are mostly Western 
European lawyers, agree that courts in Eastern Europe are not reliable. Question 
24 aimed at comparing Northern Europe with Southern Europe. Respondents 
were asked if they agreed with the statement  ‘Generally, courts in Northern 
Europe are more efficient in terms of proceeding time, review of documents, and 
response time, compared to courts in Southern Europe.’ Again, a negative image 
of Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece) might create biases toward courts of 
specific jurisdiction, but could also punish other courts that do not deserve the 
negative reputation. Data for this question are comparable with those from 
Question 24. Respondents consider courts in the northern jurisdictions to be more 
efficient than those in the south.  
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Q23: Generally, courts in Western Europe are 
more reliable than courts in Eastern Europe.
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5.4 Conclusions 
The first three chapters provided an analysis of how the competition of civil 
justice systems unfolds (Chapter 4), of what comprises the legal framework that 
facilitates this competition in the EU (Chapter 3), and of how the civil justice 
system competition relates to other key concepts of jurisdictional competition 
(Chapter 2). Complementing the analysis in these chapters, Chapter 5 offered an 
empirical overview of the demand side and the supply side of the civil justice 
system market. The aim of this chapter was to provide empirical evidence to 
support and enrich the analysis in the other chapters. Chapter 5 was divided into 
three parts. The first part focused on the role of the EU in relation to the civil 
justice system competition, while the second part focused on the competition 
activities of some Member States. The third part presented the findings of a survey 
conducted by the author on lawyers from the top law firms in the EU considered 
by their revenues. 
The first part of this chapter was dedicated to the role of the EU in relation to the 
competition involving civil justice systems. The claim here is that the EU plays a 
significant role. While the analysis produced no evidence of the EU’s direct 
involvement in the competition, there is sufficient evidence that the EU is a 
powerful catalyst in this process. The first evidence was produced in Chapter 3, 
where the EU’s role as the creator and the keeper of the legal framework of the 
civil justice system competition was discussed. The analysis revealed that the EU 
maintains, among others, a strong interest in improving cross-border procedures, 
common rules, and eliminating obstacles to the civil proceedings. Eliminating 
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obstacles and facilitating cross-border litigation fosters the premises for the 
further development of the civil justice system competition. 
In relation to this, the Treaty of Amsterdam was the first step towards a European 
Area of Justice, which is an area of freedom, security, and justice, without internal 
frontiers, and based on four principles: mutual trust, economic growth through 
better justice, simpler justice for citizens, and protection of fundamental rights. 
The related political priorities were set out in the EU Justice Agenda 2020, which 
considers that the court system plays an important role in economic growth and 
financial stability in the EU. Efficient and qualitative judicial institutions provide 
predictability, fairness, and stability to investors, along with sustainable economic 
growth. This is why the EU motivates Member States to have more efficient and 
qualitative courts. Part of the EU’s motivating strategy is the EU Justice 
Scoreboard. 
Published annually by the European Commission, the EU Justice Scoreboard 
provides data on the health of each Member State’s justice system. Member States 
provide data related to the litigious civil justice with a particular focus on 
commercial and administrative cases. The Scoreboard contains figures indicating 
where specific data from all the Member States are confronted with each other. 
While the Scoreboard is not designed to declare a winner or a loser, Member 
States can compare their results with regard to specific elements of their judicial 
system. 
Analysing Scoreboard data can reveal which Member State has the best judicial 
system, which excels in specific parameters, and which needs to reform its judicial 
system. In view of this, the Scoreboard is important for the civil justice system 
competition in the EU, because it provides an overview of the quality of the supply 
side. The analysis conducted in Section 5.1.3 used only figures meaningful for the 
civil justice system competition. It emerges from the analysis that Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Austria have the best judicial systems in 
the EU. At the same time, the Czech Republic, Poland, France, Slovakia, and 
Cyprus are in the last position. This ranking is helpful in three respects. First, it 
suggests that Luxembourg, Denmark, Estonia, and Austria have the highest 
potential in the civil justice system market. Second, it can be submitted that 
competing Member States do not necessarily have the best legal system. Third, 
the Scoreboard in conjunction with the Choice of Court Survey helps us to 
understand whether or not the demand side is choosing the highest scoring 
Member States. 
Section 5.2 analysed the position of England and Wales, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands with regard to the civil justice system competition, and they were 
seen to be the most active competitors in the EU, as well as Luxembourg and 
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Denmark as two of the best Member States based on the Scoreboard. Denmark is 
one of the best performing Member States, with fast, efficient, and transparent 
courts, but shows no interest in competing to attract foreign litigants. Similarly, 
Luxembourg offers attractive courts with fast and efficient proceedings, but lacks 
activities aimed at attracting foreign litigants. While it can be argued that political 
will to compete is missing, business groups − at least in Luxembourg − use the 
efficiency and the quality of the country’s courts as an incentive for parties 
wanting to invest in their jurisdictions. A common characteristic of Luxembourg 
and Denmark is the absence of interest from their governments in the competition 
of jurisdictions. Arguably, parties interested in the civil justice system 
competition, like lawyers, would be the motor that would drive these governments 
to compete. 
Bar associations and similar organisations are important in lobbying their 
governments to be active competition. The legal business also has an important 
economic output, and therefore not only lobbying but also economic reasons 
provide the stimulus for the governments of England and Wales, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands to be politically active in attracting cross-border 
litigants. England, Germany, and France have been engaged in a war of brochures, 
where each of them has tried to impress litigants with the qualities of their system. 
However, claims of superiority are not always supported by evidence or by the 
Scoreboard results. Compared to the others, England seems to be more active and 
diverse in its activities, which range from facilitating the presence of foreign 
lawyers in English proceedings to organising seminars to promote English courts. 
Among the group of competing countries, the Netherlands appears to be less 
active in producing brochures, but more active in terms of actions. Arguably the 
most distinct action was the Dutch government’ decision to create a Commercial 
Court that will litigate in English and deal exclusively with certain cross-border 
commercial cases. The court is scheduled to begin functioning in January 2018. 
It can be argued that while the brochure war can help competitors attract litigants, 
concrete actions might be more productive. However, this still depends on what 
and how litigants choose. 
Section 5.3 presented the findings of a survey conducted by the author among 
lawyers from the top law firms in the EU. As was explained in Chapter 4, lawyers 
exercise considerable power over their clients, which allows them to make most 
of the legal choices, including choice of court. Chapter 4 concluded that in the 
civil justice system competition, two important characteristics for the demand side 
are mobility and relatively extensive resources (mostly economic). Litigants with 
high mobility and sufficient resources tend to choose the top law firms to protect 
their interests. Given that the lawyers market is of the superstar kind, the top law 
firms would be those that earn the most revenue. Considering the above, I decided 
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to distribute the survey among lawyers working for the top one hundred law firms 
in the EU and the EU offices of the top one hundred global law firms. Of the 529 
responses to the survey, 330 were complete. 
The majority of the respondents were partners or senior associates with more than 
eleven years of experience. Survey results show that a large majority of lawyers 
speak English, while other languages are far less popular. This is not surprising, 
but reinforces the idea that competitive courts should litigate in the lingua franca 
of modern business, which is English. Experience with courts was relatively low. 
On average, lawyers have experience with 3.23 courts (including in their home 
jurisdiction), which means that their practical knowledge of other jurisdictions is 
limited. Limited information on what the supply side offers can limit the ability 
of the demand side to choose, and as a consequence can hinder the development 
of competition. The survey did not find any connection between the places where 
the lawyers had studied and their choice of court. 
As was mentioned, Chapter 4 concluded that lawyers exercise considerable power 
over their clients, and are the effective decision makers when it comes to choice 
of court. Data from the survey support this claim. The majority of the lawyers 
responded that they discussed choice of court with their clients in more than 50% 
of the cases. However, the majority of the respondents considered that the final 
choice of court is made by the lawyers and not by their clients. Respondents also 
considered that when clients make a choice of court, they choose the one 
recommended by their lawyers. 
Considering the power that lawyers have, the second part of the questionnaire was 
dedicated to lawyers’ choice of court preferences. The most attractive 
jurisdictions were England and Wales, Germany, and the Netherlands, while Italy, 
Romania, and Greece were considered the least attractive. Comparing the list of 
the most attractive jurisdictions with the list of the highest scoring jurisdictions 
from the Scoreboard demonstrates substantial differences between the two. This 
means either that lawyers use other criteria to assess the quality of a court or that 
they simply do not bother to choose the best court in the EU. The same is also true 
for the list of the most attractive jurisdictions. When asked which element makes 
the jurisdiction they choose the most attractive, lawyers mentioned quality of 
judges and court, predictability of the outcome, and familiarity with the 
jurisdiction. At the same time, ‘slow pace of the dispute resolution’, ‘presence of 
corruption’, and ‘lack of quality of judges and courts’ are the most mentioned 
elements of the least attractive courts.  
Following up on the court elements, lawyers were asked to evaluate how 
important certain criteria were in general for choosing or for avoiding a court. 
Lawyers considered ‘quality of judges and courts’, ‘lack of corruption’, and 
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‘neutrality’ as the most important when choosing a court. ‘Presence of 
corruption’, ‘lack of neutrality’, and ‘lack of quality of judges and courts’ were 
considered as the most important when avoiding a court. Comparing the elements 
considered important, and taking into account specific courts and elements 
considered important in general, a discrepancy between the two lists can be 
distinguished, while at the same time no discrepancy can be observed between the 
lists of courts to be avoided. It was suggested that this is a result of the lawyers’ 
choice of court process, which is composed of three phases. During the first phase, 
lawyers create a set of unattractive jurisdictions on the basis of the elements 
mentioned above. In the second phase, a set of possible jurisdictions is created to 
choose from based on the general elements used to consider a court attractive. At 
the end of the second phase, lawyers have a set with jurisdictions to be avoided 
and a list of possible jurisdictions to be chosen. Obviously, there are many 
jurisdictions outside of these sets. The third is the choice making phase, in which 
lawyers choose one or more jurisdictions from the second set based on the 
characteristics of the case, the client, or other case-related elements. During 
negotiation, lawyers will refuse courts from the first set and negotiate regarding 
courts from the second set. If a non-categorised court is offered during 
negotiations, lawyers are expected to take time to determine the category of this 
court. The process described here is often instinctive. Lawyers already know 
which jurisdiction to avoid and which to choose, based on experience or on 
anecdotal evidence of a general opinion about a court. Given that lawyers have an 
average personal experience with 3.23 courts, anecdotal evidence or a general 
opinion shape lawyers’ opinions with regard to courts. It is therefore 
understandable that governments undertake marketing campaigns to promote 
their jurisdictions, but it is not clear with what results. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 highlighted the elements that parties consider – or 
should consider – when making a choice of court. Survey results show that 
lawyers consider important the same elements that were highlighted in Chapter 4. 
It should be taken into account, however, that Chapter 4 considered elements from 
the perspective of clients. It is probable that lawyers would have different 
priorities, but the elements to be considered for a jurisdiction would be the same. 
Chapter 5 aimed at enriching with empirical data the analysis offered in the other 
chapters. The analysis failed to find any direct interest of the European Union in 
the civil justice competition. However, the EU plays an important role in creating 
the political and legal framework where the countries compete. One important 
instrument is the EU Justice Scoreboard, which provides data and ranks Member 
States on important elements of the justice system. These data show that the best 
jurisdictions are not necessarily those that compete in the EU. Denmark and 
Luxembourg have the best scores, but they show no particular – if any – interest 
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in competing. In these jurisdictions, legal business is financially significant, but 
local interest groups seem to lack the desire to compete in the civil justice system 
market that would push their governments to enter the race. Competing Member 
States have active interest groups that pressure governments to take steps in 
attracting litigants, and governments employ marketing strategies to promote their 
jurisdiction. While the financial interests are significant, none of the competing 
governments have approved reforms to attract cross-border litigants. An 
exception to this is the Netherlands, which has established a court with jurisdiction 
over cross-border commercial cases that offers the possibility of hearing cases in 
English. According to my survey, the Netherlands, England, and Germany are the 
Member States that most of the lawyers considered attractive; with courts’ quality 
and predictability together with the lawyers’ familiarity with them being the most 
attractive elements. However, these elements are not necessarily what make a 
court attractive in general. An explanation for this discrepancy might lie in the 
process that lawyers follow when choosing a court. This process consists of three 
phases. In the first and second phase, a list is created of unattractive and attractive 
sets of courts, respectively. General criteria are used. The third phase is the 
process of choosing a court from among those in the second set. The third phase 
makes use of elements and criteria with regard to the particular legal situation at 
hand. The survey results support the theoretical claim that choice of court is made 
by lawyers rather than clients. Data show that even in cases in which clients make 
the final choice, they are following their lawyer’s advice. 
Competition between jurisdictions is a slowly growing process, although many 
jurisdictions in the EU have the necessary potential to attract cross-border litigants 
from jurisdictions that are already competing. Legal and political developments 
might provide the necessary spark that competition needs in order to intensify. 
Empirical studies can provide the required information both for governments and 
litigants so that they might appreciate the benefits of the civil justice system 
market. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
This chapter marks the end of this research, and summarises its main findings 
following the structure of the foregoing chapters. 
6.1 A study on the competition of civil justice systems in the 
EU 
6.1.1 A Grand Tour of Europe’s courts 
The early 2000s saw a number of wealthy businessmen enter London’s courts 
with an army of lawyers behind them. Examples mentioned in Section 1.1 include 
Berezovski v Abramovich,786 Cherney v Deripaska,787 Pinchuk, Kolomoyskyi v 
Bogolyubov,788 BTA Bank v Mukhtar Ablyazov,789 and Berezovsky v 
Patarkatsishvili,790 These cases had in common a lack of connections to the UK, 
the fact that the disputes involved billions of Euros, and that the litigants were 
wealthy businessmen from the ex-Soviet Union. In several instances, parties 
lacked any connection to London courts, but they agreed to litigate in them 
anyway. Similar cases also have been witnessed in other European courts. One of 
these involved ABA shpk from Albania and ENEL spa from Italy, who were 
litigating in the Dutch courts an Albanian dispute with no apparent connection to 
the Netherlands. Not surprisingly, local lawyers were very keen to have these 
litigations taking place in their jurisdictions, because cross-border cases are highly 
lucrative. Not only lawyers but governments as well are interested in attracting 
cross-border litigants. These activities of course did not escape the attention of 
journalists, who referred to them as a competition to attract cross-border 
litigants.791 
                                                        
786 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2012] EWHC 2463 (Comm). 
787 Settled out of court. 
788 Settled out of court. 
789 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov [2015] UKSC 64. 
790 Settled out of court. 
791 Adil Mohamedbhai, ‘Why do Russian oligarchs love the English courts?’ (The Lawyer, 19 
October 2016) <https://l2b.thelawyer.com/why-do-russian-oligarchs-love-the-english-
courts/> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Khristina Narizhnaya, ‘Russian oligarchs take over London courts’ Public Radio 
International (17 February 2012) <https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-02-17/russian-
oligarchs-take-over-london-courts> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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6.1.2 Competing for litigants 
England was one of the first jurisdictions to explicitly encourage litigants to 
present their cases in its courts. In 2007, the Law Society and a group of law firms 
published a brochure called ‘England and Wales: the jurisdictions of choice’. In 
2009, Germany published a similar brochure titled ‘Law Made in Germany’. Also 
in 2009, a French and German collaboration resulted in a brochure called 
‘Continental Law’. All these activities were supported by governments and by 
interested professional organisations, and all were aimed at attracting litigants to 
their jurisdictions. This brochure war ended quickly, but competitive activities 
continued, and Germany, France and the Netherlands began to consider legislative 
changes in order to make their jurisdictions more appealing to international 
litigants. 
6.1.3 Research question 
In view of these developments, and considering the EU’s efforts to enhance cross-
border commerce, the present research aims at examining the development of the 
litigant-oriented competition between EU Member States. Future developments 
such as Brexit will probably affect choice of court and litigation strategies in 
Europe, with significant repercussions as regards the competition for litigants. For 
the purpose of the study, the main research question was: ‘How do civil justice 
systems compete in the European Union?’ Competition in this sense should be 
understood as overt attempts to attract litigants to the civil justice system of a 
jurisdiction. It is therefore implied that jurisdictions compete in terms of their 
entire judicial system, with the court as the focal point. It is also true that litigants 
make a choice of court, and perhaps do not give too much thought to the entire 
civil justice system; in effect, however, that is precisely what they choose. 
Furthermore, the research question implied the existence of a competition before 
the study was started. This implication was based on the few anecdotal evidence 
that were presented in Chapter 1, and did not affect the research, which was open 
to any conclusion. 
6.1.4 Approaching the research 
The approach taken in conducting this research involved a theoretical analysis of 
the competition’s components and an empirical study of lawyers’ preferences and 
governments’ competitive activities. 
                                                        
Mike Giglio, ‘Oligarch v. oligarch: London's courts attract litigious tycoons’ The Daily 
Beast (23 July 2012) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/oligarch-v-oligarch-londons-courts-
attract-litigious-tycoons> accessed 22 December 2017. 
Rupert Neate, ‘Top London law firms profit from feuding Russian oligarchs’ The Guardian 
(4 September 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/sep/04/london-abramovich-
v-berezovsky-court-case> accessed 22 December 2017. 
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The theoretical analysis was split into three parts. In the first, a general analysis 
of regulatory competition was conducted, and was aimed at exploring and 
analysing the notion of regulatory competition, the consequences of competition 
on the quality of laws, and problems related to choice making. The second part 
consisted of an analysis of the legal bases that support civil justice systems in the 
EU, and the relation between this competition and the harmonisation of European 
procedural law. The third part was an analysis of the civil justice system market, 
the good in the market, the supply and the demand side, and the result of a demand 
created by a unilateral or a bilateral choice of court. 
The empirical study consisted of three parts. The first was a study of the 2016 EU 
Civil Justice Scoreboard, and the aim was to assess the quality of EU Member 
State courts, taking into account the needs of the civil justice system competition. 
In the second part, the research continued with a survey on the economic 
importance of legal business for some competing jurisdictions, and on the 
competitive activities undertaken by Member States. Statistical data from several 
jurisdictions were collected and analysed. In the third part, a questionnaire was 
distributed among lawyers in the EU with the intention of collecting data on their 
choice of court preferences. This questionnaire built upon the theoretical analysis 
of the other chapters as well as upon an analysis of similar surveys conducted in 
the EU. 
6.2 General overview of regulatory competition 
6.2.1 Benefits of competition and some doubts 
Studies have shown that competitive markets are more profitable than ones that 
are less competitive, because they promote more economic growth and are more 
resilient in the face of economic downturns. Competition also stimulates more 
efficient use of the workforce as well as reductions in costs through research and 
development. 
Research and development as a consequence of competition promotes the 
accumulation of information and knowledge, and the development of social order. 
Indeed, this knowledge is accumulated – among others – for the purpose of 
overtaking other competitors, and, in general, is a benefit not only for companies 
but also for the population. Competition is also able to create some form of social 
order. In a confrontation involving social norms, only the one that serves society 
better will survive. Applied to the civil justice system competition, these theories 
show that competition fosters the development of laws and institutions; better 
fulfils the needs of consumers; and can be a more natural way of harmonising 
laws (see also Section 3.3.3.2). 
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However, competition between countries should be distinguished from that 
between companies, and both of them should be distinguished from regulatory 
competition. As regards the civil justice system competition, it was argued 
(Section 2.1) that intense competition between jurisdictions can be to the 
detriment of weaker parties, although Member States can avoid regulatory 
competition in the event of insufficient benefits or unacceptable dangers. 
Avoiding competition does not always mean avoiding its influence. Through 
cross-fertilisation and intellectual influence, developed ideas will affect even the 
most isolated country. 
6.2.2 Tiebout’s theory  
In the 1940s and 1950s, some scholars were trying to find a market-derived 
solution that could determine the level of expenditures on public goods.  
According to these authors, one of the characteristics of public goods is that 
governments cannot determine consumers’ preferences for these goods, and as a 
consequence have difficulties in allocating resources for them. Tiebout developed 
a theory (Section 2.1.4) according to which jurisdictions competing to attract 
mobile consumers are able to optimally allocate their resources. The mechanism 
proposed by Tiebout requires some competing jurisdictions to attract mobile 
consumers by offering a different set of public goods. Consumers choose the 
jurisdiction that better serves their needs in terms of taxation level (price of the 
good), and of the quality and quantity of the good on offer. Governments would 
have a better understanding of consumer preferences and find it easier to allocate 
their resources. Applied to the civil justice system competition, Tiebout’s theory 
suggests that competing jurisdictions would find an appropriate caseload level 
that they could handle, an appropriate fee level, and appropriate regulations based 
on the type of litigants that would use their jurisdictions. However, Tiebout’s 
theory relies on certain assumptions that are not likely to occur. Nevertheless, his 
theory is valuable, as it shows in a simplified way how competition can be 
beneficial to both consumers and governments. 
6.2.3 Lessons from the competition of jurisdictions in other fields of 
law 
Scholarship with regard to competition in company law is particularly abundant 
in the US, and serves as an example (with the appropriate corrections) of how the 
civil justice system competition can develop. Studies in the US suggest that the 
company law market is dominated by the state of Delaware, which is able to 
attract the vast majority of US companies thanks to its legal infrastructure and 
institutional framework. Scholars argue whether Delaware’s dominating position 
means that there is no more competition, but a definitive answer has not yet been 
provided. Furthermore, it is debated whether (Section 2.3.1) Delaware’s 
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dominating position allows for the development and predictability of law. 
Development depends on competition: namely, the more competition, the more 
laws are able to develop. Predictability depends on the interest of the demand side. 
If the demand side is not interested in predictability, the law will not be 
predictable. Furthermore, competition in company law provides some hints 
regarding the benefits of competing jurisdictions. Direct benefits are the fees 
collected from consumers, while indirect benefits derive from taxing businesses 
related to company law. It is also clear that consumers take advantage of the 
different legal solutions offered to them. 
Studies on competition in labour law suggest that − in a process known as social 
dumping − successful countries attract educated, skilled employees, while less 
attractive countries are left with less qualified employees. The same is likely to 
happen with the civil justice system competition. Some jurisdictions will attract 
more cases, thereby gaining more experience and making their courts even more 
attractive. Less appealing jurisdictions will not be able to gain as much 
experience, and therefore will lag behind in expertise. 
6.2.4 Race-to-the-bottom or race-to-the-top 
The analysis of the competition in other fields of law showed that scholars are 
concerned about a possible race-to-the-bottom, which means a deterioration in the 
quality of law as a consequence of regulatory competition. Quality of law in many 
cases is considered from the perspective of weaker parties, who, as vulnerable 
subjects, deserve special attention. The opposite of race-to-the-bottom is race-to-
the-top, which denotes an improvement in the quality of the law as a result of the 
competition. The bottom and top duopoly struggles with situations in which there 
is no weaker party, or in which there is more than one. In these situations, it 
becomes difficult to assess what happens to the quality of law. A solution would 
be to consider a different scale that would measure the desirability and 
undesirability of the effect of legislation, and at the same time assess its strictness 
or laxity. Although not perfect, such a scale might serve as an inspiration to 
develop more sophisticated measurement tools. 
The problem of a race-to-the-bottom in the civil justice system competition should 
not be understated, and competing jurisdictions should be prepared for this 
eventuality, by adopting common minimal rules in order to guarantee the rights 
of weaker parties. Furthermore, competing jurisdictions would compete for better 
laws, with no possibility of competing for weaker ones. In Europe, EU institutions 
can take the position of the law maker that guarantees minimal standards and helps 
civil justice system competition to improve its quality of law and its service. 
Currently, EU institutions are considering a Draft Directive containing common 
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minimum standards for civil procedure.792 Although this Draft Directive is a 
consequence of the competition between jurisdictions, it would stop the race-to-
the-bottom that is a result of the civil justice system competition. 
6.2.5 Choice making 
Competition is possible if consumers are able to choose. Choice, however, 
appears to be a complicated process influenced both by hidden psychological 
factors and explicit material factors. Empirical research shows (Sections 5.3.1.2 
and 5.3.4) that choice of court and choice of law are also often influenced by 
psychological factors. The impact of these factors in choice of court is not clearly 
understood, owing to the lack of both empirical and theoretical studies. More 
research on the psychology of choice of court would be beneficial for all parties 
involved in the civil justice system competition. 
Psychologists suggest (Section 2.5.1) that people organise the world of 
possibilities in front of them into distinct categories, and choice makers express 
their preferences within these categories. These are created, for instance, by habit, 
cultural norms, and tradition, while preferences can be both unconscious and 
conscious. For example, if a lawyer is asked to make a choice of court for a client, 
he has the possibility of choosing from among twenty-eight jurisdictions. The 
lawyer, however, creates in his mind three categories in which all the possibilities 
are placed. In one category are ‘unknown courts’, in another are ‘bad/don't go 
courts’, and in the third are ‘good/go courts’. Once the possible jurisdictions are 
placed in each category, a choice-making lawyer uses his preferences to choose 
between them. Potential preferences can be court fees, certain procedural 
solutions, language of proceeding, speed of proceeding, and so on. Section 5.3.4 
suggests, on the basis of empirical data, that this is how lawyers make a choice of 
court in the EU framework. If this is true, it is highly significant for the civil justice 
system competition in the EU. It means that choice makers (lawyers or their 
clients) reduce the number of available possibilities from twenty-eight to just a 
few by categorising them. As a consequence, competing governments should try 
to influence not only the preferences of the choice makers but also the 
categorisations they use. 
Moreover, psychologists suggest that choice making is a process that provokes 
anxiety. Having a plurality of possibilities creates anxiety for choice makers, 
because choosing one thing implies losing another. Choice makers lose the 
possibility of making the choice again, and by making a choice they reject all the 
                                                        
792 The Draft Directive is contained as an annex in the European Parliament, ‘Report with 
recommendations to the Commission on common minimum standards of civil procedure in 
the EU’ (2015/2084(INL)), 6 June 2017. The procedure was closed on 4 July 2017.  
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other possibilities. Choice makers are afraid to lose these opportunities, which 
makes them anxious, and as a result they avoid choice making altogether or they 
let others make the choice in their place. It was submitted (Section 2.5.2) that 
lawyers face the same anxieties when they have to choose between jurisdictions.  
Some choice makers are more prone to anxiety than others, which also reflects 
two types of personalities distinguished by psychologists: Maximisers and 
Satisficers. Maximisers are people who always want the best and are not happy 
with a second-best alternative. They tend to spend more time and effort in choice 
making. Satisficers are people who accept second-best options. They are able to 
make their choice more quickly than Maximisers, who are prone to be quickly 
dissatisfied with their choice. Their expectations often exceed reality, which 
causes them to feel less satisfied. Maximisers also tend to be less adaptive to 
options and to become frustrated, frequently falling into depression. Lawyers are 
often considered Maximisers, because the environment in which they work 
requires them to be. A corollary to this is that lawyers refrain from taking risks, 
and are resistant to change. The Maximiser and Satisficer dichotomy presents 
another difficulty during the choice making process. However, Section 2.5 did not 
attempt to cover all the related psychological interferences. Further dedicated 
research is needed to gain a better understanding of the psychology of choice 
making. 
6.2.6 Assessing the intensity of regulatory competition 
It is often debated whether there is in fact a competition of jurisdictions in a field 
of law. Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence do not always agree, even in 
situations where both theoretical and empirical analyses are abundant. It was 
suggested (Section 2.6) that this might happen in situations of low competitive 
intensity, with intensity being the product of all the competitive activities 
(political and legislative activities directed at attracting litigants) along with the 
size of the demand side and the supply side. All of these factors should be 
measured during the same period. 
The proposed method for measuring the intensity of competition aims at providing 
a quantifying tool to help researches explain more fully the studies they conduct. 
Based on this method, and using the data from the empirical studies conducted in 
Chapter 5, the intensity of the civil justice system competition in the EU ranges 
from 0.89 to 1.27, where 20 is the maximum.793 The score indicates a low-
                                                        
793 This score was calculated considering four competing jurisdictions (na = 4, Germany, the 
UK, the Netherlands, and France) and twenty-eight potential competitors (np = 28, all the 
Member States of the EU). The magnitude of the demand side was considered 0.89. This 
represents also the ratio of lawyers that consider choice of court important or very important 
in the survey organised for this research (Question 8, see Section 5.3 for the analysis of this 
322 
 
intensity competition, owing mostly to the low number of EU Member States 
actively trying to compete. 
6.3 Legal bases and relation to harmonisation  
6.3.1 Legal bases of choice of court 
The number of potential competing jurisdictions is the result of the Brussels I 
(recast) Regulation. In conjunction with the Rome I and Rome II regulations, the 
Brussels I (recast) Regulation creates the legal framework within which the civil 
justice system competition develops. 
The Brussels I (recast) Regulation sets the rules for the choice of court in civil and 
commercial matters, which are cases in which competing jurisdictions try to 
attract litigants. In particular, civil and commercial matters that involve large 
disputes or wealthy litigants (the cases mentioned in Chapter 1 are a good 
examples of this) provide lucrative opportunities for competing jurisdictions. 
Litigants or potential litigants are allowed ample autonomy to choose the court 
that best serves their needs. Furthermore, the Regulation does not require any 
connecting factors between the parties or the conflict and the selected jurisdiction. 
However, the Regulation restricts party autonomy in order to protect weaker 
parties or public interest. 
In the absence of choice of court, the main rule requires cases against a defendant 
to be brought before the court where he is domiciled. Some alternatives to this 
main rule allow claimants certain room for manoeuvre. Given that many 
international companies conduct business in several EU jurisdictions, claimants 
might have the possibility of choosing between a number of jurisdictions. This 
gives rise to what is termed unilateral choice of court, a situation in which only 
the claimant makes the choice. A bilateral choice of court is one in which both 
parties (claimant and defendant) make the choice; in practice, many business 
parties exercise this right to choose the court. 
6.3.2 Harmonisation and competition in the EU 
Differences between the civil justice systems provide the choice alternatives that 
parties need during their choice of court. A danger to this is posed by projects to 
harmonise civil procedure in the EU. Harmonisation, however, is important in the 
                                                        
question, or the Annexes for the detailed results). Political and legislative activities were 
considered between 7 and 10. The score would still remain low even if the number of 
competitive activities were increased to 20 (2.54). Evidently, the small size of the supply 
side is the major influencing factor regarding the low intensity of the civil justice system 
competition in the EU. 
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EU context because it reduces differences in legislation, reduces transaction costs, 
increases legal certainty, and contributes to the perfecting of the internal market. 
Harmonisation includes a plurality of processes aimed at smoothing differences 
between legal norms. These processes range from unification to approximation of 
legislation. Approximation would smooth differences in legislation but not erase 
them, while unification would do away with any differences. 
Eliminating differences between legislations would in effect bring competition to 
a stop. Nevertheless, Section 3.3 argued that competition would still exist, even 
in the event of unification, but it would be based on the cultural differences of 
practitioners and judges, or on differences in the application and interpretation of 
law and procedures. The same also happens within the same jurisdiction, where 
local courts have differences in quality, culture, and service, despite using the 
same law and procedure. Harmonisation, therefore, should be considered as an 
inhibitor rather than a terminator. The more that harmonisation resembles 
unification, the more it will slow down competition; and the more that it resembles 
approximation, the higher the chances that competition will remain unaffected. 
6.4 Theoretical analysis of the civil justice system 
competition in EU 
6.4.1 The civil justice system market: party autonomy 
There are clear signs that some EU Member States encourage not only companies 
but also individuals to use their civil justice system. These indications were best 
described in the examples mentioned in the Introduction (Chapter 1). Such 
activities create the civil justice system market, with a demand side, a supply side, 
and a good. The market also relies heavily on party autonomy, which allows 
natural and legal persons to choose the law that best fits their needs, and even to 
escape state tutelage and choose the law of private organisations. Party autonomy, 
however, can be distorted by parties’ bargaining power or by information 
asymmetry. Parties with more bargaining power can impose their choice on those 
with less, which would distort or suppress the weaker party’s autonomy. 
Information asymmetry can also distort party autonomy, as it allows the better-
informed party to be more adept at negotiations. EU regulations, while 
guaranteeing party autonomy, take care to protect vulnerable parties from 
distorting elements.794 A distorted party autonomy means a malformed market, 
which is to the detriment of all the actors. 
                                                        
794 For example, the Brussels I (recast) Regulation provides special protection to consumers 
(Art. 17-19) and employees (Art. 20-23). Consumers and employees confront parties with 
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6.4.2 The civil justice system market: characteristics and incentives 
The distinctive behaviour of the civil justice system market is dictated by the 
presence of certain peculiar characteristics. It is difficult to talk about a price for 
the civil justice system, as it is composed of several goods for which users should 
pay separately. Often the price of these goods is not the result of the interaction 
between demand and supply, but is subsidised by the government. It should be 
noted here that some jurisdictions, such as England, are considering the 
introduction of court fees that cover the costs incurred during litigation. However, 
court fees are dwarfed by the large fees that lawyers charge. The largest part of 
the price of the civil justice system market is expected to be the fee paid to the 
lawyer. 
Considering that court fees are subsidised by the government, it is natural to 
conclude that governments are not motivated by direct economic profit to 
participate in the civil justice system market. Furthermore, governments are 
atypical suppliers. They do not face the risk of bankruptcy if their judicial system 
does not respond to the market’s needs. Therefore, without any apparent direct 
benefit and with little risk of bankruptcy, governments should have other 
incentives to participate and to compete. 
Considering that governments subsidise courts, it can be argued that revenue from 
court fees does provide a direct benefit. Therefore, other incentives to compete 
should be considered. Looking at the brochures mentioned in Sections 1.1.2 and 
5.2, lawyers seem to be very interested in attracting litigants to their jurisdictions. 
Lawyers are a powerful lobbying group, and are able to influence government 
policies, and it is suggested that they are one of the incentives for governments to 
compete for cross-border litigants. Furthermore, Section 4.5 suggested that 
litigants incur other expenses that increase the government’s taxation base. Hence, 
indirect economic benefits seem to be the reason some jurisdictions try to attract 
litigants. 
6.4.3 Civil justice system as a bundle of goods 
The civil justice system is the good where the interests of the demand and supply 
side converge. It is not a single good, however, but a bundle. Governments act as 
suppliers of these bundled goods, although in fact their production is spread 
among different institutions. The bundled goods include laws and institutions that 
are directed at resolving disputes, and each good has its own function and 
significance. However, litigants often focus only on the court. 
                                                        
considerable financial power, trade experience, and knowledge, who can distort these 
parties’ autonomy. 
325 
 
Three of the most important goods produced by courts are dispute resolution, law 
creation, and legal education. The first has a significant value not only for society 
as a whole but also for some litigants. In fact, only repeat-player litigants would 
be interested in the other goods, and litigants that are not repeat players would be 
interested only in dispute resolution. 
6.4.4 Competition and the goods 
In the public perception, civil justice systems, courts, and court dispute resolution 
are considered public goods, and are to be understood as being the opposite of 
private goods, which are excludable and rivalrous. Excludable means that it is 
economically and practically possible to exclude some or all consumers from 
using a certain good; rivalrous means that if a consumer uses this good, the quality 
or quantity of the good deteriorates for other consumers. Public goods lack 
excludability and rivalry. Courts, however, do not fulfil these criteria. Section 
4.2.1.3 suggested that some goods, including courts, are labelled public goods for 
political purposes. It is in the interest of the government to produce and maintain 
these goods in conditions such that they resemble public goods. Therefore, 
although the existence of public goods is not disputed, it is submitted that certain 
goods are in fact labelled as such for political reasons. 
Competition between civil justice systems can instigate a change in a 
government’s attitude, with consequences for the production of public goods. 
Two scenarios were considered in this analysis. In the first, the demand side is 
composed mostly of one-shot players: namely, litigants that use the courts only 
once or incidentally. A demand side with this quality is interested only in the 
court’s dispute resolution, and has little interest in the creation of law or in legal 
education. Responding to this demand, governments would concentrate courts on 
the production of dispute resolution, investing other institutions with the creation 
of law or legal education (Section 4.2.3). Governments would make courts more 
client oriented, with cost-effective fees and/or proceedings dedicated to cross-
border litigants.795 Obviously, governments would relax their political objective 
of labelling courts as public goods, but vulnerable parties that rely on courts for 
the protection of their rights would suffer, and political pressure would increase. 
The resulting attitude of governments would depend on the interaction between 
competitive pressures to make courts more client oriented and on political 
pressure to maintain courts as public goods. In the second scenario, the demand 
side is composed of the repeat-player demand: namely, litigants that use the courts 
                                                        
795 Competition has pushed some Member States to create special courts to hear cases of cross-
border disputes. The Netherlands and England are the best examples. Germany may follow 
suit. England and the Netherlands have already begun experimenting with cost-effective 
fees.  
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often and have an interest in court precedents. This situation does not differ 
greatly from the first one. Here the courts would be under the same pressure to be 
client oriented, but this time they should also provide legal education as well as 
for the creation of laws. While these last two goods would not necessarily increase 
the price of litigation, they would increase political pressure to maintain courts as 
public goods. 
6.4.5 The demand side: interest and characteristics 
The demand side of the civil justice system competition is composed of persons 
with specific characteristics. These persons should have an interest in past, 
present, or future disputes, and this interest needs to be directed at choosing the 
civil justice system of a jurisdiction in order to resolve this dispute. Interest is 
usually expressed by means of a choice, which in turn is expressed in a written 
form in contracts or factually by investing a court with resolving a dispute. 
Choice, therefore, is very important for the quality of the demand side. Any 
distortions of the ability to choose can have a disruptive effect on the competition 
itself. 
A quintessential characteristic of the demand side is mobility, which allows 
potential clients to relocate to the jurisdiction of the chosen court and to conduct 
litigation there, although this mobility faces legislative and non-legislative 
obstacles. In the EU, however, the Brussels I (recast) Regulation has relatively 
minimal requirements for the mobility of litigants. Non-legislative obstacles 
include knowledge, time, and costs. Because limited knowledge regarding choice 
possibilities hampers mobility, litigants hire lawyers. As professionals, lawyers 
are expected to have more knowledge, and can therefore increase the mobility of 
their clients. Nevertheless, hiring a lawyer is costly – especially if extensive 
international expertise is required – and costs are a factor that restricts mobility. 
Cross-border litigants are expected to incur costs related to transport and 
language. Considering this, the typical profile of a cross-border litigant should 
resemble that of a company or individual with enough economic resources to 
shoulder the costs of mobility. 
6.4.6 Litigants and lawyers 
Lawyers do not only increase litigants’ mobility – they also provide better 
litigation opportunities, and create and execute litigation strategies. Lawyers 
comprise a group of professionals specialised in law, and who exercise 
considerable power over their clients. This power is such that it allows lawyers to 
make important decisions, including on the choice of court. The power of lawyers 
over their clients was also confirmed by data from the survey organised for the 
present research (Section 4.3.2 and 5.3.4). The power derives from the 
characteristics of the lawyers market, the characteristics of the service they 
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provide, and the interaction between lawyers and clients. The legal profession is 
entropic in reasoning, meaning that the more time that passes, the more law 
becomes complicated. This means that even repeat players need the assistance of 
a lawyer in arranging their legal situations. Lawyers’ services are a credence good, 
which means that, in most of the cases, clients cannot assess the quality and the 
quantity of the service they require. Lawyers themselves decide how much service 
a client needs. A result of this is that lawyers create a superstar kind of market, 
where parties are willing to pay a great deal for a small increment in the quality 
between lawyers. The investment in the client-lawyer relationship is difficult to 
transfer to another lawyer, which makes it a sunk cost. In addition to this, the 
market for lawyers has artificial barriers that prevent others from entering. These 
barriers result in an elite set of lawyers who accumulate larges stores of 
knowledge and finely honed abilities, thus keeping the number of good lawyers 
small. 
The combination of these characteristics gives lawyers the power to influence 
their clients. As a consequence, the demand side should be considered to be 
composed of wealthy mobile individuals and companies supported by their 
lawyers. And because lawyers exercise considerable power in the client-lawyer 
relationship, they should be considered the party that makes the choice of court. 
6.4.7 Supply side: characteristics and components 
From a technical point of view, the supply side of the civil justice system 
competition in the EU is composed of all the Member States. In practice, however, 
it is composed of all the Member States that demonstrate some sign of competition 
activity. It is usually the government of these Member States that promotes its 
jurisdictions and carries out competition activities. However, the civil justice 
system is a bundle of goods, and each good is created by different producers. 
Court adjudication is produced by courts; laws and regulations are produced by 
parliaments; and the general organisation of the system is arranged by the 
government. These institutions often have different agendas, which collide with 
the policies of the government and hinder its responses. 
As one of the components of the supply side, courts do not share the same 
incentives to compete. While governments are incentivised by indirect benefits 
from competition, the only incentive for courts to compete is the personal 
satisfaction enjoyed by judges who engage in cross-border cases and whose 
decisions are quoted by foreign colleagues. If these incentives do not exist for 
courts, their natural predisposition should be to reject the civil justice system 
competition, whereby they face the risk of having to deal with a heavier workload 
and with fewer benefits from competition. 
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As the law making institutions, parliaments also do not have any direct or indirect 
economic benefits from competition; in addition, they are often dominated by the 
political forces that are in the government, and they frequently support 
government policies. However, parliaments have to consider their policies in the 
light of electoral support. Policies related to the judiciary are sensitive for the 
electorate, so any competitive activity disapproved of by the electorate is unlikely 
to be supported by the parliament. 
6.4.8 Supply side incentives 
As mentioned, direct economic incentives for competing governments are 
virtually non-existent. In rare cases, competing governments increase fees to 
cover the costs of special courts involved in competition, meaning that some 
indirect benefits are those that instigate a government’s competitive activities. 
The legal industry of the competing jurisdictions is relatively important in terms 
of output and employment (Section 5.2), as its economic presence increases 
taxation revenue. Lawyers as a lobbying group should be a factor with regard to 
why governments compete; the brochures promoting England and Wales, or 
Germany, or continental law were all strongly supported by lawyers (Sections 
1.1.2, 4.4.1, and 5.2). Another incentive to compete is the prospect of investment, 
which requires healthy institutions and a sound judicial system. Promoting the 
judicial system as healthy and competitive helps not only in attracting litigants 
but also in attracting investors. 
Ultimately, governments have the most difficult task, as they must weigh the 
benefits and costs of competition, and decide on the best strategy. While costs can 
be easily calculated, the number of benefits is not clear. 
6.4.9 Competition from a unilateral choice of court 
Actors of the demand side often have the possibility of making a choice of court, 
within the limits of the jurisdiction rules, and without the agreement of the other 
party. These situations give rise to a unilateral choice of court, so named because 
one party chooses the court, unlike a bilateral choice of court, where both parties 
agree on the choice. This distinction is important, because choice makers are 
expected to apply different criteria in both situations. 
Section 4.5.1 assumed that the claimant making the choice is interested in winning 
the case and minimising his costs, in which case from among the jurisdictions 
available he will choose the one that minimises his costs. The claimant incurs 
court fee costs, lawyers’ fees, costs related to distance, and administration costs. 
On the basis of the Section 4.5.1.2 analysis, cost-minimising claimants would be 
interested in courts with low court fees, fast litigation times, short distances, and 
non-complex procedures. 
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In another scenario, a claimant would be interested in choosing a court that would 
maximise the benefits to be had from litigation. Three benefits were considered 
in the analysis: monetary, moral, and cost shifting. Considering these, a benefit-
maximising claimant would be interested in a court that is accurate, fast, and has 
high cost return coefficients. A court’s accuracy depends on how well trained the 
judges are, on their professionalism, and on their lack of corruption. 
Other litigants would like to maximise the utility they derive from litigating in a 
particular jurisdiction. Utility is the difference between all the possible benefits 
and all the possible costs. The possibility of having the benefits and incurring the 
costs in this scenario is equal to the claimant’s success ratio, which is the ratio 
between all the similar cases won by similar claimants and all the similar cases 
adjudicated by a given court. For a clear and useful success ratio, courts must be 
consistent, predictable, and not corrupt. While these are general factors in 
considering a court, a utility-maximising claimant would have to calculate how 
benefits and costs change in relation to the success ratio. It can be expected that 
the claimant would choose the court with the highest possible success ratio. 
In general, when the choice of court is made only by the claimant, he will choose 
a court that is near his location, offers fast proceedings, is accurate, offers non-
complex procedures, is transparent and predictable, and favours claimants. This 
analysis assumed that the claimant and his lawyer do not have any differences, 
and from among all the elements that make up the civil justice system, the 
claimant takes only the court into account. 
6.4.10 Competition from bilateral choice of court 
In a bilateral choice of court, two parties choose the court either before or after 
the conflict, which influences some of the parties’ choice preferences. Section 
4.5.2 applied the same analysis to the situation involving a unilateral choice of 
court. Three scenarios were considered: one in which parties try to minimise costs; 
one in which parties try to maximise benefits; and one in which parties try to 
maximise utility. Cost-minimising litigants would face the same costs as 
mentioned above. Two small differences in cost sources can be distinguished 
between the parties: costs related to distance, and court fees. Assuming that the 
distance between parties and the court is different, parties will have different 
preferences for a cost-minimising court. Furthermore, the party that expects to be 
claimant would also face court fees. Small differences in costs would require 
parties to negotiate for a compromise cost-minimising court, in which instance 
parties will agree to pay slightly higher costs in order to find a compromise court. 
Benefit-maximising parties would have the same benefit as in the unilateral choice 
of court analysis. Assuming that the moral benefit of both parties is equal, that it 
decays over time at the same rate, and that the parties are sure to win, both of them 
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will be interested in a court that is accurate, fast, and offers high cost-return 
coefficients. Small differences in benefits between the parties can result in 
different benefit-maximising courts for both parties. Negotiations to slightly 
reduce the benefits in order to find a compromise court between the parties can 
be expected. 
For utility-maximising parties, the same reasoning as above should be followed 
for the costs and benefits component. As regards the success ratio of the court, 
parties will have different preferences. In situations where parties are not sure of 
their position in the conflict, they will be equally interested in a neutral court, 
which is one that favours neither claimants nor defendants. In situations where 
parties know their position in front of the court, they will be interested in a court 
that favours their position. The tendency during negotiations, however, would be 
to find a court that is neutral for both parties, otherwise the negotiations would 
not proceed. 
The distinction between unilateral and bilateral choice of court situations is 
important for the output of the demand side. If the demand side consists mainly 
of unilateral choice makers, courts would tend to favour claimants. If it consists 
mainly of bilateral choice makers, courts would tend to be neutral so that the 
parties would not object to selecting them. The analysis simplifies real life 
scenarios to better distinguish the characteristics that parties prefer when making 
their choice of court. An optimal court should have low court fees, fast 
proceedings, be located close to the parties, have non-complex procedures, be 
accurate (quality of judges, experience of judges, independence), and be neutral 
(transparency and neutrality). Respondents to the survey conducted for this 
research point out that these elements are indeed the ones that parties consider 
when choosing a court (Section 5.3). Nevertheless, they have different values and 
play a different role depending on the case, lawyer, and clients involved. 
6.5 An empirical approach to the civil justice system 
competition 
6.5.1 The EU Justice Scoreboard 
The EU Justice Scoreboard is an instrument promoted by the European 
Commission, and its purpose is to organise and compare data on the health of EU 
Member States’ judicial systems. Particular attention is paid to the civil and 
commercial sections of the courts. Section 5.1.2 analysed the data of the 
Scoreboard, with the intention of determining which of the Member States scores 
highest. A good Scoreboard rating is an indication that that Member State’s court 
is comparatively healthy and therefore more competitive than others. The 
Scoreboard data are challenged by problems of methodology, however, and 
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therefore the results of this analysis should be viewed with the necessary caveat. 
Another aim of the analysis was to examine how competing Member States 
compare with each other and with non-competing Member States. 
From the analysis, the best-scoring Member States appear to be Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. France is among the Scoreboard’s bottom five, and is 
consistently at the bottom of the table for many of the Scoreboard indicators. 
Germany and the UK are in the middle and upper-middle part of the classification, 
respectively. While data from the UK are fragmentary, the low score is mostly 
because of the score in the quality of justice section. This comes as a surprise, 
considering that the quality of UK courts is highly regarded. Evidently, the 
designers of the Scoreboard have different criteria compared to those of lawyers 
or parties who make a choice of court. Germany scored comparatively low in the 
efficiency of the justice system parameter, which was surprising, considering that 
Germany uses efficiency as a leading factor in promoting its courts. 
Overall, the Scoreboard analysis provides useful hints with regard to the health of 
the justice system in these Member States. Taking into account the necessary 
caveat, it could be concluded that the competing Member States are not 
necessarily the best jurisdictions in Europe. Some Member States (Luxembourg 
and Denmark) seem to have strong competitive potential that could be exploited. 
6.5.2 Competitive activities 
The legal sector is very important for all the Member States surveyed. Data show 
that in Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, England, and France 
the economic output of the legal sectors was considerable. In addition to this, a 
considerable workforce is employed in this economic sector. While it is not clear 
whether competition can bring enough business to justify the effort in every 
country, for England there are clear indications that cross-border litigations make 
a considerable contribution in the legal sector. 
The competitive activities of Member States can be divided into two groups: legal 
and non-legal activities. The legal activities observed aim at changing the 
institutional framework of the justice system, mostly the organisation of courts 
and the changing of the legal framework, mainly procedural law. England and the 
Netherlands have created special courts responsible for resolving international 
commercial disputes, and Germany has long flirted with the idea of having 
international commercial cases litigated in English. The same idea was 
implemented with the establishment of the Netherlands Commercial Court. 
Denmark shows no sign of any competitive activity in the legal field, despite that 
country’s high Scoreboard score. As regards Luxembourg, professional 
associations promote investing in this jurisdiction, also because of the high quality 
of its courts. Despite this, the Luxembourgish government seems to be inert, and 
332 
 
no sign of competition is visible. The governments of Germany, England, and to 
some extent France appear to be more active in promoting their jurisdictions, with 
England the most active thus far in promoting its courts. Several seminars and 
activities, jointly organised by the Ministry of Justice and lawyers’ associations, 
have promoted English courts across the globe. Germany maintains a website and 
promotes its courts and legal system under the motto ‘Law Made in Germany’. 
Promotional activities by the Ministry of Justice of Germany seem to be ongoing, 
although not as intensively as the English activities. 
Competitive activities in the EU seem to be the domain of a small number of 
Member States, and this small number is responsible for the low intensity of 
competition in the EU. However, some Member States have considerable 
potential, and it remains to be seen whether any of them will find the right 
incentives to enter the market and compete. 
6.5.3 Survey 
Another element of this study’s empirical research was a survey on the choice 
preferences of lawyers in the EU (Section 5.3). A questionnaire was distributed 
to lawyers working for the biggest law firms in the EU, with the aim of collecting 
data on choice of court preferences, the factors considered when making a choice 
of court, and certain other related topics. 
Respondents were mostly partners or senior associates with more than ten years 
of experience, and all of them had experience with civil and commercial cases. 
Results from the survey show that lawyers have, on average, experience with 3.23 
courts, indicating that lawyers are not familiar with more than three jurisdictions. 
Limited knowledge and lack of familiarity with other jurisdictions is an obstacle 
to competition; hence, interested jurisdictions need to promote themselves more 
actively to lawyers, and to find mechanisms that will render them more attractive. 
The survey results confirmed that lawyers dominate their clients and most often 
make the choice of court themselves. Data also show that a large majority of 
lawyers consider that clients follow their advice in choosing a court, although in 
other cases, clients leave the choice entirely up to their lawyers. 
Respondents consider England and Wales, Germany, and the Netherlands the 
most attractive jurisdictions for cross-border litigation, while Italy, Romania, and 
Greece are the least attractive. However, these results contradict the data collected 
from the Scoreboard. It was expected that the best-scoring jurisdiction would also 
be the most attractive, but this was not the case, neither for the most attractive not 
for the least attractive jurisdictions. The survey asked the respondents to rank the 
elements that they considered appealing from the jurisdictions they had selected. 
Results show that respondents found the ‘quality of judges and courts’, 
‘predictability of the outcome’, and ‘familiarity with the jurisdiction’ the most 
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important. These results are consistent with the analysis discussed in Section 4.5. 
However, these results are slightly inconsistent with the data collected when 
respondents were asked about their ideal court. In this case, respondents 
considered ‘quality of judges’, ‘lack of corruption’, and ‘neutrality’ as the most 
important elements. 
Section 5.4 explains some of the discrepancies between the choice preferences of 
lawyers and the modality with which they make the choice of court. It is suggested 
that lawyers make their choice in three phases. During the first phase, they create 
a set of unattractive jurisdictions using the elements mentioned above. In the 
second phase, they create a set of possible jurisdictions to choose, based on the 
general elements used to consider a court attractive. At the end of the second 
phase, lawyers have a set of jurisdictions to be avoided and a list of possible 
jurisdictions to be chosen. Obviously, there are many jurisdictions outside of these 
sets. The third phase is the actual choice making, where lawyers choose one or 
more jurisdictions from the second set, based on the characteristics of the case, 
the client, or other case-related elements. During negotiations, lawyers will 
dismiss courts from the first set and negotiate on courts from the second set. If a 
non-categorised court is offered during negotiations, it is expected that lawyers 
take time to determine in which category this court is situated. The process 
described here is often instinctive, as lawyers already know which jurisdiction to 
avoid and which to favour, based on experience, on anecdotal evidence, or on 
general opinions about a court. Given that lawyers on average have personal 
experience with only 3.23 courts, anecdotal evidence or general opinions mould 
the opinion of lawyers with regard to courts. It is therefore understandable that 
governments undertake marketing campaigns to promote their jurisdictions. 
Results from the survey suggest that lawyers have certain prejudices regarding 
courts from Eastern Europe and Southern Europe. Courts in both these regions are 
considered either not reliable or not efficient, and these biases, often unfairly, 
place some courts in the ‘courts to be avoided’ category. Changing biases and 
prejudices, however, takes a great deal of time and considerable effort. 
In general, the survey showed that lawyers very much like the possibility of 
choosing a court, although their experience with courts is limited, and in addition 
they have prejudices regarding certain courts. Nevertheless, they are aware that 
some EU courts are competing to attract litigants. Among the most attractive 
courts, respondents mentioned England, Germany, and the Netherlands. The 
elements that they considered most appealing were the same as those provided in 
the analysis in Section 4.5. However, more research is needed to better determine 
how the preferred elements are applied in a choice of court situation. 
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6.6 Final remarks and further research 
The present research demonstrates that the civil justice competition in the EU is a 
process involving EU institutions, Member States, professional associations, and 
international commercial parties. The EU guarantees considerable party 
autonomy such as allowing parties not connected to the EU to litigate in the courts 
of any Member State. Currently, only a few Member States compete actively to 
attract litigants, and England is at present the most preferred jurisdiction, despite 
any visible supremacy in the services it offers. A qualitative empirical research 
with interviews targeting lawyers and judges would be strongly advised in order 
to provide more data on this issue. Additionally, more research is needed to 
determine why some Member States with considerable potential choose not to 
compete. On the basis of the overview of the competing activities, Member States 
appear to engage mostly with promotional activities and in few cases with 
legislative or institutional changes. Legislative or institutional changes, such as 
the Netherlands Commercial Court, deserve particular attention with regard to 
how competitive they will be. And developments such as Brexit can radically 
change the competition landscape in the EU. Future studies should consider the 
position of England after Brexit, and how this will affect currently competitive 
Member States or other possible competitors. The research showed that legal 
business is lucrative, and should motivate more governments to compete for 
cross-border litigants. However, the number of direct incentives for governments 
is small. For this reason, incentives for competing, and the moral or economic 
value of each incentive, should be researched further. It was suggested that 
professional organisations, mostly lawyers, are the force that drives governments 
into the civil justice system market. Lawyers are also the real force within the 
demand side, and their preferences and choices should be addressed by the 
competing jurisdictions. Ongoing research is needed here. A suggestion for more 
research was also made regarding the psychology of choice making, as it is an 
important issue that affects not only lawyers but also the policies of competing 
governments. This last suggestion remains as a reminder that the civil justice 
system competition is rich in topics of legal and practical interest. 
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Summary 
This study focuses on the civil justice system competition in the EU, a form of 
regulatory competition in which states try to attract parties to litigate in their 
jurisdictions. In this study, the term civil justice system refers to the whole 
apparatus involved in the resolution and enforcement of civil disputes. Many 
institutions and parties are engaged in this process, with courts, lawyers, and 
governments being the obvious examples. In this context, the present study’s main 
research question is ‘How do civil justice systems compete in the EU?’ To arrive 
at an answer, both a theoretical and an empirical approach are taken. The 
theoretical part considers various aspects of competition, but most importantly it 
offers an overview of regulatory competition, an analysis of the legal framework 
within which Member States operate, and an analysis of the civil justice system 
market and its elements. Based on the theoretical analysis, the empirical part is 
divided into two components; the first contains an analysis of data provided by 
the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, while the second analyses a survey on lawyers’ 
court preferences in the EU that has been conducted for this research. The 
symbiosis between the theoretical and the empirical part adds more depth to the 
research, and contributes new data and analyses to the ongoing academic debate. 
The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the 
topic, and presents the research question, certain assumptions made during the 
study, and the methodology employed. Chapter 2 establishes a framework to be 
used in the other chapters, focusing in particular on the benefits of competition, 
regulatory competition in different fields of law, and psychological implications 
involving choice of court. Chapter 3 offers a brief analysis of the legal framework 
that facilitates the civil justice system competition in the EU, and the relation 
between competition and harmonisation. Chapter 4 consists of an analysis of the 
market, the good, the supply side, and the demand side of the civil justice system. 
In addition, the chapter analyses the effects of both a unilateral and a bilateral 
demand on competition. Chapter 5 introduces the methodology and the results of 
the empirical researches. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the study. 
In 2007, the Law Society of England and Wales, with the support of the Ministry 
of Justice of the UK, published ‘England and Wales: the jurisdictions of choice’, 
a brochure aimed at promoting the courts of England as the best venues for 
litigating international commercial cases. The wide support given to this 
promotional campaign was justified by the large number of cases involving cross-
border parties in English courts. In 2010, almost 80% of the cases brought before 
the Commercial Court in England and Wales involved a foreign litigant. Cross-
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border-related cases were an important contributor to the £25.7 billion generated 
by the legal business in 2015. Lawyers are among the economic beneficiaries of 
cross-border litigation, which is why they have a vested interest in promoting their 
jurisdictions. English law firms are among the biggest in the world, eager to 
expand their business, and always involved in judiciary reforms. The echo of the 
English brochure resonated in Germany and France, which began similar 
promotional campaigns. In 2008, Germany initiated the ‘Law Made in Germany’ 
campaign, which is still ongoing, and advertises German laws and courts as being 
global, effective, and cost-efficient. Germany’s intention is to promote the use of 
its legal system by international commercial parties. To this end, proposals were 
made to allow English as a litigation language for international commercial cases 
in certain German courts. In early 2017, and in light of the prospects of Brexit, 
certain interest groups developed a strategy − referred to as the Frankfurt justice 
Initiative − to promote Frankfurt as a litigation centre. In a similar fashion, France 
has promoted its own jurisdiction, and has allowed the use of other languages in 
certain procedures before the Commercial Court of Paris. Among the competing 
Member States, the Netherlands is less vocal in promoting its jurisdiction, but is 
quite active in implementing reforms in this direction. The Act on collective 
settlement of mass damage claims and the Netherlands Commercial Court are 
considered serious attempts to make the Netherlands a hub for international 
commercial litigation. It can be argued that there is a trend to step up competitive 
activities, either because of Brexit or because Member States consider it lucrative, 
or both. 
For commercial cases, the civil justice system competition in the EU is facilitated 
by the Brussels I (recast) Regulation. The Regulation allows parties to choose the 
court of any Member State to litigate, regardless of their nationality, domicile, or 
connection with the court. Party autonomy, however, is limited for the benefit of 
weaker parties, and for certain issues important for the sovereignty of the state. 
Within this legal framework, the civil justice system market develops with its own 
distinctive characteristics, which are a subsidised price, few direct economic 
motivations, no bankruptcy risk for suppliers, and a close connection with other 
internal and cross-border markets. What is shared with other markets is the good 
offered (the civil justice system), which consists of several goods bundled 
together. Among the bundled goods are courts, legal culture, law and procedures, 
institutions, and quality of lawyers. This means that parties that make a choice of 
court are in fact choosing the entire bundle. Competition, however, has the 
possibility of changing the nature of this good. An intensive competition between 
jurisdictions would pressure governments to unbundle the goods, and to offer 
interested parties only the court, as the centrepiece of the civil justice system. This 
runs the risk of making courts resemble other dispute resolution mechanisms like 
arbitration and mediation, with consequences for the accessibility of weaker 
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parties and the transparency of procedures. It also poses the danger of not 
producing certain goods and services needed in a society, such as legal education 
and law. 
The supply side of the civil justice system market is composed of many actors, 
whose task is to produce the different goods that are bundled together. However, 
the government seems to be the leader of the supply side, and the one that 
promotes changes and advertises the justice system. Governments appear to enjoy 
certain direct benefits of engaging in the civil justice system competition, but 
these benefits do not seem to be greater than the costs, which means that 
government are motivated by indirect benefits. Among the indirect benefits 
resulting from competition is a growth in tax revenue, an increase in experience 
and in the improvement of legislation, and a better image for investors. The 
demand side of the civil justice system competition is composed of cross-border 
litigants. Litigating cross-border, however, necessitates some form of mobility, 
which requires a knowledge of foreign jurisdictions, financial means, and the help 
of a lawyer. Considering this, a typical cross-border litigant would resemble an 
individual or company that is financially wealthy and assisted by a lawyer. The 
analyses show that the lawyer is an important actor on the demand side. Lawyers 
in fact tend to dominate their clients, and to be the demand side’s most effective 
force. The power of lawyers over their client derives, among others, from the 
credence good type of service that they provide, the characteristics of the lawyer’s 
market, and the complexity of law. Therefore, in a study of the civil justice system 
competition, lawyers should be the centre of attention. Answers to the survey 
conducted for this study were in line with this analysis. Responding lawyers 
considered that the choice of court decision is made by them, with marginal input 
from their clients. 
The legal framework established by the Brussels I (recast) Regulation provides 
ample freedom in the choice of courts, which can be made by the bilateral 
agreement of both parties, or by the unilateral actions of the claimant. If the 
bilateral choice of court is dominant, the demand side would tend to prefer courts 
that have less complex procedures, are more predictable, neutral, and transparent. 
If the unilateral choice of court is dominant, the demand side would tend to prefer 
courts that have less complex procedures, are more predictable, transparent, and 
favour the claimant. Obviously, suppliers would tailor their product to fit this 
demand. Thus, the interaction between the unilateral and the bilateral demand has 
the potential to shape the behaviour of the supply side. For certain kinds of 
litigations where a unilateral choice of court is frequent, such as mass litigation, 
it can be expected that courts would favour the claimant(s). In the event of 
uncertainty about the unilateral or bilateral choice of court demand, governments 
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would prefer to offer courts that are neutral, and thus acceptable both for 
defendants and claimants. 
To acquire a better understanding of the demand side, this study conducted 
empirical research on choice of law preferences by lawyers working for the top 
one hundred law firms with offices in the European Union. These were the top 
one hundred in the world, and the top one hundred continental European law firms 
in terms of revenue. Of the 529 responses, 330 had been completed. The vast 
majority of the respondents were lawyers working as partners or senior associates, 
and with more than eleven years of experience. Most of them operated mainly in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and England, and had had professional experience 
with an average of 3.23 courts. For an overwhelming number of respondents, 
English was the language in which they were fully proficient on a professional 
level, which indicates that English has already established itself as lingua franca 
for lawyer services. Moreover, respondents considered important the possibility 
of choosing a court, and they very often made use of that opportunity. When asked 
about jurisdictions, lawyers considered England, Germany, and the Netherlands 
to be the most attractive, and Italy, Romania, and Greece to be the least attractive. 
When choosing a jurisdiction, lawyers considered the high quality of judges, lack 
of corruption, and neutrality the most attractive factors, while corruption, lack of 
neutrality, and lack of quality of judges were reasons for avoiding a court. These 
results are similar to the theoretical predictions made about the unilateral and 
bilateral choice of court, but they are at odds with what the 2016 EU Justice 
Scoreboard suggests. Compiled by the EU, the Scoreboard is a collection of data 
on the quality of the judicial system in all the Member States. Using these data, 
this study created a list of the best-scoring Member States, which were 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Austria, with England and 
Germany trailing in the middle of the list. It is submitted that this happens because 
lawyers make their choice of court in three phases. In the first phase, lawyers 
discard unattractive or dangerous jurisdictions (e.g. Italy, Romania, and Greece); 
in the second phase, they create a list of jurisdictions that are attractive, while 
discarding unknown jurisdictions; in the third phase, and from among the 
jurisdictions listed in the second phase, lawyers choose the one (or several) that 
best serve the needs of the case at hand. The choice in the last phase can be 
influenced by other factors, such as choice overload, choice maximising 
behaviour, and choice biases. Some of these biases were exposed by the survey, 
which found that lawyers have a certain bias in preferring jurisdictions from 
north-western Europe. It would seem that empirical studies should focus a little 
more on psychological factors that influence choice of court. The use of 
longitudinal studies on lawyers’ preferences would provide a better perspective 
regarding long-term choice changes, and possibly connect it with other political 
or legal developments. 
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This study shows that certain jurisdictions in the EU are competing to attract 
litigants, as litigation appears to be a lucrative business. In the market that is 
created, lawyers are the dominating force on the demand side, while governments 
act as suppliers. The results of the survey on choice of court preferences indicate 
that lawyers prefer certain jurisdictions, but often base their choice on factors that 
are not strictly connected to the properties of the court. Psychological or other 
interferences, such as choice biases and choice overload, are highly instrumental 
in the choice of court, and these would justify being given more attention by 
academics as well as practitioners. Beyond the academic world, this study has 
practical significance for lawyers and governments alike. The interest 
demonstrated by partners and senior associates in the survey shows that lawyers 
have a keen interest in learning more about choice of law preferences and the 
lessons drawn from it. A similar interest is shared by governments that try to 
attract litigating lawyers to their jurisdictions; in addition to gaining a better 
understanding of lawyers’ preferences, governments could use the combined 
theoretical and empirical study as a valuable asset in their policy making. 
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Samenvatting796 
Deze studie richt zich op de concurrentie tussen rechtssystemen in civiele zaken 
in de EU (‘civil justice system competition’). Dit is een vorm van concurrentie op 
het gebied van regelgeving, waarin lidstaten partijen proberen aan te trekken om 
te procederen in hun jurisdicties. In deze studie wordt met de term ‘systeem van 
civiele geschillenbeslechting’ (‘civil justice system’) bedoeld het geheel aan 
instrumenten dat betrokken is bij het beslechten van civielrechtelijke geschillen. 
Er zijn veel instituten en partijen betrokken bij dit proces, waarvan rechtbanken, 
advocaten en overheden in het bijzonder moeten worden genoemd. De 
onderzoeksvraag van deze studie is: ‘Hoe concurreren systemen van civiele 
geschillenbeslechting in de EU?’ Om tot een antwoord te komen, wordt zowel een 
theoretische als een empirische benadering gehanteerd. Het theoretische deel 
omvat verschillende aspecten van competitie, maar bovenal geeft het een 
overzicht van de competitie die er op het gebied van regelgeving bestaat. 
Daarnaast bevat dit deel een analyse van het wettelijke kader waarbinnen lidstaten 
opereren en een analyse van de elementen van systemen van civielrechtelijke 
geschillenbeslechting. Het empirische deel is verdeeld in twee componenten. Het 
eerste onderdeel bevat een analyse van de data die beschikbaar is gesteld door het 
2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, terwijl het tweede onderdeel een analyse is van een 
enquête naar de voorkeuren van advocaten voor rechtbanken van de verschillende 
landen in de EU die voor dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd. Deze combinatie van het 
theoretische en empirische deel verdiept niet alleen het onderzoek, maar deze 
nieuwe data en analyse vormen een bijdrage aan het academische debat. 
De studie is verdeeld in zes hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een inleiding op het 
onderwerp en presenteert de onderzoeksvraag, de aannames waarop dit onderzoek 
is gebaseerd en de methodologie. Hoofdstuk 2 verschaft het raamwerk voor de 
volgende hoofdstukken en gaat in het bijzonder in op de voordelen van 
concurrentie, concurrentie op het gebied van regelgeving in verschillende 
rechtsgebieden en de psychologische implicaties van het maken van een 
forumkeuze. Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een korte analyse van het wettelijke kader dat de 
concurrentie tussen systemen van civiele geschillenbeslechting in de EU mogelijk 
maakt en de relatie tussen concurrentie en harmonisering. Hoofdstuk 4 bestaat uit 
een analyse van de markt, het goed, de aanbodzijde en de vraagzijde van het 
burgerlijk rechtssysteem. Daarnaast worden de effecten van zowel een unilaterale 
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als een bilaterale vraag op concurrentie geanalyseerd. Hoofdstuk 5 bevat de 
methodologie en de resultaten van de empirische onderzoeken. Hoofdstuk 6 
presenteert de conclusies van de studie. 
In 2007 publiceerde The Law Society of England and Wales, met steun van het 
Ministerie van Justitie van het Verenigd Koninkrijk, een brochure genaamd 
‘England and Wales: the jurisdictions of choice’ ter promotie van de Engelse 
rechtbanken als de beste plekken om te procederen in internationale handelszaken. 
De grote steun voor deze promotiecampagne werd gerechtvaardigd door de grote 
hoeveelheid zaken waarbij grensoverschrijdende partijen betrokken waren in 
Engelse rechtbanken. In 2010 was bij bijna 80% van de zaken die voor de 
Commercial Court in Engeland en Wales werden gebracht een buitenlandse partij 
betrokken. Grensoverschrijdende zaken droegen een groot deel bij aan de 25,7 
miljard pond die in 2015 door juridische ondernemingen werd gegenereerd. 
Onder andere advocaten profiteren van de grote hoeveelheid 
grensoverschrijdende procedures. Zij hebben daardoor belang bij het promoten 
van hun jurisdicties. Engelse advocatenkantoren behoren tot de grootste kantoren 
ter wereld. Deze kantoren willen graag uitbreiden en zijn zeer betrokken bij 
hervormingen van de rechterlijke macht. De echo van de Engelse brochure 
galmde na in Duitsland en Frankrijk, waar aan soortgelijke promotiecampagnes 
volgde. In 2008 nam Duitsland het initiatief tot de ‘Law Made in Germany’ 
campagne, die nog steeds wordt vaan de gang is. Het land adverteert zijn wetten 
en rechtbanken als internationaal, effectief en kostenefficiënt. De intentie van 
Duitsland is om het gebruik van zijn juridische systeem te promoten bij 
internationale handelspartijen. Met het oog op dit doel werden er voorstellen 
ingediend om het Engels toe te staan als procestaal bij internationale handelszaken 
in bepaalde Duitse rechtbanken. Begin 2017 ontwikkelden bepaalde 
interessegroepen, in het licht van de vooruitzichten op de Brexit, een strategie, het 
Frankfurt Justice Initative, om Frankfurt te promoten als een procescentrum. In 
Frankrijk werden soortgelijke acties ondernomen door het promoten van de 
Franse jurisdictie en het toestaan van het gebruik van andere talen bij bepaalde 
procedures bij de Commercial Court of Paris. Hoewel Nederland zijn rechtspraak 
minder nadrukkelijk promoot dan de andere (en concurrerende) lidstaten, is ook 
Nederlandactief in het implementeren van soortgelijke hervormingen. De Wet 
collectieve afwikkeling massaschade en de Netherlands Commercial Court 
worden als serieuze pogingen gezien om Nederland een hub te maken in de 
procesvoering bij internationale handelszaken. Een verklaring voor de 
intensivering van concurrentie tussen lidstaten kan worden gevonden in de 
ophanden zijnde Brexit, of in de vooronderstelling dat deze concurrentie lucratief 
zal zijn, of beide. 
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Voor handelszaken wordt de concurrentie in het systemen van civiele 
geschillenbeslechting in de EU gestimuleerd door de Brussel I (herschikking) 
verordening. De Verordening staat partijen toe om een rechtbank te kiezen om te 
procederen in elk van de lidstaten, ongeacht hun nationaliteit, woonplaats of 
connecties met de rechtbank. De autonomie van partijen wordt echter beperkt ter 
bescherming van zwakkere partijen en van publieke belangen. Binnen dit 
wettelijke kader ontwikkelt de markt van systemen van civiele 
geschillenbeslechting zich met zijn eigen kenmerken, zoals een gesubsidieerde 
prijs, weinig directe economische motivatie, geen risico op een faillissement voor 
aanbieders en een goede verbinding met andere interne en grensoverschrijdende 
markten. Overeenkomsten met markten zijn vooral gelegen in het feit dat er een 
goed wordt aangeboden, namelijk het burgerlijk rechtssysteem, dat in feite bestaat 
uit verschillende goederen in één bundel. Deze gebundelde goederen zijn onder 
andere gerechten, de juridische cultuur, de regelgeving en procedures, instituties 
en de kwaliteit van advocaten. Dit betekent dat partijen eigenlijk een heel pakket 
wanneer zij de keuze maken voor een bepaald gerecht maken. Concurrentie kan 
de aard van dit goed veranderen. Intensieve concurrentie tussen jurisdicties kan 
overheden ertoe brengen verschillende goederen uit dit pakket te halen en 
geïnteresseerde partijen onderdelen van dit pakket, in het bijzonder de gerechte 
als pure geschillenbeslechters, als een apart goed aan te bieden. Het risico hiervan 
is echter dat rechtbanken in te grote mate zullen gaan lijken op andere 
geschillenbeslechtingsmechanismes, zoals arbitrage en mediation, wat gevolgen 
heeft voor de toegankelijkheid voor zwakkere partijen en de transparantie van 
procedures. Daarnaast is het gevaar hiervan dat bepaalde goederen en diensten die 
nodig zijn in een maatschappij, zoals juridisch onderwijs en de wet, niet meer 
geproduceerd zullen worden. 
De aanbodzijde van het systeem van civiele rechtspleging bestaat uit veel partijen 
wier taak het is om de verschillende goederen te produceren die samen worden 
gebundeld tot één goed. De overheid lijkt daarbij de leider te zijn van de 
aanbodzijde en degene die met veranderingen adverteert en het rechtssysteem 
promoot. Overheden genieten bepaalde voordelen van de deelname aan de 
concurrentie tussen justitiële systemen. Deze voordelen lijken echter niet groter 
te zijn dan de kosten. De overheid wordt dus gemotiveerd wordt door indirecte 
voordelen. Onder de indirecte voordelen van de competitie vallen de toename in 
belastingopbrengsten, toename van ervaring, verbetering van de wetgeving en een 
beter imago voor investeerders. De vraagzijde van de competitie in het burgerlijk 
rechtssysteem bestaat uit grensoverschrijdende partijen. Om over de grens te 
procederen is er een bepaalde vorm van mobiliteit noodzakelijk, wat een bepaalde 
kennis van buitenlandse jurisdicties vergt, financiële middelen en de hulp van een 
advocaat. Dit in ogenschouw nemende zou een typische grensoverschrijdende 
partij een individu of bedrijf zijn met meer dan voldoende financiële middelen en 
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een advocaat. De analyses laten zien dat de advocaat een belangrijke partij is aan 
de vraagzijde. Advocaten hebben de neiging om hun cliënten te domineren en zijn 
daardoor de meest effectieve macht aan de vraagzijde. De macht van advocaten 
over hun cliënten komt onder andere voort uit het karakter van de dienst 
(vertrouwensgoed; credence good) die zij verschaffen, de karakteristieken van de 
advocatenmarkt en de complexiteit van de wet. Daarom zouden advocaten in het 
middelpunt van belangstelling moeten staan in het onderzoek naar de concurrentie 
tussen systemen van civiele geschillenbeslechting. De uitkomsten van de survey 
die is gedaan voor deze studie, zijn in overeenstemming met deze analyse. 
Advocaten die op de enquête reageerden, beschouwden de forumkeuze inderdaad 
als een keuze die door hen wordt gemaakt, met marginale inspraak van hun 
cliënten. 
Het wettelijke kader dat is vastgesteld door de Brussel I (herschikking) 
verordening verschaft veel vrijheid om een forumkeuze te maken of het gewenste 
gerecht te adiëren. Deze keuze kan worden gemaakt door de bilaterale 
overeenkomst van betrokken partijen of door een unilaterale keuze door de eiser, 
binnen de grenzen van de alternatieve bevoegdheidsregels. Als de bilaterale 
forumkeuze dominant is, heeft de vraagzijde de voorkeur voor rechtbanken met 
minder complexe procedures, die beter voorspelbaar, neutraal en transparant zijn. 
Als de unilaterale forumkeuze dominant is, heeft de vraagzijde een voorkeur voor 
rechtbanken met minder complexe procedures, die beter voorspelbaar en 
transparant zijn en de eiser bevoordelen. Aanbieders passen hun product 
natuurlijk aan deze vraag aan. De interactie tussen de unilaterale en bilaterale 
vraag heeft dus de potentie om het gedrag van de aanbodzijde te vormen. Bij 
bepaalde soorten procesvoeringen waarbij een unilaterale forumkeuze vaak 
voorkomt, bijvoorbeeld bij massageschillen, kan er worden verwacht dat 
rechtbanken de eiser(s) bevoordelen. In de situatie waarbij er onzekerheid is over 
de unilaterale of bilaterale forumkeuze, zouden overheden de voorkeur hebben 
om neutrale rechtbanken aan te bieden, die acceptabel zijn voor zowel gedaagden 
als eisers. 
Om een beter inzicht te krijgen in de vraagzijde is er voor deze studie een 
empirisch onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de rechtskeuzevoorkeuren van advocaten 
werkend bij de top honderd advocatenkantoren in de EU. Deze kantoren vormden 
de top honderd van de wereld, en de top honderd van de continentaal Europese 
advocatenkantoren, met betrekking tot de inkomsten. Van de 529 reacties waren 
330 surveys volledig ingevuld. De grote meerderheid van de respondenten was 
advocaat, werkende als partner of senior associate, met meer dan elf jaar ervaring. 
Het grootste deel van hen werkte voornamelijk in Duitsland, Nederland en 
Engeland en had professionele ervaring met gemiddeld 3,23 rechtbanken. Het 
overgrote deel van de respondenten beheerst het Engels op een professioneel 
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niveau, wat aanduidt dat het Engels reeds is gevestigd als lingua franca voor 
advocatendiensten. Bovendien beschouwden de respondenten forumkeuze als een 
belangrijke vrijheid en zij maakten vaak gebruik van deze vrijheid. Wanneer de 
advocaten werd gevraagd naar jurisdicties, beschouwden zij Engeland, Duitsland 
en Nederland als de meest aantrekkelijke jurisdicties en Italië, Roemenië en 
Griekenland als de minst aantrekkelijke jurisdicties. De meest aantrekkelijke 
factoren van een rechtsstelsel vonden advocaten de hoge kwaliteit van rechters, 
de afwezigheid van corruptie, en neutraliteit. De aanwezigheid van corruptie, een 
gebrek aan neutraliteit en een gebrekkige kwaliteit van rechters waren 
daarentegen de belangrijkste redenen om een rechtsstelsel te vermijden. Deze 
resultaten zijn vergelijkbaar met de theoretische voorspellingen over de 
unilaterale en bilaterale forumkeuze, maar ze zijn wel in strijd met wat de 2016 
EU Justice Scoreboard suggereert. Het 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard is een door 
de EU samengestelde datacollectie over de kwaliteit van rechtssystemen in alle 
lidstaten. Gebruikmakende van deze data, heeft deze studie een lijst gecreëerd met 
de best-scorende lidstaten, namelijk Luxemburg, Nederland, Denemarken, 
Estland en Oostenrijk, terwijl Engeland en Duitsland achterblijven in het midden 
van de lijst. Er wordt aangevoerd dat dit zo is, omdat advocaten hun forumkeuze 
in drie fasen maken. In de eerste fase verwerpen advocaten onaantrekkelijke of 
gevaarlijke jurisdicties (bijvoorbeeld Italië, Roemenië en Griekenland); in de 
tweede fase creëren zij een lijst met aantrekkelijke jurisdicties, waarbij ze 
onbekende jurisdicties verwerpen; in de derde face kiezen rechters een jurisdictie 
uit de lijst met de resterende jurisdicties van de tweede fase, die het beste is 
toegesneden op de behoeften van hun zaak. De keuze in de laatste fase kan tevens 
door andere factoren worden beïnvloed, zoals een overdaad aan keuze, keuze 
maximaliserend gedrag en keuze biases. Sommige van deze biases zijn 
blootgelegd door het onderzoek, waarin werd gevonden dat advocaten een zekere 
bias hebben naar jurisdicties van Noordwest-Europa. Empirische studies zouden 
meer moeten focussen op psychologische factoren die de forumkeuze 
beïnvloeden. Het gebruik van longitudinale studies naar de voorkeuren van 
advocaten zou een beter inzicht kunnen geven in de lange termijn veranderingen 
van keuzes en zou de voorkeuren mogelijk kunnen verbinden met andere politieke 
of juridische ontwikkelingen. 
Deze studie laat zien dat bepaalde jurisdicties in de EU concurreren om 
procederende partijen aan te trekken, omdat procederen een winstgevende 
bedrijfsvoering kan zijn. In de gecreëerde markt zijn advocaten de overheersende 
partij aan de vraagzijde en overheden gedragen zich als aanbieders. De resultaten 
van het onderzoek naar voorkeuren in forumkeuze geven aan dat advocaten 
bepaalde jurisdicties prefereren, maar hun keuze is vaak gebaseerd op factoren 
die niet strikt verbonden zijn met eigenschappen van het gerecht. Psychologische 
of andere factoren, zoals keuze biases en een overdaad aan keuze, hebben een 
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grote invloed op de forumkeuze en er zou daarom meer aandacht aan deze 
verstoringen moeten worden gegeven door zowel academici als mensen uit de 
praktijk. Ook buiten de academische wereld is deze studie van grote praktische 
betekenis voor advocaten en overheden. Uit de resultaten van dit onderzoek blijkt 
dat advocaten veel interesse hebben om meer kennis te vergaren over de 
voorkeuren bij forumkeuzes en de implicaties ervan. Deze interesse wordt gedeeld 
door overheden die proberen om procespartijen aan te trekken naar hun 
jurisdicties. Naast een beter begrip van de voorkeuren van advocaten, zouden 
overheden deze gecombineerde theoretische en empirische studie kunnen 
gebruiken voor beleidsvorming. 
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Annexes 
 
Calculating a score from the Scoreboard 
Tab 1: Length of proceedings 
 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Total 
LU n/a 2 n/a 2 
EE 2 3 4 3 
AT n/a 4 n/a 4 
BG 7 n/a 3 5 
DK 1 10 n/a 5.5 
HU 5 6 6 5.666667 
LT 6 1 13 6.666667 
NL 8 5 8 7 
PL 4 12 5 7 
SE 11 8 2 7 
SI 9 13 1 7.666667 
RO 13 7 10 10 
FI 10 15 11 12 
LV 16 14 7 12.33333 
DE n/a 11 14 12.5 
CZ 14 9 17 13.33333 
ES 18 16 15 16.33333 
FR 19 18 12 16.33333 
HR 12 19 18 16.33333 
EL n/a 17 n/a 17 
SK 17 21 16 18 
BE n/a n/a 19 19 
IT 20 22 20 20.66667 
MT 21 23 22 22 
CY 24 n/a 23 23.5 
IE n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PT n/a n/a n/a n/a 
UK n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Tab 2: Clearance rate 
 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Total 
IT 3 1 2 2 
RO 2 6 1 3 
EL n/a 4 n/a 4 
LV 4 5 5 4.666667 
SI 5 2 9 5.333333 
SE 7 11 10 9.333333 
MT 10 15 4 9.666667 
FI 9 8 14 10.33333 
HR 6 3 23 10.66667 
BG 11 n/a 11 11 
HU 8 9 18 11.66667 
AT n/a 13 n/a 13 
ES 14 19 7 13.33333 
DE n/a 16 12 14 
SK 12 24 6 14 
DK 16 14 n/a 15 
PL 13 17 15 15 
CZ 20 7 19 15.33333 
CY 23 n/a 8 15.5 
EE 18 10 20 16 
NL 17 18 13 16 
LU n/a 22 17 19.5 
FR 22 23 16 20.33333 
LT 19 21 21 20.33333 
BE n/a 20 22 21 
IE 24 25 n/a 24.5 
PT n/a n/a n/a n/a 
UK n/a n/a n/a n/a 
  
378 
 
Tab 3: Pending cases 
 
Figure 10 Figure 11 Figure 12 Total 
LU n/a 2 n/a 2 
HU 4 8 2 4.666667 
BG 3 n/a 8 5.5 
AT n/a 6 n/a 6 
EE 5 7 7 6.333333 
DK 9 5 n/a 7 
LV 6 11 4 7 
SE 2 3 16 7 
NL 7 4 13 8 
FI 10 1 18 9.666667 
PL 16 12 3 10.33333 
PT n/a n/a 11 11 
LT 8 10 17 11.66667 
CZ 15 15 6 12 
MT 11 17 9 12.33333 
RO 14 19 5 12.66667 
FR 12 18 10 13.33333 
BE n/a n/a 15 15 
DE n/a 9 21 15 
ES 13 13 19 15 
EL n/a 16 n/a 16 
SI 23 14 12 16.33333 
HR 22 23 14 19.66667 
CY 18 n/a 22 20 
SK 19 21 n/a 20 
IT 20 22 20 20.66667 
IE n/a n/a n/a n/a 
UK n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Tab 4: Efficiency of justice system 
 Total 
BG 7.166667 
HU 7.333333 
AT 7.666667 
SE 7.777778 
LV 8 
EE 8.444444 
RO 8.555556 
DK 9.166667 
SI 9.777778 
NL 10.33333 
FI 10.66667 
LU 10.75 
PL 10.77778 
PT 11 
EL 12.33333 
LT 12.88889 
CZ 13.55556 
DE 13.83333 
IT 14.44444 
MT 14.66667 
ES 14.88889 
HR 15.55556 
FR 16.66667 
SK 17 
BE 19 
CY 19.66667 
IE 24.5 
UK n/a 
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Tab 5: Accessibility 
 
Figure 
18 
Figure 
21 
Figur
e 23 
Figure 
24 
Figure 
25 
Figure 
26 
Total 
AT 1 1 1 1 5.5 21 5.083333 
BE 1 4.75 4.75 1 1 18 5.083333 
BG 1 5 3 1 1 4 2.5 
CY 4 5 5 8 3.5 23 8.083333 
CZ 3 1 1 2 5 24 6 
DE 1 3 2 1 3 9 3.166667 
DK 1 3 2 1 1 19 4.5 
EE 1 1 1 1 1 13 3 
EL 4 4.75 4 7 6 26 8.625 
ES 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.166667 
FI 1 1 1 1 3 16 3.833333 
FR 2 5 2.75 5 5.5 20 6.708333 
HR 1 5 5 2 3 12 4.666667 
HU 2 2 2 1 1 6 2.333333 
IE 1 4 2 2 1 14 4 
IT 2 3.25 2.75 8 3 15 5.666667 
LT 1 1 5 1 1 11 3.333333 
LU 2 5 1 1 2.5 17 4.75 
LV 1 1 1 1 1 5 1.666667 
MT 3 4 1 7 1 7 3.833333 
NL 1 4 5 1 1 3 2.5 
PL n/a 3.75 3 n/a n/a n/a 3.375 
PT 1 2.25 1 6 3 22 5.875 
RO 1 1 1 1 1 10 2.5 
SE 1 3 1 7 3 25 6.666667 
SI 1 3 3 4 2 8 3.5 
SK 2 1 5 2 1 1 2 
UK n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Tab 6: Resources 
 
Figure 
28 
Figure 
30 
Figure 
33 
Figure 
34 
Figure 
35 
Figure 
37 
Total 
AT 5 15 21 5 14 2 10.33333 
BE 8 18 11 4 18 3 10.33333 
BG 24 4 10 5 8 2 8.833333 
CY 28 23 4 6 25 7 15.5 
CZ 21 5 19 5 26 1 12.83333 
DE 3 11 9 3 17 1 7.333333 
DK 13 26 13 5 13 4 12.33333 
EE 26 17 23 3 3 2 12.33333 
EL 16 12 1 2 20 6 9.5 
ES 12 21 6 3 12 1 9.166667 
FI 7 16 27 6 15 1 12 
FR 14 24 20 2 28 2 15 
HR 18 2 16 5 11 3 9.166667 
HU 23 6 12 2 24 1 11.33333 
IE 11 27 8 2 2 5 9.166667 
IT 9 22 3 5 10 3 8.666667 
LT 25 8 24 3 5 1 11 
LU 1 3 2 5 23 1 5.833333 
LV 20 10 25 4 4 1 10.66667 
MT 15 25 5 6 22 7 13.33333 
NL 6 19 17 1 9 1 8.833333 
PL 17 7 14 4 27 n/a 13.8 
PT 19 14 7 2 19 1 10.33333 
RO 27 13 18 4 7 1 11.66667 
SE 4 20 26 6 6 1 10.5 
SI 10 1 22 4 1 1 6.5 
SK 22 9 15 5 16 7 12.33333 
UK 2 n/a n/a n/a 21 n/a 11.5 
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Tab 7: Quality of justice systems 
 
Total 
SI 5 
ES 5.166667 
DE 5.25 
LU 5.291667 
NL 5.666667 
BG 5.666667 
LV 6.166667 
IE 6.583333 
HU 6.833333 
HR 6.916667 
RO 7.083333 
LT 7.166667 
IT 7.166667 
SK 7.166667 
EE 7.666667 
AT 7.708333 
BE 7.708333 
FI 7.916667 
PT 8.104167 
DK 8.416667 
SE 8.583333 
MT 8.583333 
EL 9.0625 
CZ 9.416667 
PL 10.82143 
FR 10.85417 
UK 11.5 
CY 11.79167 
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Tab 8: Independence 
 
Figure 44 Figure 46 Figure 48 Total 
FI 2 1 1 1.333333 
DK 1 2 2 1.666667 
IE 5 4 4 4.333333 
LU 6 3 5 4.666667 
NL 7 5 3 5 
SE 3 10 7 6.666667 
UK 8 6 6 6.666667 
DE 9 7 9 8.333333 
AT 4 11 11 8.666667 
EE 10 8 10 9.333333 
BE 11 14 8 11 
FR 13 13 12 12.66667 
CY 12 15 14 13.66667 
MT 20 9 13 14 
RO 14 12 19 15 
CZ 17 18 16 17 
LT 16 16 20 17.33333 
PL 19 19 17 18.33333 
EL 18 17 21 18.66667 
PT 22 20 15 19 
HU 15 22 22 19.66667 
LV 21 21 18 20 
ES 23 23 24 23.33333 
SI 24 24 25 24.33333 
IT 26 26 23 25 
HR 25 25 26 25.33333 
BG 27 27 27 27 
SK 28 28 28 28 
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Tab 9: Final Scoreboard score 
 Total 
LU 6.977273 
NL 7.5 
DK 7.791667 
EE 8.111111 
AT 8.166667 
FI 8.333333 
UK 8.428571 
SE 8.592593 
IE 8.631579 
HU 8.689655 
LV 8.814815 
DE 9.125 
RO 9.142857 
SI 9.310345 
BG 9.5 
LT 10.42857 
BE 10.75 
PT 11.05952 
ES 11.37931 
MT 11.57692 
IT 12.34483 
HR 12.35714 
EL 12.67045 
CZ 12.89286 
PL 12.94565 
FR 13.1875 
SK 13.73077 
CY 14.54348 
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List of law firms included in the study 
Top 100 Law firms in Europe in 2014797 
 Firm Revenue 
(€m) 
Country offices in the 
EU 
1 Garrigues 331.9 Spain PL, BE, UK, 
ES, PT 
2 Fidal 322.6 France FR 
3 Loyens & Loeff 289.3 Netherlands NL, BE, UK, 
LU, FR 
4 Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira 
248 Spain ES, PT, BE, 
UK, FR,  
5 Hengeler Mueller  226.8 Germany DE, BE, UK 
6 Gide Loyrette Nouel 192.5  France BE, FR, HU, 
PL, UK 
7 Noerr  190.8 Germany  DE, SK, HU, 
RO, CZ, PL, 
ES, BE, UK 
8 Uría Menéndez  185.46 Spain ES, BE, UK 
9 Gleiss Lutz  166 Germany DE, BE 
10 Roedl & Partner 155.9 Germany  AT, BG, HR, 
CY, CZ, EE, 
FI, FR, DE, 
HU, IT, LV, 
LT, PL, RO, 
SK, SI, ES, 
SE, UK 
                                                        
797 The list was obtained from The Lawyer. The link used to obtain the 2014 list has been 
replaced with the 2016 list. The 2014 list <http://www.thelawyer.com/analysis/ 
intelligence/european-100-2014/european-100-2014-ranking/>, the 2016 list 
<http://reports.thelawyer.com/reports/european-100-2016>.  
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11 Bonelli Erede 
Pappalardo  
151 Italy IT, BE, UK 
12 NautaDutilh 150 Netherlands NL, BE, UK, 
LU 
13 Stibbe 136 Netherlands NL, BE, UK 
14 De Brauw Blackstone 
Westbroek 
133 Netherlands NL, UK, BE,  
15 Chiomenti Studio 
Legale  
130.3 Italy IT, UK, BE 
16 Mannheimer 
Swartling 
124.5 Sweden SE, DE, BE 
17 Kromann Reumert  120  Denmark DK, UK 
18 Egorov Puginsky 
Afanasiev & 
Partners798 
119.2 Russia  
19 Arthur Cox  114.5 Ireland IE, UK 
20 Heuking Kühn Lüer 
Wojtek 
107.6 Germany  DE, BE, 
21 Gianni Origoni 
Grippo Cappelli & 
Partners 
107 Italy IT, BE, UK 
22 Bech-Bruun  107 Denmark DK 
23 A&L Goodbody  105.4 Ireland IE, UK 
24 McCann FitzGerald  103.5 Ireland IE, UK, BE 
25 Houthoff Buruma 102 Netherlands NL, BE, UK 
26 Matheson  101.4 Ireland IE, UK 
27 Flick Gocke 
Schaumberg  
100.5 Germany DE, AT 
                                                        
798 Law firms in italics were not included in the target population for the survey. 
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28 Arendt & Medernach 99 Luxembourg LU, UK 
29 Wikborg Rein 94.3 Norway   
30 Luther 92.6 Germany DE, BE, UK, 
LU 
31 Vinge 92.3 Sweden  BE, SE 
32 Plesner  90 Denmark DK 
33 Goerg  84.4 Germany  DE 
34 Thommessen 83 Norway  
35 Bredin Prat  81.9 France  FR, BE 
36 Lenz & Staehelin  80.5 Switzerland  
37 Beiten Burkhardt  80 Germany  DE, BE 
38 NCTM 77 Italy IT, BE, UK 
39 Elvinger Hoss & 
Prussen  
75.7 Luxembourg  LU 
40 Gorrissen Federspiel 74.5 Denmark DK 
41 Schjødt 73.2  Norway   
42 Wolf Theiss 70 Austria  AT, BG, HR, 
CZ, HU, PL, 
RO, SK, SI 
43 Baer & Karrer 70 Switzerland  
44 Wiersholm 69.9 Norway  
45 Homburger 69.7 Switzerland  
46 Schellenberg Wittmer  68.9 Switzerland   
47 Lindahl 68.9 Sweden  SE 
48 William Fry  68.5 Ireland  IE, UK 
49 BA-HR 67 Norway  
388 
 
50 Schoenherr  66.7 Austria  AT, BE, BG, 
HR, CZ, HU, 
PL, RO, SK, 
SI 
51 Roschier 63.6 Finland FI, SE 
52 Lett  61.7 Denmark DK 
53 Gómez-Acebo & 
Pombo 
60.7 Spain  ES, BE, PT, 
UK 
54 Schultze & Braun  59.4 Germany  DE, FR, UK 
55 Hannes Snellman 57.5 Finland  FI, SE 
56 Capstan 53.3 France  FR 
57 Liedekerke Wolters 
Waelbroeck 
Kirkpatrick 
52.6 Belgium  BE, UK 
58 Setterwalls 52.6 Sweden SE 
59 Legance  51.8 Italy  IT, UK 
60 P+P Pollath + 
Partners  
51.5 Germany DE 
61 GSK Stockmann + 
Kollegen 
50.2 Germany  DE, BE 
62 De Pardieu Brocas 
Maffei 
50.1 France FR 
63 Darrois Villey 
Maillot Brochier 
50 France  FR 
64 Arntzen de Besche 48.5 Norway  
65 Mason Hayes & 
Curran 
48 Ireland  IE, UK 
66 Niederer Kraft & 
Frey  
47.5 Switzerland   
67 Walder Wyss 45 Switzerland  
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68 Cremades & Calvo-
Sotelo  
43 Spain ES 
69 Roca Junyent  42.8 Spain  ES 
70 August & Debouzy 42.4  France  FR, BE 
71 Selmer 42.2 Norway  
72 Castren & Snellman 40.7 Finland FI 
73 Kappellmann und 
Partner 
40 Germany DE, BE 
74 FPS  39.9 Germany DE 
75 Jeantet Associés 39 France FR, LU 
76 Delphi 39 Sweden SE 
77 Buse Heberer Fromm 38.8 Germany  DE, BE, UK, 
IT, ES, FR 
78 Steenstrup Stordrange 38.3 Norway  
79 Pestalozzi  38.1 Switzerland  
80 Haavind 37.9 Norway  
81 MLGTS  37.7 Portugal  PT 
82 Fromont-Briens 37 France  FR 
83 Borenius 35.7 Finland  FI 
84 Kluge  35.6 Norway  
85 Vieira de Almeida & 
Associados  
35 Portugal  PT 
86 Vischer  34.4 Switzerland   
87 Eubelius 34.1 Belgium  BE 
88 Dillon Eustace  33.6 Ireland  IE 
89 CHSH  33.4 Austria  AT, SK, RO, 
CZ, BG 
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90 Boekel de Nerée  33.1 Netherlands  NL, UK 
91 De Gaulle Fleurance 
& Associes 
33 France  FR, BE 
92 PLMJ 33 Portugal  PT 
93 Graf von Westphalen 32.7 Germany DE, BE 
94 UGGC 32  France FR, BE 
95 Bruun & Hjejle  31.9 Denmark DK 
96 Krogerus 31.5 Finland FI 
97 Racine 30.5 France FR, BE 
98 SKW Schwarz 30.5 Germany DE 
99 MAQS 30.4 Sweden SE 
100 Pavia e Ansaldo  30 Italy IT, BE 
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Top 100 Law firms in the world in 2014799 
 Firm Revenues Country 
with the 
most 
lawyers 
Offices in the 
EU 
1 Baker & McKenzie $2,540,000,000 United 
States 
AT, BE, CZ, 
FR, DE, HU, 
IT, LU, NL, 
PL, ES, SE, 
UK 
2 DLA Piper $2,481,000,000 United 
States 
AT, BE, CZ, 
FR, DE, HU, 
IT, LU, NL, 
PL, RO, SK, 
ES, UK 
3 Latham & Watkins $2,285,000,000 United 
States 
BE, FR, DE, 
IT, ES, UK 
4 Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & 
Flom 
$2,235,000,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, UK, 
FR 
5 Clifford Chance $2,125,500,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, CZ, FR, 
DE, IT, LU, 
NL, PL, RO, 
ES, UK 
6 Kirkland & Ellis $2,016,000,000 United 
States 
UK, DE 
7 Linklaters $1,963,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, FR, DE, 
IT, NL, PL, 
ES, SE, UK 
8 Allen & Overy $1,930,500,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, CZ, FR, 
DE, GR, HU, 
IT, LU, NL, 
                                                        
799 The American lawyer (2014) 104. 
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PL, RO, SK, 
ES, UK 
9 Freshfields 
Bruckhaus 
Deringer 
$1,927,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
AT, BE, FR, 
DE, IT, ES, 
UK 
10 Norton Rose 
Fulbright 
$1,904,000,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, FR, 
GR, IT, PL, 
NL, UK 
11 Jones Day $1,766,000,000 United 
States 
BE, UK, FR, 
ES, NL, DE, 
IT 
12 Hogan Lovells $1,717,500,000 United 
States 
BE, HR, FR, 
DE, LU, HU, 
IT, NL, PL, 
ES, UK,  
13 Sidley Austin $1,601,000,000 United 
States 
BE, UK 
14 White & Case $1,440,000,000 United 
States 
DE, SK, BE, 
RO, HU, FI, 
UK, ES, IT, 
FR, CZ, SE, 
PL 
15 Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher 
$1,386,500,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, FR, 
UK 
16 Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius 
$1,291,000,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, FR, 
UK 
17 Sullivan & 
Cromwell 
$1,278,000,000 United 
States 
DE, UK, FR 
18 Dentons $1,261,500,000 United 
States 
BE, CZ, FR, 
DE, HU, PL, 
RO, SK, ES, 
UK 
393 
 
19 Herbert Smith 
Freehills 
$1,251,500,000 Australia IE, BE, DE, 
UK, ES, FR 
20 Greenberg Traurig $1,230,500,000 United 
States 
NL, UK, PL 
21 Cleary Gottlieb 
Steen & Hamilton 
$1,190,000,000 United 
States 
FR, BE, UK, 
DE, IT 
22 K&L Gates $1,159,000,000 United 
States 
UK, DE, BE, 
IT, FR, PL 
23 Mayer Brown $1,146,000,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, UK, 
FR 
24 Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges 
$1,137,000,000 United 
States 
HU, FR, UK, 
DE, CZ, PL 
25 Simpson Thacher 
& Bartlett 
$1,128,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
26 CMS Legal 
Services 
$1,118,500,000 Germany AT, BE, BG, 
HR, CZ, FR, 
DE, HU, IT, 
LU, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SK, 
SI, ES, UK 
27 Reed Smith $1,075,000,000 United 
States 
FR, UK, DE, 
GR 
28 Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and 
Dorr 
$1,073,000,000 United 
States 
DE, BE, UK,  
29 King & Wood 
Mallesons 
$1,020,000,000 China BE, FR, DE, , 
IT, LU, ES, 
UK 
30 Morrison & 
Foerster 
$1,011,000,000 United 
States 
DE, BE, UK 
31 Ropes & Gray $997,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
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32 Davis Polk & 
Wardwell 
$975,000,000 United 
States 
UK, FR, ES 
33 Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart & 
Sullivan 
$972,500,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, FR, 
UK 
34 Paul Hastings $941,000,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, FR, 
UK, IT 
35 Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton 
& Garrison 
$934,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
36 Ashurst $916,500,000 Australia BE, DE, UK, 
IT, ES, FR, SE 
37 McDermott Will & 
Emery 
$881,000,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, UK, 
IT, FR 
38 Orrick, Herrington 
& Sutcliffe 
$867,500,000 United 
States 
DE, BE, UK, 
IT, FR 
39 King & Spalding $861,500,000 United 
States 
DE, UK, FR 
40 Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld 
$828,500,000 United 
States 
DE, UK 
41 Shearman & 
Sterling 
$820,500,000 United 
States 
BE, FR, DE, 
IT, UK 
42 Dechert $777,000,000 United 
States 
BE, IE, DE, 
UK, LU, FR 
43 Squire Sanders $775,500,000 United 
States 
BE, DE, SK, 
HU, UK, ES, 
FR, CZ, PL 
44 Proskauer Rose $768,500,000 United 
States 
UK, FR 
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45 Bingham 
McCutchen 
$762,000,000 United 
States 
dissolved800 
46 Goodwin Procter $752,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
47 Winston & Strawn $741,000,000 United 
States 
BE, FR, UK 
48 O’Melveny & 
Myers 
$733,000,000 United 
States 
BE, UK 
49 Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy 
$706,000,000 United 
States 
DE, UK 
50 Debevoise & 
Plimpton 
$688,000,000 United 
States 
DE, FR, UK 
51 Arnold & Porter $686,000,000 United 
States 
BE, UK 
52 Alston & Bird $675,000,000 United 
States 
BE 
53 Cooley $674,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
54 Covington & 
Burling 
$657,000,000 United 
States 
BE, UK 
55 Slaughter and May $645,500,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, UK 
56 Foley & Lardner $644,000,000 United 
States 
BE 
57 Bryan Cave $643,000,000 United 
States 
DE, FR, UK 
58 Perkins Coie $635,500,000 United 
States 
-801 
                                                        
800 By the time the survey was distributed, this law firm was dissolved. 
801 Shows that the law firm did not have offices in any EU Member State by the time the survey 
was distributed. 
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59 Vinson & Elkins $630,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
60 Holland & Knight $627,000,000 United 
States 
- 
61 Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore 
$614,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
62 McGuireWoods $609,500,000 United 
States 
BE, UK 
63 Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz 
$601,000,000 United 
States 
- 
64 Eversheds $597,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
AT, BE, EE, 
FI, FR, DE, 
HU, IE, IT, 
LV, LT, NL, 
PL, RO, ES, 
SE, UK 
65 Baker Botts $586,000,000 United 
States 
BE, UK 
66 Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati 
$575,000,000 United 
States 
BE 
67 Clyde & Co $571,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
GR, ES, FR, 
UK 
68 Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher 
$559,000,000 United 
States 
FR, UK, DE, 
IT 
69 Hunton & Williams $545,000,000 United 
States 
UK, BE 
70 Pillsbury Winthrop 
Shaw Pittman 
$543,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
71 Baker & Hostetler $540,000,000 United 
States 
- 
71 Seyfarth Shaw $540,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
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73 Katten Muchin 
Rosenman 
$506,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
74 Pinsent Masons $505,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
UK, DE, FR 
75 Littler Mendelson $487,000,000 United 
States 
- 
76 Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft 
$481,500,000 United 
States 
UK, BE 
77 Sheppard, Mullin, 
Richter & Hampton 
$466,500,000 United 
States 
UK, BE 
78 Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver & 
Jacobson 
$458,500,000 United 
States 
DE, FR, UK 
79 Faegre Baker 
Daniels 
$452,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
80 J&A Garrigues $441,000,000 Spain - 
81 McCarthy Tétrault $439,000,000 Canada UK 
82 Minter Ellison $435,000,000 Australia UK 
83 Fidal $428,500,000 France - 
84 Duane Morris $421,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
85 Simmons & 
Simmons 
$420,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, FR, DE, 
IT, LU, PT, 
ES, NL, UK 
86 Locke Lord $415,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
87 Allens $414,000,000 Australia - 
88 Nixon Peabody $411,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
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89 Venable $409,500,000 United 
States 
- 
90 Bird & Bird $406,000,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, CZ, DK, 
FI, FR, DE, 
HU, IT, NL, 
PL, ES, SE, 
UK 
91 Clayton Utz $405,000,000 Australia - 
92 Hughes Hubbard & 
Reed 
$396,000,000 United 
States 
FR 
93 Troutman Sanders $394,000,000 United 
States 
- 
94 Schulte Roth & 
Zabel 
$389,000,000 United 
States 
UK 
95 Kilpatrick 
Townsend & 
Stockton 
$388,500,000 United 
States 
SE 
96 Drinker Biddle & 
Reath 
$388,000,000 United 
States 
- 
97 Fragomen, Del 
Rey, Bernsen & 
Loewy 
$387,000,000 United 
States 
BE, FR, DE, 
UK 
98 Cahill Gordon & 
Reindel 
$386,500,000 United 
States 
UK 
99 Berwin Leighton 
Paisner 
$385,500,000 United 
Kingdom 
BE, FR, DE,  
100 Loyens & Loeff $384,000,000 Netherlands - 
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Survey results 
Q1: What is your current job position in your law firm? 
Answer Options Completed Including uncompleted 
Junior Associate 7.3% 24 7.9% 42 
Associate 16.7% 55 18.3% 97 
Senior Associate 27.0% 89 27.0% 143 
Partner 40.6% 134 36.7% 194 
Counsel 5.5% 18 6.0% 32 
Of Counsel 1.5% 5 2.3% 12 
Other (please specify) 1.5% 5 1.7% 9 
  
330 
 
529 
 
Q2: What field of law do you work in? 
Completed Uncompleted 
Corporate 54 Corporate 81 
Litigation 39 Litigation 63 
M&A 38 M&A 60 
IP Law 27 Commercial 49 
Finance 26 Arbitration 34 
Banking 22 Dispute Resolution 25 
Dispute Resolution 15 Tax 25 
Insolvency 15 Banking Finance 23 
Energy 14 Insolvency 23 
Competition Law 13 Employment 19 
Real Estate 11 Energy 19 
Tax 11 Real Estate 18 
Commercial Law 10 Financial 15 
Construction 8 Construction 12 
International Arbitration 7 Capital Markets 11 
Financial Institutions 5 Insurance 9 
Regulatory Law 5 Private Equity 6 
Insurance 5 Public Procurement 5 
Labour Law 4 Liability 5 
 329  502 
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Q3: In which official languages of the EU do you have full 
professional proficiency? 
 Responses Controlled for home 
jurisdiction 
English 466 406 
German 166 29 
French 94 44 
Dutch 89 0 
Swedish 55 13 
Danish 45 3 
Spanish 36 13 
Italian 32 15 
Finnish 24 2 
Romanian 14 2 
Hungarian 9 1 
Portuguese 10 2 
Polish 9 2 
Bulgarian 7 0 
 
Q4: In which jurisdiction(s) did you graduate? 
 Bachelor Master Doctoral Other 
Germany 64 55 56 28 
Netherlands 42 49 10 8 
United 
Kingdom 
24 47 3 17 
Denmark 23 23 0 0 
Sweden 23 19 0 3 
France 17 20 4 15 
Spain 15 8 1 1 
Ireland 11 4 0 0 
Italy 11 6 5 4 
Austria 8 9 4 4 
Belgium 7 10 1 2 
Finland 7 8 0 2 
Portugal 6 4 0 0 
Romania 6 4 0 1 
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USA 5 20 3 23 
Hungary 4 3 3 0 
Australia 3 2 0 3 
Poland 3 4 2 1 
Bulgaria 2 2 0 0 
China 1 0 0 1 
Japan 1 0 0 0 
Malta 1 0 1 0 
Moldova 1 1 1 0 
Canada 0 1 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 
0 1 1 0 
Singapore 0 1 0 0 
Switzerland 0 1 0 1 
Iceland 0 0 0 1 
Israel 0 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 0 0 0 1  
285 302 95 120 
 
Q5: In which jurisdiction in the European Union do you mainly 
operate? 
Germany 28.48% 94 
Netherlands 13.94% 46 
England and Wales802 8.48% 28 
Denmark 7.27% 24 
Sweden 7.27% 24 
Spain 4.85% 16 
France 3.94% 13 
Austria 3.64% 12 
Ireland 3.64% 12 
Finland 2.73% 9 
Italy 2.73% 9 
Belgium 2.42% 8 
Luxembourg 2.42% 8 
                                                        
802 England and Wales were two separate options in the Questionnaires, United Kingdom 
(England) and United Kingdom (Wales) respectively. The results from these answers we 
combined together into England and Wales. 
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Romania 2.12% 7 
Hungary 1.52% 5 
Portugal 1.52% 5 
Poland 1.21% 4 
Bulgaria 0.91% 3 
Czech Republic 0.30% 1 
Greece 0.30% 1 
Scotland 0.30% 1 
Cyprus 0.00% 0 
Croatia 0.00% 0 
Estonia 0.00% 0 
Latvia 0.00% 0 
Lithuania 0.00% 0 
Malta 0.00% 0 
Slovakia 0.00% 0 
Slovenia 0.00% 0   
330 
 
Q6: With which EU Member States’ court(s) do you have a 
professional experience? 
 Completed Questionnaires Uncompleted 
Questionnaires  
Controlled Response Controlled Response 
Germany 63 157 85 205 
England and 
Wales803 
115 143 153 196 
Netherlands 47 93 66 145 
France 73 86 100 125 
Austria 48 60 63 80 
Spain 39 55 54 77 
Belgium 46 54 55 73 
                                                        
803 England and Wales were two separate options in the Questionnaires, United Kingdom 
(England) and United Kingdom (Wales) respectively. The results from these answers we 
combined together into England and Wales. 
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Italy 45 54 62 79 
Denmark 27 51 31 73 
Sweden 25 49 31 73 
Luxembourg 28 36 33 49 
Ireland 14 26 19 33 
Poland 22 26 28 35 
Romania 14 21 20 32 
Finland 11 20 14 36 
Portugal 15 20 16 28 
Greece 14 15 18 19 
Hungary 9 14 11 19 
Czech Republic 10 11 14 16 
Scotland 9 10 12 14 
Slovakia 10 10 13 14 
Malta 9 9 9 9 
Bulgaria 5 8 6 13 
Cyprus 8 8 10 10 
Lithuania 7 7 10 10 
Croatia 6 6 10 11 
Slovenia 6 6 9 10 
Northern Ireland 6 6 8 9 
Latvia 3 3 4 4 
Estonia 2 2 4 4 
  
1066 
 
1501 
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Q7: How many years of experience in the legal field do you have 
since you obtained your bachelor degree? 
 Completed Questionnaires  Uncompleted Questionnaires 
one year or 
less 
2.42% 8 2.84% 15 
up to 3 8.18% 27 10.02% 53 
up to 6 18.79% 62 18.53% 98 
up to 10 13.33% 44 14.37% 76 
11 or more 57.27% 189 54.25% 287   
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Q8: In my opinion, the possibility to choose a court is: 
 Completed 
Questionnaires 
Uncompleted Questionnaires 
Very important 50.91% 168 47.00% 227 
Important 37.88% 125 39.96% 193 
Moderately 
important 
8.79% 29 10.14% 49 
Of little importance 0.61% 2 1.24% 6 
Unimportant 0.30% 1 0.21% 1 
No opinion 1.52% 5 1.45% 7 
  
330 
 
483 
 
Q9: Considering your work in the last 12 months, how often did you 
make a choice of court? 
 Completed Questionnaires Uncompleted Questionnaires 
Always 23.6% 78 20.9% 101 
Usually 18.2% 60 17.4% 84 
Frequently 23.3% 77 22.2% 107 
Sometimes 9.4% 31 9.5% 46 
Occasionally 10.3% 34 9.5% 46 
Rarely 7.3% 24 9.3% 45 
Never 6.7% 22 9.9% 48 
No opinion 1.2% 4 1.2% 6 
  
 
 
483 
405 
 
Q10: How often do you discuss the choice of court with your client(s)? 
 Completed 
Questionnaires 
Uncompleted 
Questionnaires 
Every time 16.4% 54 13.3% 64 
Usually, in about 90% of the 
cases 
17.3% 57 15.7% 76 
Frequently, in about 70% of 
the cases 
18.5% 61 17.0% 82 
Sometimes, in about 50% of 
the cases 
16.1% 53 16.1% 78 
Occasionally, in about 30% 
of the cases 
12.1% 40 13.5% 65 
Rarely, in less than 10% of 
the cases 
14.8% 49 17.4% 84 
Never 2.7% 9 4.3% 21 
No opinion 2.1% 7 2.7% 13 
  330  483 
 
Q11: From your experience, how often the choice of court is made by 
the client and not by you (lawyer)? 
 Completed 
Questionnaires 
Uncompleted 
Questionnaires 
Every time 4.8% 16 3.9% 19 
Usually, in about 90% of 
the cases 
3.9% 13 5.0% 24 
Frequently, in about 70% of 
the cases 
7.6% 25 7.5% 36 
Sometimes, in about 50% of 
the cases 
11.8% 39 12.0% 58 
Occasionally, in about 30% of 
the cases 
23.0% 76 19.7% 95 
Rarely, in less than 10% of the 
cases 
35.5% 117 35.8% 173 
Never 6.4% 21 7.5% 36 
No opinion 7.0% 23 8.7% 42 
  
330 
 
483 
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Q12: From your experience, how often do clients follow your advice on 
the choice of court? 
 Completed 
Questionnaires 
Uncompleted 
Questionnaires 
Every time 18.8% 62 18.6% 90 
Usually, in about 90% of the 
cases 
55.5% 183 54.5% 263 
Frequently, in about 70% of the 
cases 
14.5% 48 13.3% 64 
Sometimes, in about 50% of 
the cases 
2.7% 9 2.9% 14 
Occasionally, in about 30% of 
the cases 
0.6% 2 0.6% 3 
Rarely, in less than 10% of the 
cases 
0.9% 3 1.0% 5 
Never 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 
No opinion 7.0% 23 9.1% 44 
  
330 
 
483 
 
Q13: Is your choice influenced more by substantive law or procedural 
law? 
 Completed 
Questionnaires 
Uncompleted 
Questionnaires 
Substantive law 18 5.45% 27 5.59% 
Mostly substantive law 80 24.24% 106 21.95% 
Somewhat substantive law 21 6.36% 33 6.83% 
Equally substantive law and 
procedural law 
114 34.55% 161 33.33% 
Somewhat procedural law 17 5.15% 24 4.97% 
Mostly procedural law 48 14.55% 66 13.66% 
Procedural law 8 2.42% 13 2.69% 
N/A 24 7.27% 53 10.97% 
 
330 100.00% 483 100.00% 
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Q14: In your opinion, which jurisdictions in the EU have the most 
attractive civil justice system with regard to court litigation? 
Answer 
Options 
Most attractive 2nd most 
attractive 
3rd most attractive 
Germany 115 31.5% 61 18.1% 43 15.1% 
England and 
Wales804 
92 25.2% 75 22.3% 48 16.8% 
Netherlands 42 11.5% 57 16.9% 30 10.5% 
(None) 29 7.9% 35 10.4% 58 20.4% 
Denmark 25 6.8% 8 2.4% 11 3.9% 
Sweden 16 4.4% 26 7.7% 17 6.0% 
France 13 3.6% 11 3.3% 23 8.1% 
Austria 9 2.5% 33 9.8% 14 4.9% 
Luxembourg 7 1.9% 5 1.5% 8 2.8% 
Ireland 5 1.4% 5 1.5% 6 2.1% 
Finland 3 0.8% 3 0.9% 4 1.4% 
Spain 3 0.8% 4 1.2% 6 2.1% 
Belgium 2 0.5% 3 0.9% 6 2.1% 
Hungary 1 0.3% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Italy 1 0.3% 3 0.9% 1 0.4% 
Poland 1 0.3% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Slovenia 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Bulgaria 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Cyprus 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Croatia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Czech Republic 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Estonia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Greece 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Latvia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 
Lithuania 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Malta 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Portugal 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
                                                        
804 England and Wales were two separate options in the Questionnaires, United Kingdom 
(England) and United Kingdom (Wales) respectively. The results from these answers we 
combined together into England and Wales. 
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Romania 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 
Slovakia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Northern 
Ireland 
0 0.0% 2 0.6% 4 1.4% 
Scotland 0 0.0% 2 0.6% 4 1.4% 
 
365 
 
337 
 
285 
 
 
Q14: In your opinion, which jurisdictions in the EU have the most 
attractive civil justice system with regard to court litigation? 
(Controlled for home jurisdiction) 
Answer 
Options 
Most attractive 2nd most 
attractive 
3rd most attractive 
Germany 33 22.3% 52 18.2% 40 17.4% 
England and 
Wales805 
63 42.6% 69 24.1% 46 20.0% 
Netherlands 8 5.4% 48 16.8% 0 0.0% 
(None) 29 19.6% 35 12.2% 58 25.2% 
Denmark 1 0.7% 8 2.8% 9 3.9% 
Sweden 2 1.4% 18 6.3% 15 6.5% 
France 5 3.4% 10 3.5% 22 9.6% 
Austria 4 2.7% 32 11.2% 12 5.2% 
Luxembourg 3 2.0% 3 1.0% 7 3.0% 
Ireland 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 1 0.4% 
Finland 0 0.0% 2 0.7% 3 1.3% 
Spain 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 3 1.3% 
Belgium 0 0.0% 3 1.0% 6 2.6% 
Hungary 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Italy 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Poland 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Slovenia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Bulgaria 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Cyprus 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
                                                        
805 England and Wales were two separate options in the Questionnaires, United Kingdom 
(England) and United Kingdom (Wales) respectively. The results from these answers we 
combined together into England and Wales. 
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Croatia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Czech Republic 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Estonia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Greece 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Latvia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 
Lithuania 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Malta 0 0.0% 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Portugal 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Romania 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Slovakia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Northern 
Ireland 
0 0.0% 2 0.7% 4 1.7% 
Scotland 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 1.3% 
 
148 
 
286 
 
230 
 
 
Q15: Bearing in mind the jurisdictions that you consider attractive, in 
your opinion, what are the elements/factors that make these 
jurisdictions attractive? 
 Completed surveys Including uncompleted 
surveys 
Answer Options 1st 
impor-
tant 
2nd 
impor-
tant 
3rd 
impor-
tant 
1st 
impor-
tant 
2nd 
impor-
tant 
3rd impor-
tant 
Quality of judges 
and courts 
54 40 44 60 41 46 
Predictability of the 
outcome 
39 27 27 40 29 29 
Familiarity with the 
jurisdiction 
31 17 11 34 17 12 
Client’s familiarity 
with the jurisdiction 
30 12 11 31 20 13 
Speed of the dispute 
resolution 
27 38 42 30 39 43 
Availability of 
certain 
measures/injunctions 
25 23 15 27 25 16 
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A common practice 
of choosing that 
court 
18 8 4 23 9 5 
Common knowledge 
that the court is good 
17 14 17 17 14 19 
Enforcement 
possibilities in that 
jurisdiction 
16 24 21 16 27 25 
Fairness of the 
outcome 
14 23 17 14 25 17 
Lack of corruption 13 16 9 16 17 12 
(None) 12 11 11 17 15 16 
Neutrality 10 18 12 12 19 15 
Language of the 
court (proceeding) 
9 11 18 9 13 20 
Low court and 
procedural fees 
(costs in general) 
6 13 17 7 14 17 
Previous experience 
with the court 
3 7 6 5 8 6 
Proximity to 
business partners 
(notaries, bailiffs, 
financial advisors) 
2 1 2 2 2 3 
The presence of a 
branch of our law 
firm (or partner law 
firm) 
2 0 4 2 0 4 
Lack of bureaucracy 1 9 10 2 9 10 
The distance 
between the court 
and my location 
1 0 6 1 1 6 
Proximity to 
financial 
centres/hubs 
0 1 4 0 1 4 
Quality of local 
lawyers 
0 8 7 0 8 8 
 
330 321 315 365 353 346 
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Q16: In your opinion, which jurisdictions in the EU have the least 
attractive civil justice system as regards litigation proceedings? 
Answer 
Options 
Least attractive 2nd least attractive 3rd least attractive 
Italy 98 31 26 
(None) 81 67 80 
Romania 47 42 27 
Greece 35 38 19 
Bulgaria 34 28 20 
Hungary 9 12 12 
England and 
Wales806 
9 12 14 
Spain 8 17 7 
Cyprus 6 5 8 
France 6 11 12 
Poland 4 6 7 
Portugal 4 3 8 
Croatia 3 2 9 
Luxembourg 3 1 2 
Slovenia 3 3 3 
Belgium 2 4 4 
Germany 2 2 2 
Malta 2 3 4 
Slovakia 2 3 8 
Austria 1 1 0 
Czech Republic 1 4 4 
Finland 1 0 0 
Ireland 1 0 1 
Latvia 1 2 0 
Lithuania 1 1 5 
Northern 
Ireland 
1 0 0 
                                                        
806 England and Wales were two separate options in the Questionnaires, United Kingdom 
(England) and United Kingdom (Wales) respectively. The results from these answers we 
combined together into England and Wales. 
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Denmark 0 1 0 
Estonia 0 2 0 
Netherlands 0 2 1 
Sweden 0 0 1 
Scotland 0 0 1 
 
365 303 285 
 
Q17: Bearing in mind the jurisdictions that you consider least 
attractive, in your opinion what are the elements/factors that make 
these jurisdictions less attractive? 
 Completed surveys Including Uncompleted 
surveys 
Answer Options Most 
impor-
tant 
2nd 
most 
impor-
tant 
3rd most 
impor-
tant 
Most 
impor-
tant 
2nd 
most 
impor-
tant 
3rd 
most 
impor-
tant 
Slow pace of the 
dispute resolution 
80 54 37 85 56 37 
Presence of 
corruption 
53 29 26 57 31 28 
(None) 35 30 37 46 38 46 
Lack of quality of 
judges and courts 
27 26 12 27 29 13 
Presence of 
bureaucracy 
25 27 11 27 30 14 
Lack of neutrality 23 31 6 26 33 7 
Unpredictability of 
the outcome 
23 38 52 24 41 53 
Client’s 
unfamiliarity with 
the jurisdiction 
12 8 10 15 8 10 
High court and 
procedural fees 
(costs in general) 
10 10 9 10 10 10 
Lack of enforcement 
possibilities in that 
jurisdiction 
10 10 9 12 10 9 
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Unfamiliarity with 
the jurisdiction 
10 8 17 11 8 18 
Common knowledge 
that the 
court/jurisdiction is 
not good 
9 7 8 9 7 9 
A common practice 
of not choosing that 
court/jurisdiction 
5 0 2 5 0 3 
Unfairness of the 
outcome 
3 8 19 3 9 20 
Availability of 
certain (negative) 
measures/injunctions 
2 3 3 3 3 3 
Previous experience 
with the court 
2 3 5 3 3 6 
The 
court/proceeding is 
in a language I am 
not used 
1 7 13 2 9 13 
Distance from 
business partners 
(notaries, bailiffs, 
financial advisors) 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
Distance to financial 
centres/hubs 
0 2 0 0 3 0 
Lack of quality of 
local lawyers 
0 1 6 0 1 7 
The absence of a 
branch of our law 
firm (or partner law 
firm) 
0 1 0 0 2 2 
The distance 
between the court 
and my location 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
 
330 305 286 365 333 312 
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Q18: How influential are the following elements/factors when you make a 
choice of court? 
Answer Options Not at 
all  
Slightl
y  
Some-
what  
Very  Extrem-
ely  
N/A Response 
Count 
Quality of judges 
and courts 
3 8 22 115 160 19 327 
Lack of 
corruption 
10 9 30 78 179 17 323 
Neutrality 9 6 37 118 140 18 328 
Speed of the 
dispute 
resolution 
4 6 44 128 128 17 327 
Enforcement 
possibilities in 
that jurisdiction 
4 15 42 112 145 13 331 
Predictability of 
the outcome 
6 10 37 124 132 18 327 
Fairness of the 
outcome 
7 8 48 118 129 16 326 
Familiarity with 
the jurisdiction 
6 18 60 131 102 10 327 
Common 
knowledge that 
the court is good 
7 12 68 163 70 11 331 
Quality of local 
lawyers 
15 26 67 126 77 16 327 
Previous 
experience with 
the court 
6 31 83 137 58 14 329 
Availability of 
certain 
measures/injunct
ions 
7 29 95 132 51 16 330 
Lack of 
bureaucracy 
8 29 102 120 53 14 326 
Client’s 
familiarity with 
the jurisdiction 
13 38 85 121 60 13 330 
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Language of the 
court 
(proceeding) 
18 40 86 106 66 14 330 
A common 
practice of 
choosing that 
court 
26 52 99 101 36 16 330 
Low court and 
procedural fees 
(costs in general) 
26 64 120 76 28 14 328 
Proximity to 
business partners 
(notaries, 
bailiffs, financial 
advisors) 
45 112 92 47 15 17 328 
Proximity to 
financial 
centres/hubs 
73 115 81 28 12 19 328 
The distance 
between the 
court and my 
location 
92 99 75 32 12 17 327 
The presence of 
a branch of our 
law firm (or 
partner law firm) 
111 80 55 43 17 24 330 
Other (please 
specify) 
      
6 
 
Q19: How influential are the following elements/factors when you avoid a 
certain court? 
Answer Options Not at 
all  
Slightl
y  
Some-
what  
Very  Extrem-
ely  
N/A Response 
Count 
Presence of 
corruption 
6 4 18 53 208 36 325 
Lack of 
neutrality 
7 4 25 75 186 31 328 
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Lack of quality 
of judges and 
courts 
4 8 19 94 171 29 325 
Unfairness of the 
outcome 
7 11 30 101 144 32 325 
Unpredictability 
of the outcome 
6 12 42 97 143 26 326 
Slow pace of the 
dispute 
resolution 
5 7 48 112 124 25 321 
Lack of 
enforcement 
possibilities in 
that jurisdiction 
5 19 39 100 137 26 326 
Common 
knowledge that 
the 
court/jurisdiction 
is not good 
4 20 62 126 89 27 328 
Presence of 
bureaucracy 
7 23 83 112 73 29 327 
Lack of quality 
of local lawyers 
13 29 74 102 76 30 324 
Previous 
experience with 
the court 
11 37 80 114 55 25 322 
Unfamiliarity 
with the 
jurisdiction 
12 48 100 87 54 24 325 
High court and 
procedural fees 
(costs in general) 
21 59 100 83 40 23 326 
Availability of 
certain (negative) 
measures/injunct
ions 
16 58 114 86 23 30 327 
Client’s 
unfamiliarity 
with the 
jurisdiction 
23 67 98 83 32 23 326 
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The 
court/proceeding 
is in a language I 
am not used 
41 70 77 72 38 28 326 
A common 
practice of not 
choosing that 
court/jurisdiction 
35 75 96 73 16 34 329 
Distance from 
business partners 
(notaries, 
bailiffs, financial 
advisors) 
87 99 75 29 9 28 327 
The absence of a 
branch of our 
law firm (or 
partner law firm) 
103 85 73 29 5 31 326 
The distance 
between the 
court and my 
location 
103 98 57 31 6 28 323 
Distance to 
financial 
centres/hubs 
102 107 63 17 7 30 326 
Other (please 
specify) 
      
3 
 
Q20: According to you, which of the following jurisdictions in the 
EU actively attracts litigants in (promotes) its court system? 
 Responses Controlled for home 
jurisdiction 
England and Wales807 238 211 
Germany 114 65 
Netherlands 101 72 
(None) 53 53 
                                                        
807 England and Wales were two separate options in the Questionnaires, United Kingdom 
(England) and United Kingdom (Wales) respectively. The results from these answers we 
combined together into England and Wales. 
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Sweden 36 25 
Austria 30 28 
Luxembourg 29 27 
France 26 22 
Ireland 16 12 
Belgium 11 10 
Denmark 8 7 
Northern Ireland 6 6 
Scotland 6 6 
Finland 5 5 
Cyprus 2 2 
Slovenia 2 2 
Spain 2 0 
Estonia 1 1 
Malta 1 1 
Italy 1 0 
Croatia 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 
Greece 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0 
Poland 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 
Romania 0 0 
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Q21: The differences between civil law courts and common law 
courts are considerable. 
Strongly disagree 2 
Disagree 7 
Somewhat disagree 20 
Neither agree nor disagree 28 
Somewhat agree 52 
Agree 137 
Strongly agree 70 
N/A 14 
Response Count 330 
 
Q22: It is easier to litigate in a common law country than in a civil 
law country. 
Strongly disagree 36 
Disagree 75 
Somewhat disagree 34 
Neither agree nor disagree 90 
Somewhat agree 29 
Agree 30 
Strongly agree 6 
N/A 30 
Response Count 330 
 
Q23: Generally, courts in Western Europe are more reliable than 
courts in Eastern Europe. 
Strongly disagree 2 
Disagree 3 
Somewhat disagree 7 
Neither agree nor disagree 39 
Somewhat agree 75 
Agree 124 
Strongly agree 56 
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N/A 24 
Rating Average 5.54 
Response Count 330 
 
Q24: Generally, courts in Northern Europe are more efficient, in 
terms of proceeding time, review of documents and response time, 
compared to courts in Southern Europe. 
Strongly disagree 2 
Disagree 7 
Somewhat disagree 5 
Neither agree nor disagree 29 
Somewhat agree 65 
Agree 126 
Strongly agree 73 
N/A 23 
Response Count 330 
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Survey Questionnaire 
Survey on the choice of court in the European Union 
About the survey 
Dear respondent, 
We, Prof. Xandra Kramer and Erlis Themeli, PhD researcher, from the Erasmus 
School of Law Rotterdam (the Netherlands) are conducting this survey as part of 
a research on the choice of court in the EU. This survey is part of our research 
project that aims at understanding the preferences of lawyers in making choice of 
courts and the responses of governments thereto. The focus of this survey is the 
practice of choice of court by leading lawyers and law firms in the EU. In the key 
European instrument, the Brussels I Regulation (recast), the choice of court is well 
regulated and guaranteed in the European Union. In recent years, a number of 
Member States have engaged in the promotion of their jurisdictions as venues 
where to conduct court litigation. The interaction between the choices made by 
lawyers and the readiness of governments to attract them, needs further studies to 
facilitate governments’ resource allocation and to help lawyers better develop 
their choice of court strategies. 
Your responses to this survey will be used to understand the preferences of 
lawyers as regards jurisdictions as well as elements they appreciate when 
choosing Member States’ courts. Our study aims at contributing to the academic 
debate by gathering an analysing new data and to a more comprehensive treatment 
of the topic. The results of the survey along with a theoretical analysis will be 
published late 2016. 
We will protect your privacy and treat the responses to this survey as confidential. 
The individual information you provide will be used for academic research 
purposes only and will not be released to any third party. 
Should you require further information on this survey or the research please 
contact: 
 
Prof. dr. Xandra Kramer: kramer@law.eur.nl 
Erlis Themeli, LLM: themeli@law.eur.nl 
We thank you for taking part in this survey. 
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Part 1 - About you 
This part contains questions related to your professional and educational 
background. 
 
* 1. What is your current job position in your law firm? 
□ Junior Associate 
□ Associate 
□ Senior Associate 
□ Partner 
□ Counsel 
□ Of Counsel 
□ Other (please specify) 
 
  
* 2. What field of law do you work in? (Please, indicate the field of law that you 
predominantly are involved in, e.g.: IP law, Energy, financial institutions.) 
 
__________________ 
  
* 3. In which official languages of the EU do you have full professional 
proficiency? (More than one option possible.) 
□ Bulgarian 
□ Croatian 
□ Czech 
□ Danish 
□ Dutch 
□ English 
□ Estonian 
□ Finnish 
□ French 
□ German 
□ Greek 
□ Hungarian 
□ Irish 
□ Italian 
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□ Latvian 
□ Lithuanian 
□ Maltese 
□ Polish 
□ Portuguese 
□ Romanian 
□ Slovak 
□ Slovenian 
□ Spanish 
□ Swedish 
 
* 4. In which jurisdiction(s) did you graduate? (Please, include the jurisdictions 
where you obtained your bachelor, master, doctoral degree or other university 
degree.) 
□ Jurisdiction(s) of bachelor graduation:  
□ Jurisdiction(s) of master graduation:  
□ Jurisdiction(s) of doctoral degree:  
□ Jurisdiction(s) of other university degree:  
  
* 5. In which jurisdiction in the European Union do you mainly operate? (Please, 
indicate the jurisdiction where you conduct the majority of your professional 
activity.) 
□ Austria 
□ Belgium 
□ Bulgaria 
□ Cyprus 
□ Croatia 
□ Czech Republic 
□ Denmark 
□ Estonia 
□ Finland 
□ France 
□ Germany 
□ Greece 
□ Hungary 
□ Ireland 
□ Italy 
□ Latvia 
□ Lithuania 
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□ Luxembourg 
□ Malta 
□ Netherlands 
□ Poland 
□ Portugal 
□ Romania 
□ Slovakia 
□ Slovenia 
□ Spain 
□ Sweden 
□ United Kingdom (England)808 
□ United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) 
□ United Kingdom (Scotland) 
□ United Kingdom (Wales) 
□ Other (please specify) 
  
* 6. With which EU Member States’ court(s) do you have a professional 
experience? (More than one choice possible. If you would like to mention 
experiences outside the EU, please specify in Other.) 
□ Austria 
□ Belgium 
□ Bulgaria 
□ Cyprus 
□ Croatia 
□ Czech Republic 
□ Denmark 
□ Estonia 
□ Finland 
□ France 
□ Germany 
□ Greece 
□ Hungary 
□ Ireland 
□ Italy 
□ Latvia 
□ Lithuania 
□ Luxembourg 
                                                        
808 England and Wales were given as United Kingdom (England) and United Kingdom (Wales) 
in the questionnaire. Responses for both of them were combined together for the analysis. 
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□ Malta 
□ Netherlands 
□ Poland 
□ Portugal 
□ Romania 
□ Slovakia 
□ Slovenia 
□ Spain 
□ Sweden 
□ United Kingdom (England)809 
□ United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) 
□ United Kingdom (Scotland) 
□ United Kingdom (Wales) 
□ Other (please specify) 
  
* 7. How many years of experience in the legal field do you have since you 
obtained your bachelor degree? (Please, indicate the total number of years in the 
legal field, i.e. practicing lawyer, judge, in-house, academic field, etc.) 
□ one year or less 
□ up to 3 
□ up to 6 
□ up to 10 
□ 11 or more 
  
                                                        
809 England and Wales were given as United Kingdom (England) and United Kingdom (Wales) 
in the questionnaire. Responses for both of them were combined together for the analysis. 
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Part 2 – Choice of court for dispute resolution 
This part contains question related to the choice of court process. 
 
* 8. In my opinion, the possibility to choose a court is: 
□ Very important 
□ Important 
□ Moderately important 
□ Of little importance 
□ Unimportant 
□ No opinion 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 9. Considering your work in the last 12 months, how often did you make a choice 
of court? (Please consider as relevant the cases when you prepared a legal opinion, 
drafted a choice of court clause in a contract or chose a court where to submit your 
litigation case.) 
□ Always 
□ Usually 
□ Frequently 
□ Sometimes 
□ Occasionally 
□ Rarely 
□ Never 
□ No opinion 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 10. How often do you discuss the choice of court with your client(s)? 
□ Every time 
□ Usually, in about 90% of the cases 
□ Frequently, in about 70% of the cases 
□ Sometimes, in about 50% of the cases 
□ Occasionally, in about 30% of the cases 
□ Rarely, in less than 10% of the cases 
□ Never 
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□ No opinion 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 11. From your experience, how often the choice of court is made by the client 
and not by you (lawyer)? 
□ Every time 
□ Usually, in about 90% of the cases 
□ Frequently, in about 70% of the cases 
□ Sometimes, in about 50% of the cases 
□ Occasionally, in about 30% of the cases 
□ Rarely, in less than 10% of the the cases 
□ Never 
□ No opinion 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 12. From your experience, how often do clients follow your advice on the choice 
of court? 
□ Every time 
□ Usually, in about 90% of the cases 
□ Frequently, in about 70% of the cases 
□ Sometimes, in about 50% of the cases 
□ Occasionally, in about 30% of the cases 
□ Rarely, in less than 10% of the cases 
□ Never 
□ No opinion 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 13. In general, when you make a choice of court, is your choice influenced more 
by the substantive law or the procedural law of that jurisdiction? 
□ Substantive law  
□ Mostly substantive law  
□ Somewhat substantive law  
□ Equally substantive law and procedural law  
□ Somewhat procedural law  
□ Mostly procedural law 
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□ Procedural law  
□ N/A 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
 
* 14. In your opinion, which jurisdictions in the EU have the most attractive civil 
justice system with regard to court litigation? (Please rank the best three. If you 
would like to mention jurisdictions outside the EU, please specify in Comment.) 
(Options: Austria – Belgium – Bulgaria – Cyprus – Croatia – Czech Republic – 
Denmark – Estonia – Finland – France – Germany – Greece – Hungary – Ireland 
– Italy – Latvia – Lithuania – Luxembourg – Malta – Netherlands – Poland – 
Portugal – Romania – Slovakia – Slovenia – Spain – Sweden – United Kingdom 
(England)810 – United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) – United Kingdom (Scotland) 
– United Kingdom (Wales)) 
□ Most attractive 
□ 2nd most attractive 
□ 3rd most attractive 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
 
 * 15. Bearing in mind the jurisdictions that you consider attractive, in your 
opinion, what are the elements/factors that make these jurisdictions attractive? 
(Please select the three most important elements.) 
(Elements: A common practice of choosing that court - Availability of certain 
measures/injunctions - Client’s familiarity with the jurisdiction - Common 
knowledge that the court is good - Enforcement possibilities in that jurisdiction - 
Fairness of the outcome - Familiarity with the jurisdiction - Lack of bureaucracy 
- Lack of corruption - Language of the court (proceeding) - Low court and 
procedural fees (costs in general) – Neutrality - Predictability of the outcome - 
Previous experience with the court - Proximity to business partners (notaries, 
bailiffs, financial advisors) - Proximity to financial centres/hubs - Quality of 
judges and courts - Quality of local lawyers - Speed of the dispute resolution - 
The distance between the court and my location - The presence of a branch of our 
law firm (or partner law firm) – (none)) 
                                                        
810 England and Wales were given as United Kingdom (England) and United Kingdom (Wales) 
in the questionnaire. Responses for both of them were combined together for the analysis. 
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□ Most important 
□ 2nd most important 
□ 3rd most important 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
 
* 16. In your opinion, which jurisdictions in the EU have the least attractive civil 
justice system as regards litigation proceedings? (Please rank the least attractive. 
If you would like to mention jurisdictions outside the EU, please specify in 
Comment.) 
(Options: Austria – Belgium – Bulgaria – Cyprus – Croatia – Czech Republic – 
Denmark – Estonia – Finland – France – Germany – Greece – Hungary – Ireland 
– Italy – Latvia – Lithuania – Luxembourg – Malta – Netherlands – Poland – 
Portugal – Romania – Slovakia – Slovenia – Spain – Sweden – United Kingdom 
(England)811 – United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) – United Kingdom (Scotland) 
– United Kingdom (Wales)) 
□ Least attractive 
□ 2nd least attractive 
□ 3rd least attractive 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
 
* 17. Bearing in mind the jurisdictions that you consider least attractive, in your 
opinion what are the elements/factors that make these jurisdictions less attractive? 
(Please choose the three most important elements.) 
(Elements: A common practice of not choosing that court/jurisdiction - 
Availability of certain (negative) measures/injunctions - Client’s unfamiliarity 
with the jurisdiction - Common knowledge that the court/jurisdiction is not good 
- Distance from business partners (notaries, bailiffs, financial advisors) - Distance 
to financial centres/hubs - High court and procedural fees (costs in general) - Lack 
of enforcement possibilities in that jurisdiction - Lack of neutrality - Lack of 
quality of judges and courts - Lack of quality of local lawyers - Presence of 
bureaucracy - Presence of corruption - Previous experience with the court - Slow 
pace of the dispute resolution - The absence of a branch of our law firm (or partner 
law firm) - The court/proceeding is in a language I am not used - The distance 
                                                        
811 England and Wales were given as United Kingdom (England) and United Kingdom (Wales) 
in the questionnaire. Responses for both of them were combined together for the analysis. 
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between the court and my location - Unfairness of the outcome - Unfairness of 
the outcome812 - Unfamiliarity with the jurisdiction - Unpredictability of the 
outcome – (none) 
□ Most important 
□ 2nd most important 
□ 3rd most important 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
 
* 18. How influential are the following elements/factors when you make a choice 
of court? 
(Options: Not at all influential - Slightly influential - Somewhat influential - Very 
influential - Extremely influential - N/A) 
□ A common practice of choosing that court 
□ Availability of certain measures/injunctions 
□ Client’s familiarity with the jurisdiction 
□ Common knowledge that the court is good 
□ Enforcement possibilities in that jurisdiction 
□ Fairness of the outcome 
□ Familiarity with the jurisdiction 
□ Lack of bureaucracy 
□ Lack of corruption 
□ Language of the court (proceeding) 
□ Low court and procedural fees (costs in general) 
□ Neutrality 
□ Predictability of the outcome 
□ Previous experience with the court 
□ Proximity to business partners (notaries, bailiffs, financial advisors) 
□ Proximity to financial centres/hubs 
□ Quality of judges and courts 
□ Quality of local lawyers 
□ Speed of the dispute resolution 
□ The distance between the court and my location 
□ The presence of a branch of our law firm (or partner law firm) 
□ Other (please specify) 
                                                        
812 ‘Unfairness of the outcome’ options was given two times. Responses for both of were 
combined together for the analysis. 
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* 19. How influential are the following elements/factors when you avoid a certain 
court? 
(Options: Not at all influential - Slightly influential - Somewhat influential - Very 
influential - Extremely influential - N/A) 
□ A common practice of not choosing that court/jurisdiction 
□ Availability of certain (negative) measures/injunctions 
□ Client’s unfamiliarity with the jurisdiction 
□ Common knowledge that the court/jurisdiction is not good 
□ Distance from business partners (notaries, bailiffs, financial advisors) 
□ Distance to financial centres/hubs 
□ High court and procedural fees (costs in general) 
□ Lack of enforcement possibilities in that jurisdiction 
□ Lack of neutrality 
□ Lack of quality of judges and courts 
□ Lack of quality of local lawyers 
□ Presence of bureaucracy 
□ Presence of corruption 
□ Previous experience with the court 
□ Slow pace of the dispute resolution 
□ The absence of a branch of our law firm (or partner law firm) 
□ The court/proceeding is in a language I am not used 
□ The distance between the court and my location 
□ Unfairness of the outcome 
□ Unfairness of the outcome813 
□ Unfamiliarity with the jurisdiction 
□ Unpredictability of the outcome 
□ Other (please specify) 
  
                                                        
813 ‘Unfairness of the outcome’ options was given two times. Responses for both of were 
combined together for the analysis. 
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Part 3 – Your general view on the civil justice systems in the EU 
This part contains general questions related to the court system and civil 
procedural setting in EU Member States and your view on them. Please indicate 
how much you disagree or agree with the statements below, based on your 
personal experience or perception. 
 
* 20. According to you, which of the following jurisdictions in the EU actively 
attracts litigants in (promotes) its court system? (Multiple choice possible. If you 
would like to mention jurisdictions outside the EU, please specify in Comment.) 
□ Austria 
□ Belgium 
□ Bulgaria 
□ Cyprus 
□ Croatia 
□ Czech Republic 
□ Denmark 
□ Estonia 
□ Finland 
□ France 
□ Germany 
□ Greece 
□ Hungary 
□ Ireland 
□ Italy 
□ Latvia 
□ Lithuania 
□ Luxembourg 
□ Malta 
□ Netherlands 
□ Poland 
□ Portugal 
□ Romania 
□ Slovakia 
□ Slovenia 
□ Spain 
□ Sweden 
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□ United Kingdom (England)814 
□ United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) 
□ United Kingdom (Scotland) 
□ United Kingdom (Wales) 
□ (None) 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 21. The differences between civil law courts and common law courts are 
considerable. 
□ Strongly disagree  
□ Disagree  
□ Somewhat disagree  
□ Neither agree nor disagree  
□ Somewhat agree  
□ Agree  
□ Strongly agree  
□ N/A 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 22. It is easier to litigate in a common law country than in a civil law country. 
□ Strongly disagree  
□ Disagree  
□ Somewhat disagree  
□ Neither agree nor disagree  
□ Somewhat agree  
□ Agree  
□ Strongly agree  
□ N/A 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
 
  
                                                        
814 England and Wales were given as United Kingdom (England) and United Kingdom (Wales) 
in the questionnaire. Responses for both of them were combined together for the analysis. 
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* 23. Generally, courts in Western Europe are more reliable than courts in Eastern 
Europe. 
□ Strongly disagree  
□ Disagree  
□ Somewhat disagree  
□ Neither agree nor disagree  
□ Somewhat agree  
□ Agree  
□ Strongly agree  
□ N/A 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
  
* 24. Generally, courts in Northern Europe are more efficient, in terms of 
proceeding time, review of documents and response time, compared to courts in 
Southern Europe. 
□ Strongly disagree  
□ Disagree  
□ Somewhat disagree  
□ Neither agree nor disagree  
□ Somewhat agree  
□ Agree  
□ Strongly agree  
□ N/A 
□ Comment (please let us know any comment to this question or to your 
response) 
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Part 4 – End of the survey and final remarks 
 
25. Please enter your e-mail if you are available for clarifications or a short 
interview. 
 
26. Please enter your e-mail if you would like to receive an overview of the results 
of the survey. 
 
27. Do you have any comment on the topic of this survey or the survey itself? 
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